

CAMBRIDGE GREEK AND LATIN CLASSICS

PLUTARCH

HOW
TO STUDY
POETRY

EDITED BY RICHARD HUNTER AND
DONALD RUSSELL

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(De audiendis poetis)

EDITED BY

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PREFACE

Plutarch's *How to study poetry* opens a window on to many aspects of reading practice in the Graeco-Roman world; we hope that this edition will not only make this work better known and more accessible, but that it will also encourage modern readers to reflect upon the presuppositions which they themselves bring to their reading, and upon the history of those presuppositions.

The origins of this edition are as follows. For several years DR had intended to produce an edition and had prepared a draft commentary, but felt unable to complete the task. RH has taken over and expanded the whole. DR's notes have either been simply reproduced or subsumed into new discussions; except on a couple of occasions or when textual suggestions are involved, no attempt is made to distinguish between the contributions of the two editors. Most of the Introduction is the work of RH. In keeping with the style of *Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics*, we have also tried to foreground our understanding of what the text means, rather than the names of earlier scholars who have helped or hindered its exegesis; an important debt, however, to the edition of Ernesto Valgiglio (Turin 1973) should be recorded.

Particular thanks are due to Andrew Dyck, Pat Easterling, Doreen Innes and David Sedley. Michael Sharp and Elizabeth Hanlon of Cambridge University Press have been supportive and imaginative as ever.

REFERENCES AND ABBREVIATIONS

1. References to the *Moralia* are by page number only (e.g., 15c, 404b), unless the title of the essay is relevant. With the exception of the English title of the essay edited in this volume, titles for the *Moralia*, both English and Latin, are usually given after the list in Russell 1993: xxiii–xxix; in a few cases where no possibility of confusion arises, a different English title may be given.
2. Standard abbreviations for other collections and editions of texts and for works of reference are used, but the following may be noted:

<i>CA</i>	J.U. Powell, <i>Collectanea Alexandrina</i> (Oxford 1925)
<i>CPG</i>	E.L. von Leutsch and F. Schneidewin, <i>Corpus paroemiographorum Graecorum</i> (Göttingen 1839–51)
Denniston	J.D. Denniston, <i>The Greek particles</i> , 2nd edn. (Oxford 1954)
<i>FGrHist</i>	F. Jacoby, <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> (Berlin/Leiden 1923–)
<i>GP</i>	A.S.F. Gow and D.L. Page, <i>The Greek Anthology. The Garland of Philip</i> , I–II (Cambridge 1968)
<i>IEG</i>	M.L. West, <i>Iambi et elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum cantati</i> , I–II, 2nd edn. (Oxford 1989–92)
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i> (Berlin 1873–)
K-B	R. Kühner, <i>Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache</i> , I, 3rd edn. revised by F. Blass (Hannover 1890–2)
K-G	R. Kühner, <i>Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache</i> , II, 3rd edn. revised by B. Gerth (Hannover/Leipzig 1898–1904)
KRS	G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven and M. Schofield, <i>The Presocratic philosophers</i> , 2nd edn. (Cambridge 1983)
Lampe	G.W.H. Lampe, <i>A patristic Greek lexicon</i> (Oxford 1961–68)
<i>LfgrE</i>	<i>Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos</i> (Göttingen 1955–2010)
<i>LGGA</i>	<i>Lessico dei grammatici greci antichi</i> , www.aristarchus.unige.it/lgga
<i>LGPV</i>	P.M. Fraser, E. Matthews and others, <i>A lexicon of Greek personal names</i> (Oxford 1987–)
<i>LIMC</i>	<i>Lexicon iconographicum mythologiae classicae</i> (Zurich 1981–1999)
Long-Sedley	A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, <i>The Hellenistic philosophers</i> (Cambridge 1987)
LSJ	H.G. Liddell, R. Scott, H. Stuart Jones, R. McKenzie, P.G.W. Glare, <i>Greek-English lexicon, with a revised supplement</i> , 9th edn., (Oxford 1996)
<i>MT</i>	W.W. Goodwin, <i>Syntax of the moods and tenses of the Greek verb</i> , 2nd edn. (London 1889)
<i>OLD</i>	P.G.W. Glare and others, <i>Oxford Latin dictionary</i> (Oxford 1968–82)

<i>PMG</i>	D.L. Page, <i>Poetae melici Graeci</i> (Oxford 1962)
<i>RE</i>	A. Pauly, G. Wissowa, W. Kroll et al. (eds.), <i>Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft</i> (Stuttgart/Munich 1893–1980)
Smyth	H.W. Smyth, <i>Greek grammar</i> (Cambridge, MA 1920)
<i>SVF</i>	H. von Arnim, <i>Stoicorum veterum fragmenta</i> , I–IV (Leipzig 1903–24). Reference is made by volume and entry number.
<i>TrGF</i>	<i>Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta</i> (Göttingen 1971–2004)

INTRODUCTION

1 PLUTARCH

P. was a native of Chaeronea in Boeotia where he lived most of his long life (c. 45 – c. 120 AD) as the head both of a leading local family and of an informal philosophical ‘school’, modelled to some extent upon the Academy at Athens and devoted principally to Platonic philosophy and related learning; in his youth P. had studied in Athens under the Platonist Ammonius of Alexandria.¹ P. also served as a priest at Delphi, and his three surviving ‘Pythian dialogues’ (*Moralia* 384d–438e) attest to his deep concern with, and knowledge of, the rituals and underlying theology of the oracle. Apart from his intimate familiarity with the intellectual life of Athens, P. also made, it seems, several visits to Rome and was on good terms with a number of influential Romans. Through one of them, L. Mestrius Florus,² P. received Roman citizenship as (probably) L. Mestrius Plutarchus, and to another, Q. Sosius Senecio (consul 99, 107), he dedicated the vast enterprise of the *Parallel lives*, the works for which he is best known.

As well as the *Parallel lives*, most of which are preserved, we also possess a corpus of some seventy-eight miscellaneous works, several of which are certainly not by P., which are today known collectively as the *Moralia*; the title is owed to a subset of these works which may go back even to late antiquity, but which was finally brought together and placed at the head of his edition, under the label τὰ ἠθικά, by Maximus Planudes in the late thirteenth century and which has a much richer textual tradition than most of the rest of what we call the *Moralia*.³ The extant *Moralia* are, however, only a fraction of P.’s output beyond the *Parallel lives*; a list of some 227 works survives from later antiquity, the so-called ‘Lamprias Catalogue’, but this too is known to be incomplete.⁴ At the head of the *Moralia*, as they were first printed in the Aldine edition of 1509,⁵ stand three treatises on education, the first of which, on the education of children, is certainly spurious; the second, on the use of poetry as a propaedeutic to philosophy, is the subject of the present edition,⁶ and the third, ‘On listening to lectures’, is concerned with the

¹ On the dates for P.’s life cf., e.g., Ziegler 1951: 639–41 = 1964: 4–6, Jones 1966; for P. and Chaeronea cf. Jones 1971: 3–12. Ziegler’s essay remains the best encyclopaedic account of P.’s life and work, but see also Flacelière-Irigoin 1987; for an accessible account in English cf. Russell 1972. On P.’s Platonism cf. Dillon 1977: 184–230, Van Hoof 2010: 19–40.

² Cf. Jones 1971: 48–9, Puech 1992: 4860.

³ Cf. Flacelière-Irigoin 1987: cclv–vi.

⁴ Cf. Ziegler 1951: 696–702 = 1964: 60–6, Flacelière-Irigoin 1987: cccxi–xviii.

⁵ Cf. Flacelière-Irigoin 1987: cclxxvii–ccxcii.

⁶ The Lamprias Catalogue (103) gives the title of the present essay as Πῶς δὲ ποιημάτων ἀκούειν, and this is reflected in the English title we have adopted; all the manuscripts, however, offer Πῶς δὲ τὸν νέον ποιημάτων ἀκούειν, which fairly of course reflects the substance of the essay. For the relation to Chrysippus’ similarly named essay cf. below p. 11.

proper attitudes to adopt in receiving philosophical instruction.⁷ Although there do seem to be links between the second and third of these,⁸ the interrelationships and chronology of P's works are extremely obscure.⁹ If, as is usually – though not universally – accepted, the Soclarus for whom the present essay was written was P's oldest son and, given the nature of the work, he must have been between ten and fifteen years old at the time of its composition, then *De audiendis poetis* was perhaps written in the early 80s, i.e. comparatively early in P's career, rather than in the last twenty or so years of his life from which much of the vast corpus appears to come. Over-confidence in this dating would, however, be misplaced.¹⁰

2 'HOW TO STUDY POETRY'

P's essay is a discussion of the dangers to young men's minds and moral attitudes which lurk within poetry, and of how those dangers may be avoided and, more positively, poetry made beneficial, if young men are taught some basic truths about poetry and are given proper guidance by older and more experienced readers, guidance which they can then use in their own way as they become more independent readers. Like much of what survives of the ancient discussion of poetry, P's central concern is not what we usually think of as 'literary criticism', but rather with the moral well-being of young men; the goal is the creation of the proper responses within young pupils which will prepare them for the challenges of serious philosophy when they are older. The most famous imitation of P's essay, St Basil's work 'On Greek Literature',¹¹ takes over P's scheme, with Christianity playing the role of philosophy: Basil finds pagan texts and anecdotes which can be shown to teach Christian virtues and/or be in accord with Christian texts.

Much in P's essay stands firmly within the mainstream of the Hellenistic discussion of poetry, which takes its direction primarily from Aristotle and his Peripatetic successors.¹² We are, however, constantly reminded of three particular traditions or bodies of material – Plato, the detailed critical and interpretative analysis of Homer, itself importantly indebted to Aristotle and the Peripatetics,

⁷ Cf. Hillyard 1981. ⁸ Cf. Hunter 2009a: 169 n.1.

⁹ Jones 1966 and 1971 are important contributions.

¹⁰ For doubts about an early date for the treatise cf., e.g., Zadorojnyi 2002: 298.

¹¹ Cf. Wilson 1975. The exact title of the work is uncertain, and it will be cited throughout this book as 'St Basil, *Greek lit.*'.

¹² Rostagni 1955: 308–14 argues for a debt, in itself perfectly likely, to Aristotle's *On Poets*, as well as to the *Poetics*. Schlemm 1893 is an important collection of material on P's possible sources, but the attempt to 'source' virtually all P's quotations seems fundamentally misconceived, and the attempt is not repeated in this edition. On this essay and P's ideas on literature more generally see Valgiglio 1967 and 1973, Tagliacacchi 1961, von Reutern 1933, Van der Stockt 1992, Hunter 2009a: Chapter 6.

which comes down to us (largely) in the scholia and Eustathius' commentaries, and finally the Stoics.

In a general way, P's essay is a contribution to the same educational project which Protagoras is made to outline in the Platonic dialogue named after him:

People teach and admonish their children from earliest days throughout their lives. As soon as a child understands what is being said to him, the nurse and the mother and the *paidagōgos* and the father himself¹³ struggle to make him excellent; with regard to every action and statement they teach him by pointing out (διδάσκοντες καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενοι) that 'this is just, that unjust', and 'this is honourable, that disgraceful', and 'this is pious, that impious', and 'do these things, do not do those'. If he obeys willingly, fine; if not, they straighten him (εὐθύνουσιν) with threats and blows as though he was a piece of wood which was bent and twisted. . . . [Later in school when they have learned to read] the teachers give them the poems of good poets to read and compel them to learn them by heart; in these poems there are many admonitions (νοουθετήσεις) and many descriptions and passages of praise and encomium of good men from the past, so that the child will imitate them from envy and desire to be like them. (Plato, *Protagoras* 325c5–6a3)

P's two ideal students are perhaps slightly beyond the two ages which Protagoras describes here, but the pattern is much the same: what is at stake is the moral health of the young, the wish to make them 'useful members of society', which inevitably means inculcating approved and traditional social values – the aim of ancient élite education was unsurprisingly conservative. P's fathers and teachers will not use corporal punishment on their charges, but they will deploy the same certainty about right and wrong in the texts they teach, and they will point this out (ἐνδείκνυσθαι) to the young with such regularity that the young eventually will be able to do this for themselves. If the 'end product' of the education which Protagoras describes is model élite Athenians, ready to hold public office, P's students will – if all goes well – end up as replicas of P. himself, important men in their own worlds with serious philosophical interests (cf. 33b). Another way to view P's educational project is as a specific instance of the general rule that the Athenian Stranger lays down in Book 1 of Plato's *Laws*:

I say that the man who is going to be good at anything must practise this very thing from earliest childhood. . . . In short, we say that the correct nurture which education offers is to turn the soul of the child at play towards love of that of which, when he has become a man, he will be a perfect master. (Plato, *Laws* 1.643b–d)

As the opening of P's essay makes clear, it is never too early to introduce the young to 'philosophy'; as Plato had put it elsewhere in the *Republic*, 'while [the citizens

¹³ Cf. n. on 36d οὐδ' ἀκρίτως . . . παιδαγωγῶν.

of the ideal state] are adolescents and children (μειράκια . . . καὶ παῖδες), their education and philosophy should be appropriately adolescent' (*Rep.* 6.498b2–3).

Later in the *Protagoras*, Socrates makes clear that the discussion of poetry will only get you so far (not, in his view, very far at all) along the road to understanding, and in the *Republic* Plato went much further and banned virtually all poetry from his ideal state, for, to put it very broadly, three related reasons: poets retail dangerous untruths, particularly about the gods and morality, poetry has an emotional power which plays upon the worst parts of us and which can work deleterious effects at a psychological level (particularly upon the young), and poets imitate not 'truth' but merely imitations of truth, and – an argument very familiar from the *Ion* – have no genuine knowledge of what it is they represent in their poetry. In many ways, *Republic* 2–3 and 10 set the agenda for all subsequent discussion of poetry; the potential damage that poetry could cause was an idea which would lie in wait at every stage of the subsequent critical tradition. At the conclusion of his second discussion of poetry in Book 10, the Platonic Socrates indeed issues what was to prove an invitation to the subsequent tradition:

I assume that we would also allow poetry's champions – those people who, though not poetically gifted themselves, are lovers of poets – to speak on its behalf in prose and to try to show that it is not only pleasurable (ἡδεῖα) but also beneficial (ὠφελίμη) for societies and for human life. We would listen to this sympathetically, for no doubt we will profit if poetry is shown to be not only pleasurable but also beneficial. (Plato, *Republic* 10.607d7–e2)

The earliest and most influential response to that challenge which we possess is Aristotle's *Poetics*. P's essay is another kind of response,¹⁴ and like much else of what we know of the ancient reaction to Plato – including the fullest such discussion we possess, in Proclus' commentary on the *Republic*¹⁵ – an important part of its strategy is to show that poetry and philosophy work to the same ends and, indeed, that philosophy has borrowed from the poets.

One further Platonic disquisition on early education may also have been important for P. here. In Book 7 of the *Laws* (810e–811f) the Athenian notes that they have very many poets – some who write seriously, others who aim at laughter – and that some citizens want the learning by heart of 'whole poets' to be the basis for a correct (ὀρθῶς) education for the young. In what is perhaps the earliest explicit reference to the making of poetic anthologies (cf. further below), he further notes that others 'choose summaries of all the poets and put them

¹⁴ Cf. Valgiglio 1967: 337. On different aspects of P's use of and response to the *Republic* cf., e.g., Bréchet 1999, Whitmarsh 2001: 50–4, Halliwell 2002: 296–302, Zadorojnyi 2002, Hunter 2009a: 181–8, Schlemm 1893: 20–2 argues that P's response to Plato was not direct, but reflects rather an intervening Peripatetic response. In as much as such things can be established, this seems very improbable; P's essay reflects both a direct engagement with Plato and such engagements by P's predecessors.

¹⁵ Cf. Sheppard 1980. It seems very probable that Proclus knew and used P's essay.

with particular speeches given in full and say that the children should commit these to memory . . .'. To this practice the Athenian objects that 'every poet has said many things well and many things the opposite (of well)', and as a result of this 'wide learning' (πολυμαθία) is a danger for children. This is very close to P.'s opening assertions about the 'much good and much bad' to be found in poetry (15c); P.'s comparisons of poetry to the head of an octopus and to the mixed drugs of Egypt, comparisons which urge the need for παιδαγωγία ὀρθή, 'correct guidance', read almost like a mannered elaboration of the Platonic statement. The Athenian's suggested answer to this situation is that children should be made to learn philosophical discourses, such as the one the characters in the *Laws* are themselves engaged in, and 'if in his search he should happen upon'¹⁶ poems of poets and prose writings, or even simple statements which have not been written down, which are closely related to these discourses of ours, he should in no way neglect them, but should have them written down and first compel the teachers to learn and commend them . . .'. Here then is an alternative to the banning of poetry; poetry will be permitted which is closely akin (ἄδελφά) to philosophy. P. takes up this 'idealizing' challenge also by making poetry, not – as some did¹⁷ – the same thing as philosophy or – as others did¹⁸ – the origin of all philosophical insights, but rather preparatory for philosophy.

P.'s response, which owes of course much to intervening Peripatetic and scholastic traditions (cf. further below), operates on several fronts. Chapter 2 lays down a basis for responding to *Republic* 2–3, whereas chapters 3 and 7 on *mimēsis* tackle the challenge of Book 10. 'Poets tell many lies' is one motto of the work (16a), but it yields primacy to the assertion that, like the head of an octopus, poetry contains much that is indeed pleasurable (ἡδύ), but also much that is 'nourishing for a young soul' (15b); when P. asserts at the head of the work that 'it is perhaps neither possible nor beneficial (ὠφέλιμον) to keep [young men] away from poems' (15a), he is not merely drawing a line between the 'real' educational world in which he lives and which had poetry at its heart and, on the other side, the education envisaged in Plato's ideal state, but he is also, as with the immediately following declaration of poetry's 'nourishing' power, stating, almost as a given, what Plato had taken very great pains to deny in the *Republic*. The proof of his assertion lies both in the whole educational tradition which he implicitly evokes and in the essay which follows; P. will demonstrate that, with the proper guidance and the proper tools, the young can not merely avoid the

¹⁶ The language here is also very evocative of the activity of the 'bee-like' anthologist, cf. below p. 16; for περιτυγχάνει (811e2) in this connection cf. περιεπείσομεν in Apollodorus of Athens' account of how he 'came across' the Coan epic *Meropis* (*SH* 903A).

¹⁷ A good statement of the position that poetry and philosophy are essentially the same thing, varying only in mode of expression, is Maximus of Tyre 4, and cf. also Dio 55; such a view is related to, but different from, the Stoic position, cf. further below pp. 12–13.

¹⁸ Cf. Hillgruber 1994/9: I 5–34. This popular ancient game appears, however, to be reflected at 35e–6d, see nn. on 35e ἀποδιδόντας . . . ἐκείνοις and 36d συνοικειούν.

dangers which poetry poses, but actually draw moral benefit from it and use it as important preparation for the serious study of philosophy which lies ahead. Poetry may be very dangerous, but – with the proper guidance – it contains within itself the weapons with which to combat those dangers.

Plato himself is made a willing partner in P.'s educational project: the engagement with poetry which P. envisages will prepare the young men for the philosophic ascent from the cave towards that which Plato had held out as truly 'real' (36e).¹⁹ As for the lies themselves, Plato had begun his discussion by noting that there were two kinds of λόγοι, the 'true' (ἀληθής) and the 'false' (ψεῦδος), and it will turn out that, as far as poetry is concerned, it is the latter which overwhelmingly dominates. For P. also, μῦθος and πλάσμα are a defining characteristic of poetry ('we do not know any poetry which is without *muthos* and *pseudos*', 16c), and absolutely central to its appeal, but it is that very knowledge which will safeguard young readers. P. here tracks this part of the *Republic* very closely, with several of the same poetic examples being adduced; the Platonic intertext, and hence the purpose of P.'s arguments, is always present. The tools for dealing with these examples which P. places in the hands of young men and their teachers are of two kinds: first, knowledge of the nature of poetry, particularly of its inevitable falsehoods (chapters 2, 7) and of the fact that it is mimetic (chapters 3, 7), and, secondly, an array of interpretative methods for always getting the best out of one's reading.

It may well be thought that P. is at least unrealistic in his claim that, provided the young know, and keep repeating, that poetry contains falsehoods, they will be able to resist 'the sorcery of poetry' (16d), for this would seem to go against not only a Platonic or 'Longinian' insistence on the sweeping emotional and psychological power of poetry, but also upon our own experience of reading literature or watching plays or films. In his account of this aspect of poetry in *Republic* 10, Plato stresses the performance of poetry as an important element in its power:

The very best of us, when we listen to Homer or one other of the tragedians representing (μιμουμένου) one of the heroes in grief and delivering a long speech amidst lamentation or even singing and beating their breasts, feel pleasure, as you know, and we surrender ourselves and are carried with them in sympathy. We earnestly praise as a good poet whoever most of all can affect us in this way. (Plato, *Republic* 10.605c9–d5)

Here is where Plato's insistent identification of Homer as a tragedian in Book 10 has its force; the rhapsodic performance of Homer is for Plato (cf. esp. the *Ion*) no different (for both performers and audience) in its effects from drama. In this, Plato's views are very much those of his time (cf. esp. Gorgias, *Helen*

¹⁹ Cf. Hunter 2009a: 169–70.

8–11).²⁰ P. writes the same language, but he is thinking of a paedagogical system in which the pupil is alone (or in a very small group) with his teacher – there is not the danger of ‘group emotion’ of which Plato was only too aware – and where what might be studied are not large stretches of text, a whole play for example, where emotional power is given time to develop and the audience can indeed ‘surrender’ to a sustained representation, but rather (as the essay everywhere demonstrates) short, often very short, extracts lacking full context. P.’s pupils may well be working with anthologies, as he himself was (see further below). For Plato too, of course, there is serious danger to the pupil’s moral and psychological health when he reads out even a short extract which contains ‘bad’ thoughts or the views of a low or evil character (cf. *Republic* 3.395b–6e), but P. largely ignores the question of the effect of poetry on the performer; and this absence may reflect the reception situation which he imagines. Be that as it may, P.’s hopes for the efficacy of his interpretative tools may indeed be rather optimistic, but they arise within a framework which makes them at least comprehensible.

For P. there are two fundamental facts about the mimetic nature of poetry which we must understand. The first is in fact ultimately a development from the passage of Plato which we have just considered. After his account of how we ‘surrender’ to performance, Plato notes that when real disaster strikes in our lives, we try to behave in the opposite way to the emotional ‘weakness’ we show in the theatre (605d7–e1); in other words we know what is right, but this knowledge is overcome when we are in the theatre or listening to a rhapsode, and indeed we want it that way, because that is what ‘good poets’ can do. As we have seen, P. on the other hand thinks that we can actively deploy our knowledge while experiencing poetry, but this does not mean that we are rejecting the quality of the poetry, merely its subjects or characters or the sentiments it expresses. In chapter 3 P. also turns to his own purposes Plato’s repeated (e.g. *Rep.* 2.377e2, 10.600e7–1a2) analogy between poets and painters. Poets, like painters, are ‘good’, if the imitation that they produce is good; the subject of the imitation may be ugly or morally reprehensible, but the imitation can be praiseworthy (ἡδόμεθα καὶ θαυμάζομεν, 18a with n.) and indeed καλόν. Again, this view, which ultimately goes back to a reading of Aristotle (cf. introductory note to chapter 3), might suggest an amoral approach to art, which might be thought surprising in this treatise, but again the reception-situation which P. envisages must never be forgotten: the teacher is never far away – we are not to think that the pupil will snigger by himself at pornography (18b).

Secondly, we are always to remember that poetry does not abandon ‘likeness to the truth’ (ὁμοιότης τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, 25b), for ‘plausibility’ is crucial to the effect of poetry;²¹ P. forestalls an obvious objection – how can, e.g., poetic tales of

²⁰ Cf. n. on 15d Γοργίας.

²¹ Cf. Strabo 1.2.9 on Odysseus ‘telling many lies like truth’ (*Odyssey* 19.203), a verse also cited by P. at 347e to illustrate with approval how poetry tells τοῖς πεπραγμένοις εἰκότα.

the Underworld be 'plausible'? – by now focusing his attention after chapter 7 largely on human characters in poetry and what they say. P.'s 'truth' here is not, of course, the truth of a Plato, but rather the truth of our experience of life: we know that no one is perfect, that everyone has good and bad qualities or behaves well or ill at different times, and that no one is always successful; therefore, there will be good and bad in poetry and characters will be 'mixed'. It may be true that poets exaggerate the upsets of fortune, the twists and turns of a plot, more than is 'normal' in our experience (25d), but that is not fundamentally untrue to what we know is actually a 'fact of life'. That poetry was 'an imitation of life' had long been established as a critical cliché,²² and we may also be reminded of the Hellenistic classification of material into the 'true' (realized in literature in history), the 'like true' (realized in comedy and mime, where there are indeed good and bad characters), and the 'fantastical' (realized in the higher reaches of poetry);²³ this is the kind of 'truth' which P. has in mind. Armed with this knowledge, we will be able to take a properly discriminating attitude to poetry, not assuming that because a character in Homer says something, it must be praiseworthy, because Homer is a great poet.

P. therefore replaces Plato's rejection of poetry with a controlled régime which puts the responsibility for correct interpretation upon the pupil and teacher;²⁴ poetry is to be enjoyed within very strict parameters and for clearly defined purposes. The dangers of unfettered access have been removed, not by eliminating access altogether, but by placing between poetry and its young audience the barriers of critical interpretation and socially approved goals. In the case of poetry, no less than in that of alcohol, attempts at complete prohibition, such as Lycurgus' attempt to eradicate the vines (15d–e), are not only doomed to failure, but are themselves positively harmful, as they block access to what is beneficial (τὸ χρήσιμον) in the banned product. That P. elsewhere (451c–d) uses this same analogy of Lycurgus to illustrate how we should not try to free ourselves of all irrational emotion, but rather use our reason to control and channel it, strikingly illustrates how the view of poetry in *How to study poetry* reflects P.'s whole approach to moral education. For P., poetic interpretation is not, as it is sometimes for us, a

²² Cf., e.g., Strabo 1.2.5 (on Homer), Valgiglio 1973: 168; for Aristotle, 'tragedy is an imitation not of men, but of action and life' (*Poetics* 1450a16). An early expression of this idea, in a non-technical context, is Lycurgus, *Against Leocrates* 102: 'Poets imitate human life and, selecting out the noblest actions, they win men over with argument and demonstration (μετὰ λόγου καὶ ἀποδείξεως)'. Two points are worth noticing in the present context. Lycurgus does not, of course, here mention philosophers, but it is clear how easy it would be to use his words to establish the affinity between poets and philosophers. Secondly, the rhetorical context demands that, for Lycurgus, poets here are positive models; P. would not disagree, but for his purposes he does not write of poetry's 'selection': rather, his treatise recognizes and tries to deal with the fact that, because poetry imitates life, not everything in poetry is καλόν.

²³ Cf., e.g., Quintilian 2.4.2, Sextus Empiricus, *Against the grammarians* 263.

²⁴ Cf. Konstan 2004.

'literary' matter; rather, it is indeed a matter of moral health, and the pursuit of τὸ χρήσιμον in poetry, which was the challenge which Plato had issued, is part of a whole approach to life, not merely the choice of a particular mode of poetic interpretation. *How to study poetry* may be seen from this perspective, not just as a kind of prologue to the next stage of education as represented in *On listening to lectures*,²⁵ but also to foreshadow the 'adult' discussions of *Sympotic questions*, themselves a rewriting of a 'classic' Platonic text, the *Symposium*. In the *Sympotic questions* P. and his friends pursue τὸ χρήσιμον across a wide spectrum of subjects; the pursuit is no less than one for a fulfilled life as a serious (σπουδαῖος) and educated (παιδευμένος) member of élite society. *How to study poetry* is designed to guide those at the beginning of this path.

The second set of traditions of the greatest importance to P. is educational practice in the study of poetry. At every turn throughout the treatise the reader finds similarities, often amounting to virtual verbal identity, between Plutarchan comments on particular passages and what remains of post-Aristotelian commentary on classical poetry; this is, of course, particularly true for Homer, a fact which reflects both the dominance of Homer in ancient criticism and education and the richness of the surviving scholia, particularly on the *Iliad*.²⁶ The origins of our Homeric scholia, particularly the difficulty of assigning individual notes or observations to particular scholars or particular dates, are a notorious problem,²⁷ but this uncertainty does not prevent us from gaining a broad understanding of P.'s relationship to this material. This essay of P. shows particularly close links to two classes of Homeric scholia, the so-called D-scholia and the bT or 'exegetical' scholia. The D-scholia derive from many different sources and periods, but some of the material is clearly old and goes back at least to the late classical period; this is particularly true of the large amount of simple glossing or explanation of Homeric words which is found in these scholia, a feature which points to the very close links between these notes and educational practice. Given the proclaimed purposes of P.'s essay, a link with such material is both expected and welcome, as it helps to anchor the treatise within a genuine educational context.²⁸ The 'exegetical' scholia are similarly diverse in origin, but they contain much which is clearly Alexandrian or at least Hellenistic and would have been familiar to P.; in general, these scholia are particularly valuable for their 'literary criticism'²⁹ and for their view, congenial to P. and shared with what the papyri tell us of how poetry was approached in Egyptian schoolrooms, of the poet as moralist

²⁵ For the links between the two cf. Hunter 2009a: 169 n.1.

²⁶ P. cites the *Iliad* more than three times as often as the *Odyssey* in this treatise; this may well reflect the dominant position of the *Iliad* in school education.

²⁷ For helpful summaries of the classes of Homeric scholia cf., e.g., Snipes 1988: 196–204 and Dickey 2007: 18–28.

²⁸ On this context see esp. Criboire 2001a: 205–10 and Morgan 1998a *passim* and 1998b: 87–8.

²⁹ On this see esp. Nünlist 2009.

and teacher. Much here goes back to Peripatetic and Alexandrian scholarship; the familiar exegetical pattern of ‘problem’ and ‘solution’ which structures so many of these scholia may be traced back to Aristotle’s *Homeric problems* (cf. also chapter 25 of the *Poetics*) and beyond.³⁰ Whereas Aristotle and his successors used this technique to show that Homer did in fact know his job, P. is here less concerned with the poet than with his vulnerable audience; the two concerns often, of course, overlap. This rich scholarly material can often be supplemented from elsewhere; many of these other sources, such as the vast Homeric commentaries of Eustathius, bishop of Thessaloniki in the twelfth century, are considerably later than P., but given the conservatism of the tradition, they will often contain suggestive material that could have been familiar to P.

The similarities between P.’s explanations and those of the D and bT scholia show him firmly in the mainstream of Hellenistic discussion of Homer and of how the poet was used in education; some of P.’s explanations can strike us as very ‘forced’, but we must be wary of assuming that that is how they appeared in antiquity. The other major class of Homeric scholia, the so-called A-scholia (named from the famous Venetus A manuscript), are here particularly valuable, as they explicitly contain material deriving from four works of the Augustan and imperial periods on the text and interpretation of Homer; two of which were devoted to the work of Alexandrian scholars, notably Aristarchus; the A-scholia are our principal source of information on the Alexandrian constitution of the text. Unsurprisingly, given the level at which the essay is aimed, P. has little to say about this ‘higher’ area of ancient Homeric scholarship, though he does once take pointed issue with an alleged Aristarchan athetesis (26f–7a, where see n. on ὁ μὲν οὔν . . . φοβηθείς), and does so quite in the manner of scholiastic debate (note the appeal to ethical ‘teaching’). This may, however, be the exception which proves the rule, for the verses at issue there are ones which have entirely disappeared from our texts of Homer and very probably also led a most precarious existence in P.’s day; athetized verses did not, on the whole, disappear (after all, they survived for the scholiasts to record the athetesis). Elsewhere, P. seems to make no distinction between verses which had been excised or athetized by one or more of the Alexandrians and those on which no suspicion had ever been cast; it has been suggested that this shows him rejecting the Alexandrian methodology and the resulting textual interventions,³¹ but P. (and/or his sources) behave entirely

³⁰ Cf. Hunter 2009a: 21. It is a great pity that we do not know more of P.’s Ὅμηρικά μελεταί (fr. 122–7 Sandbach); Hillgruber 1994/9, however, makes a strong case for seeing this work as the principal source of the pseudo-Plutarchan *On Homer*, and cf. also Babut 1969: 161–3.

³¹ Cf. Bréchet 2005. As far as we know, it was never suggested in antiquity that Plato’s ‘censorship’ in *Republic* 2–3 was the origin of later practices of textual editing, though of course it was Plato who, for us and probably for subsequent critics, first identified many ‘problematic’ passages.

normally in using them as ordinary parts of the text. Be that as it may, P's students are not to be blind to the moral problems which often led to Alexandrian athetesis (e.g. 25e on *Iliad* 16.97–100). P. may, of course, have his satirical eye partly on the Alexandrians in deprecating 'excuses and specious explanations' for immoral passages (26a), and it is true that a perhaps surprisingly high number of P's Homeric examples involve verses which had been expunged by Zenodotus or athetized by Aristophanes of Byzantium and/or Aristarchus, but such verses were precisely those which were likely to gather a body of critical explanation on which P. and his sources could draw. That said, it is understandable if P. here has little time for the more arcane reaches of scholarship; his young men were to move on to philosophy,³² not to become professional scholars or γραμματικοί, and scholarship, as practised by the great Alexandrians, did not always have its eye on ethics and morality, which is where P's young men's gaze was to be directed.

P. refers on a number of occasions to the Stoics in general or to named heads of the school, both dismissively (25c, 31d–e) and as models of good practice in dealing with poetry (33c, 34b); several passages are also redolent of Stoic terminology, and – particularly in the final part of the treatise – many of the citations which P. uses are known also to have been deployed by Stoic writers, most notably Chrysippus. It was argued long ago that a major source for P's essay, the major source in fact, was a lost work of Chrysippus περὶ τοῦ πῶς δεῖ τῶν ποιημάτων ἀκούειν, 'Concerning how to study poetry' (Diog. Laert. 7.200 = *SVF* II 16), of which nothing is otherwise known and to which no existing fragment is explicitly ascribed; P. will, on this argument, have adapted Chrysippus' essay to the needs of οἱ νέοι.³³ P's essay has more recently been used as important evidence in reconstructing both Stoic views in general and this essay of Chrysippus, in particular.³⁴ Though P. is elsewhere a harsh critic of

³² In fact, the standard educational curriculum in P's time would take the young men on to rhetoric, before philosophy, but P. did not teach rhetoric and seems not to have been particularly interested in it. His contemporary Quintilian, however, shows how studying poetry could be, and was, propaedeutic to rhetoric, as well as to philosophy. So too, texts such as the *Ars rhetorica* attributed to Dionysius of Halicarnassus offer elaborate rhetorical analyses of Homeric speeches, using techniques of close reading and attention to context which are not unlike those we find in P.

³³ Cf. Elter 1893: 58–70, von Reutern 1933: 80–8; Schlemm 1893 also gathers much of the evidence. An important plank in Elter's argument was the fact that a number of poetic quotations, all without ascription, are shared between P. and Stobaeus, both of whom will go back, according to this argument, independently to Chrysippus, cf. *TrGF* 349–60 with the note of Kannicht-Snell.

³⁴ De Lacy 1948 and Nussbaum 1993 are both very suggestive treatments; for caution about the extent of Stoic influence cf. K. Ziegler 1951: 806–7 = Ziegler 1964: 169–70, Babut 1969: 87–92. It would certainly be dangerous to assume that P. only has the Stoics in view in his criticism of allegorical readings at 19e–f, cf. Long 1992: 61–2. There is a brief but helpful account of Stoic readings of poetry in Gutzwiller 2010.

Stoic doctrine – an essay ‘That the Stoics say more paradoxical things than the poets’ survives, at least in summary (*Moralia* 1057c–8d) – the Stoic concern with education and with the use of poetry for moral purposes would make use of (inter alia) Stoic sources in P.’s essay unsurprising. There seems, however, little point in trying to fit a ‘Stoic period’ into P.’s intellectual biography.³⁵ Moreover, it is not always easy, particularly in a non-technical essay such as *How to study poetry*, to draw firm distinctions between positions held by Stoics and those of Middle Platonism, and so the suspicion of Stoic sources or influences must often remain at the level merely of possibility.

The serious Stoic engagement with poetry and the poetic heritage is one of the most distinctive things about their writing; Cleanthes’ *Hymn to Zeus* is one of the more remarkable survivals of Hellenistic poetry. In his *Homeric studies* P. discussed the Stoic claims for agreement between their doctrines and early poetry (fr. 125 Sandbach), but in what spirit we do not know. Zeno, the founder of the school, wrote a *περὶ ποιητικῆς ἀκροάσεως*, as well as five books of *Homeric problems* (Diog. Laert. 7.4 = *SVF* I 41); Zeno is said to have distinguished between what Homer wrote *κατὰ δόξαν* (‘in accordance with opinion’) and what was *κατὰ ἀλήθειαν* (‘in accordance with truth’, Dio 53.4–5 = *SVF* I 274), thus saving the poet from allegations of inconsistency, and although this does not map exactly on to Plutarchan distinctions, it is easy enough to see a foreshadowing of Plutarchan methodology.³⁶ It is, however, Chrysippus, the prolific head of the school in the latter part of the third century, who is most associated with the poetry of the past.³⁷ In addition to *περὶ τοῦ πῶς δεῖ τῶν ποιημάτων ἀκούειν* he wrote a book *On poems*, and became notorious for his lavish use of poetic citation. Surviving fragments show him interpreting Homer (*SVF* II 904–5) and Hesiod (*SVF* II 908). Galen repeatedly refers to his piling up of citation upon citation (cf., e.g., *SVF* II 906–7), and Apollodorus of Athens scoffed that if you took the citations out of Chrysippus’ work, there would be nothing left (Diog. Laert. 7.181); one anecdote has it that he quoted so much of Euripides’ *Medea* in one of his works that it could be called ‘Chrysippus’ *Medea*’ (Diog. Laert. 7.180).³⁸

The practice of poetic citation for exemplary purposes had of course been regular since the beginnings of philosophical prose; both Plato and P. were very adept in using snatches of poetry to reinforce their arguments. Stoic justification for the practice is in fact preserved: Seneca (*Ep.* 108.9–10) notes how verse makes a more striking impression than prose, particularly upon non-philosophers, and he cites from Cleanthes a memorable comparison:³⁹

³⁵ Cf. Babut 1969: 92–3.

³⁶ On apparent contradictions within the work of a poet cf. 20c–21d.

³⁷ To the literature cited in n.34 above add Struck 2004: chap. 3.

³⁸ Cf. n. on 33e αἰαί. . . χρῆται δὲ μὴ.

³⁹ Cf. also *SVF* I 486, another claim of Cleanthes about the particular philosophical power of ‘poetic and musical examples’, and Strabo 1.2.8.

Just as our breath gives a louder (*clariorem*) sound, when it has been drawn through the long and narrow tube of a trumpet to the wider opening at the end, so the restricting rules of poetry (*carminis arta necessitas*) make our meaning clearer (*clariorem*). (Cleanthes, *SVF* I 487)

For the Stoics, as indeed for others, poetry – particularly the popular classics of Homer and the Attic stage – could both give 'starting points' (ἀφορμαί) for philosophical investigation and also provided a large body of illustrative material which was accessible to both experts and laypeople. How such material was standardly used may be illustrated from the famous opening scene of Menander's *Misoumenos*, in which the soldier Thrasonides keeps away from his own house where he has put the captured Krateia and does not take sexual advantage of her:⁴⁰

[The Stoics] say that love (ἔρως) is an inclination towards friendliness (ἐπιβολὴ φιλοποιίας) caused by the appearance of beauty; it is not love for sex, but for friendship. They say at any rate that Thrasonides kept away from his beloved, although he had her in his power, because he was hated by her. Thus love is love of friendship, as Chrysippus says in *On love*, and it is also not sent by god. (Diogenes Laertius 7.130 = *SVF* III 716, 718)

Two further texts may support the circumstantial evidence for a debt by P. to the Stoics in this essay. The first is the Stoic Strabo's defence of the 'seriousness' and value of poetry, most notably Homer, against the view of Eratosthenes of Cyrene, who was Librarian at Alexandria in the second half of the third century, that poetry was nothing but ψυχολογία (1.2.3–8).⁴¹ Strabo begins from the position that 'the ancients said that poetry was a kind of first philosophy, which guides us from childhood into life and pleasurably teaches us characters and passions and actions', and that this is indeed how poetry is used in early education throughout Greece, 'not for simple entertainment, but for moral discipline (σωφρονισμός)'. On this view, Homer, of course, is not expert in everything, but he did possess very wide learning which he shares with us and with which he endows some of his characters, like Odysseus; poetry proves to be an 'imitation of life through language'. For Strabo – and this is something which P. too acknowledges – it is the novelty of the mythic element in poetry which attracts children, and this, together with the element of the marvellous in poetry, 'increases the pleasure which is a charm (φίλτρον) to learning'; eventually, however, when their intelligence has become strong, children will no longer need 'such lures'. Poetry will, however, always appeal to the uneducated (or, indeed, women), i.e. to those

⁴⁰ Horace similarly makes the Stoic Stertinius quote extensively from Terence's *Eunuchus* to illustrate the foolish behaviour of lovers (*Sat.* 2.3.259–71).

⁴¹ Cf., e.g., Nussbaum 1993: 127–8.

incapable of passing on to higher studies, and so poetry can perform a socially useful function of both protreptic and deterrence; poetry in fact *was* the universal educator until such things as the writing of history and philosophy made late appearances, and largely remains so, since ‘philosophy is for the few’. Clearly, P.’s essay is not primarily concerned with the function of poetry in regard to adults, but the parallels to Strabo’s account are clear;⁴² not everything in Strabo’s argument is specifically ‘Stoic’, but the general trend is suggestive in its intellectual affiliations.

Secondly, there is part of Sextus Empiricus’ attack upon the claims and practice of γραμματική (*Against the grammarians* = *Against the mathematicians* I).⁴³ In chapters 270–98 of that work, Sextus turns to the claims of poetry and poetic exegesis; his source in this section is avowedly Epicurean (perhaps Zeno of Sidon), and it is not improbable that it was the Stoics who were the principal and original target.⁴⁴ According to Sextus, grammarians claim that poetry gives many ‘starting-points for wisdom and the happy life’, but that γραμματική is necessary to understand what poets are really saying; philosophers, they further claim, use poetic citation to give authority to their claims, and indeed poetry preceded and was the origin of philosophy. Real philosophy, however, is according to Sextus utterly different from poetry; genuine philosophers (οἱ γνησίως φιλοσοφούντες, 280) do not appeal to the poets, because for them argument is sufficient, but poetic citation is used by those who ‘bamboozle the vulgar masses’. Poetry, according to the Epicureans, has ‘no or little’ practical value for life, and as such the same holds true for grammar; poetry is, after all, falsehood which aims at ψυχαγωγία, not at significant truth. This attack is plainly not, as it were, ‘the opposite’ of P.’s claims and practice in *How to study poetry*, but there is enough in Sextus which recalls P. – with P. playing the role of γραμματικός at a rather lower level than Sextus has in mind – to give this passage at least a suggestive force.

Sextus’ Epicurean source is taking aim at such Stoic claims as we find in an educational treatise of Philo of Alexandria, claims with which P. would not have wildly disagreed:

γραμματική exposes us⁴⁵ to the stories of poets and prose-writers and will thus produce intelligence (νόησις) and wide learning. Through the misfortunes which the heroes and demigods celebrated in poetry are said to have endured, it will also teach us to despise the vain fictions of our empty fancies. (Philo, *De congressu* 15)

⁴² Strabo proceeds (1.2.9) to acknowledge that, although the truth predominates, there are elements of ψεῦδος in Homer, notably myths which are adornments for the poetry designed to appeal to mass audiences; this chapter is related to P.’s claims for the ‘plausibility’ of poetic fiction in chapter 7 of *How to study poetry*.

⁴³ Cf. Blank 1998. ⁴⁴ Cf. Blank 1998: 286. ⁴⁵ The text is uncertain.

Later in the same allegorical treatise, Philo describes the relationship between γραμματική and philosophy:

When I was first roused by the goads of philosophy to desire her, I attached myself (ὥμιλῃσα)⁴⁶ while I was still very young to one of her maids, *Grammatiké*, and all the children I had by her, writing, reading, the stories the poets tell, I dedicated to her mistress. (Philo, *De congressu* 74)

P's purpose in the present essay is not fundamentally different. When P. stamps his essay as an alternative to the Epicurean avoidance of poetry (15d) and gives it a title which seems to allude to a work of Chrysippus, he will be sending signals of at least a Stoic flavour to his work. The importance that the Stoics attached to poetry – the mere fact that they took it 'seriously' (σπουδαίως in all its senses) – and to early education more generally⁴⁷ and the clear link that they drew between poetic citation and philosophical learning meant that, for this essay at least, P. could borrow from them with a clear conscience.

Whatever P.'s 'sources' (direct or indirect), it is as clear as such things can be that they included anthologies of both poetic citations and anecdotes (*chreiai*);⁴⁸ no doubt P. also used complete texts, notably perhaps Plato's *Republic*, and also his memory and his note books,⁴⁹ but both the nature of the compilation and overlap with other anthologies, notably Stobaeus, make it clear that he was also importantly indebted to the same kinds of anthologies that were used both in school education and at higher philosophical levels.⁵⁰ Indeed, part of the rhetorical force of the essay comes from the appearance that it gives of being itself an anthology of pieces surrounded by the didactic comment that a teacher would normally supply orally. The arrangement of such gnomic anthologies was, as we see on a massive scale in Stobaeus' later compilation, most commonly

⁴⁶ The verb suggests both 'spent time with' and 'slept with', cf. LSJ s.v. IV.

⁴⁷ Quintilian 1 is an important source for Chrysippus' views, cf. *SVF* III 732–42.

⁴⁸ Cf. Russell 1972: 26–7, 46–7; on the history and use of such gnomic anthologies cf. esp. Barns 1950, 1951, Konstan 2010. The fourth century seems to have been the crucial period for the formation of the anthological habit and (probably) the appearance of the first anthologies; the boundaries between the oral discussion of familiar poetic tags and the written collection of those tags are fluid. Suggestive texts include Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.56 (Socrates' accuser said that he 'picked out (ἐκλεγόμενον) the worst passages of the most important poets' and used them to corrupt his pupils, cf. Graziosi 2002: 178–80), 1.6.14 (Socrates and his friends go through 'the books' of old poets and 'if we see something good we pick it out (ἐκλέγομεθα)'), and Isocrates, *To Nicocles* 44 ('if someone were to make a selection (ἐκλέξειε) of the so-called *gnômai* of leading poets, on which they had exerted the utmost seriousness...'); there is a suggestive discussion with regard to Hesiod in Ford 2010.

⁴⁹ Cf. 464f from the proem to *On quiet of mind*, 'I gathered together material on tranquillity of mind from the notebooks (ὑπομνήματα) which I happened to have made for my own use'.

⁵⁰ It seems unlikely that Chrysippus himself 'published' an anthology of the citations which he used in his work; rather, he himself will have used (inter alia) existing collections, cf. Hense, *RE* IX 2576–7.

through the grouping together of extracts on a particular subject such as wealth or Fortune, and often with citations taking opposing views being matched against each other (cf. 20d–22a). John Barns has traced the history of the image of the bee, which P. uses at 32e, as an image, not just of the poet, but also of the pupil and ‘anthologist’ who gathers and stores for future use even the most unpromising material;⁵¹ P. will thus, in part, be staking out a history of the kind of treatise he is writing and its affiliations.

It is in the nature of anthologizing that passages, particularly very short passages such as are the lifeblood of the current treatise, are taken ‘out of context’ and take on meanings quite other than those which they originally carried; many examples of this may be cited from P.’s essay. Such ‘distortion’ is not, of course, unique to P., but the cause lies in the moralizing and ethical bias of his whole educational programme; what is at stake here is, after all, not ‘literary interpretation’, but the moral health of young men. The matter is thus quite different from works concerned with adult matters, such as full-blown philosophizing, where P. earnestly takes philosophers to task for attacking their opponents’ views by taking small pieces of text out of context:

Those who correct others should go through with great care the arguments and writings of those they are criticizing, and not mislead the inexperienced by detaching sayings from all different contexts and attacking words rather than facts. (*Not even a pleasant life is possible* . . . 1086c⁵²)

It is less important that P. then proceeds precisely to do what he has warned against – this is, after all, a polemical tract – than that the difference reflects the different nature of the essays and their implied audiences. Nevertheless, the apparent distortions of meaning which P. is willing to countenance in *How to study poetry* have led in the past to some harsh criticism:

This is an amazing treatise. It shows how entirely wrapt up in the ethical outlook, how utterly devoid of historical sense, was the Chaeronean philosopher. His difficulty was real. But instead of removing it, as he might easily have done, by explaining the difference of moral and religious outlook between his own age and the past, he must needs resort to this childish performance of ingenious misinterpretations and juggling with texts. He makes the moral question predominate over everything, and strengthens it by the immensity of his erudition.

K.M. Westaway’s verdict⁵³ of some ninety years ago seems itself amusingly ‘devoid of historical sense’ in its apparent expectations of ancient education,

⁵¹ Barns 1950: 132–4, 1951: 6; cf. also Borthwick 1991.

⁵² Cf. also 1108d on Colotes.

⁵³ Westaway 1922: 89–90. For other early criticism of this treatise cf. Van der Stockt 1992: 13–14.

but in fact she put her finger on one of the most striking features of the treatise, and one which bears eloquent witness to the fact that it is indeed rooted, not just in P's Platonism, but also in genuine educational practice. We may find this 'amazing', but we should be grateful for a text which helps us to see how the most broadly diffused reading strategies in the ancient world were bred in the bones of the educated élite.

3 STRUCTURE

The organization of *How to study poetry* is at least not pellucid to the casual reader, and some the appearance of miscellaneousness in P's prescriptions for reading will be bound to survive any suggested structure. Nevertheless, there is clearly an overarching frame which moves from the simplest form of commendation or reproof for what one reads to the association of literature with the highest reaches of philosophy;⁵⁴ and from children who take greatest pleasure in philosophical statements which seem least like philosophy to the young man ready to be 'escorted to philosophy'; this move mimics the progress which P. expects the young men to make, if his precepts are followed. Within this broad framework, however, different patterns have been detected by modern scholars, and it will be best to set out the plan of the treatise using the modern chapter divisions, together with notes on areas of transition or doubt:⁵⁵

- 1 Introduction. Young people readily absorb philosophical ideas concealed in fiction, because they enjoy the fiction. Here is where the danger lies. As there is good and bad in poetry, and total censorship is neither practical nor beneficial, it is much better to guide young men's reading in a philosophical direction.
- 2 All poetry contains falsehoods and mythical material; this is the most crucial thing for the young to understand. These falsehoods, however, fall into different classes: some stories and ideas are known by the poets to be false, others are false but are believed true by poets.
- 3 Poetry is an imitative art (μιμητική); this is the second guiding principle. One can admire the skill of a mimetic artist without admiring what he imitates, and so the young must not assume that the poet approves of immoral or ugly sentiments or actions – it may rather be that they are appropriate to the character being imitated. At 18f P. introduces Paris as the only Homeric

⁵⁴ Cf. Hunter 2009a: 170–1. On the structure of the work see especially Schenkeveld 1982; Valgiglio 1991 presents a restatement of the views expressed more diffusely in his edition.

⁵⁵ We are aware that no such setting-out can fail at some level to reflect our views about the work's structure. In fact, the modern chapter-divisions prove, in our view, to follow the scheme of the work pretty well.

hero who had sex in the daytime, thus showing that Homer disapproved. This example clearly belongs as much with chapter 4 as with chapter 3.

- 4 Poets themselves offer guidance to interpretation, either by explicit statement or through the development of the story, and this makes allegorical interpretation of even episodes such as the adultery of Ares and Aphrodite unnecessary (cf. n. on 19c πάλαι μὲν ὑπονοίαις ἀλληγορίαις δὲ νῦν). At 20c, an anecdote about Melanthius, there is something of a fresh start: P. has just contrasted poets with philosophers, but the Melanthius anecdote compares them with politicians whose contradictory policies in fact produce a balanced result. This transitional passage introduces the topic of wiping out something offensive in the text by adducing another, more laudable, quotation on the other side by the same poet (20d–21d) or indeed by another poet or person of note (21d–22a). Before the exemplification of the lesson of the Melanthius anecdote, however, P. adduces three couplets of stichomythia (20c–d) in which the second verse ‘corrects’ the first, and thus the ‘solution’ (λύσις) of the morally dubious utterance is ‘obvious’ (πρόδηλος). We might have thought that these instances belonged rather with the earlier section on the guidance which poets themselves offer, rather than under the apparent heading of ‘inconsistencies’ within and between poets, but P. (interestingly) considers such cases of stichomythia as instances of inconsistent statements by poets placed beside each other.
- 5 P. now returns to single passages. We must pay particular attention to context and to the contextual meaning of individual words, or else we may go very wrong. This brief section contains only two examples and may perhaps be a sign that the treatise is unrevised, although it is hardly impossible within the overall rather loose structure of the treatise.
- 6 A particular, and very important, form of attention to individual words lies in the nature of poetic language, not so much the matter of learned glosses, but such features as metaphor, the metonymy of divine names and how poets use key terms like εὐδαιμονία. The chapter concludes (25b) with ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἱκανὰ περὶ τούτων, which seems to draw to a close the lengthy discussion of potentially misleading names and words.
- 7 Poetry is mimetic – the young must never forget this – and does not altogether abandon likeness to reality (τὸ ἀληθές), and therefore examples of vice as well as of virtue abound in poetic texts. To this P. adds the importance to poetry of emotion and surprise. This is probably, however, not a completely different point, despite ἐνεῖ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ‘veracity apart’ (25c), as the sequence of thought may be that the fact that characters (even gods!) may be a mixture of good and bad and may suffer reverses of fortune is truer to our experience than the opposite.
- 8 Therefore, because we understand the nature of poetry, we must not slavishly approve everything that happens or that characters say in literature; an Achilles can behave both well and reprehensibly. Where the poet’s view

(and what ours should be) is unclear; as in the cases of Nausicaa's expressed wish to marry Odysseus or Odysseus' apparent materialism, we can put forward alternative explanations and direct the young man to choose the better. Tragedy offers a particularly rich harvest of situations such as this.

- 9 Our knowledge that poetry contains both good and bad also means that we must always ask *why* a character says something and *why* we should accept this; we should be alert and questioning readers, just as in real life it is entirely reasonable to ask why we are told to do this or that. The chapter concludes (28d) with ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀβλαβῆ παρέξει τὴν τῶν ποιημάτων ἀκρόασιν, thus marking the end of the 'negative' part of the treatise, i.e. how to avoid being damaged by poetry.
- 10 We must seek out the good in literature and make distinctions between good characters and bad, good races and bad, as there is much that is positive to take away from poetry. This chapter begins, as had chapter 5 and as do the two subsequent chapters, with a simile: just as grapes often lie hidden in the rampant foliage which surrounds them, so 'many useful lessons' may escape the young man in poetry because of the elaborate style and fictions which surround them. The simile seems to be a way of switching our attention from the dangers of poetry to the good things which it is worth searching out; it is not particularly apt for the subject-matter of the rest of chapter 10, described as 'about difference' (30b), and so its significance seems to be to the work as a whole, not merely local. This seems confirmed by P's claim (28e) that he will only touch upon the subject of the good things in poetry, leaving lengthy elaborations to 'those who write more for show'; the subject of difference is then introduced by 'First of all . . . '.
- 11 Readers whose concern is morality should pay particular attention to what is said about the cardinal virtues and about the control of vice. Part of this (31d) will be close attention to individual words, though not the word games of the Stoics (although P's reflection of Stoic thought is here as strong as anywhere in the treatise). The introductory simile which points the lesson that different readers look for different things seems here apt for the material which it introduces.
- 12 We must learn to find what is valuable even in suspect passages, whether that is by interpretation or by correction and rewriting. Transition to the subject of actually rewriting suspect passages is managed through a passage of Archilochus (33b), which we can use to justify continuing our normal activities in times of grief. The transition is apparently close (δεῖν, where see n. ad loc.), but certainly requires work on the part of the reader. Here again the difficulty may arise from P's selection of material from an already loosely organized σχολή. The opening simile of the bee that searches out what is good in even the most unpromising places is, however, again apt for the material which follows, and the subject of 'correction' is formally concluded at the end of the chapter (34b).

- 13 Another way of deriving value from literature is by extending the reference of a citation to analogous cases; Chrysippus showed the way here. One particular class of examples is those which show how Homer makes clear that physical characteristics and accidents of fortune are unimportant – what matters is moral qualities; this in turn will lead us to behave more sensibly towards our fellows and also ourselves to bear misfortunes in better spirit. Despite the link that P. forges through Homeric material, this chapter seems to cover two reasonably distinct subjects, namely the ability to draw general lessons from the particular by extension of poetic reference, and the need to focus on moral values, not the gifts of fortune, such as physical appearance and wealth.
- 14 What is good in poetry should be associated with related doctrines of philosophy: Hesiod foreshadows Plato and is confirmed by him, as Aeschylus foreshadows Epicurus and is confirmed by him. This bringing-together of poets and philosophers will both stimulate the young man and prepare him for the study of the higher discipline which he is shortly to undertake.

It is clear, then, that the whole treatise is dominated by the idea that there is good and bad in poetry (1) and that we must teach the young to seek out the former and avoid the dangers of the latter. Chapters 2 and 3 partly explain why there is 'bad' even in great poetry and point to the two dominant features of poetry which the young man must never forget; chapters 4–6 then set out various methods for avoiding taking negative messages away from the apparent 'bad' in poetry. Chapter 7 repeats the lesson that poetry is mimetic, but now anchors this in the idea that poetry is an imitation of life and in a consideration of the ingredients of successful poetry; chapters 8–9 extend the methods for avoiding the 'bad' by considering complex characters and cultivating in the young an almost philosophical refusal to accept statements unless they are accompanied by explanation and defence. Chapter 10 turns, by means of a simile, to ways of finding 'the good' in poetry; it is in the nature of the case that the methods to be employed are not always radically different from those for avoiding the 'bad', and chapters 11–13 continue this new front in the battle of education. Though chapter 13 seems indeed to be a chapter 'of two halves' (cf. above), its subjects, namely extending the particular to the general, and the primacy of moral over physical or accidental circumstances, lead quite smoothly into the introduction of philosophy itself, which comes in the final chapter. This, then, is the basic structure: chapters 4–6 and 8–9 stand as parallel accounts of methods for avoiding the 'bad', though the later chapters deal more (though not exclusively) with characters rather than individual passages; chapters 2–3 and 7 show why such methods are necessary. Chapters 10–13 are not fundamentally different, though they are aimed at 'finding the good' rather than 'avoiding the bad' (note the conclusion of chapter 9 cited above), and chapter 13 seems to stand somewhat

apart; chapters 10–12 are indeed bound together by three parallel similes which open the chapters, and chapter 12 concludes with a closural tag, τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐπανορθώσεως γένος τοιοῦτόν ἐστι (34b).

Within this structure further micro-structures of progression may be detected,⁵⁶ but what has been set out here seems to break the treatise down into meaningful units and to respect the somewhat informal, perhaps even untidy, lecture-style presentation which P. claims for his work (15a). What is important, however, is that within this clear, if not dominating, structure, the gradual movement of the pupil upwards towards philosophy is always apparent; this is the real message we are to take away.

4 LANGUAGE AND STYLE

Reading P. is not quite like reading a classical Greek author; although the language is not in fact that different. P. consciously aims to write the classical language, not the *koinê* of his day, although not with the pedantic concern for exactness of linguistic imitation, so memorably mocked by Lucian, which characterizes one end of the so-called 'Atticist' movement and which lies at the heart of most modern discussion of learned, written Greek in the first two centuries after Christ. P. is not, of course, immune from these tendencies, as, for example, his careful use of particles demonstrates,⁵⁷ and strictly non-classical syntactical or phraeseological features are comparatively rare: P. uses the optative, a form which modern scholarship has turned into a touchstone of Atticist pretension, more frequently than Hellenistic prose which is unaffected by Atticism,⁵⁸ but does so occasionally in unclassical ways;⁵⁹ μή has a tendency to displace οὐ in any kind of subordinate phrase or clause, whether or not the sense is conditional (e.g. 26d μὴ δυνηθείς); there is also a tendency, again characteristic of later Greek, to use prepositional phrases instead of dependent genitives, e.g. 14ε ταῖς περὶ ἔδωδὴν καὶ πόσιν ἡδοναῖς, 'the pleasures of eating and drinking'.

Nevertheless, the most obvious characteristics of P.'s style, which are to some extent peculiar to him, also go back to formal Hellenistic prose and ultimately perhaps to Isocrates.⁶⁰ Three features in particular may be singled out here as phenomena which should strike every reader of the present treatise.

⁵⁶ Cf. Schenkeveld 1982: 69.

⁵⁷ Cf., e.g., 20b γοῦν, 32ε αὐτίκα γοῦν, 21a καὶ μὴν... γε, 22c introductory τοῖνυν, 17b apodotic δέ, 19b–c τε... τε; perhaps the most striking instance is the 'Atticist' gem ἀνωστέπως (32ε). P.'s fondness for litotes (21a, d οὐ χεῖρον, 17b, d οὐ πάνυ etc) may also be seen as a conscious reproduction of classical χάρις.

⁵⁸ Cf. Ziegler 1951: 931–2 = 1964: 294–5.

⁵⁹ Cf. the transmitted μέλλοιμεν at 22d which we keep.

⁶⁰ On P.'s style see esp. Russell forthcoming; there is a brief survey in Hillyard 1981: xxii–xxxiii, a useful collection of examples in Lo Cascio 1997: 26–31, and further bibliographical guidance in Torraca 1998.

First, there is P's fondness for various forms of verbal amplification, most notably the use of near synonyms in close juxtaposition;⁶¹ such doubling may be used to define a precise nuance, or its principal cause may seem to be a striving for elegant balance. A few examples from the early pages of the treatise will suggest the range of this technique:

14ε παρέχουσιν ὑπήκοους ἑαυτοὺς καὶ χειροῦθεις 'they show themselves obedient and manageable'.

15b τὸ μηδαμοῦ νωθρὸν ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ σφοδρὸν καὶ δεδορκός 'the quality of being nowhere lethargic, but everywhere eager and awake'; here the expansion is redoubled by the combination of negative and positive, and the substantival neuter adjectives are another common feature of Plutarch's writing.

17d πεπονηθῶτων . . . καὶ προεαλωκότων ὑπὸ δόξης καὶ ἀπάτης '(expressions of) persons who have suffered and have fallen captive to deceitful opinion'; here the alliterative pair of near synonyms (cf., e.g., 26a, 27f πιθανός . . . καὶ πανοῦργος) is combined with another pair which forms a virtual hendiadys.

17d δυσθήρατός ἐστι καὶ δύσληπτος '(truth) is hard to hunt down and hard to grasp'; here the pair of synonyms is not only alliterative but also consists of two words of similar formation.

18f ταῦτ' οὐκ ἐπαινοῦντες οὐδὲ δοκιμάζοντες ἀλλ' ὥς ἄτοπα καὶ φαῦλα φαύλοισι καὶ ἀτόποις ἤθεσι καὶ προσώποις περιτιθέντες γράφουσιν '(we must remind the boys that) poets do not write these things in praise or approval but because they are assigning weird and wicked words to wicked and weird characters and persons'; here a cluster of amplifications – a common phenomenon – is combined with a simple and obvious chiasmus.

19a προδιαβάλλει τὰ φαῦλα καὶ προσυνίστησι τὰ χρηστὰ 'anticipates his condemnation of the wicked and recommendation of the bad'. This is not an amplification as such, but the fullness and balance, of both verbal form and rhythm, is typical of P. and clearly related to the other phenomena considered here. P. is particularly rich in double compound verbs, many of them appearing in P. for the first time.

20a ἐφήμερον καὶ ἀψίκoron καὶ ἀβέβαιον 'ephemeral, transient and unstable'; triplets of synonyms are much less common than doublets, but by no means rare (cf. 34a ἄφροσι καὶ ἀνοήτοις καὶ ἀχαρίστοις).

A second remarkable feature of P's style, in which he has almost no rival among major Greek prose authors of any period, is the richness of his imagery. It is almost as if P. habitually associates anything he describes or touches upon with something else which it resembles or does not, and he uses this association to define what he is talking about. The result is that his writing has a very rich, almost poetical texture, which however also often obscures or even overwhelms the clarity and/or logic of his thought.⁶² This Plutarchan characteristic

⁶¹ Cf. Rehdantz-Blass 1886: 13–18, Kowalski 1918: 173, Teodorsson 2000.

⁶² The fullest study is Fuhrmann 1964; see also Dronkers 1892, Hirsch-Luipold 2002.

is perhaps less noticeable in the current treatise which relies so heavily upon brief poetic quotations, but even here P.'s habitual modes are on show; chapters 10–12 each begin with a simile drawn from the natural or agricultural world. Unsurprisingly, the preface is a particular site for such display. Thus we begin with an analogy, embellished by learned allusions to a Greek (Philoxenus) and a Roman (Cato) figure, between food which is not what it seems and philosophy concealed in attractive fiction; allusions to food and the use of food vocabulary then continue through the introductory sections, but these are supplemented by a quite different analogy – the young man ruined by the pleasure which poetry offers is like a city captured because one gate has been left open – expressed in parallel οὔτε... οὔτε clauses, another common device in P.⁶³ Complexes of imagery and comparison, not limited to a single instance, are in fact not uncommon. Thus, for example, in the preface P. urges his addressee to use the advice which follows 'if it seems no worse than the so-called "amethysts" which some people use at, or take before, drinking-parties' (15b); this is an elegant and understated ('no worse than...') variant of the comparison form, but the idea that poetry may be like wine is elaborately picked up at 15d–f with the story of Dryas, a quotation (involving 'poetic' imagery) from Plato, an analogy between the excesses of fertile vineyards and the excesses of poetry, and then a comparison between the effect of mandragora growing near vines and that of proper guidance in reading poetry.

A third feature of P.'s style to which attention must be paid is its rhythmical character, along with which goes P.'s avoidance of 'hiatus' (the juxtaposition of vowels or diphthongs at the end of one word and the beginning of another). Literary prose, like poetry, was designed to be heard, and thus it required some of the pleasing euphonic patterning of verse, while at the same time avoiding the regularity of verse structures. Traditions of prose rhythm go back to the classical period,⁶⁴ but P.'s practice seems to be based on Hellenistic practice and theory, some at least of which drew important inspiration from Isocrates;⁶⁵ this same tradition was that adopted and adapted by Cicero and writers of classical Latin prose.⁶⁶ From an early period, it was the ends of cola or sentences ('clausulae') where rhythmical effects in prose were most concentrated, though by no means exclusively so. As for the avoidance of hiatus, P. differs very markedly from the Atticists of the next generation, i.e. from Dio Chrysostom onwards, and here again the older tradition to which he adheres goes back to Isocrates, although P. once allows himself a gibe at Isocrates' fussiness (350d). Hiatus is permitted only

⁶³ The most common structure for comparisons is ὥσπερ/καθάπερ... οὕτω, but μέν... δέ in parallel is also not uncommon (e.g. 15c, 20c, 28b, 32e).

⁶⁴ There is a helpful orientation in Dover 2003; for more detail cf. Dover 1997: chapter 8.

⁶⁵ On prose-rhythm in P. cf. Sandbach 1939, Ziegler 1951: 935–6 = 1964: 298–9.

⁶⁶ For this reason studies of Latin prose-rhythm are also useful for P., cf. esp. Fraenkel 1968, Nisbet 1990.

in cases involving the definite article, μή, καί, εἰ and ἦ, and short vowels may be elided; the only obvious exceptions in this treatise are κρέα ἡδιστα (14d) and, in a quotation of an observation by Simonides, ἐμοῦ ἑξαπατᾶσθαι (15d).⁶⁷

The most common rhythmical clausulae in P. are as follows:

Cretic + spondee (—υ—x). Variants may be produced by resolution, e.g. —υ—υ—x, the Ciceronian *esse uideatur*, or by replacing the cretic by a molossus (— — —) or a choriamb (—υ—υ—).

Double cretic (—υ—υ—x). P. uses this less frequently than do some authors; the same variants as in the previous case are available.

Cretic preceded by dactyl (—υ—υ—x), the colon *edite regibus*, spondee (— — —x) or trochee (—υ—υx), the so-called 'hypodochmius'.

Two trochees (—υ—x), the 'ditrochee'; this is very common in P., and the usual variants by resolution are also found (—υ—υ—x or —υ—υ—x).

These types do not, of course, account for all sentence- or colon-endings (see below), and it is often uncertain how a particular clausula was actually felt. So too, there is uncertainty about the treatment of καί followed by an open vowel: are we to assume crasis (the 'blending' of the two into a single long syllable) or correption (the shortening of καί)? What is not in doubt, however, is the importance of rhythm to P.'s prose, and it is always worthwhile to pay attention to this while reading, or indeed reading aloud. In some elaborated passages rhythmical patterning emerges in even quite short cola, and is by no means restricted to sentence-endings. Two examples of such elaboration follow, not accidentally drawn from the opening and the very close of the work (14f–15a, 37a–b), to illustrate how integral to P.'s prose this feature may be. Other analyses of these passages are no doubt possible; we are here most concerned with demonstrating the importance of the subject.

οὔτε γὰρ πόλιν	—υ—υx	hypodochmius
αἱ κεκλεισμένοι πύλαι	—υ—υx	hypodochmius
τηροῦσιν ἀνάλωτον	—υ—υ—x	(res.) cretic + spondee
ἂν διὰ μιᾶς	—υ—υx	resolved ditrochee
παραδέξεται τοὺς πολεμίους,	— — — υ—υx	molossus + (res.) cretic
οὔτε νέον αἰ περὶ		
τὰς ἄλλας ἡδονὰς		
ἐγκράτεια σώιζουσιν,	— — — —x	molossus + spondee
ἂν τῇ δι' ἀκοῆς λάθῃ	—υ—υ—υ—	double cretic
προέμενος αὐτόν,	—υ—υ—x	double trochee
ἄλλ' ὅσον μᾶλλον αὐτῇ	—υ—x	double trochee
τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ λογίζεσθαι	—υ— —x	cretic + spondee
πεφυκότος ἀπτεται,	—υ—υ—x	dactyl + cretic

⁶⁷ For P.'s practice in general cf. Ziegler 1951: 932–5 = 1964: 295–8.

μᾶλλον ἀμεληθεῖσα βλάπτει	—υ—x	double trochee
καὶ διαφθείρει	—υ—x	cretic + spondee
τὸν παραδεξάμενον.	—υ—υ—υ—x	hemiepes ⁶⁸
διὸ καὶ τούτων ἕνεκα		
καὶ τῶν προειρημένων ἀπάντων	—υ—x	double trochee
ἀγαθῆς δεῖ		
τῷ νέῳ κυβερνήσεως	—υ—υ—	double cretic
περὶ τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν,	—υ—x	cretic + spondee
ἵνα μὴ προδιαβληθεῖς	—υ—υ—x	(res.) cretic + spondee
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον προπαιδευθεῖς	—υ—x	cretic + spondee
εὐμενῆς καὶ φίλος καὶ οἰκεῖος	—υ—x	cretic + spondee ⁶⁹
ὑπὸ ποιητικῆς		
ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν προπέμπηται.	—υ—x	cretic + spondee

5 THE TEXT

The principal witnesses to the text of *De audiendis poetis* are some thirty manuscripts ranging in date from (probably) the later tenth century to the fifteenth.⁷⁰ The MSS all go back to a common ancestor,⁷¹ and may be broadly grouped into two or three families, but the detailed relationships between them remain obscure, and the matter is not pursued in the current edition. We have also undertaken no new collation of MSS, but have drawn our information about readings principally from the Teubner edition of Paton 1925, as revised by Gärtner 1974, from Valgiglio 1973, from Philippon 1987, and from Bernardakis 2008. It would be fair to describe the text printed in the current edition as ‘eclectic’, rather than as driven by any strong view about the value of any particular manuscript or group of manuscripts;⁷² we naturally hope that the text is as close to what P. wrote as the nature of evidence allows, but doubt exists in a number of places and we have sought not to conceal that.

A particular problem concerns the text of P’s very many poetic quotations.⁷³ P’s MSS often give readings different to all or most of the direct tradition for the poets concerned. The reasons for this will be various: quotation from memory by

⁶⁸ This could also be analyzed as a dactyl followed by a choriamb.

⁶⁹ This assumes correpion of the second καί.

⁷⁰ Cf. Valgiglio 1973: lix–xci, Philippon 1987: 82–3, and Hillyard 1981: xxxix–xliv (*On listening to lectures* has a rather similar textual history). On the textual history of the *Moralia* more generally cf. Flacelière-Irigoien 1987: ccxxvii–cccxxiv.

⁷¹ Note the error ἐκάστω or ἐκάστωι at 32e, common to the whole tradition.

⁷² The value of Parisinus gr. 1956 (D), which contains in many places a quite different text from the rest of the tradition, has greatly divided previous editors; D’s principal champion has been Bernardakis, cf. Bernardakis 2008: 5–34, Flacelière-Irigoien 1987: cclx–cclxi.

⁷³ Cf. Philippon 1987: 83–4.

P., deliberate adaptation by P. (to suit either his argument or his syntax), scribal error within the tradition of P., contamination between P. and other indirect witnesses to the poetic text, use by P. of previous anthologies, rather than direct consultation of poetic witnesses. Our aim has been to print the text which we believe P. wrote, even where that clearly differs from the true text of the relevant poet; the reasons for such differences are explained in the commentary.

SIGLA

- M the unanimous reading of Plutarch MSS; occasionally this sign is used even where one or more MSS present alternative variants.
- m a reading attested in some, but not all, of the Plutarch MSS; ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ readings are not differentiated, even if the latter appears in only one MS.
- q a reading attested elsewhere, including elsewhere in Plutarch, in the tradition for the poetic passages quoted in the treatise.
- c a reading which is the result of conjecture.
- m* a reading by a later hand or corrector in a MS.
- i a reading attested in ancient quotations of Plutarch.

ΠΛΟΥΤΑΡΧΟΥ ΠΩΣ ΔΕΙ ΤΟΝ ΝΕΟΝ
ΠΟΙΗΜΑΤΩΝ ΑΚΟΥΕΙΝ

- ^{14d} **1** εἰ μὲν, ὡς Φιλόξενος ὁ ποιητὴς ἔλεγεν, ὦ Μάρκε Σήδατιε, τῶν κρεῶν τὰ μὴ κρέα ἥδιστα ἔστι καὶ τῶν ἰχθύων οἱ μὴ ἰχθύες, ἐκείνοις ἀποφαινεσθαι παρῶμεν οὐς ὁ Κάτων ἔφη τῆς καρδίας τὴν ὑπερώϊαν εὐαισθη-
^e τοτέραν ἔχειν. ὅτι δὲ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίαι λεγομένων οἱ σφόδρα νέοι τοῖς μὴ δοκοῦσι φιλοσόφως μὴδ' ἀπὸ σπουδῆς λέγεσθαι χαίρουσι μᾶλλον καὶ παρέχουσιν ὑπηκόους ἑαυτοὺς καὶ χειροήθεις, δῆλόν ἐστιν ἡμῖν. οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ Αἰσώπεια μυθάρια καὶ τὰς ποιητικὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν Ἀβάριν τὸν Ἡρακλείδου καὶ τὸν Λύκωνα τὸν Ἀρίστωνος διερχόμενοι περὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν ψυχῶν δόγματα μεμειγμένα μυθολογίαι μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἐνθουσιῶσι. διὸ δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἐν ταῖς περὶ ἔδωδὴν καὶ πόσιν ἡδοναῖς διαφυλάττειν εὐσχημονοῦντας αὐτοὺς, ^f **2** καὶ ἀναγνώσεσιν ἐθίζειν, ὥσπερ ὄψωι χρωμένους μετρίως τῷ τέρποντι, τὸ χρήσιμον ἀπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ σωτήριον διώκειν. οὔτε γὰρ πόλιν αἰ κεκλεισμένοι πύλαι τηροῦσιν ἀνάλωτον, ἂν διὰ μιᾶς παραδέξῃται τοὺς πολεμίους, οὔτε νέον αἰ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἡδονὰς ἐγκράτειαι σώζουσιν,
^{15a} **3** ἂν τῇ δι' ἀκοῆς λάθῃ προέμενος αὐτόν, ἀλλ' ὅσον μᾶλλον αὕτη τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ λογίζεσθαι πεφυκὸς ἅπτεται, μᾶλλον ἀμεληθεῖσα βλάπτει καὶ διαφθείρει τὸν παραδεξάμενον. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν οὗτ' ἴσως δυνατόν ἐστιν οὗτ' ὠφέλιμον ποιημάτων ἀπείργειν τὸν τηλικούτον ἡλικίος οὐμός τε τὸ νῦν Σώκλαρός ἐστι καὶ ὁ σὸς Κλεάνδρος, εὖ μάλα παραφυλάττωμεν αὐτοὺς, ὡς ἐν ταῖς ἀναγνώσεσι μᾶλλον ἢ ταῖς ὁδοῖς παιδαγωγίας δεομένους. ἃ δ' οὖν ἔμοι περὶ ποιημάτων εἰπόντι πρῶτην ἐπῆλθε νῦν πρὸς
^b **4** σὲ πέμψαι γεγραμμένα, δέλθε· κἂν δοκῇ σοι μὴδὲν εἶναι φαυλότερα τῶν ἀμεθύστων καλουμένων, ἃ τινες ἐν τοῖς πότοις περιάπτονται καὶ προλαμβάνουσι, μεταδίδου τῷ Κλεάνδρῳ καὶ προκαταλάβανε τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ, διὰ τὸ μηδαμοῦ νωθρὸν ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ σφοδρὸν καὶ δεδορκὸς εὐαγωγοτέραν ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων οὔσαν.

πουλύποδος κεφαλῇ ἐνὶ μὲν κακὸν ἐν δὲ καὶ ἐσθλόν,

ὅτι βρωθῆναι μὲν ἐστιν ἥδιστος, δυσόνειρον δ' ὕπνον ποιεῖ, φαντασίας ταραχῶδεις καὶ ἀλλοκότους δεχόμενον, ὡς λέγουσιν. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ποιητικῇ πολὺ μὲν τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τρόφιμον νέου ψυχῆς ἔνεστιν, οὐκ ἔλαττον

14d Σηδάτιε c: Σήδαπε M οὐς... ἔχειν m: οἷς... ὑπάρχειν m **14e** ὑποθέσεις ἀλλὰ καὶ m: ὑποθέσεις καὶ M διερχόμενοι περὶ c: διερχόμενοι M: διερχόμενοι ἀλλὰ καὶ m: διερχόμενοι καὶ c εὐσχημονοῦντας m: εὐσχήμενας m **14f** ἀπ' αὐτοῦ M: ἀπ' αὐτῶν c ἂν τῇ c: ἂν γε m: ἂν τι m: ἂν m **15a** μᾶλλον ἀμεληθεῖσα M: τοσοῦτο μᾶλλον ἀμελ. c εἰπόντι... γεγραμμένα m: εἰπεῖν... πέμψαι διανοήθην· καὶ λαβὼν ταῦτα γεγρ. m δέλθε m: διελθεῖν m

δὲ τὸ ταρακτικὸν καὶ παράφορον, ἂν μὴ τυγχάνη παιδαγωγίας ὀρθῆς ἢ ἀκρόασις. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ὡς ἔοικε περὶ τῆς Αἰγυπτίων χώρας ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι

φάρμακα, πολλὰ μὲν ἐσθλὰ μεμειγμένα πολλὰ δὲ λυγρὰ

τοῖς χρωμένοις ἀναδίδωσιν.

ἔνθ' ἐνὶ μὲν φιλότης, ἐν δ' ἥμερος, ἐν δ' ὀαριστύς
πάρφασις, ἢ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονεόντων·

οὐ γὰρ ἄπτεται τὸ ἀπατηλὸν αὐτῆς ἀβελτέρων κομιδῇ καὶ ἀνοήτων. διὸ καὶ Σιμωνίδης μὲν ἀπεκρίνατο πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα “τί δὴ μόνους οὐκ ἐξαπαταῖς Θεσσαλούς;” “ἀμαθέστεροι γὰρ εἰσιν ἢ ὡς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατᾶσθαι.” Γοργίας δὲ τὴν τραγωιδίαν εἶπεν ἀπάτην, ἣν ὁ δ τ' ἀπατήσας δικαιοτέρος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατήσαντος καὶ ὁ ἀπατηθεὶς σοφώτερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατηθέντος. πότερον οὖν τῶν νέων ὥσπερ τῶν Ἰθακησίων σκληρῶι τινὶ τὰ ὦτα καὶ ἀτέγκτωι κηρῶι καταπλάσσουντες ἀναγκάζωμεν αὐτοὺς τὸ Ἐπικούρειον ἀκάτειον ἀραμένους ποιητικὴν φεύγειν καὶ παρεξελάνειν, ἢ μᾶλλον ὀρθῶι τινὶ λογισμῶι παριστάντες καὶ καταδέοντες τὴν κρίσιν, ὅπως μὴ παραφέρηται τῶι τέρποντι πρὸς τὸ βλάπτον, ἀπευθύνωμεν καὶ παραφυλάττωμεν;

οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ Δρύαντος υἱὸς κρατερὸς Λυκόοργος

ὕγιαίνοντα νοῦν εἶχεν, ὅτι πολλῶν μεθυσκομένων καὶ παροινούντων τὰς ἀμπέλους περιῶν ἐξέκοπτεν ἀντὶ τοῦ τὰς κρήνας ἐγγυτέρω e προσαγαγεῖν καὶ “μαίνόμενον” θεόν, ὡς φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων, “ἐτέρωι θεῶι νήφοντι κολαζόμενον” σωφρονίζειν. ἀφαιρεῖ γὰρ ἡ κρᾶσις τοῦ οἴνου τὸ βλάπτον, οὐ συναναιροῦσα τὸ χρήσιμον. μηδ' ἡμεῖς οὖν τὴν ποιητικὴν ἡμερίδα τῶν Μουσῶν ἐκκόπτωμεν μηδ' ἀφανίζωμεν, ἀλλ' ὅπου μὲν ὑφ' ἡδονῆς ἀκράτου πρὸς δόξαν αὐθάδως θρασυνόμενον ἐξυβρίζει καὶ ὑλομανεῖ τὸ μυθῶδες αὐτῆς καὶ θεατρικόν, ἐπιλαμβανόμενοι κολούωμεν καὶ πιέζωμεν· ὅπου δ' ἄπτεται τινος ἀληθινῆς μούσης τῇι χάριτι καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ τοῦ λόγου καὶ ἀγωγὸν οὐκ ἄκαρπὸν ἔστιν οὐδὲ κενόν, f ἐνταῦθα φιλοσοφίαν εἰσάγωμεν καὶ καταμιγνύωμεν. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ μανδραγόρας ταῖς ἀμπέλαις παραφυόμενος καὶ διαδιδούς τὴν δύναμιν εἰς τὸν οἶνον μαλακωτέραν ποιεῖ τὴν καταφορὰν τοῖς πίνουσιν, οὕτω τοὺς λόγους ἢ ποίησις ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἀναλαμβάνουσα μιγνυμένους πρὸς τὸ μυθῶδες ἐλαφρὰν καὶ προσφιλεῖν παρέχει τοῖς νέοις τὴν μάθησιν. ὅθεν

15d σκληρῶι c: κηρῶι M ἀκάτειον c: ἀκάτιον M **15e** ποιητικὴν ἡμερίδα M: ἡμερίδα c ἀληθινῆς μούσης c: μούσης M **15f** lacuna after ἀναλαμβάνουσα c

οὐ φευκτέον ἐστὶ τὰ ποιήματα τοῖς φιλοσοφεῖν μέλλουσιν, ἀλλὰ ἐν
 16a ποιήμασιν προφίλοσοφητέον ἐθιζομένους ἐν τῷ τέρποντι τὸ χρήσιμον
 ζητεῖν καὶ ἀγαπᾶν· εἰ δὲ μή, διαμάχεσθαι καὶ δυσχεραίνειν. ἀρχὴ γὰρ
 αὕτη παιδεύσεως,

ἔργου δὲ παντὸς ἦν τις ἄρχηται καλῶς,
 καὶ τὰς τελευτὰς εἰκός ἐσθ' οὕτως ἔχειν

κατὰ τὸν Σοφοκλέα.

2 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰσάγωμεν εἰς τὰ ποιήματα τὸν νέον μηδὲν οὕτω
 μεμελετημένον ἔχοντα καὶ πρόχειρον ὥς τὸ “πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἄοιδοι”
 τὰ μὲν ἐκόντες τὰ δ' ἄκοντες. ἐκόντες μὲν, ὅτι πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀκοῆς
 καὶ χάριν, ἣν οἱ πλεῖστοι διώκουσιν, αὐστηροτέραν ἡγοῦνται τὴν
 ἀλήθειαν τοῦ ψεύδους. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἔργωι γιγνομένη, κἂν ἀτερπὲς ἔχη τὸ
 b τέλος, οὐκ ἐξίσταται· τὸ δὲ πλαττόμενον λόγῳ ῥᾶιστα παραχωρεῖ
 καὶ τρέπεται πρὸς τὸ ἥδιον ἐκ τοῦ λυποῦντος. οὔτε γὰρ μέτρον
 οὔτε τρόπος οὔτε λέξεως ὄγκος οὔτ' εὐκαιρία μεταφορᾶς οὔθ' ἁρμονία
 καὶ σύνθεσις ἔχει τοσοῦτον αἰμυλίας καὶ χάριτος ὅσον εὖ πεπλεγ-
 μένη διάθεσις μυθολογίας· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν γραφαῖς κινητικώτερον ἐστὶ
 χρῶμα γραμμῆς διὰ τὸ ἀνδρεῖκελον καὶ ἀπατηλόν, οὕτως ἐν ποιή-
 μασι μεμειγμένον πιθανότητι ψεῦδος ἐκπλήττει καὶ ἀγαπᾶται μᾶλλον
 τῆς ἀμύθου καὶ ἀπλάστου περὶ μέτρον καὶ λέξιν κατασκευῆς. ὁθεν
 c ὁ Σωκράτης ἐκ τινων ἐνυπνίων ποιητικῆς ἀψάμενος αὐτὸς μὲν, ἅτε
 δὴ γεγωνὸς ἀληθείας ἀγωνιστῆς τὸν ἅπαντα βίον, οὐ πιθανὸς ἦν
 οὐδ' εὐφυὲς ψευδῶν δημιουργός, τοὺς δ' Αἰσώπου μύθους τοῖς ἔπεσιν
 ἐνέτεινεν ὥς ποιήσιν οὐκ οὔσαν ἤι ψεῦδος μὴ πρόσεστι. θυσίας μὲν γὰρ
 ἀχόρους καὶ ἀναύλους ἴσμεν, οὐκ ἴσμεν δ' ἄμυθον οὐδ' ἀψευδῆ ποιήσιν.
 τὰ δ' Ἐμπεδοκλέους ἔπη καὶ Παρμενίδου καὶ θηριακὰ Νικάνδρου καὶ
 γνωμολογίαι Θεόγνιδος λόγοι εἰσὶ κεχρημένοι παρὰ ποιητικῆς ὥσπερ
 d ὄχημα τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸν ὄγκον, ἵνα τὸ πεζὸν διαφύγῳσιν. ὅταν οὖν
 ἄτοπόν τι καὶ δυσχερὲς ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασι λέγηται περὶ θεῶν ἢ δαιμόνων
 ἢ ἀρετῆς ὑπ' ἄνδρὸς ἑλλογίμου καὶ δόξαν ἔχοντος, ὁ μὲν ὡς ἀληθῆ
 προσδεξάμενος λόγον οἶχεται φερόμενος καὶ διέφθαρται τὴν δόξαν, ὁ δὲ
 μεμνημένος αἰεὶ καὶ κατέχων ἑναργῶς τῆς ποιητικῆς τὴν περὶ τὸ ψεῦδος
 γοητείαν καὶ δυνάμενος λέγειν ἐκάστοτε πρὸς αὐτήν

ὦ μηχανήμα λυγκὸς αἰολώτερον,

16a τὸν νέον μηδὲν mm: μηδὲν m ἔχοντας c 16b παραχωρεῖ M: περι- m
 16c ἐνέτεινεν c: ἐνόμιζεν m: ἐνέμιζεν mm: ἐνέμιζεν m κεχρημένοι M: κιχράμενοι c
 16d λυγκὸς c: λυγγὸς m: σφιγγὸς m

τί παίζουσα τὰς ὀφρῦς συνάγεις, τί δ' ἐξαπατῶσα προσποιῇ διδάσκειν;" οὐδὲν πείσεται δεινὸν οὐδὲ πιστεύσει φαῦλον, ἀλλ' ἐπιλήψεται μὲν αὐτοῦ φοβουμένου τὸν Ποσειδῶνα καὶ ταρβούντος μὴ τὴν γῆν ἀναρρήξει καὶ ἀπογυμνώσῃ τὸν Ἄιδην, ἐπιλήψεται δὲ τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι χαλεπαίνοντος ὑπὲρ τοῦ πρώτου τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ὃν e

αὐτὸς ὕμνων αὐτὸς ἐν δαίτηι παρῶν
αὐτὸς τὰδ' εἰπὼν αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ὁ κτανών,

παύσεται δὲ τὸν φθιτὸν Ἀχιλλέα καὶ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα τὸν καθ' Ἴδου δακρύων ἀδυνάτους καὶ ἀσθενεῖς χεῖρας ἐπιθυμίαι τοῦ ζῆν ὀρέγοντας. ἂν δὲ πού συνταράττῃται τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ κρατῇται φαρμασσόμενος, οὐκ ὀκνήσει πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἰπεῖν

ἀλλὰ φώσδε τάχιστα λιλαίεο· ταῦτα δὲ πάντα
ἴσθ', ἵνα καὶ μετόπισθε τεῇ εἴπησθα γυναικί.

καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο χαριέντως Ὅμηρος εἰς τὴν Νέκυιαν εἶπεν, ὥς γυναικὸς ἀκρόασιν οὔσαν διὰ τὸ μυθῶδες. τοιαῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἃ πλάττουσιν f
ἐκόντες οἱ ποιηταί· πλείονα δ' ἢ μὴ πλάττοντες ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι καὶ δοξάζοντες αὐτοὶ προσαναχρώννυνται τὸ ψεῦδος ἡμῖν· οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ Διὸς εἰρηκότος Ὀμήρου 17a

ἐν δ' ἐτίθει δύο κῆρε τανηλεγέος θανάτοιο,
τὴν μὲν Ἀχιλλῆος τὴν δ' Ἑκτορος ἵπποδάμοιο,
ἔλκε δὲ μέσσα λαβών· ῥέπε δ' Ἑκτορος αἵσιμον ἡμαρ,
ῶιχετο δ' εἰς Αἶδαο, λίπεν δὲ ἔ Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων,

τραγωιδίαν ὁ Αἰσχύλος ὅλην τῷ μύθῳ περιέθηκεν, ἐπιγράψας Ψυχοστασίαν καὶ παραστήσας ταῖς πλάστιγξι τοῦ Διὸς ἐνθεν μὲν τὴν Θέτιν ἐνθεν δὲ τὴν Ἥω, δεομένας ὑπὲρ τῶν υἱέων μαχομένων. τοῦτο δὲ παντὶ δῆλον ὅτι μυθοποίημα καὶ πλάσμα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἢ ἐκπληξιν ἀκροατοῦ γέγονε. τὸ δὲ

Ζεὺς, ὃς τ' ἀνθρώπων ταμίης πολέμοιο τέτυκται

καὶ τό b

θεὸς μὲν αἰτίαν φύει βροτοῖς,
ὅταν κακῶσαι δῶμα παμπήδην θέληι,

16e τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι m: τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος m δαίτηι m: διαίτηι m: δαιτί m **16f** τοιαῦτ' ἄρ' ἐστὶν c: τοιαῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶν c

ταῦτα δ' ἤδη κατὰ δόξαν εἴρηται καὶ πίστιν αὐτῶν, ἣν ἔχουσιν ἀπάτην περὶ θεῶν καὶ ἄγνοϊαν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐκφερόντων καὶ μεταδιδόντων. πάλιν αἱ περὶ τὰς νεκυίας τερατουργαίαι καὶ διαθέσεις ὀνόμασι φοβεροῖς ἐνδημιουργοῦσαι φάσματα καὶ εἰδωλα ποταμῶν φλεγόμενων καὶ τόπων ἀγρίων καὶ κολασμάτων σκυθρωπῶν οὐ πάνυ πολλοὺς διαλανθάνουσιν ὅτι τὸ μυθῶδες αὐταῖς πολὺ καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ὥσπερ τρο-
 c φαῖς τὸ φαρμακῶδες ἐγκέκραται. καὶ οὐθ' Ὅμηρος οὔτε Πίνδαρος οὔτε Σοφοκλῆς πεπεισμένοι ταῦτ' ἔχειν οὕτως ἔγραψαν·

ἔνθεν τὸν ἄπειρον ἐρεύγονται σκότον
 βληχροὶ δνοφερᾶς νυκτὸς ποταμοί,

καί

παρ δ' ἴσαν ὤκεανοῦ τε ῥοὰς καὶ Λευκάδα πέτρην,

καί

στενωπὸς Ἰδίου καὶ παλιρροία βυθοῦ.

ὅσας μέντοι τὸν θάνατον ὡς οἰκτρὸν ἢ τὴν ἀταφίαν ὡς δεινὸν ὀλοφυρό-
 μενοι καὶ δεδιότες φωνὰς ἐξηγνήχασιν

μή μ' ἄκλαυστον ἄθαπτον ἰὼν ὅπιθεν καταλείπειν

καί

ψυχὴ δ' ἐκ ῥεθέων πταμένη Ἰδίοσδε βεβήκει,
 ὃν πότμον γοώσασα, λιποῦσ' ἀνδρότητα καὶ ἥβην

καί

d μή μ' ἀπολέσῃς ἄωρον· ἡδὺ γὰρ τὸ φῶς
 λεύσειν· τὰ δ' ὑπὸ γῆν μή μ' ἰδεῖν ἀναγκάσῃς,

αὗται πεπονθότων εἰσὶ καὶ προεαλωκότων ὑπὸ δόξης καὶ ἀπάτης. διὸ μᾶλλον ἄπτονται καὶ διαταράττουσιν ἡμᾶς, ἀναπιμπλαμένους τοῦ πάθους καὶ τῆς ἀσθενείας ἀφ' ἧς λέγονται. πρὸς ταῦτα δὴ πάλιν παρασκευάζωμεν εὐθύς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔχειν ἔναυλον ὅτι ποιητικῇ μὲν οὐ πάνυ μέλον ἐστὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, ἡ δὲ περὶ ταῦτ' ἀλήθεια καὶ τοῖς μηδὲν ἄλλο πεπονημένοις ἔργον ἢ γνῶσιν καὶ μάθησιν τοῦ ὄντος εὖ μάλα δυσστήρατός ἐστι καὶ δύσληπτος, ὡς ὁμολογοῦσιν αὐτοί. καὶ τὰ Ἐμπε-
 δοκλέους ἔστω πρόχειρα ταυτί·

οὕτως οὐτ' ἐπιδερκτὰ τὰδ' ἀνδράσιν οὐτ' ἐπακουστά
οὔτε νόωι περιληπτὰ,

e

καὶ τὰ Ξενοφάνους,

καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὕτις ἀνὴρ γένητ' οὐδέ τις ἔσται
εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων,

καὶ νῆ Δία τὰ Σωκράτους ἐξομνυμένου παρὰ Πλάτωνι τὴν περὶ τούτων
γνώσιν. ἤττον γὰρ ὥς εἰδόσι τι περὶ τούτων προσέξουσιν τοῖς ποιηταῖς
ἐν οἷς τοὺς φιλοσόφους ἰλιγγιῶντας ὁρῶσιν.

3 ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπιστήσωμεν αὐτὸν ἅμα τῷι προσάγειν τοῖς
ποιήμασιν ὑπογράφοντες τὴν ποιητικὴν ὅτι μιμητικὴ τέχνη καὶ f
δύναμις ἐστὶν ἀντίστροφος τῇ ζωγραφίᾳ. καὶ μὴ μόνον ἐκεῖνο τὸ
θυρολούμενον ἀκηκοὺς ἔστω, ζωγραφίαν μὲν εἶναι φθεγγομένην τὴν
ποίησιν, ποίησιν δὲ σιγῶσαν τὴν ζωγραφίαν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τούτῳ 18a
διδάσκωμεν αὐτὸν ὅτι γεγραμμένην σαύραν ἢ πίθηκον ἢ Θερσίτου
πρόσωπον ἰδόντες ἡδόμεθα καὶ θαυμάζομεν οὐχ ὥς καλὸν ἀλλ' ὥς
ὁμοιον. οὐσίαι μὲν γὰρ οὐ δύναται καλὸν γενέσθαι τὸ αἰσχρόν· ἡ δὲ
μίμησις, ἂν τε περὶ φαῦλον ἂν τε περὶ χρηστὸν ἐφίκεται τῆς ὁμοιότη-
τος, ἐπαινεῖται. καὶ τοῦναντίον ἂν αἰσχροῦ σώματος εἰκόνα καλὴν
παράσχη, τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸ εἶκός οὐκ ἀπέδωκεν.

γράφουσι δὲ καὶ πράξεις ἀτόπους ἔνιοι, καθάπερ Τιμόμαχος
τὴν Μηδείας τεκνοκτονίαν καὶ Θέων τὴν Ὀρέστου μητροκτονίαν
καὶ Παρράσιος τὴν Ὀδυσσεὺς προσποίητον μανίαν καὶ Χαιρεφάνης b
ἀκολάστους ὁμιλίαις γυναικῶν πρὸς ἀνδρας. ἐν οἷς μάλιστα δεῖ τὸν νέον
ἐθίζεσθαι, διδασκόμενον ὅτι τὴν πρᾶξιν οὐκ ἐπαινοῦμεν ἥς γέγονεν ἢ
μίμησις, ἀλλὰ τὴν τέχνην εἰ μεμίμηται προσηκόντως τὸ ὑποκείμενον.
ἐπεὶ τοίνυν καὶ ποιητικὴ πολλάκις ἔργα φαῦλα καὶ πάθη μοχθηρὰ
καὶ ἦθη μιμητικῶς ἀπαγγέλλει, δεῖ τὸ θαυμαζόμενον ἐν τούτοις καὶ
κατορθούμενον μήτ' ἀποδέχεσθαι τὸν νέον ὥς ἀληθὲς μήτε δοκιμάζειν ὥς
καλόν, ἀλλ' ἐπαινεῖν μόνον ὥς ἐναρμόττον τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ προσώπῳ
καὶ οἰκεῖον. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὑὸς βοὴν καὶ ψόφον τροχιλίας καὶ πνευμάτων c
ῥοῖζον καὶ θαλάττης κτύπον ἀκούοντες ἐνοχλούμεθα καὶ δυσχεραίνομεν,
ἂν δὲ τις πιθανῶς ταῦτα μιμῇται, καθάπερ Παρμένων τὴν ὕν καὶ Θεό-
δωρος τὰς τροχιλίας, ἡδόμεθα, καὶ νοσῶδη μὲν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ὕπουλον
ὥς ἀτερπὲς θέαμα φεύγομεν, τὸν δ' Ἀριστοφῶντος Φιλοκτήτην καὶ τὴν
Σιλανίωνος Ἰοκάστην ὁμοίους φθίνουσι καὶ ἀποθνήσκουσι πεπονημέ-
νους ὁρῶντες χαίρομεν, οὕτως ὁ νέος ἀναγιγνώσκων ἅ Θερσίτης ὁ

γελωτοποιὸς ἢ Σίσυφος ὁ φθορεὺς ἢ Βάτραχος ὁ πορνοβοσκὸς λέγων
 ἢ πράττων πεποίηται, διδασκέσθω τὴν μιμουμένην ταῦτα δύναμιν καὶ
 d τέχνην ἐπαινεῖν, ἃς δὲ μιμεῖται διαθέσεις καὶ πράξεις προβάλλεσθαι καὶ
 κακίζειν. οὐ γάρ ἐστι ταῦτὸ τὸ καλὸν τι μιμεῖσθαι καὶ καλῶς. καλῶς γάρ
 ἐστι τὸ πρεπόντως καὶ οἰκείως, οἰκεῖα δὲ καὶ πρέποντα τοῖς αἰσχροῖς
 τὰ αἰσχρά. καὶ γὰρ αἱ Δαμωνίδα τοῦ χωλοῦ κρηπῖδες, ἃς ἀπολέσας
 εὔχετο τοῖς τοῦ κλέφαντος ἐναρμόσαι ποσί, φαῦλαι μὲν ἦσαν ἐκείνῳ δ'
 ἥρμοττον. καὶ τό

εἶπερ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν χρή, τυραννίδος πέρι
 κάλλιστον ἀδικεῖν,

καὶ τό

τοῦ μὲν δικαίου τὴν δόκησιν ἄρνησο
 τὰ δ' ἔργα τοῦ πᾶν δρῶντος ἔνθα κερδανεῖς,

καί

e τάλαντον ἢ προῖξ. μὴ λάβω; ζῆν δ' ἐστι μοι
 τάλαντον ὑπεριδόντι; τεύξομαι δ' ὕπνου
 προέμενος; οὐ δώσω δὲ κἂν Αἰδοῦ δίκην
 ὥς ἡσεβηκῶς εἰς τάλαντον ἀργυροῦν;

μοχθηροὶ μὲν εἰσι λόγοι καὶ ψευδεῖς, Ἐτεοκλεῖ δὲ καὶ Ἰξίονι καὶ
 τοκογλύφῳ πρεσβύτῃ πρέποντες. ἂν οὖν ὑπομινησκώμεν τοὺς παῖ-
 f δας ὅτι ταῦτ' οὐκ ἐπαινοῦντες οὐδὲ δοκιμάζοντες ἀλλ' ὥς ἄτοπα καὶ
 φαῦλα φαύλοις καὶ ἀτόποις ἦθεσι καὶ προσώποις περιτιθέντες γρά-
 φουσιν, οὐκ ἂν ὑπὸ τῆς δόξης βλάπτοντο τῶν ποιητῶν. ἀλλὰ τοῦ-
 ναντίον ἢ πρὸς τὸ πρόσωπον ὑποψία διαβάλλει καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὸν
 λόγον, ὥς φαῦλον ὑπὸ φαύλου καὶ λεγόμενον καὶ πραττόμενον. οἶόν
 ἐστι καὶ τὸ τῆς συγκοιμήσεως τοῦ Πάριδος ἐκ τῆς μάχης ἀποδράντος.
 οὐδένα γὰρ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων ἡμέρας συγκοιμώμενον γυναικὶ ποιήσας
 ἢ τὸν ἀκόλαστον καὶ μοιχικὸν ἐν αἰσχύνῃ διηλός ἐστι καὶ φόγῳ τιθέ-
 μενος τὴν τοιαύτην ἀκρασίαν.

19a **4** ἐν δὲ τούτοις εὖ μάλα προσεκτέον εἴ τινας ὁ ποιητὴς αὐτὸς
 ἐμφάσεις δίδωσι κατὰ τῶν λεγομένων ὥς δυσχεραينوμένων ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.
 καθάπερ ὁ Μένανδρος ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ τῆς Θαΐδος πεποίηκεν

ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν αἶεδε τοιαύτην, θεά,
 θρασεῖαν ὥραϊαν δὲ καὶ πιθανὴν ἄμα,

18d Δημωνίδα m ἐναρμόσαι m: ἀρμόσαι m κερδανεῖ c **18e** λάβω c: λαβών
 m: λαβών καὶ m

ἀδικοῦσαν ἀποκλείουσιν αἰτοῦσαν πυκνά,
μηδενὸς ἐρώσαν, προσποιουμένην δ' αἰεί.

ἄριστα δ' Ὅμηρος τῷ γένει τούτῳ κέχρηται· καὶ γὰρ προδιαβάλλει
τὰ φαῦλα καὶ προσυνίστησι τὰ χρηστὰ τῶν λεγομένων. προσυνίστησι
μὲν οὕτως b

αὐτίκα μειλίχιον καὶ κερδαλέον φάτο μῦθον

καί

τὸν δ' ἀγανοῖς ἐπέεσσιν ἐρητύσασκε παραστάς.

ἐν δὲ τῷ προδιαβάλλειν μονονοῦ μαρτύρεται καὶ διαγορεύει μήτε
χρῆσθαι μήτε προσέχειν ὡς οὔσιν ἀτόποις καὶ φαύλοις, οἷον τὸν τ'
Ἀγαμέμνονα μέλλων διηγείσθαι τῷ ἱερεῖ χρώμενον ἀπηνῶς προεῖρηκεν

ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἀτρεΐδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι ἦνδανε θυμῷ,
ἀλλὰ κακῶς ἀφίει,

τουτέστιν ἀγρίως καὶ αὐθάδως καὶ παρὰ τὸ προσήκον· τῷ τ' Ἀχιλλεῖ c
τοὺς θρασεῖς λόγους περιτίθησιν

οἶνοβαρές, κυνὸς ὄμματ' ἔχων, κραδίην δ' ἐλάφοιο

τὴν αὐτοῦ κρίσιν ὑπειπὼν

Πηλεΐδης δ' ἐξαῦτις ἀταρτηροῖς ἐπέεσσιν
Ἀτρεΐδην προσέειπε, καὶ οὐ πῶ λῆγε χόλοιο.

καλὸν γὰρ εἰκὸς οὐδὲν εἶναι μετ' ὀργῆς καὶ αὐστηρῶς λεγόμενον. ὁμοίως
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων

ἦ ῥα, καὶ Ἔκτορα δῖον αἰεκέα μήδετο ἔργα,
πρηνέα πὰρ λεχέεσσι Μενoitιάδαο τανύσσας.

εὔ δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἐπιρρήσεσι χρῆται, καθάπερ τινὰ ψῆφον ἰδίαν ἐπιφέρων
τοῖς πραττομένοις ἢ λεγομένοις, ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς μοιχείας τοῦ Ἄρεος τοὺς d
θεοὺς ποιῶν λέγοντας

οὐκ ἀρετᾶι κακὰ ἔργα· κιχάνει τοι βραδὺς ὦκύν,

ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς τοῦ Ἔκτορος ὑπερφροσύνης καὶ μεγαλαυχίας

ὥς ἔφατ' εὐχόμενος, νεμέσθη δὲ πότνια Ἥρη,

ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς Πανδάρου τοξείας

ὥς φάτ' Ἀθηναίη, τῷ δὲ φρένας ἄφρονι πείθην.

αὗται μὲν οὖν αἱ τῶν λόγων ἀποφάσεις καὶ δόξα παντός εἰσι κατιδεῖν τοῦ προσέχοντος· ἑτέρας δ' ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν παρέχουσι
 e μαθήσεις, ὥσπερ ὁ Εὐριπίδης εἰπεῖν λέγεται πρὸς τοὺς τὸν Ἰξίονα
 λοιδοροῦντας ὡς ἀσεβῆ καὶ μιαρόν, “οὐ μέντοι πρότερον αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς
 σκηνῆς ἐξήγαγον ἢ τῷ τροχῷ προσηλῶσαι.” παρὰ δ' Ὀμήρῳ σιω-
 πώμενόν ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτο γένος τῆς διδασκαλίας, ἔχει δ' ἀναθεώρησιν
 ὠφέλιμον ἐπὶ τῶν διαβεβλημένων μάλιστα μύθων, οὓς ταῖς πάλαι μὲν
 ὑπονοαῖς ἀλληγορίαις δὲ νῦν λεγομέναις παραβιαζόμενοι καὶ διαστρέ-
 φοντες ἔνιοι μοιχευομένην φασὶν Ἀφροδίτην ὑπ' Ἄρεος μηνύειν Ἥλιον,
 ὅτι τῷ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀστέρι συνελθὼν ὁ τοῦ Ἄρεος μοιχικὰς ἀποτελεῖ
 γενέσεις, Ἥλιου δ' ἐπαναφερομένου καὶ καταλαμβάνοντος οὐ λανθά-
 f νουσιν. τὸν δὲ τῆς Ἥρας καλλωπισμὸν ἐπὶ τὸν Δία καὶ τὴν περὶ τὸν
 κεστὸν γοητείαν ἄερος τινὸς κάθαρσιν εἶναι βούλονται τῷ πυρῶδει
 πλησιάζοντος, ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοῦ τὰς λύσεις τοῦ ποιητοῦ διδόντος.
 ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς περὶ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης διδάσκει τοὺς προσέχοντας, ὅτι
 μουσικὴ φαύλη καὶ αἵσματα πονηρὰ καὶ λόγοι μοχθηρὰς ὑποθέσεις λαμ-
 20a βάνοντες ἀκόλαστα ποιοῦσιν ἦθη καὶ βίους ἀνάνδρους καὶ ἀνθρώπους
 τρυφὴν καὶ μαλακίαν καὶ γυναικοκρατίαν ἀγαπῶντας

εἵματά τ' ἐξημοιβὰ λοετρά τε θερμὰ καὶ εὐνὰς.

διὸ καὶ τὸν Ὀδυσσεά τῷ κιθαρῳιδῷ προστάττοντα πεποιήκεν

ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ μετάβηθι καὶ ἵππου κόσμον ἄεισον,

καλῶς ὑφηγούμενος τὸ παρὰ τῶν φρονίμων καὶ νοῦν ἐχόντων χρῆναι
 λαμβάνειν τοὺς μουσικοὺς καὶ ποιητικοὺς τὰς ὑποθέσεις. ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ
 τῆς Ἥρας ἄριστα τὴν ἀπὸ φαρμάκων καὶ γοητείας καὶ μετὰ δόλου πρὸς
 τοὺς ἀνδρας ὁμιλίαν καὶ χάριν ἔδειξεν οὐ μόνον ἐφήμερον καὶ ἀψίκορον
 b καὶ ἀβέβαιον οὔσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μεταβάλλουσαν εἰς ἐχθραν καὶ ὀργήν,
 ὅταν τὰ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἀπομαρανθῇ. τοιαῦτα γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς ἀπειλεῖ καὶ
 λέγει πρὸς αὐτήν

ὄφρα ἴδῃς ἦν τοι χραίσμη φιλότῃς τε καὶ εὐνῇ,
 ἦν ἐμίγῃς ἐλθοῦσα θεῶν ἅπο καὶ μ' ἀπάτησας.

ἢ γὰρ τῶν φαύλων διάθεσις ἔργων καὶ μίμησις ἂν προσαποδῶι τὴν
 συμβαίνουσαν αἰσχύνην καὶ βλάβην τοῖς ἐργασαμένοις, ὠφέλησεν οὐκ

19e ἔχει c: ἔχον m: ἔχων m **19f** τινὸς M: τινὰ c **20a** γυναικοκρατίαν m:
 -κρασίαν m εὐνὰς m: εὐναί m ἀπὸ φαρμάκων c: ἀπὸ τῶν φ. m: μετὰ φ. m καὶ
 μετὰ M: μετὰ c καὶ χάριν M: χάριν c

ἐβλάψε τὸν ἀκροώμενον. οἱ γοῦν φιλόσοφοι παραδείγμασι χρῶνται, νοουθετοῦντες καὶ παιδεύοντες ἐξ ὑποκειμένων, οἱ δὲ ποιηταὶ ταῦτα c ποιοῦσι πλάττοντες αὐτοὶ πράγματα καὶ μυθολογοῦντες.

ὁ μὲν οὖν Μελάνθιος εἴτε παίζων εἴτε σπουδάζων ἔλεγε διασώιζεσθαι τὴν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν ῥητόρων διχοστασίας καὶ ταραχῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἀποκλίνειν ἅπαντας εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν τοῖχον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι τινα τοῦ βλάπτοντος ἀνθολκὴν ἐν τῇ διαφορᾷ τῶν πολιτευομένων. αἱ δὲ τῶν ποιητῶν ὑπεναντιώσεις πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀνταναφέρουσαι τὴν πίστιν οὐκ ἔωσιν ἰσχυρὰν ῥοπήν γενέσθαι πρὸς τὸ βλάπτον. ὅπου μὲν οὖν αὐτοὶ τῷ τιθέναι σύνεγγυς ἐκφανεῖς ποιοῦσι τὰς ἀντιλογίας, δεῖ τῷ βελτίονι συνηγορεῖν ὥσπερ ἐν τούτοις

A. πόλλ', ὦ τέκνον, σφάλλουσιν ἀνθρώπους θεοί.

d

B. τὸ ῥᾷστον εἴπας, αἰτιάσασθαι θεούς.

καὶ πάλιν

A. χρυσοῦ σὲ πλήθει, τοῖσδε δ' οὐ χαίρειν χρεών.

B. σκαῖόν γε πλουτεῖν κάλλο μῆδεν εἰδέναι.

καί

A. τί δῆτα θύειν δεῖ σε κατθανοῦμενον;

B. ἄμεινον· οὐδεὶς κάματος εὐσεβεῖν θεούς.

τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα τὰς λύσεις ἔχει προδήλους, ἐὰν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, πρὸς τὰ βελτίονα τῇ κρίσει τοὺς νέους κατευθύνωμεν. ὅσα δ' εἴρηται μὲν ἀτόπως εὐθύς δ' οὐ λέλυται, ταῦτα δεῖ τοῖς ἀλλαχόθι πρὸς τοῦναντίον εἰρημένους ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀνταναιρεῖν, μὴ ἀχθομένους τῷ ποιητῇ μῆδ' e χαλεπαίνοντας ἀλλ' ὥς ἐν ἡθελ καὶ μετὰ παιδιᾷ λεγόμενα δεχομένους. εὐθύς, εἰ βούλει, πρὸς τὰς Ὀμηρικὰς τῶν θεῶν ῥίψεις ὑπ' ἀλλήλων καὶ τρώσεις ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ διαφορὰς καὶ χαλεπότητας

οἶσθα καὶ ἄλλον μῦθον ἀμείνονα τοῦδε νοῆσαι

καὶ νοεῖς νῆ Δία καὶ λέγεις κρεῖττον ἀλλαχόθι καὶ βέλτιον τὰ τοιαῦτα

θεοὶ βεῖα ζῶντες

καί

τῷ ἐνὶ τέρπονται μάκαρες θεοὶ ἥματα πάντα

20c ταῦτα c: ταῦτα M αὐτοὶ... ποιοῦσι c: αὐτοῖς τῷ τιθέναι... ποιεῖ m: αὐτοῖς τὸ τιθέναι... ποιεῖ m **20d** τοῖσδε m: τοῦσδε m θύειν q: οὔσιν m: κάμνειν m **20e** ὥς ἐν c: ἐν M λεγόμενα δεχομένους c: λεγομένοις M

καί

ὥς γὰρ ἐπεκλώσαντο θεοὶ δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσι,
ζῶειν ἀχνυμένοις· αὐτοὶ δέ τ' ἀκηδέες εἰσίν.

γ αὐται γὰρ εἰσιν δόξαι περὶ θεῶν ὑγιαίνουσαι καὶ ἀληθεῖς, ἐκεῖνα δὲ
πέπλασται πρὸς ἑκπληξιν ἀνθρώπων. πάλιν Εὐριπίδου λέγοντος

πολλαῖσι μορφαῖς οἱ θεοὶ σοφισμάτων
σφάλλουςιν ἡμᾶς κρείσσονες πεφυκότες

21a οὐ χεῖρόν ἐστιν ὑπενεγκεῖν τό

εἰ θεοὶ τι δρωσι φαῦλον, οὐκ εἰσιν θεοί,

βέλτιον εἰρημένον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. καὶ τοῦ Πινδάρου σφόδρα πικρῶς καὶ
παροξυντικῶς εἰρηκός

χρὴ δὲ πᾶν ἔρδοντ' ἀμαυρῶσαι τὸν ἐχθρόν,

ἀλλ' αὐτός γε σὺ λέγεις ὅτι

τὸ παρ δίκαν
γλυκὺ πικροτάτα μένει τελευτά,

καὶ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους

τὸ κέρδος ἡδύ, κἂν ἀπὸ ψευδῶν ἴηι,

καὶ μὴν σοῦ γ' ἀκηκόαμεν ὥς

οὐκ ἐξάγουσι καρπὸν οἱ ψευδεῖς λόγοι.

β πρὸς δ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ περὶ τοῦ πλούτου,

δεινὸς γὰρ ἔρπειν πλοῦτος ἔς τε τᾶβατα
καὶ † πρὸς τὰ βατὰ † χῳπόθεν πένης ἀνὴρ
οὐδ' ἐντυχὼν δύναται' ἂν ὦν ἐρᾷ τυχεῖν.
καὶ γὰρ δυσειδὲς σῶμα καὶ δυσώνυμον
γλώσσηι σοφὸν τίθησιν εὐμορφὸν τ' ἰδεῖν,

ἀντιπαραθήσει πολλὰ τῶν Σοφοκλέους, ὧν καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστί

γένοιτο κἂν ἄπλουτος ἐν τιμαῖς ἀνὴρ

21a φαῦλον m: φλαῦρον m ἴηι m: εἴη m 21b ἔς τε c: ἔσται q: πρὸς τε m: τε m πρὸς
τᾶβατα m: πρὸς τὰ βατὰ m: πρὸς βέβηλα c χῳπόθεν q: καὶ ὀπόθεν M ἐντυχὼν
m: τυχὼν m: εὐτυχὼν q

καί

οὐδὲν κακίων πτωχός, εἰ καλῶς φρονεῖ

καί

ἀλλὰ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν
 τίς χάρις, εἰ κακόβουλος
 φροντὶς ἐκτρέφει τὸν εὐαίωνα πλοῦτον;

c

ὁ δὲ Μένανδρος ἐπῆρε μὲν ἀμέλει τὴν φιληδονίαν καὶ ὑπεχαλύνωσε τοῖς
 ἔρωτικοῖς καὶ διαπύροις ἐκείνοις

ἅπανθ' ὅσα ζῆι καὶ τὸν ἥλιον βλέπει
 τὸν κοινὸν ἡμῖν, δοῦλα ταῦτ' ἔσθ' ἡδονῆς.

πάλιν δ' ἐπέστρεψε καὶ περιέσπασε πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν
 θρασύτητα τῆς ἀκολασίας ἐξέκοψεν εἰπὼν

ὄνειδος αἰσχρὸς βίος ὅμως καὶ ἡδὺς ἦι.

ταῦτα γὰρ ἐκείνοις μὲν ἔστιν ὑπεναντία, βελτίω δὲ καὶ χρησιμώτερα.
 δεῖν οὖν θάτερον ἢ τοιαύτη τῶν ἐναντίων ποιήσῃ παράθεσις καὶ
 κατανόησις, ἢ παράξῃ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἢ καὶ τοῦ χείρονος ἀποστήσῃ
 τὴν πίστιν.

ἂν δ' αὐτοὶ μὴ διδῶσι τῶν ἀτόπως εἰρημένων λύσεις, οὐ χεῖρόν ἐστιν
 ἐτέρων ἐνδόξων ἀποφάσεις ἀντιτάττοντας ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ζυγοῦ ῥέπειν
 ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον. οἷον τοῦ Ἀλέξιδος κινουῦντος ἐνίους ὅταν λέγῃ

τὰς ἡδονὰς δεῖ συλλέγειν τὸν σώφρονα.
 τρεῖς δ' εἰσὶν αἱ γε τὴν δύναμιν κεκτημέναι
 τὴν ὡς ἀληθῶς συντελοῦσαν τῷ βίῳ,
 τὸ πιεῖν τὸ φαγεῖν τὸ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης τυγχάνειν.
 τὰ δ' ἄλλα προσθήκας ἅπαντα χρή καλεῖν,

ὑπομνηστέον ὅτι Σωκράτης τούναντίον ἔλεγε, τοὺς μὲν φαύλους ζῆν
 ἕνεκα τοῦ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν, τοὺς δ' ἀγαθοὺς ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἕνεκα τοῦ
 ζῆν. πρὸς δὲ τὸν γράψαντα

ποτὶ τὸν πονηρὸν οὐκ ἄχρηστον ὄπλον ἡ πονηρία,

21d ῥέπειν ποιεῖν c: ποιεῖν m: ῥέπειν m τὸ πιεῖν τὸ φαγεῖν m_q: τὸ φαγεῖν τὸ πιεῖν
 m_q χρῆ m: δεῖ m τὸν πονηρὸν M: πονηρὸν q

τρόπον τινὰ συνεξομοιοῦσθαι κελεύοντα τοῖς πονηροῖς, τὸ τοῦ Διογένους παραβαλεῖν ἔστιν· ἐρωτηθεὶς γὰρ ὅπως ἂν τις ἀμύναιτο τὸν ἐχθρόν, “αὐτός,” ἔφη, “καλὸς κάγαθός γενόμενος.” δεῖ δὲ τῷ Διογένει καὶ πρὸς τὸν Σοφοκλέα χρῆσασθαι· πολλὰς γὰρ ἀνθρώπων μυριάδας ἐμβέβληκεν εἰς ἄθυμίαν περὶ τῶν μυστηρίων ταῦτα γράψας

ὥς τρισόλβιοι

f κεῖνοι βροτῶν, οἱ ταῦτα δερχθέντες τέλη
 μόλωσ' ἐς Αἰδου· τοῖσδε γὰρ μόνοις ἐκεῖ
 ζῆν ἔστι, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοισι πάντ' ἔχειν κακά.

Διογένης δ' ἀκούσας τι τοιοῦτον “τί λέγεις;” ἔφη· “κρίττονα μοῖραν
22a ἔξει Παταικίων ὁ κλέπτης ἀποθανὼν ἢ Ἐπαμεινώνδας ὅτι μεμύηται;”
Τιμοθέωι μὲν γὰρ αἰδοντι τὴν Ἄρτεμιν ἐν τῷ θεάτρωι

μαινάδα θυιάδα φοιβάδα λυσσάδα

Κινησίας εὐθύς ἀντεφώνησε “τοιαύτη σοι θυγάτηρ γένοιτο.” χαρίεν δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ Βίωνος πρὸς τὸν Θεογνιν λέγοντα

πᾶς γὰρ ἀνὴρ πενίῃ δεδμημένος οὔτε τι εἰπεῖν
οὔθ' ἔρξαι δύναται, γλῶσσα δὲ οἱ δέδεται

“πῶς οὖν σὺ πένης ὦν φλυαρεῖς τοσαῦτα καὶ καταδολεσχεῖς ἡμῶν;”

5 δεῖ δὲ μὴδὲ τὰς ἐκ τῶν παρακειμένων ἢ συμφραζομένων παραλιπεῖν
ἀφορμὰς πρὸς τὴν ἐπανάρθωσιν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ ἱατροὶ τῆς κανθαρίδος
οὔσης θανασίμου τοὺς πόδας ὅμως καὶ τὰ πτερὰ βοηθεῖν οἶονται καὶ
b ἀναλύειν τὴν δύναμιν, οὕτως ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασι, κἂν ὄνομα κἂν ῥῆμα
παρακείμενον ἀμβλυτέραν ποιῇ τὴν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἀπαγωγὴν, ἐπι-
λαμβάνεσθαι καὶ προσδισαφεῖν, ὥς ἐπὶ τούτων ἔνιοι ποιοῦσι

τοὔτό νύ που γέρας ἐστὶν διζυροῖσι βροτοῖσι,
κείρασθαί τε κόμην βαλέειν τ' ἀπὸ δάκρυ παρειῶν

καί

ὥς γὰρ ἐπεκλώσαντο θεοὶ δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσι,
ζῶειν ἀχνημένοις.

οὐ γὰρ ἀπλῶς εἶπε πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὑπὸ θεῶν ἐπικεκλῶσθαι λυπηρόν
c βίον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἄφροσι καὶ ἀνοήτοις, οὓς δειλαίους καὶ οἰκτροὺς διὰ
μοχθηρίαν ὄντας εἶωθε “δειλοὺς” καὶ “διζυροὺς” προσαγορεύειν.

ἐμβέβληκεν εἰς ἄθυμίαν m: ἐμβέβληκεν ἄθυμίας m: ἐμπέπληκεν ἄθυμίας m 21f ἔχειν c:
ἐκεῖνα m: ἐκεῖ m 22a μαινάδα θυιάδα φοιβάδα λυσσάδα M: θυιάδα φοιβάδα μαινάδα
λυσσάδα q 22b πᾶσιν m: καὶ πᾶσιν m 22c δειλαίους m: δολίους m

6 ἄλλος τοίνυν τρόπος ἐστὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ὑποψίας πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἐκ τοῦ χείρονος μεθιστὰς ὃ διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων τῆς συνηθείας, περὶ ὃν δεῖ τὸν νέον γεγυμνάσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ τὰς λεγομένας γλώττας. ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ φιλόλογον καὶ οὐκ ἀηδὲς ὅτι “ρίγεδανός” κακοθάνατός ἐστιν εἰδέναι (“δάνον” γὰρ Μακεδόνες τὸν θάνατον καλοῦσι), “καμμονίην” δὲ νίκην Αἰολεῖς τὴν ἐξ ἐπιμονῆς καὶ καρτερίας, Δρύοπες δὲ “πόπους” τοὺς δαίμονας. τουτὶ δ’ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ χρήσιμον, εἰ μέλλοιμεν ἐκ τῶν ποιημάτων ὠφελήσεσθαι καὶ μὴ βλαβήσεσθαι, τὸ γιγνώσκειν d πῶς τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ὀνόμασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ χρῶνται καὶ πάλιν τοῖς τῶν κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν, καὶ τί τὴν Τύχην καὶ τὴν Μοῖραν νοοῦντες ὀνομάζουσι, καὶ πότερον ταῦτα τῶν ἀπλῶς ἢ τῶν πολλαχῶς λεγομένων ἐστὶ παρ’ αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ ἄλλα πολλά. καὶ γὰρ “οἶκον” ποτὲ μὲν τὴν οἰκίαν καλοῦσιν

οἶκον ἐς ὑπόροφον,

ποτὲ δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν

ἐσθίεται μοι οἶκος,

καὶ “βίοτον” ποτὲ μὲν τὸ ζῆν

ἀμενήνωσεν δὲ οἱ αἰχμὴν
κυανοχαῖτα Ποσειδάων, βιότοιο μεγήρας,

ποτὲ δὲ τὰ χρήματα

e

βίοτον δέ μοι ἄλλοι ἔδουσι,

καὶ τῷ “ἀλύειν” ποτὲ μὲν ἀντὶ τοῦ δάκνεσθαι καὶ ἀπορεῖσθαι κέχρηται

ὥς ἔφαθ’, ἡ δ’ ἀλύουσ’ ἀπεβήσετο, τείρετο δ’ αἰνῶς,

ποτὲ δ’ ἀντὶ τοῦ γαυριᾶν καὶ χαίρειν

ἡ ἀλύεις ὅτι Ἴρον ἐνίκησας τὸν ἀλήτην;

καὶ τῷ “θοάζειν” ἡ τὸ κινεῖσθαι σημαίνουσιν, ὥς Εὐριπίδης

κῆτος θοάζον ἐξ Ἀτλαντικῆς ἁλός,

ἡ τὸ καθέζεσθαι, ὥς Σοφοκλῆς

ρίγεδανός m: -ή m **22d** ὠφελήσεσθαι m: -ηθήσεσθαι m τύχην m: ψύχην m βίοτον c: τὸν βίον M **22e** καθέζεσθαι c: καθέζεσθαι καὶ θαάσσειν M

f τίνας πόθ' ἔδρας τάσδε μοι θαάζετε
 ἱκτηρίοις κλάδοισιν ἐξεστέμμενοι;

χαρίεν δὲ καὶ τὸ τὴν χρεῖαν τῶν ὀνομάτων συνοικειοῦν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν, ὡς οἱ γραμματικοὶ διδάσκουσιν, ἄλλην πρὸς ἄλλα δύναμιν λαμβανόντων, οἷον ἔστι

νῆ' ὀλίγην αἰνεῖν, μεγάλη δ' ἐνὶ φορτίᾳ θέσθαι.

23a τῶι μὲν γὰρ “αἰνεῖν” ἀντὶ τοῦ παραιτεῖσθαι νῦν κέχρηται, καθάπερ ἐν
 τῇι συνθηαίᾳ “καλῶς” φάμεν “ἔχειν” καὶ “χαρίεν” κελεύομεν, ὅταν μὴ
 δεώμεθα μῆδὲ λαμβάνωμεν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῇν

ἐπαινὴν Περσεφόειαν

ἐνιοὶ φασιν ὡς παραιτητὴν εἰρῆσθαι. ταύτην δὴ τὴν διαίρεσιν καὶ
 διάκρισιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐν τοῖς μείζοσι καὶ σπουδαιοτέροις παρα-
 φυλάττοντες ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἀρχώμεθα διδάσκειν τοὺς νέους ὅτι χρῶν-
 ται τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ὀνόμασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ ποτὲ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ἐφαπ-
 τόμενοι τῇι ἐννοίᾳ, ποτὲ δὲ δυνάμεις τινὰς ὧν οἱ θεοὶ δοτῆρὲς εἰσι
 καὶ καθηγεμόνες ὁμωνύμως προσαγορεύοντες. οἷον εὐθύς ὁ Ἀρχίλοχος,
 ὅταν μὲν εὐχόμενος λέγηι

b κλυθ' ἄναξ Ἥφαιστε καὶ μοι σύμμαχος γουνουμένωι
 ἵλαος γενοῦ, χαρίζεω δ' οἷά περ χαρίζαι,

αὐτὸν τὸν θεὸν κατακαλούμενος δῆλός ἐστιν· ὅταν δὲ τὸν ἄνδρα τῆς
 ἀδελφῆς ἠφανισμένον ἐν θαλάττῃ καὶ μὴ τυχόντα νομίμου ταφῆς
 θρηνῶν λέγηι μετριώτερον ἂν τὴν συμφορὰν ἐνεργεῖν

εἰ κείνου κεφαλὴν καὶ χαρίεντα μέλεα
 Ἥφαιστος καθαροῖσιν ἐν εἵμασιν ἀμφεπονθήθη,

τὸ πῦρ οὕτως, οὐ τὸν θεὸν προσηγόρευκε. πάλιν δ' ὁ μὲν Εὐριπίδης
 εἰπὼν ἐν ὄρκωι

μὰ τὸν μετ' ἄστρον Ζῆν' Ἄρη τε φοῖνιον

αὐτοὺς τοὺς θεοὺς ὠνόμακε· τοῦ δὲ Σοφοκλέους λέγοντος

c τυφλὸς γάρ, ὦ γυναῖκες, οὐδ' ὁρῶν Ἄρης
 συὸς προσώπωι πάντα τυρβάζει κακά

22f ἄλλην... λαμβανόντων m: ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλην δύναμιν λαμβάνοντες m τῶι μὲν γὰρ
 m: τὸ μὲν γὰρ m αἰνεῖν ἀντὶ τοῦ παραιτεῖσθαι c: αἰνεῖν σημαίνεται τὸ ἐπαινεῖν. αὐτῶι
 δὲ τῶι (οἱ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ) ἐπαινεῖν ἀντὶ τοῦ παραιτεῖσθαι M **23b** κατακαλούμενος m:
 ἐπικαλ- m προσηγόρευκε m: -σε m ὠνόμακε m: -σε m

τὸν πόλεμον ἔστιν ὑπακοῦσαι, καθάπερ αὖ τὸν χαλκὸν Ὀμήρου λέγοντος

τῶν νῦν αἶμα κελαινὸν ἐύρροον ἀμφὶ Σκάμανδρον
ἔσκέδασ' ὄξυς Ἄρης.

πολλῶν οὖν οὕτω λεγομένων εἰδέναι δεῖ καὶ μνημονεύειν ὅτι καὶ τῷ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ Ζηνὸς ὀνόματι ποτὲ μὲν τὸν θεὸν ποτὲ δὲ τὴν τύχην πολλακίς δὲ τὴν εἰμαρμένην προσαγορεύουσιν. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ λέγωσι

Ζεῦ πάτερ, Ἰδθ' ἐν μετέωρῳ

καὶ

d

ὦ Ζεῦ, τίς εἶναι φησι σοῦ σοφώτερος;

τὸν θεὸν αὐτὸν λέγουσιν. ὅταν δὲ ταῖς αἰτίαις τῶν γιγνομένων πάντων ἐπονομάζωσι τὸν Δία καὶ λέγωσι

πολλὰς δ' ἰφθίμους ψυχὰς Ἄϊδι προΐαψεν
< > Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή,

τὴν εἰμαρμένην. οὐ γὰρ τὸν θεὸν ὁ ποιητὴς οἶεται κακὰ μηχανᾶσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων ἀνάγκην ὀρθῶς ὑποδείκνυσιν, ὅτι καὶ πόλεσι καὶ στρατοπέδοις καὶ ἡγεμόσιν, ἂν μὲν σωφρονῶσιν, εὖ πράττειν πέπρωται καὶ κρατεῖν τῶν πολεμίων, ἂν δ' εἰς πάθη καὶ ἁμαρτίας ἐμπεσόντες ὥσπερ οὗτοι διαφέρωνται πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ στασιάζωσιν, ἀσχημονεῖν καὶ ταραττεσθαι καὶ κακῶς ἀπαλλάττειν. e

εἰμαρμένον γὰρ τῶν κακῶν βουλευμάτων
κακὰς ἀμοιβὰς ἔστι καρποῦσθαι βροτοῖς.

καὶ μὴν ὁ Ἡσίοδος τὸν Προμηθεὰ ποιῶν τῷ Ἐπιμηθεῖ παρακελευόμενον

μή ποτε δῶρα
δέξασθαι παρ Ζηνὸς Ὀλυμπίου ἀλλ' ἀποπέμπειν,

ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς τύχης δυνάμει τῷ τοῦ Διὸς ὀνόματι κέχρηται· τὰ γὰρ τυχερὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν Διὸς δῶρα κέκληκε, πλούτους καὶ γάμους καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ πάντα ὅλως τὰ ἐκτός, ὧν ἡ κτῆσις ἀνόνητός ἐστι τοῖς χρῆσθαι καλῶς μὴ δυναμένοις. διὸ καὶ τὸν Ἐπιμηθεὰ φαῦλον ὄντα καὶ ἀνόητον f οἶεται δεῖν φυλάττεσθαι καὶ δεδιέναι τὰς εὐτυχίας, ὥς βλαβησόμενον καὶ διαφθαρησόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν. καὶ πάλιν ὅταν λέγηι

μηδέ ποτ' οὐλομένην πενήν θυμοφθόρον ἀνδρὶ
τέτλαθ' ὄνειδίζειν, μακάρων δόσιν αἶεν ἔοντων,

24a θεόσδοτον νῦν τὸ τυχερὸν εἶρηκεν, ὥς οὐκ ἄξιον ὄν ἐγκαλεῖν τοῖς διὰ τὴν
τύχην πενομένοις, ἀλλὰ τὴν μετ' ἀργίας καὶ μαλακίας καὶ πολυτελείας
ἀπορίαν αἰσχυρὰν καὶ ἐπονείδιστον οὔσαν. οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦνομα
τῆς τύχης λέγοντες, εἰδότες δὲ τὴν τῆς ἀτάκτως καὶ ἀορίστως πε-
ριφερομένης αἰτίας δύναμιν ἰσχυρὰν καὶ ἀφύλακτον οὔσαν ἀνθρωπίνῳι
λογισμῶι τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ὀνόμασιν ἐξέφραζον, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς καὶ πράγ-
ματα καὶ ἦθη καὶ νῆ Δία λόγους καὶ ἄνδρας εἰώθαμεν δαιμονίους καὶ
θείους προσαγορεύειν. οὕτω δὴ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἀτόπως περὶ τοῦ Διὸς
λέγεσθαι δοκούντων ἐπανορθωτέον – ὦν ἔστι καὶ ταῦτα

b δοιοὶ γάρ τε πίθοι κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει
κηρῶν ἐμπλειοί, ὁ μὲν ἐσθλῶν, αὐτὰρ ὁ δειλῶν

καί

ὄρκια μὲν Κρονίδης ὑψίζυγος οὐκ ἐτέλεσεν,
ἀλλὰ κακὰ φρονέων τεκμαίρεται ἀμφοτέροισι

καί

τότε γάρ ῥα κυλίνδετο πῆματος ἀρχὴ
Τρωσὶ τε καὶ Δαναοῖσι Διὸς μεγάλου διὰ βουλάς,

- ὥς περὶ τῆς τύχης ἢ τῆς εἰμαρμένης λεγομένων, ἐν αἷς τὸ ἀσυλλόγιστον
ἡμῖν τῆς αἰτίας καὶ ὅλως οὐ καθ' ἡμᾶς. ὅπου δὲ τὸ προσῆκον καὶ κατὰ
λόγον καὶ εἰκὸς ἔστιν, ἐνταῦθα κυρίως ὀνομάζεσθαι τὸν θεὸν νομίζωμεν,
ὥσπερ ἐν τούτοις

c αὐτὰρ ὁ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπεπωλεῖτο στίχας ἀνδρῶν,
Αἴαντος δ' ἄλέεινε μάχην Τελαμωνιάδαο·
Ζεὺς γάρ οἱ νεμέσασχ' ὅτ' ἀμείνονι φωτὶ μάχοιτο

καί

Ζεὺς γάρ τὰ μὲν μέγιστα φροντίζει βροτῶν,
τὰ μικρὰ δ' ἄλλοις δαίμοσιν παρὲς ἔαι.

σφόδρα δὲ δεῖ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὀνόμασι προσέχειν, κατὰ πολλὰ πράγ-
ματα κινουμένοις καὶ μεθισταμένοις ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν. οἷόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ

23f ἄξιον ὄν c: ἄξιον M 24a ἀπορίαν m: ἀπορίαν κακίζειν m οὕτω m: τούτῳι
m: τούτων m 24b αἰτίας m: αἰτίας σημαίνεται m 24c νεμέσασχ' q: ἐνεμέσα M:
νεμεσᾶθ' q ὅτ'... μάχοιτο m: om. m

τῆς ἀρετῆς. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἔμφρονας παρέχεται καὶ δικαίους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἐν πράξεσι καὶ λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξας ἐπιεικῶς καὶ δυνάμεις περιποιεῖται, παρὰ τοῦτο ποιοῦνται καὶ τὴν εὐδοξίαν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, ὀνομάζοντες ὥσπερ “ἐλαίαν” τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλαίας, καὶ “φηγὸν” d τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς φηγοῦ καρπὸν ὁμωνύμως τοῖς φέρουσιν. οὐκοῦν ὁ νέος ἡμῖν, ὅταν μὲν λέγωσι

τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν

καί

τῆμος σφῆι ἀρετῇ Δαναοὶ ῥήξαντο φάλαγγας

καί

εἰ δὲ θανεῖν θέμις, ὧδε θανεῖν καλόν,
εἰς ἀρετὴν καταλυσασμένους βίον,

εὐθύς οἰέσθω λέγεσθαι ταῦτα περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης καὶ θειοτάτης ἔξεως ἐν ἡμῖν, ἣν ὀρθότητα λόγου καὶ ἀκρότητα λογικῆς φύσεως καὶ διάθεσιν ὁμολογουμένην ψυχῆς νοοῦμεν. ὅταν δ' ἀναγιγνώσκῃ πάλιν τό τε

Ζεὺς δ' ἀρετὴν ἀνδρεσσιν ὀφέλλει τε μινύθει τε e

καὶ τό

πλούτῳ δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ κύδος ὀπηδεῖ,

μὴ καθήσθω τοὺς πλουσίους ἐκπεπληγμένος καὶ τεθηπὼς καθάπερ ὦνιον εὐθύς ἀργυρίου τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντας, μὴδ' ἐπὶ τῇ τύχῃ κείσθαι τὴν αὐτοῦ φρόνησιν αὔξειν ἢ κολοῦειν νομίζων, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ δόξης ἢ δυνάμεως ἢ εὐτυχίας ἢ τινος ὁμοίου τῇ ἀρετῇ κεχρησθαι τὸν ποιητὴν ἡγούμενος. καὶ γὰρ τῇ κακότητι ποτὲ μὲν ἰδίως σημαίνουσι κακίαν καὶ μοχθηρίαν ψυχῆς, ὡς Ἡσίοδος

τὴν μὲν γὰρ κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἐλέσθαι,

ποτὲ δ' ἄλλην τινὰ κάκωσιν ἢ δυστυχίαν, ὡς Ὀμηρος f

αἶψα γὰρ ἐν κακότητι βροτοὶ καταγῆράσκουσιν.

ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐξαπατηθεῖ τις ἂν οὕτω τοὺς ποιητὰς οἰόμενος λέγειν, ὡς οἱ φιλόσοφοι λέγουσι τὴν παντελεῖ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔξιν

περιποιεῖται m: περιποιεῖ m: περιποίησιν m: περιτίθησιν c: παρὰ m: οὐ παρὰ m 24d
καταλυσασμένους q: καταδυσ- M ὁμολογουμένην m: ἐπαινουμένην m 24e αὐτοῦ c:
αὐτοῦ M ἡγούμενος m: ἡγείσθω m μὲν γὰρ m q: μὲν τοι m q

25a ἢ κτῆσιν ἢ τελειότητα βίου κατὰ φύσιν εὐροοῦντος, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ κατα-
 χρωμένους πολλάκις τὸν πλούσιον εὐδαίμονα καλεῖν ἢ μακάριον καὶ
 τὴν δύναμιν ἢ τὴν δόξαν εὐδαιμονίαν. Ὅμηρος μὲν γὰρ ὀρθῶς κέχρηται
 τοῖς ὀνόμασιν

ὥς οὐ τοι χαίρων τοῖσδε κτεάτεσσιν ἀνάσσω

καὶ Μένανδρος

ἔχω δὲ πολλὴν οὐσίαν καὶ πλούσιος
 καλοῦμ' ὑπὸ πάντων, μακάριος δ' ὑπ' οὐδενός,

Εὐριπίδης δὲ πολλὴν ἐργάζεται ταραχὴν καὶ σύγχυσιν ὅταν λέγηι

μή μοι γένοιτο λυπρὸς εὐδαίμων βίος

καί

b τί τὴν τυραννίδ', ἀδικίαν εὐδαίμονα,
 τιμαῖς;

ἂν μή τις, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ταῖς μεταφοραῖς καὶ καταχρήσεσι τῶν
 ὀνομάτων ἔπηται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἱκανὰ περὶ τούτων.

7 ἐκεῖνο δ' οὐχ ἅπαξ ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ὑπομνηστέον ἐστὶ τοὺς νέους,
 ἐνδεικνύμενον αὐτοῖς ὅτι μιμητικὴν ἢ ποιήσις ὑπόθεσιν ἔχουσα κόσμῳ
 μὲν καὶ λαμπρότητι χρῆται περὶ τὰς ὑποκειμένας πράξεις καὶ τὰ
 ἦθη, τὴν δ' ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς οὐ προλείπει, τῆς μιμήσεως ἐν
 τῷ πιθανῷ τὸ ἀγωγὸν ἐχούσης. διὸ καὶ κακίας καὶ ἀρετῆς σημεῖα
 μεμειγμένα ταῖς πράξεσιν ἢ μὴ παντάπασι τῆς ἀληθείας ὀλιγοροῦσα
 c συνεκφέρει μίμησις, ὥσπερ ἡ Ὀμήρου πολλὰ πάνυ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς χαίρειν
 φράζουσα μήτε τι φαῦλον ἀρετῇ προσεῖναι μήτε κακίαι χρηστὸν
 ἀξιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ πάντως μὲν ἐν πᾶσιν ἀμαρτωλὸν εἶναι τὸν ἀμαθῆ,
 περὶ πάντα δ' αὖ κατορθοῦν τὸν ἀστεῖον. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν ταῖς σχο-
 λαῖς ἀκούομεν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ τῷ βίῳ τῶν πολλῶν κατὰ τὸν
 Εὐριπίδην

οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο χωρὶς ἐσθλὰ καὶ κακά,
 ἀλλ' ἔστι τις σύγκρασις.

δνευ δὲ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς μάλιστα μὲν ἡ ποιητικὴ τῷ ποικίλῳ χρῆται
 d καὶ πολυτρόπῳ. τὸ γὰρ ἐμπαθὲς καὶ παράλογον καὶ ἀπροσδόκητον,
 ὧι πλείστη μὲν ἐκπληξίς ἐπεται πλείστη δὲ χάρις, αἱ μεταβολαὶ παρ-
 εχουσι τοῖς μύθοις· τὸ δ' ἀπλοῦν ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἄμυθον. ὅθεν οὔτε νικῶντας

24f ἢ τελειότητα c: ἢ καὶ τελειότητα m: τελειότητα m
 ἐνδεικνύμενον m: -ους m 25d ἀπλοῦν m: ἀπὸν m

25b ἱκανὰ m: ἱκανῶς m

ἀεὶ πάντα ποιοῦσι τοὺς αὐτοὺς οὐτ' εὐημεροῦντας οὔτε κατορθοῦν-
τας. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῖς θεοῖς, ὅταν εἰς ἀνθρωπίνας ἐμπέσσωσι πράξεις,
ἀπαθέσι χρῶνται καὶ ἀναμαρτήτοις, ἵνα μηδαμοῦ τό τε ταράττον
καὶ τὸ ἐκπλήττον ἀργῇ τῆς ποιήσεως ἀκινδύνων καὶ ἀναγωνίστων
γινομένων.

8 οὕτως οὖν τούτων ἐχόντων ἐπάγωμεν τοῖς ποιήμασι τὸν νέον μὴ
τοιαύτας ἔχοντα δόξας περὶ τῶν καλῶν ἐκείνων καὶ μεγάλων ὀνομάτων, ^e
ὥς ἄρα σοφοὶ καὶ δίκαιοι οἱ ἄνδρες ἦσαν, ἄκροί τε βασιλεῖς καὶ κανόνες
ἀρετῆς ἀπάσης καὶ ὀρθότητος. ἐπεὶ βλαβήσεται μεγάλα δοκιμάζων
πάντα καὶ τεθηπώς, μὴ δυσχεραίνων μηδὲν ἀκούων μηδ' ἀποδεχόμενος
τοῦ ψέγοντος αὐτοὺς τοιαῦτα πράττοντας καὶ λέγοντας

αἶ γάρ, Ζεῦ τε πάτερ καὶ Ἀθηναίη καὶ Ἀπολλων,
μήτε τις οὖν Τρώων θάνατον φύγοι, ὅσσοι ἔασι,
μήτε τις Ἀργείων, νῶιν δ' ἐκδύμεν ὄλεθρον,
ὄφρ' οἷοι Τροίης ἱερὰ κρήδεμνα λύωμεν

καί

οἰκτροτάτην δ' ἤκουσα ὅπα Πριάμοιο θυγατρὸς
Κασσάνδρης, τὴν κτεῖνε Κλυταιμῆστρη δολόμητις ^f
ἄμφ' ἐμοί

καί

παλλακίδι προμιγῆναι, ἵν' ἐχθήρειε γέροντα.
τῇι πιθόμην καὶ ἔρεξα

καί

Ζεῦ πάτερ, οὐ τις σείο θεῶν ὀλοώτερος ἄλλος.

μηδὲν ἐπαινεῖν ἐθιζέσθω τοιοῦτον ὁ νέος, μηδὲ προφάσεις λέγων μηδὲ ^{26a}
παραγωγὰς τινὰς εὐπρεπεῖς ἐπὶ πράγμασι φαύλοις μηχανώμενος
πιθανὸς ἔστω καὶ πανοῦργος, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον οἰέσθω, μίμησιν
εἶναι τὴν ποιήσιν ἡθῶν καὶ βίων ἀνθρώπων οὐ τελείων οὐδὲ καθαρῶν
οὐδ' ἀνεπιλήπτων παντάπασιν, ἀλλὰ μεμειγμένων πάθεσι καὶ δόξαις
ψευδέσι καὶ ἀγνοίαις, διὰ δ' εὐφυΐαν αὐτοὺς πολλακίς μετατιθέντων
πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον. ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη παρασκευὴ τοῦ νέου καὶ διάνοια, τοῖς
μὲν εὖ λεγομένοις καὶ πραττομένοις ἐπαιρομένου καὶ συνενθουσιῶντος,
τὰ δὲ φαῦλα μὴ προσιεμένου καὶ δυσχεραίνοντος, ἀβλαβῇ παρέξει τὴν ^b

25d ἀκινδύνων καὶ ἀναγωνίστων γινομένων c: ἀκίνδυνον καὶ ἀνανταγωνίστον γινόμενον M **25e** μηδὲν c: μηδὲ m: μηδὲν μηδὲ m: πάντα μηδὲ m θυγατρὸς m: -ων m **26a** παραγωγὰς τινὰς εὐπρεπεῖς m: παραγωγὰς τὰς εὐπρεπεῖς m: παραγωγὰς εὐπρεπεῖς λόγων c

ἀκρόασιν. ὁ δὲ πάντα θαυμάζων καὶ πᾶσιν ἐξοικειούμενος καὶ καταδε-
 δουλωμένος τῇ δόξῃ τὴν κρίσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἡρωϊκῶν ὀνομάτων, ὥσπερ
 οἱ τὴν Πλάτωνος ἀπομιμούμενοι κυρτότητα καὶ τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους
 τραυλότητα, λήσεται πρὸς πολλὰ τῶν φαύλων εὐχερῆς γενόμενος. δεῖ
 δὲ μὴ δειλῶς μὴδ' ὥσπερ ὑπὸ δεισιδαιμονίας ἐν ἱερῷ φρίττειν ἅπαντα
 καὶ προσκυνεῖν, ἀλλὰ θαρραλέως ἐθιζόμενον ἐπιφωνεῖν μηδὲν ἥττον
 τοῦ “ὀρθῶς” καὶ “πρεπόντως” τὸ “οὐκ ὀρθῶς” καὶ “οὐ προσηκόν-
 τως.” οἷον ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐκκλησίαν συνάγει τῶν στρατιωτῶν νοσοῦν-
 των, ἀσχάλλων μὲν ἀργοῦντι τῷ πολέμῳ μάλιστα διὰ τὴν ἐν ταῖς
 στρατείαις ἐπιφάνειαν αὐτοῦ καὶ δόξαν, ἱατρικὸς δ' ὢν καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν
 ἐνάτην ἢ ταῦτα κρίνεσθαι πέφυκεν αἰσθόμενος οὐκ οὔσαν συνήθη τὴν
 νόσον οὐδὲ συνεστῶσαν ἀπὸ κοινῶν αἰτιῶν, ἀναστὰς δ' οὐ δημαγωγεῖ
 πρὸς τὸν ὄχλον, ἀλλὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ γίγνεται σύμβουλος

Ἀτρείδη, νῦν ἄμμε πάλιμπλαγχθέντας οἶω
 ἄψ ἀπονοστήσειν,

ὀρθῶς ταῦτα καὶ μετρίως καὶ πρεπόντως. τοῦ δὲ μάντεως δεδιέναι
 φήσαντος τὴν ὀργὴν τοῦ δυνατωτάτου τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐκέτ' ὀρθῶς
 οὐδὲ μετρίως, ἐπομόσας μηδὲνα προσοίσειν χεῖρας αὐτῷ ζῶντος αὐτοῦ,
 προστίθουσιν

οὐδ' ἦν Ἀγαμέμνονα εἵπησι,

ἐνδεικνύμενος ὀλιγωρίαν καὶ περιφρόνησιν τοῦ ἄρχοντος. ἐκ δὲ τούτου
 μᾶλλον παροξυνθεὶς ἐπὶ τὸ ξίφος φέρεται σφάττειν διανοούμενος, οὔτε
 πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ὀρθῶς οὔτε πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον. εἴτ' αὖθις μετανοήσας

ἄψ ἐς κουλεὸν ὥσε μέγα ξίφος, οὐδ' ἀπίθησε
 μύθῳ Ἀθηναίης,

ὀρθῶς πάλιν καὶ καλῶς, ὅτι τὸν θυμὸν ἐκκόψαι παντάπασι μὴ δυνηθεὶς,
 ὅμως πρὶν ἀνήκεστόν τι δρᾶσαι μετέστησε καὶ κατέσχευεν εὐπειθῇ τῷ
 λογισμῷ γενόμενον. πάλιν ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων ἐν μὲν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἐκκλη-
 σίαν γιγνομένοις καὶ λεγομένοις ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καταγέλαστός ἐστιν, ἐν δὲ
 τοῖς περὶ Χρυσίδα σεμνότερος καὶ βασιλικώτερος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς
 ἀγομένης τῆς Βρισηίδος

δακρύσας ἐτάρων ἄφαρ ἔζετο νόσφι λιασθεῖς,

οὗτος δ' αὐτὸς εἰς τὴν ναῦν ἐμβιβάζων καὶ παραδιδούς καὶ ἀποπέμ-
 πων τὴν ἄνθρωπον ἦν ὀλίγῳ πρόσθεν εἶρηκε τῆς γαμετῆς τῇ εὐνοίᾳ

26b τῇ δόξῃ m: τῇ ἔξει m **26c** μάλιστα m: μάλιστα πάντων m ἀναστὰς δ'
 c: ἀναστὰς M πρὸς τὸν ὄχλον M: τὸν ὄχλον c τὴν ὀργὴν c: ὀργὴν M

προκρίνειν, οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν οὐδ' ἔρωτικόν ἐποίησε. καὶ μὴν ὁ Φοῖνιξ διὰ τὴν παλλακίδα κατάρματος ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς γενόμενος

τὸν μὲν ἐγὼ – φησί – βούλευσα κατακτάμεν ὅξει χαλκῶι· f
ἀλλὰ τις ἀθανάτων παῦσεν χόλον, ὃς ῥ' ἐνὶ θυμῶι
δήμου θῆκε φάτιν καὶ ὀνειδέα πόλλ' ἀνθρώπων,
ὥς μὴ πατροφόνος μετ' Ἀχαιοῖσιν καλεοίμην.

ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀρίσταρχος ἐξεῖλε ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη φοβηθεῖς· ἔχει δὲ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν ὀρθῶς, τοῦ Φοῖνικος τὸν Ἀχιλλέα διδάσκοντος οἶόν ἐστιν 27a
ὀργή καὶ ὅσα διὰ θυμὸν ἀνθρωποὶ τολμῶσι, μὴ χρώμενοι λογισμῶι
μηδὲ πειθόμενοι τοῖς παρηγοροῦσι. καὶ γὰρ τὸν Μελέαγρον ἐπεισάγει
τοῖς πολίταις ὀργιζόμενον, εἴτα πραϋνόμενον, ὀρθῶς τὰ πάθη ψέγων,
τὸ δὲ μὴ συνακολουθεῖν ἀλλ' ἀντιτάττεσθαι καὶ κρατεῖν καὶ μετανοεῖν
ἐπαινῶν ὡς καλὸν καὶ συμφέρον.

ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἡ διαφορὰ πρόδηλος· ὅπου δ' ἀσαφῆ τὰ τῆς γνώμης, διοριστέον οὕτω πως ἐφιστάντας τὸν νέον. εἰ μὲν ἡ Ναυσικάα ξένον ἄνδρα τὸν Ὀδυσσεά θεασαμένη καὶ παθοῦσα τὸ τῆς Καλυψοῦς πάθος πρὸς αὐτόν, ἅτε δὴ τρυφῶσα καὶ γάμων ὥραν ἔχουσα, τοιαῦτα b
μωραίνει πρὸς τὰς θεραπαινίδας

αἱ γὰρ ἐμεῦ τοιοῦσδε πόσις κεκλημένος εἶη
ἐνθάδε ναιετάων, καὶ οἱ ἄδοι αὐτόθι μέμνουν,

ψεκτέον τὸ θράσος αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν ἀκολασίαν· εἰ δὲ τοῖς λόγοις τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τὸ ἥθος ἐνιδούσα καὶ θαυμάσασα τὴν ἔντευξιν αὐτοῦ πολὺν νοῦν ἔχουσαν εὐχεται τοιοῦτῳ συνοικεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ πλωτικῶι τινι καὶ ὀρχηστικῶι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἄξιον ἄγασθαι. πάλιν τῆς Πηνελόπης τοῖς μνηστῆρσι προσδιαλεγόμενης οὐκ ἀπανθρώπως, ἐκείνων δ' αὐτῇ χαριζομένων ἱμάτια καὶ χρύσια καὶ κόσμον ἄλλον, ἡδόμενος Ὀδυσσεύς,

οὐνεκα τῶν μὲν δῶρα παρέλκετο, θέλγε δὲ θυμόν, c

εἰ μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ δωροδοκίᾳ καὶ πλεονεξίᾳ χαίρει, τὸν κωμωιδούμενον ὑπερβάλλει μαστροπείᾳ Πολιάγρον

εὐδαίμων Πολιάγρος < >
οὐράνιον αἶγα πλουτοφόρον τρέφων·

εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον οἰόμενος ὑποχειρίους ἔξειν διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα τὸ μέλλον οὐ προσδοκῶντας, λόγον ἔχει τὸ ἡδόμενον αὐτοῦ καὶ θαρροῦν. ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῇ διαριθμῆσει τῶν χρημάτων, ἃ συνεξέθησαν οἱ Φαίακες αὐτῷ καὶ

27a ἀσαφῆ τὰ m: ἀσάφεια m 27b ἱμάτια καὶ χρύσια m: ἱμάτια m 27c ἐλπίδα m: ἐλπίδα καὶ m: ἐλπίδα θαρροῦντες καὶ m: ἐλπίδα θαρροῦντας καὶ c: ἡδόμενον αὐτῷ M

ἀπέπλευσαν, εἰ μὲν ἀληθῶς ἐν ἐρημίαι τοσαύτη καὶ τῶν καθ' αὐτὸν ἀσαφεῖαι καὶ ἀδηλόγητι γεγρονῶς περὶ τῶν χρημάτων φοβεῖται,

d

μή τί οἱ οἷχωνται κοίλῃς ἐπὶ νηὸς ἔχοντες,

οἰκτίρειν ἄξιον ἢ βδελύττεσθαι νῆ Δία τὴν φιλοπλουτίαν· εἰ δ', ὥσπερ ἔνιοι λέγουσι, περὶ τῆς Ἰθάκης ἀμφοδοξῶν οἶεται τὴν τῶν χρημάτων σωτηρίαν ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι τῆς τῶν Φαίακων ὁσιότητος (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκερδῶς φέροντας αὐτὸν εἰς ἄλλοτρίαν ἐκβαλεῖν χώραν καὶ καταλιπεῖν, ἀποσχομένους τῶν χρημάτων), οὔτε φαύλῳ τεκμηρίῳ χρῆται καὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἄξιον ἐπαινεῖν. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἔκθεσιν αὐτὴν εἰ μὲν ἀληθῶς ἐγένετο καθεύδοντος ψέγουσι, καὶ Τυρρηνοὺς ἱστορίαν τινὰ
e φασὶ διαφυλάττειν ὡς ὑπνῶδους φύσει τοῦ Ὀδυσσεῶς γενομένου καὶ δυσεντεύκτου διὰ τοῦτο τοῖς πολλοῖς ὄντος, εἰ δ' οὐκ ἦν ἀληθὴς ὁ ὕπνος, ἀλλ' αἰδούμενος μὲν ἀποπέμψαι τοὺς Φαίακας ἄνευ ξενίων καὶ φιλοφροσύνης, μὴ δυνάμενος δὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς λαθεῖν ἐκείνων συμπαραόντων ἐχρήσατο τῆς ἀπορίας παρακαλύμματι, κοιμωμένῳ ποιήσας ὁμοιον ἑαυτὸν, ἀποδέχονται.

καὶ ταῦτα δὴ τοῖς νέοις ὑποδεικνύοντες οὐκ ἐάσομεν φορὰν πρὸς τὰ φαῦλα γίγνεσθαι τῶν ἡθῶν ἀλλὰ τῶν βελτιόνων ζῆλον καὶ προαίρεσιν, εὐθύς τοῖς μὲν τὸ ψέγειν τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἐπαινεῖν ἀποδιδόντες. μάλιστα δὲ
f τοῦτο ποιεῖν δεῖ ἐν ταῖς τραγωιδίαις ὅσαι λόγους ἔχουσι πιθανοὺς καὶ πανούργους ἐν πράξεσιν ἀδόξοις καὶ πονηραῖς. οὐ πάνυ γὰρ ἀληθὲς τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους λέγοντος

οὐκ ἔστ' ἀπ' ἔργων μὴ καλῶν ἔπη καλά·

καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς εἴωθεν ἦθεσι φαύλοις καὶ ἀτόποις πράγμασι λόγους ἐπιγελῶντας καὶ φιланθρώπους αἰτίας πορίζειν. καὶ ὁ σύσκηνος αὐτοῦ
28a πάλιν ὁρᾷς ὅτι τὴν τε Φαίδραν καὶ προσεγκαλοῦσαν τῷ Θησεῖ πεποίηκεν ὡς διὰ τὰς ἐκείνου παρανομίας ἐρασθεῖσαν τοῦ Ἱππολύτου. τοιαύτην δὲ καὶ τῇ Ἑλένῃ παρρησίαν κατὰ τῆς Ἑκάβης ἐν ταῖς Τρωιάσι δίδωσιν, οἰομένην δεῖν ἐκείνην κολάζεσθαι μᾶλλον ὅτι μοιχὸν αὐτῆς ἔτεκε. μὴδὲν οὖν τούτων κομψὸν ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ πανούργον ὁ νέος ἐθιζέσθω, μὴδὲ προσμειδιάτω ταῖς τοιαύταις εὐρησιλογίαις, ἀλλὰ βδελυτέσθω τοὺς λόγους μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ ἔργα τῆς ἀκολασίας.

9 ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοίνυν καὶ τὸ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐκάστου τῶν λεγομένων ἐπιζητεῖν χρήσιμόν ἐστιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κάτων ἔτι παιδάρῳ ὦν ἔπραττε μὲν
b ὁ προστάξειεν ὁ παιδαγωγός, αἰτίαν δὲ καὶ λόγον ἀπῆιτει τοῦ

27d ἐπὶ νηὸς m_q: ἐκ νηὸς m_q ἔχοντες M_q: ἄγοντες q 27e τοῖς πολλοῖς m: πολλοῖς m: πολλὰκις c 27f αὐτὸς c: οὗτος m: οὗτως m

προστάγματος· τοῖς δὲ ποιηταῖς οὐ πειστέον ὥσπερ παιδαγωγοῖς ἢ νομοθέταις, ἂν μὴ λόγον ἔχῃ τὸ ὑποκείμενον. ἔξει δέ, ἅνπερ χρηστὸν ἦι· ἂν δὲ μοχθηρόν, ὀφθήσεται κενὸν καὶ μάταιον ὄν. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν μὲν τοιούτων τὰς αἰτίας πικρῶς ἀπαιτοῦσι καὶ διαπυνθάνονται πῶς λέλεκται

μηδέ ποτ' οἶνοχόην τιθέμεν κρητῆρος ὑπερθεῖν
πινόντων

καί

ὃς δέ κ' ἀνὴρ ἀπὸ ὧν ὀχέων ἕτερ' ἄρμαθ' ἱκνῆται,
ἔγχει ὀρεξάσθω.

τῶν δὲ μειζόνων ἀβασανίστως δέχονται τὴν πίστιν, οἷα καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστίν c

δουλοῖ γὰρ ἄνδρα, κἂν θρασύσπλαγχνός τις ἦι,
ὅταν συνειδῇ μητρὸς ἢ πατρὸς κακά,

καί

μικρὸν φρονεῖν χρή τὸν κακῶς πεπραγότα.

καίτοι ταῦτα τῶν ἡθῶν ἄπτεται καὶ τοὺς βίους διαταράττει, κρίσεις ἐμποιοῦντα φαύλας καὶ δόξας ἀγεννεῖς, ἂν μὴ πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν εἰθισμένοι λέγωμεν “διὰ τί ‘μικρὸν φρονεῖν χρή τὸν κακῶς πεπραγότα’ καὶ μὴ μᾶλλον ἀνταίρειν τῇ τύχῃ καὶ ποιεῖν ὑψηλὸν ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἀταπείνωτον; διὰ τί δέ, ἂν ἐκ πατρὸς φαύλου καὶ ἀνοήτου γεγωνῶς αὐτὸς ὦ χρηστὸς καὶ φρόνιμος, οὐ προσήκει μοι διὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀρετὴν μέγα φρονεῖν ἀλλὰ d καταπεπληγχαὶ καὶ ταπεινὸν εἶναι διὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἀμαθίαν;” ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἀπαντῶν καὶ ἀντερείδων καὶ μὴ παντὶ λόγῳ πλάγιον ὥσπερ πνεύματι παραδιδούς ἑαυτὸν ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς ἔχειν νομίζων τὸ “βλάξ ἄνθρωπος ἐπὶ παντὶ λόγῳ φιλεῖ ἐπτοῆσθαι”, πολλὰ διακρούσεται τῶν οὐκ ἀληθῶς οὐδ' ὠφελίμως λεγομένων. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀβλαβῇ παρέξει τὴν τῶν ποιημάτων ἀκρόασιν.

10 ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ ἐν ἀμπέλου φύλλοις καὶ κλήμασιν εὐθαλοῦσι πολ-
λάκις ὁ καρπὸς ἀποκρύπτεται καὶ λανθάνει κατασκιαζόμενος, οὕτως e
ἐν ποιητικῇ λέξει καὶ μυθεύμασι περικεχυμένοις πολλὰ διαφεύγει τὸν
νέον ὠφέλιμα καὶ χρήσιμα, δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ πᾶσχειν μηδ' ἀποπλανᾶσθαι
τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλ' ἐμφύεσθαι μάλιστα τοῖς πρὸς ἀρετὴν φέρουσι καὶ
δυναμένοις πλάττειν τὸ ἥθος, οὐ χειρόν ἐστι καὶ περὶ τούτων διελθεῖν
ἐν βραχέσιν, ἀψάμενον ὥς ἐν τύπῳ τῶν πραγμάτων, μήκη δὲ καὶ

κατασκευᾶς καὶ παραδειγμάτων ὅχλον ἑῶντα τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικώτερον γράφουσι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ φαῦλα γινώσκων ὁ νέος ἦθη καὶ πρόσωπα τοῖς λόγοις προσεχέτω καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν ἃς
 f ὁ ποιητὴς ἑκατέρωι προσηκόντως ἀποδίδωσιν· οἷον ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς πρὸς τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα λέγει, καίπερ λέγων μετ' ὀργῆς

οὐ γὰρ σοί ποτε ἴσον ἔχω γέρας, ὅππότε' Ἀχαιοὶ
 Τρώων ἐκπέρσωσ' εὖ ναιόμενον πτολίεθρον,

ὁ δὲ Θερσίτης τῶι αὐτῶι λοιδορούμενος λέγει

πλεῖαί τοι χαλκοῦ κλισίαι, πολλαὶ δὲ γυναῖκες
 εἰσὶν ἐνὶ κλισίῃσι ξεαίρετοι, ἅς τοι Ἀχαιοὶ
 29a πρωτίστωι δίδομεν, εὖτ' ἂν πτολίεθρον ἔλωμεν,

καὶ πάλιν ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς

αἶ κέ ποθι Ζεὺς
 δῶσι πόλιν Τροίην εὐτείχεον ἐξαπατάξαι,

ὁ δὲ Θερσίτης

ὄν κεν ἐγὼ δήσας ἀγάγω ἢ ἄλλος Ἀχαιῶν.

πάλιν τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος ἐν τῇ ἐπιπωλήσει τὸν Διομήδην λοιδορήσαν-
 τος ὁ μὲν οὐδὲν ἀντεῖπεν,

αἰδεσθεὶς βασιλῆος ἐνιπὴν αἰδοίοιο,

ὁ δὲ Σθένηςλος, οὗ μηδεὶς λόγος,

Ἄτρεϊδῃ – φησί – μὴ ψεύδε' ἐπιστάμενος σάφα εἰπεῖν.
 ἡμεῖς τοι πατέρων μέγ' ἀμείνονες εὐχόμεθ' εἶναι.

b ἢ γὰρ τοιαύτη διαφορὰ μὴ παρορωμένη διδάξει τὸν νέον ἄστεϊον ἡγεῖσθαι τὴν ἀτυφίαν καὶ μετριότητα, τὴν δὲ μεγαλαυχίαν καὶ περιαιτολογίαν ὡς φαῦλον εὐλαβεῖσθαι. χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος κατανοεῖν ἐνταῦθα· τὸν μὲν γὰρ Σθένηςλον ἀπροσαύδητον παρῆλθε, τοῦ δ' Ὀδυσσέως οὐκ ἡμέλησε δηχθέντος ἀλλ' ἡμέψατο καὶ προσηγόρευσεν,

ὥς γινῶ χωομένοιο· πάλιν δ' ὁ γε λάζετο μῦθον·

τὸ μὲν γὰρ πᾶσιν ἀπολογεῖσθαι θεραπευτικὸν καὶ οὐκ ἀξιωματικόν· τὸ δὲ πάντων καταφρονεῖν ὑπερήφανον καὶ ἀνόητον. ἄριστα δ' ὁ Διομήδης

29b ἡμέλησε δηχθέντος m: ἡμέλησε m

ἐν μὲν τῇ μάχῃ σιωπᾷ κακῶς ἀκούων ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως, μετὰ δὲ τὴν μάχην παρρησίαι χρηταὶ πρὸς αὐτόν

ἀλκὴν μὲν μοι πρῶτον ὀνειδίσας ἐν Δαναοῖσιν.

εὖ δ' ἔχει καὶ φρονίμου διαφορὰν ἀνδρὸς καὶ μάντεως πανηγυρικοῦ μὴ παραλιπεῖν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κάλχας οὐ συνεῖδε τὸν καιρόν, ἀλλ' ἐν πλήθει παρ' οὐδὲν ἐποιήσατο κατηγορῆσαι τοῦ βασιλέως ὡς τὸν λοιμὸν αὐτοῖς ἐπαγαγόντος· ὁ δὲ Νέστωρ βουλόμενος ἐμβαλεῖν λόγον ὑπὲρ τῶν πρὸς τὸν Ἀχιλλέα διαλλαγῶν, ἵνα μὴ διαβάλλειν δοκῇ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος ὡς ἀμαρτόντα καὶ χρησάμενον ὀργῇ,

δαίνυ δαῖτα γέρουσιν· ἔοικέ τοι, οὐ τοι ἀεικές.

πολλῶν δ' ἀγρομένων τῷ πείσεαι ὅς κεν ἀρίστην
βουλὴν βουλεύσῃ.

d

καὶ μετὰ τὸ δεῖπνον ἐξαποστέλλει τοὺς πρέσβεις· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ἐπανόρθωσις ἀμαρτίας, ἐκεῖνο δὲ κατηγορία καὶ προπηλακισμός.

ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς γένεσι διαφορὰς σκεπτέον, ὧν τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὁ τρόπος. οἱ μὲν Τρῶες ἐπίασι μετὰ κραυγῆς καὶ θράσους, οἱ δ' Ἀχαιοί

σιγῇ δειδιότες σημάντορας.

τὸ γὰρ ἐν χερσὶ τῶν πολεμίων ὄντων φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἀνδρείας ἅμα καὶ πειθαρχίας σημεῖον. ὅθεν ὁ μὲν Πλάτων ἐθίζει τοὺς ψόγους φοβεῖσθαι καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς πόνους καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους, ὁ δὲ Κάτων ἔλεγε φιλεῖν τοὺς ἐρυθριῶντας μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς ὠχριῶντας. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν ἴδιος χαρακτήρ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Δόλων ἐπαγγέλλεται

τόφρα γὰρ ἐς στρατὸν εἴμι διαμπερές, ὅφρ' ἂν ἴκωμαι
νῆ' Ἀγαμεμνονέην,

ὁ δὲ Διομήδης ἐπαγγέλλεται μὲν οὐδέν, ἤττον δ' ἂν φησι φοβηθῆναι μεθ' ἑτέρου πεμπόμενος. Ἑλληνικὸν οὖν καὶ ἀστεῖον ἢ πρόνοια, βαρβαρικὸν δὲ καὶ φαῦλον ἢ θρασύτης· καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν ζηλοῦν τὸ δὲ δυσχεραίνειν. ἔχεται δὲ τινος οὐκ ἀχρήστου θεωρίας καὶ τὸ περὶ τοὺς Τρῶας καὶ τὸν Ἑκτορα πάθος, τοῦ Αἴαντος αὐτῷ μονομαχεῖν μέλλοντος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Αἰσχύλος Ἰσθμοὶ πύκτου πληγέντος εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ κραυγῆς γενομένης, “οἶον” εἶπεν “ἡ ἄσκησίς ἐστιν. οἱ θεώμενοι βοῶσιν, ὁ δὲ πληγεὶς σιωπᾷ.” τοῦ δὲ ποιητοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι τὸν Αἴαντα μετὰ τῶν ὀπλων ἐπιόντα λαμπρὸν οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες ἔχαιρον ὀρώντες,

30a

Τρώας δὲ τρόμος αἰνὸς ὑπῆλυθε γυῖα ἕκαστον,
 "Ἐκτορί τ' αὐτῷ θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι πάτασσε,

τίς οὐκ ἂν ἀγάσαιο τὴν διαφορὰν; τοῦ μὲν κινδυνεύοντος ἡ καρδία
 πηδᾷ μόνον, ὥσπερ παλαίειν νῆ Δί' ἢ σταδιοδρομεῖν μέλλοντος, τῶν
 δὲ θεωμένων τρέμει καὶ πάλλεται τὸ σῶμα δι' εὐνοίαν καὶ φόβον ὑπὲρ
 τοῦ βασιλέως. ἐνταῦθα δὲ καὶ τὴν τοῦ κρατίστου πρὸς τὸν κάκιστον
 διαφορὰν ἀποθεωρητέον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Θερσίτης

ἔχθιστος δ' Ἀχιλῆι μάλιστ' ἦν ἡδ' Ὀδυσῆι,

- b ὁ δ' Αἴας αἶε τε τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ προσφιλὴς καὶ πρὸς τὸν Ἐκτορα λέγει περὶ
 αὐτοῦ

νῦν μὲν δὴ σάφα εἴσεται οἴοθεν οἶος
 οἷοι καὶ Δαναοῖσιν ἄριστῆς μετέασι,
 καὶ μετ' Ἀχιλλῆα ῥηξήνορα θυμολέοντα.

καὶ τοῦτο μὲν Ἀχιλλέως τὸ ἐγκώμιόν ἐστι, τὰ δ' ἐξῆς ὑπὲρ ἀπάντων
 εἴρηται χρησίμως

ἡμεῖς δ' εἰμὲν τοῖοι οἱ ἂν σέθεν ἀντιάσαιμεν
 καὶ πολέες,

- οὔτε μόνον οὐτ' ἄριστον ἀποφαίνων ἑαυτὸν ἀλλὰ μετὰ πολλῶν ὁμοίων
 c δυνάμενον ἀμύνασθαι. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἱκανὰ περὶ διαφορᾶς, ἂν μὴ κάκεῖνο
 βουλώμεθα προσλαβεῖν, ὅτι τῶν Τρώων ἐαλώκασι καὶ πολλοὶ ζῶντες,
 οὐδεῖς δὲ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, καὶ τῶν μὲν ὑποπεπτῶκασιν ἔνιοι τοῖς πολεμίοις,
 ὥσπερ ὁ Ἄδραστος, οἱ Ἀντιμάχου παῖδες, ὁ Λυκάων, αὐτὸς ὁ Ἐκτωρ
 δεόμενος περὶ ταφῆς τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως, ἐκείνων δ' οὐδεῖς, ὡς βαρβαρικοῦ
 τοῦ ἱκετεύειν καὶ ὑποπίπτειν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν ὄντος, Ἑλληνικοῦ δὲ τοῦ
 νικᾶν μαχόμενον ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν.

- II ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς νομαῖς ἡ μὲν μέλιττα διώκει τὸ ἄνθος, ἡ δ' αἶξ
 τὸν θαλλόν, ἡ δ' ὕς τὴν ῥίζαν, ἄλλα δὲ ζῶια τὸ σπέρμα καὶ τὸν καρπὸν,
 d οὕτως ἐν ταῖς ἀναγνώσεσι τῶν ποιημάτων ὁ μὲν ἀπανθίζεται τὴν
 ἱστορίαν, ὁ δ' ἐμφύεται τῷ κάλλει καὶ τῇ κατασκευῇ τῶν ὀνομάτων,
 καθάπερ ὁ Ἀριστοφάνης περὶ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου φησί

χρῶμαι γὰρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ στόματος τῷ στρογγύλῳ,

οἱ δὲ τῶν πρὸς τὸ ἥθος εἰρημένων ὠφελίμως ἔχονται, πρὸς οὓς δὴ
 νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν. ὑπομιμνήσκωμεν οὖν αὐτοὺς ὅτι δεινὸν ἐστὶ

30a ὑπῆλυθε m_q: ἐπήλυθε d **30b** ὁμοίων m: ὁμοίως m δυνάμενον c: -μένων m
30d ὑπομιμνήσκωμεν m: -ομεν m ὑπομιν. οὖν m: ὑπομιν. m

τὸν μὲν φιλόμυθον μὴ λανθάνειν τὰ καινῶς ἱστορούμενα καὶ περιττῶς, μηδὲ τὸν φιλόλογον ἐκφεύγειν τὰ καθαρῶς πεφρασμένα καὶ ῥητορικῶς, τὸν δὲ φιλόκαλον καὶ φιλότιμον καὶ μὴ παιγνίας ἀλλὰ παιδείας ἕνεκα ποιημάτων ἀπτόμενον ἀργῶς καὶ ἀμελῶς ἀκούειν τῶν πρὸς ἀνδρείαν e ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ δικαιοσύνην ἀναπεφωνημένων, οἷα καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστί

Τυδείδη, τί παθόντε λελάσμεθα θούριδος ἀλκῆς;
ἀλλ' ἄγε δεῦρο, πέπον, παρ' ἔμ' ἴστασο· δὴ γὰρ ἔλεγχος
ἔσσεται, εἴ κεν νῆας ἔλῃ κορυθαίολος Ἔκτωρ.

τὸ γὰρ ἐν κινδύνῳ τοῦ διαφθαρεῖν καὶ ἀπολέσθαι μετὰ πάντων ὄντα τὸν φρονιμώτατον ὄραν τὸ αἰσχροὺν δεδοκίκα καὶ τὸ ἐπονείδιστον ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν θάνατον, ἐμπαθῇ ποιήσῃ πρὸς ἀρετὴν τὸν νέον. καὶ τῷ

χαῖρε δ' Ἀθηναίη πεπνυμένωι ἀνδρὶ δικαίῳ

τοιοῦτον ἐπιλογισμὸν δίδωσι, μήτε πλουσίῳ τινὶ μήτε καλῷ τὸ σῶμα μήτ' ἰσχυρῷ τὴν θεὸν χαίρουσαν ἀλλὰ φρονίμῳ καὶ δικαίῳ ποιήσας, f καὶ πάλιν τὸν Ὀδυσσεά φάσκουσιν μὴ περιορᾶν μηδὲ προλείπειν

οὔνεκ' ἐπιτητής ἐστί καὶ ἀγχίνοος καὶ ἐχέφρων,

ἐνδείκνυται μόνον εἶναι τῶν ἡμετέρων θεοφιλὲς καὶ θεῖον ἀρετὴν, εἶγε δὴ τὰ ὅμοια χαίρειν τοῖς ὁμοίοις πέφυκεν.

ἐπεὶ δὲ μεγάλου καὶ δοκοῦντος εἶναι καὶ ὄντος τοῦ κρατεῖν ὀργῆς 31a μεῖζον ἐστὶν ἢ φυλακὴ καὶ ἡ πρόνοια τοῦ μὴ περιπτεσεῖν ὀργῇ μηδ' ἁλῶναι, καὶ ταῦτα δεῖ τοῖς ἀναγιγνώσκουσιν ὑποδεικνύειν μὴ παρέργως, ὅτι τὸν Πρίαμον ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς οὐκ ἀνασχετικὸς ὦν οὐδὲ πρᾶος ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν κελεύει καὶ μὴ παροξύνειν αὐτόν, οὕτως

μηκέτι νῦν μ' ἐρέθιζε, γέρον (νοέω δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς
Ἔκτορά τοι λῦσαι, Διόθεν δέ μοι ἄγγελος ἦλθε)
μὴ σε, γέρον, οὐδ' αὐτὸν ἐνὶ κλισίῃσιν ἐάσω,
καὶ ἱκέτην περ ἐόντα, Διὸς δ' ἀλίτωμαι ἐφετμάς,

καὶ τὸν Ἔκτορα λούσας καὶ περιστείλας αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπήνην τίθῃσι, b πρὶν ἡκισμένον ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ὀφθῆναι,

μὴ ὁ μὲν ἀχνυμένῃ κραδίῃ χόλον οὐκ ἐρύσαιτο,
παῖδα ἰδὼν, Ἀχιλῆϊ δ' ὀρινθείη φίλον ἦτορ
καὶ ἐκατακτείνειε, Διὸς δ' ἀλίτῃται ἐφετμάς.

30e τῷ c: τὸ M
τος M

30f φάσκουσιν m: φάσκουσα m

31a καὶ δοκοῦντος i: δοκοῦν-

τὸ γὰρ ἐπισφαλῶς πρὸς ὀργὴν ἔχοντα καὶ φύσει τραχὺν ὄντα καὶ θυμοειδῆ μὴ λανθάνειν ἑαυτὸν ἀλλ' ἐξευλαβεῖσθαι καὶ φυλάττεσθαι τὰς αἰτίας καὶ προκαταλαμβάνειν τῷ λογισμῷ πόρρωθεν ὅπως οὐδ' ἄκων
 c τῷ πάθει περιπεσεῖται, θαυμαστῆς ἐστὶ προνοίας. οὕτω δὲ δεῖ καὶ πρὸς μέθην τὸν φίλοινον ἔχειν καὶ πρὸς ἔρωτα τὸν ἐρωτικόν· ὥσπερ ὁ Ἀγασίλαος οὐχ ὑπέμεινεν ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ φιληθῆναι προσιόντος, ὁ δὲ Κῦρος οὐδ' ἰδεῖν τὴν Πάνθειαν ἐτόλμησε, τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων τὸυναντίον ὑπεκκαύματα τοῖς πάθεσι συλλεγόντων καὶ πρὸς ἃ μάλιστα κακῶς καὶ ὀλισθηρῶς ἔχουσιν αὐτοὺς προῖεμένων. ὁ δ' Ὀδυσσεὺς οὐ μόνον ἑαυτὸν ἀνέχει θυμούμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν Τηλέμαχον ἐκ τοῦ λόγου συνιδῶν χαλεπαίνοντα καὶ μισοπόνηρον ἀμβλύνει καὶ παρασκευάζει πόρρωθεν ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι, κελεύων

d οἱ δέ μ' ἀτιμήσουσι δόμον κάτα, σὸν δὲ φίλον κῆρ
 τετλάτω ἐν στήθεσσι κακῶς πάσχοντος ἐμεῖο,
 ἦν περ καὶ διὰ δῶμα ποδῶν ἔλκωσι θύραζε
 ἢ βέλεσιν βάλλωσι· σὺ δ' εἰσορόων ἀνέχεσθαι.

ὥσπερ γὰρ τοὺς ἵππους οὐκ ἐν τοῖς δρόμοις χαλινοῦσιν ἀλλὰ πρὸ τῶν δρόμων, οὕτω τοὺς δυσκαθέκτους πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ καὶ θυμοειδεῖς προκαταλαμβάνοντες τοῖς λογισμοῖς καὶ προκαταρτύνοντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας ἄγουσιν.

δεῖ δὲ μὴ δὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀμελῶς ἀκούειν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν Κλεάνθους παιδιὰν παραιτεῖσθαι· κατειρωνεύεται γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε προσποιοῦμενος ἐξηγεῖσθαι τὸ δῆ

Ζεῦ πάτερ Ἰδθην μεδέων

ὥς εἰδήσει μεδέων, καὶ τό

e Ζεῦ ἄνα Δωδωναῖε

κελεύων ἀναγιγνώσκειν ὑφ' ἑν, ὥς τὸν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀναθυμιώμενον ἀέρα διὰ τὴν ἀνάδοσιν ἀναδωδωναῖον ὄντα. καὶ Χρῦσιππος δὲ πολλαχοῦ γλίσχρος ἐστίν, οὐ παίζων ἀλλ' εὐρησιλογῶν ἀπιθάνως, καὶ παραβι- αζόμενος “εὐρύοπα Κρονίδην” εἶναι τὸν δεινὸν ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ διαβεβηκότα τῇ δυνάμει τοῦ λόγου. βέλτιον δὲ ταῦτα τοῖς γραμ- ματικοῖς παρέντας ἐκεῖνα μᾶλλον πιέζειν οἷς ἅμα τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ πιθανὸν ἔνεστιν

31c χαλεπαίνοντα c: χαλεπὸν ὄντα M οἱ δέ μ' Mq: εἰ δέ μ' q **31d** τὸ δῆ m: τὸ δὲ m: τό τε m Ἰδθην μεδέων ὥς εἰδήσει μεδέων c: Ἰδθην μεδέων εἰδήσει μεδέων m: Ἰδθην μεδέων m: εἰδήσει μεδέων c **31e** ἔνεστιν c: ἐστὶν M

οὐδέ με θυμὸς ἄνωγεν, ἐπεὶ μάθον ἔμμεναι ἐσθλός

καί

πᾶσιν γὰρ ἐπίστατο μείλιχος εἶναι.

τὴν τε γὰρ ἀνδρείαν ἀποφαίνων μάθημα καὶ τὸ προσφιλῶς ἅμα καὶ ῥ
κεχαρισμένως ἀνθρώποις ὁμιλεῖν ἀπ' ἐπιστήμης καὶ κατὰ λόγον γίγ-
νεσθαι νομίζων προτρέπει μὴ ἀμελεῖν ἑαυτῶν, ἀλλὰ μανθάνειν τὰ καλὰ
καὶ προσέχειν τοῖς διδάσκουσιν, ὥς καὶ τὴν σκαιότητα καὶ τὴν δειλίαν
ἀμαθίαν καὶ ἄγνοιαν οὖσαν. σφόδρα δὲ τούτοις κάκεῖνα σύμφωνά ἐστιν
ἃ λέγει περὶ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος

ἧ μὲν ἀμφοτέροισιν ὁμὸν γένος ἦδ' ἴα πάτρη,
ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς πρότερος γεγόνει καὶ πλείονα ἦιδε.

32a

θειότατον γὰρ ἀποφαίνει τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ βασιλικώτατον, ἐν ἧι τίθε-
ται τὴν μεγίστην ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ Διός, ἅτε δὴ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς
ἔπεσθαι ταύτῃ νομίζων. ἐθιστέον δ' ἅμα καὶ τούτων ἐγρηγορότως τὸν
νέον ἀκούειν

ψεῦδος δ' οὐκ ἔρρει· μάλα γὰρ πεπνυμένος ἐστί

καί

Ἀντίλοχε, πρόσθεν πεπνυμένε, ποῖον ἔρεξας;
ῥισχυνας μὲν ἐμὴν ἀρετὴν, βλάβας δέ μοι ἵππους

καί

Γλαῦκε, τίη δὲ σὺ τοῖος ἐὼν ὑπέροπλον ἔειπας;
ὦ πέπον, ἦ τ' ἐφάμην σε περὶ φρένας ἔμμεναι ἄλλων,

b

ὥς οὐτε ψευδομένων τῶν φρονίμων οὔτε κακομαχούντων ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν
οὔτε παρ' ἀξίαν ἑτέροις ἐγκαλούντων. καὶ τὸν Πάνδαρον δὲ πεισθῆναι
λέγων διὰ τὴν ἀφροσύνην τὰ ὄρκια συγχέαι δῆλός ἐστιν οὐκ ἂν
ἀδικῆσαι τὸν φρόνιμον ἡγούμενος. ὁμοία δ' ἔστι καὶ περὶ σωφροσύνης
ὑποδεικνύειν ἐφιστάντα τοῖς οὕτω λεγομένοις

τῷ δὲ γυνὴ Προΐτου ἐπεμήνατο, δ' Ἄντεια,
κρυπταδίῃ φιλότῃ μιγήμεναι· ἀλλὰ τὸν οὐ τι
πεῖθ' ἀγαθὰ φρονέοντα, δαΐφρονα Βελλεροφόντην

καί

ἡ δ' ἦτοι τὸ πρὶν μὲν ἀναίνετο ἔργον ἀεικές,
δῖα Κλυταιμῆστρη· φρεσὶ γὰρ κέχρητ' ἀγαθῇσιν.

c

ἐν μὲν οὖν τούτοις τῇ φρονήσει τὴν τοῦ σωφρονεῖν αἰτίαν ἀποδίδωσιν,
ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρὰ τὰς μάχας κελεύσεσιν ἐκάστοτε λέγων

αἰδώς, ὦ Λύκιοι. πόσε φεύγετε; νῦν θοοὶ ἔστε

καί

ἀλλ' ἐν φρεσὶ θέσθε ἕκαστος
αἰδῶ καὶ νέμεσιν· δὴ γὰρ μέγα νεῖκος ὄρωρεν

ἀνδρείους ἔοικε ποιεῖν τοὺς σώφρονας διὰ τὸ αἰδεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ
d τὰς ἡδονὰς δυναμένους ὑπερβαίνειν καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους ὑφίστασθαι.
ἀφ' ὧν καὶ Τιμόθεος ὀρμηθεὶς οὐ κακῶς ἐν τοῖς Πέρσαις τοὺς Ἕλληνας
παρεκάλει

σέβεσθ' αἰδῶ συνεργὸν ἀρετᾶς δοριμάχου,

Αἰσχύλος δὲ καὶ τὸ πρὸς δόξαν ἔχειν ἀτύφως καὶ μὴ διασοβεῖσθαι μηδ'
ἐπαίρεσθαι τοῖς παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπαίνοις ἐν τῷ φρονεῖν τίθεται περὶ
τοῦ Ἀμφιαράου γράφων

οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει,
βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενος,
ἀφ' ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλευματα.

τὸ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ καὶ τῇ διαθέσει τῇ περὶ αὐτὸν οὔσῃ κρατίστη
e μεγαλοφρονεῖν νοῦν ἔχοντος ἀνδρός ἐστι. πάντων οὖν ἀναγομένων εἰς
τὴν φρόνησιν ἀποδείκνυνται πᾶν εἶδος ἀρετῆς ἐπιγιγνώμενον ἐκ λόγου
καὶ διδασκαλίας.

12 ἡ μὲν οὖν μέλιττα φυσικῶς ἐν τοῖς δριμυτάτοις ἄνθεσι καὶ ταῖς
τραχυτάταις ἀκάνθαις ἐξανευρίσκει τὸ λειότατον μέλι καὶ χρηστικώτα-
τον, οἱ δὲ παῖδες, ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐντρέφωνται τοῖς ποιήμασιν, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν
φαύλους καὶ ἀτόπους ὑποψίας ἐχόντων ἔλκειν τι χρήσιμον ἀμωσγέπως
μαθήσονται καὶ ὠφέλιμον. αὐτίκα γοῦν ὑποπτὸς ἐστὶν ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων
ὥς διὰ δωροδοκίαν ἀφείς τῆς στρατείας τὸν πλούσιον ἐκείνον τὸν τὴν
Αἴθην χαρισάμενον αὐτῷ

f δῶρ', ἵνα μή οἱ ἔποιθ' ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἠνεμόεσσαν
ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ τέρποιτο μένων· μέγα γὰρ οἱ ἔδωκεν
Ζεὺς ἄφενος.

ὀρθῶς δέ γ' ἐποίησεν, ὥς Ἀριστοτέλης φησίν, ἵππον ἀγαθὴν ἀνθρώπου
τοιούτου προτιμήσας· οὐδὲ γὰρ κυνὸς ἀντάξιος οὐδ' ὄνου μὰ Δία

δειλὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἀναλκις, ὑπὸ πλούτου καὶ μαλακίας διερρηγκῶς. πάλιν αἴσχιστα δοκεῖ τὸν υἱὸν ἢ Θέτις ἐφ' ἡδονάς παρακαλεῖν καὶ ἀναμι- 33a
νήσκειν ἀφροδισίων. ἀλλὰ κἀνταῦθα δεῖ παραθεωρεῖν τὴν τοῦ Ἀχιλ-
λέως ἐγκράτειαν, ὅτι τῆς Βρισηίδος ἐρῶν ἡκούσης πρὸς αὐτόν, εἰδὼς
τὴν τοῦ βίου τελευτὴν ἐγγὺς οὔσαν οὐ σπεύδει τῶν ἡδονῶν πρὸς
ἀπόλαυσιν οὐδ' ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ πενθεῖ τὸν φίλον ἀπραξία καὶ παρ-
αλείψει τῶν καθηκόντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ἡδονῶν διὰ τὴν λύπην ἀπέχ-
εται, ταῖς δὲ πράξεσι καὶ ταῖς στρατηγίαις ἐνεργὸς ἐστί. πάλιν ὁ Ἀρχίλο-
χος οὐκ ἐπαινεῖται λυπούμενος μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνδρὶ τῆς ἀδελφῆς διεφθαρ-
μένῳ κατὰ θάλασσαν, οἴνῳ δὲ καὶ παιδιᾷ πρὸς τὴν λύπην μάχεσθαι b
διανοούμενος. αἰτίαν μέντοι λόγον ἔχουσιν εἴρηκεν

οὔτε τι γὰρ κλαίων ἰήσομαι οὔτε κάκιον
θήσω τερπωλὰς καὶ θαλίας ἐφέπων.

εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲν ἐνόμιζεν ποιήσῃν κάκιον “τερπωλὰς καὶ θαλίας
ἐφέπων”, πῶς ἡμῖν τὰ παρόντα χεῖρον ἔξει φιλοσοφοῦσι καὶ πολι-
τευομένοις καὶ προιοῦσιν εἰς ἀγορὰν καὶ καταβαίνουσιν εἰς Ἀκαδήμειαν
καὶ γεωργίαν ἐφέπουσιν; ὅθεν οὐδ' αἱ παραδιορθώσεις φαύλως ἔχουσιν
αἷς καὶ Κλεάνθης ἐχρήσατο καὶ Ἀντισθένης, ὁ μὲν εὖ μάλα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους c
θορυβήσαντας ἰδὼν ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ πρὸς τό

τί δ' αἰσχρὸν ἦν μὴ τοῖσι χρωμένοις δοκῇ;

παραβαλὼν εὐθύς

αἰσχρὸν τό γ' αἰσχρὸν, κἀν δοκῇ κἀν μὴ δοκῇ,

ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης τὸ περὶ τοῦ πλούτου

φίλοις τε δοῦναι σῶμά τ' εἰς νόσους πεσόν
δαπάναισι σῶσαι

μεταγράφων οὕτω

πόρναις τε δοῦναι σῶμά τ' εἰς νόσους πεσόν
δαπάναισι ἐπιτρίψαι.

καὶ ὁ Ζήνων ἐπανορθούμενος τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους

ὅστις δὲ πρὸς τύραννον ἐμπορεύεται,
κείνου ὅστις δοῦλος, κἀν ἐλεύθερος μὲν d

33c θορυβήσαντας ἰδὼν m: θορυβήσαντας m θεάτρῳ πρὸς τό c: θεάτρῳ M:
θεάτρῳ τό c ἦν μὴ... δοκῇ m: εἰ μὴ... δοκεῖ mq τὸ περὶ c: περὶ M

μετέγραφεν

οὐκ ἔστι δοῦλος, ἂν ἐλεύθερος μόληι,

τῷ ἐλευθέρῳ νῦν συνεμφαίνων τὸν ἀδεῇ καὶ μεγαλόφρονα καὶ
ἀταπεινῶτον. τί δὴ κωλύει καὶ ἡμᾶς ταῖς τοιαύταις ὑποφωνήσεσι τοὺς
νέους ἀποκαλεῖν πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον, οὕτω πως χρωμένους τοῖς λεγομένοις;

τόδ' ἔστι τὸ ζηλωτὸν ἀνθρώποις, ὅτῳ
τόσον μερίμνης εἰς ὃ βούλεται πέσει.

οὔκ, ἀλλ'

ὅτῳ

τόσον μερίμνης εἰς ὃ συμφέρει πέσει.

τὸ γὰρ ἂ μὴ δεῖ βουλούμενον λαμβάνειν καὶ τυγχάνειν οἰκτρὸν ἔστι καὶ
ἄζηλον. καί

e οὐκ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν σ' ἐφύτευσ' ἀγαθοῖς,
Ἀγάμεμνον, Ἄτρεϋς. δεῖ δέ σε χαίρειν
καὶ λυπεῖσθαι.

μὰ Δία, φήσομεν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ σε χαίρειν, μὴ λυπεῖσθαι, τυγχάνοντα
μετρίων· οὐ γὰρ

ἐπὶ πᾶσιν σ' ἐφύτευσ' ἀγαθοῖς
Ἀγάμεμνον, Ἄτρεϋς.

αἰαῖ τόδ' ἤδη θεῖον ἀνθρώποις κακόν,
ὅταν τις εἰδῇ τάγαθόν, χρῆται δὲ μή.

θηριῶδες μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ οἰκτρὸν εἰδότα τὸ βέλτιον ὑπὸ τοῦ
χείρονος ἐξ ἀκρασίας καὶ μαλακίας ἄγεσθαι.

τρόπος ἔσθ' ὁ πείθων τοῦ λέγοντος, οὐ λόγος.

f καὶ τρόπος μὲν οὖν καὶ λόγος ἢ τρόπος διὰ λόγου, καθάπερ ἵππεϋς διὰ
χαλινοῦ καὶ διὰ πηδαλίου κυβερνήτης, οὐδὲν οὕτω φιλάνθρωπον οὐδὲ
συγγενὲς ἐχούσης τῆς ἀρετῆς ὄργανον ὡς τὸν λόγον.

34a

A. πρὸς θῆλυ νεύει μᾶλλον ἢ 'πὶ τᾶρρνα;
B. ὅπου προσῆι τὸ κάλλος, ἀμφιδέξιος.

33d συνεμφαίνων c: συνεκ- M ἀποκαλεῖν m: ὑπο- m: παρα- m: ἀνα- c λαμβάνειν
m: λαβεῖν m **33e** σ' ἐφύτευσ' q: ἐφύτευσ' m: ἐφύτευσέ σ' m **33f** ἵππεϋς c: ἵππος
m: ἵππους m διὰ πηδαλίου c: πηδαλίου M

ἦν δὲ βέλτιον εἰπεῖν

ὅπου προσῆι τὸ σῶφρον, ἀμφιδέξιος

ὥς ἀληθῶς καὶ ἰσόρροπος· ὁ δ' ὑφ' ἡδονῆς καὶ ὤρας ὥδε κάκεῖ μετοικα-
κίζόμενος ἐπαρίστερος καὶ ἀβέβαιος.

φόβος τὰ θεῖα τοῖσι σώφροσιν βροτῶν

οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλά

θάρσος τὰ θεῖα τοῖσι σώφροσιν βροτῶν,

φόβος δὲ τοῖς ἄφροσι καὶ ἀνοήτοις καὶ ἀχαρίστοις, ὅτι καὶ τὴν παν-
τὸς αἰτίαν ἀγαθοῦ δύναμιν καὶ ἀρχὴν ὥς βλάπτουσιν ὑφορῶνται καὶ
δεδίασι. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐπανορθώσεως γένος τοιοῦτόν ἐστι. b

13 τὴν δ' ἐπὶ πλέον τῶν λεγομένων χρῆσιν ὑπέδειξεν ὀρθῶς ὁ
Χρύσιππος, ὅτι δεῖ μετάγειν καὶ διαβιβάζειν ἐπὶ τὰ ὁμοειδῆ τὸ χρήσι-
μον. ὁ τε γὰρ Ἡσίοδος εἰπὼν

οὐδ' ἂν βοῦς ἀπόλοιτ', εἰ μὴ γέιτων κακὸς εἴη

καὶ περὶ κυνὸς ταῦτό καὶ περὶ ὄνου λέγει καὶ περὶ πάντων ὁμοίως τῶν
ἀπολέσθαι δυναμένων. καὶ πάλιν τοῦ Εὐριπίδου λέγοντος

τίς δ' ἐστὶ δοῦλος τοῦ θανεῖν ἄφροντις ὦν;

ὑπακουστέον ὅτι καὶ περὶ πόνου καὶ νόσου τὰ αὐτὰ εἴρηκεν. ὥς γὰρ
φαρμάκου πρὸς ἓν ἀρμόσαντος νόσημα τὴν δύναμιν καταμαθόντες οἱ
ἰατροὶ μετάγουσι καὶ χρῶνται πρὸς ἅπαν τὸ παραπλήσιον, οὕτω καὶ c
λόγον κοινοῦν καὶ δημοσιεύειν τὴν χρεῖαν δυνάμενον οὐ χρὴ περιορᾶν
ἐνὶ πράγματι συνητημένον ἀλλὰ κινεῖν ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ ὅμοια, καὶ τοὺς
νέους ἐθίζειν τὴν κοινότητα συνορᾶν καὶ μεταφέρειν ὀξέως τὸ οἰκεῖον,
ἐν πολλοῖς παραδείγμασι ποιουμένους μελέτην καὶ ἄσκησιν ὀξυηκοῖας,
ἵνα τοῦ μὲν Μενάνδρου λέγοντος

μακάριος ὅστις οὐσίαν καὶ νοῦν ἔχει

τοῦτο καὶ περὶ δόξης καὶ περὶ ἡγεμονίας καὶ περὶ λόγου δυνάμεως
εἰρησθαι νομίζωσι, τὴν δὲ πρὸς τὸν Ἀχιλλέα τὸν ἐν Σκύρῳ καθημένον d
ἐν ταῖς παρθένοις γεγεννημένην ἐπίπληξιν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσεως

σὺ δ', ὦ τὸ λαμπρὸν φῶς ἀποσβεννὺς γένους,
ξαίνεις, ἀρίστου πατρὸς Ἑλλήνων γεγῶς;

34a ὥδε m: δεῦρο m μετοικακίζόμενος m: μετοικιζόμενος m οὐδαμῶς c: καὶ μὴν
οὐδαμῶς M καὶ τὴν παντὸς m: τὴν παντὸς m **34c** τὸ οἰκεῖον M: ἐπὶ (or πρὸς)
τὸ οἰκεῖον c

καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἄσωτον οἷωνται λέγεσθαι καὶ πρὸς τὸν αἰσχροκερδῇ καὶ
πρὸς τὸν ἀμελῇ καὶ ἀπαίδευτον

πίνεις, ἀρίστου πατρὸς Ἑλλήνων γεγώς,

ἢ κυβεύεις ἢ ὀρτυγοκοπεῖς ἢ νῆ Δία καπηλεύεις ἢ τοκογλυφεῖς, μηδὲν
μέγα φρονῶν μηδ' ἄξιον τῆς εὐγενείας;

μη̅ πλοῦτον εἴπηις. οὐχὶ θαυμάζω θεόν
ὃν χῶ κάκιστος ῥαϊδίως ἐκτίησας.

e

οὐκοῦν μηδὲ δόξαν εἴπηις μηδὲ σώματος εὐμορφίαν μηδὲ στρατηγικὴν
χλαμύδα μηδ' ἱερατικὸν στέφανον, ὧν καὶ τοὺς κακίστους ὀρῶμεν
τυγχάνοντας.

τῆς δειλίας γὰρ αἰσχρὰ γίνεται τέκνα

καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία τῆς ἀκολασίας καὶ τῆς δεισιδαιμονίας καὶ τοῦ φθόνου καὶ
τῶν ἄλλων νοσημάτων ἀπάντων. ἄριστα δ' εἰρηκότος Ὀμήρου τό

Δύσπαρι εἶδος ἄριστε

καὶ τό

Ἑκτορ εἶδος ἄριστε

(ψόγου γὰρ ἀποφαίνει καὶ λοιδορίας ἄξιον ὧι μηδὲν ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν
f εὐμορφίας κάλλιον) ἐφαρμοστέον τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίοις, κολοῦντα τοὺς
μεγαλοφρονούντας ἐπὶ τοῖς μηδενὸς ἀξίοις, καὶ διδάσκοντα τοὺς νέους
ὄνειδος ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ λοιδορίαν τὸ “χρήμασιν ἄριστε” καὶ “δείπνοις
ἄριστε” καὶ “παισὶν ἢ ὑποζυγίοις ἄριστε” καὶ νῆ Δία τὸ λέγειν ἐφεξῆς
35a “ἄριστε.” δεῖ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν καλῶν διώκειν τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ περὶ τὰ
πρῶτα πρῶτον εἶναι καὶ μέγαν ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις· ἢ δ' ἀπὸ μικρῶν δόξα
καὶ φαύλων ἄδοξός ἐστι καὶ ἀφιλότιμος.

τοῦτο δ' ἡμᾶς εὐθὺς ὑπομιμνήσκει τὸ παράδειγμα τὸ τοὺς ψόγους
ἀποθεωρεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐν τοῖς Ὀμήρου μάλιστα ποιήμασιν·
ἔμφασις γὰρ γίγνεται μεγάλη τοῦ τὰ σωματικά καὶ τυχερὰ μὴ μεγάλης
ἄξια σπουδῆς νομίζειν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς δεξιώσεσι καὶ ἀνακλή-
σεσιν οὐ καλοὺς οὐδὲ πλουσίους οὐδ' ἰσχυροὺς προσαγορεύουσιν, ἀλλὰ
τοιαύταις εὐφημίαις χρῶνται

διογενὲς Λαερτιάδη, πολυμήχαν' Ὀδυσσεῦ

34d οἷωνται c: οἷονται m: οἷον τε m
τῶι λέγειν m

34d ἢ νῆ Δία m: ἢ m

34f τὸ λέγειν m:

καί

Ἔκτορ υἱὲ Πριάμοιο, Διὶ μῆτιν ἀτάλαντε

b

καί

ὦ Ἀχιλεῦ Πηλέος υἱέ, μέγα κῦδος Ἀχαιῶν

καί

δῖε Μενoitιάδη, τῷ ἐμῷ κεχαρισμένε θυμῷ.

ἔπειτα λοιδοροῦσιν οὐδὲν ἐφαπτόμενοι τῶν σωματικῶν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς
ἀμαρτήμασι τοὺς ψόγους ἐπιφέροντες

οἶνοβαρές, κυνὸς ὄμματ' ἔχων

καί

Αἶαν νείκει ἄριστε, κακοφραδές

καί

Ἰδομενεῦ, τί πάρος λαβρεύεαι; οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ
λαβραγόρην ἔμεναι

καί

Αἶαν ἀμαρτοεπὲς βουγαίε.

καὶ τέλος ὁ Θερσίτης ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως οὐ χωλὸς οὐ φαλακρὸς οὐ c
κυρτὸς ἀλλ' ἀκριτόμυθος λοιδορεῖται, τὸν δ' Ἥφαιστον ἢ τεκοῦσα
φιλοφρονουμένη προσηγόρευσεν ἀπὸ τῆς χωλότητος

ὄρσεο κυλλοπόδιον, ἐμὸν τέκος.

οὕτως Ὅμηρος καταγελᾷ τῶν αἰσχυνομένων ἐπὶ χωλότησιν ἢ
τυφλότησιν, οὔτε ψεκτὸν ἡγούμενος τὸ μὴ αἰσχρὸν οὔτ' αἰσχρὸν τὸ μὴ
δι' ἡμᾶς ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τύχης γιγνόμενον.

δύο δὲ περιγίγνεται μεγάλα τοῖς τῶν ποιητῶν ἐπιμελῶς ἐθιζομένοις
ἀκούειν, τὸ μὲν εἰς μετρίότητα, μηδενὶ τύχην ἐπαχθῶς καὶ ἀνοήτως
ὄνειδίζειν, τὸ δ' εἰς μεγαλοφροσύνην, αὐτοὺς χρησαμένους τύχαις μὴ
ταπεινοῦσθαι μηδὲ διαταράττεσθαι, φέρειν δὲ πράως καὶ σκώμματα d
καὶ λοιδορίας καὶ γέλωτας, μάλιστα μὲν τὸ τοῦ Φιλήμονος ἔχοντας
πρόχειρον

ἦδιον οὐδέν οὐδὲ μουσικώτερον
ἔστ' ἢ δύνασθαι λοιδορούμενον φέρειν.

ὃν δὲ φαίνεται τις ἐπιλήψεως δεόμενος, τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων καὶ
τῶν παθῶν ἐπιλαμβανόμενος, ὥσπερ ὁ τραγικός Ἀδραστος, τοῦ
Ἀλκμέωνος εἰπόντος πρὸς αὐτόν

ἀνδροκτόνου γυναικὸς ὁμογενῆς ἔφους,

ἀπεκρίνατο

σὺ δ' αὐτόχειρ γε μητρὸς ἧ σ' ἐγείνατο.

^e καθάπερ γὰρ οἱ τὰ ἱμάτια μαστιγοῦντες οὐχ ἄπτονται τοῦ σώματος,
οὕτως οἱ δυστυχίας τινὰς ἢ δυσγενεῖας ὀνειδίζοντες εἰς τὰ ἔκτος ἐντείνον-
ται κενῶς καὶ ἀνονήτως, τῆς ψυχῆς δ' οὐ θιγγάνουσιν οὐδὲ τῶν ἀληθῶς
ἐπανορθώσεως δεομένων καὶ δήξεως.

14 καὶ μὴν ὥσπερ ἐπάνω πρὸς τὰ φαῦλα καὶ βλαβερὰ ποιήματα
λόγους καὶ γνώμας ἀντιτάσσοντες ἐνδόξων καὶ πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν
ἔδοκοῦμεν ἀφιστάναι καὶ ἀνακρούειν τὴν πίστιν, οὕτως ὃ τι ἂν ἀστεῖον
εὕρωμεν παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ χρηστόν, ἐκτρέφειν χρὴ καὶ αὔξειν ἀποδεί-
ξεσι καὶ μαρτυρίαις φιλοσόφοις, ἀποδιδόντας τὴν εὐρεσιν ἐκείνοις. καὶ

^f γὰρ δίκαιον καὶ ὠφέλιμον, ἰσχὺν τῆς πίστεως καὶ ἀξίωμα προσλαμ-
βανούσης, ὅταν τοῖς ἀπὸ σκηνῆς λεγομένοις καὶ πρὸς λύραν αἰδομένοις
καὶ μελετωμένοις ἐν διδασκαλείῳ τὰ Πυθαγόρου δόγματα καὶ τὰ
Πλάτωνος ὁμολογῇ, καὶ τὰ Χίλωνος παραγγέλματα καὶ τὰ Βίαντος

^{36a} ἐπὶ τὰς αὐτὰς ἄγῃ γνώμας ἐκείνοις τοῖς παιδικοῖς ἀναγνώσασιν. ὁθεν
οὐ παρέργως ὑποδεικτέον ὅτι τὸ μὲν

τέκνον ἐμόν, οὗ τοι δέδοται πολεμῆια ἔργα,
ἀλλὰ σύ γ' ἱμερόεντα μετέρχεο ἔργα γάμοιο

καὶ τό

Ζεὺς γάρ τοι νεμέσασχ', ὅτ' ἀμείνوني φωτὶ μάχοιο

οὐδὲν διαφέρει τοῦ “γνώθι σαυτόν,” ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει διάνοιαν
ἐκείνῳ· τὸ δὲ

νήπιοι, οὐδ' ἴσασιν ὅσῳ πλέον ἥμισυ παντός

καὶ τό

ἢ δὲ κακὴ βουλή τῷ βουλευέσαντι κακίστη

35d ἐπιλαμβανόμενος m: -εσθαι m: -μένουσ' m **35e** ἀνονήτως c: ἀνοήτως M

36a μάχοιο m: μάχοιτο m

ταῦτόν ἐστι τοῖς Πλάτωνος ἐν Γοργία καὶ Πολιτείᾳ δόγμασι περὶ τοῦ
 “τὸ ἀδικεῖν κάκιον εἶναι τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι” καὶ τοῦ κακῶς πάσχειν τὸ
 ποιεῖν κακῶς βλαβερώτερον. ἐπιρρητέον δὲ καὶ τῷ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου b

θάρσει· πόνου γὰρ τᾶκρον οὐκ ἔχει χρόνον

ὅτι τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ παρ’ Ἐπικούρου θρυλούμενον αἰεὶ καὶ θαυμαζόμενον,
 ὡς “οἱ μεγάλοι πόνου συντόμως ἐξάγουσιν, οἱ δὲ χρόνιοι μέγεθος οὐκ
 ἔχουσιν.” ὦν τὸ μὲν εἴρηκεν ὁ Αἰσχύλος ἐναργῶς, τὸ δὲ τῷ εἰρημένῳ
 παρακείμενόν ἐστιν· εἰ γὰρ ὁ μέγας καὶ σύντονος οὐ παραμένει πόνος,
 οὐκ ἔστι μέγας ὁ παραμένων οὐδὲ δυσκαρτέρητος. τὰ δὲ τοῦ Θέσπιδος
 ταυτί

ὁρᾷς ὅτι Ζεὺς τῷδε πρωτεύει θεῶν,
 οὐ ψεῦδος οὐδὲ κόμπον οὐ μῶρον γέλων
 ἀσκῶν· τὸ δ’ ἡδὺ μῦθος οὐκ ἐπίσταται c

τί διαφέρει τοῦ “πόρρω γὰρ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἰδρυται τὸ θεῖον,” ὡς
 Πλάτων ἔλεγε; τὸ δέ

φάσω μέγιστον
 κῦδος ἔχειν ἀρετάν· πλοῦ-
 τος δὲ καὶ δειλοῖσιν ἀνθρώπων ὁμιλεῖ

λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ Βακχυλίδου καὶ πάλιν ὑπὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου παρα-
 πλησίως

ἐγὼ δ’ οὐδὲν πρεσβύτερον
 νομίζω τᾶς σωφροσύνας,
 ἐπεὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς αἰεὶ ξύνεστι

καὶ τό

τί μάταν βροτοὶ δὲ πολλὰ
 πέπασθε, πλούτῳ τε δοκεῖτ’
 ἀρετὰν κατεργάσσεσθαι;
 ἐν ἐσθλοῖς δὲ καθήσεσθ’ ἀνολβοὶ

ἄρ’ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶν ὦν οἱ φιλόσοφοι λέγουσι περὶ πλούτου καὶ d
 τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν, ὡς χωρὶς ἀρετῆς ἀνωφελῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀνονήτων
 τοῖς ἔχουσι; τὸ γὰρ οὕτω συνάπτειν καὶ συνοικεῖοῦν τοῖς δόγμασιν
 ἐξάγει τὰ ποιήματα τοῦ μύθου καὶ τοῦ προσωπείου, καὶ σπουδῇ

36b τᾶκρον c: ἄκρον M Ἐπικούρου m: - ρωι m **36c** φάσω μέγιστον q: φάσωμε
 πιστὸν M τί μάταν... ἀνολβοὶ q: τιμὰν τὰν τέτασθε, πλούτῳ δ’ ἀρετὰν κατερ-
 γασάσθω δοκεῖτ’, ἐν ἐσθλοῖς δὲ καθήσεσθ’ ἀνολβοὶ M

περιτίθησιν τοῖς χρησίμως λεγομένοις· ἔτι δὲ προανοίγει καὶ προκινεῖ
 τὴν τοῦ νέου ψυχὴν τοῖς ἐν φιλοσοφίαι λόγοις. ἔρχεται γὰρ οὐκ
 ἄγευστος αὐτῶν παντάπασιν οὐδ' ἀνήκοος, οὐδ' ἀκρίτως ἀνάπλεως ὧν
 ἤκουε τῆς μητρὸς αἰεὶ καὶ τίτθης καὶ νῆ Δία τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ παιδαγ-
 e γωγοῦ, τοὺς πλουσίους εὐδαιμονιζόντων καὶ σεβομένων, φριπτόντων
 δὲ τὸν θάνατον καὶ τὸν πόνον, ἄζηλον δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν
 ἄνευ χρημάτων καὶ δόξης ἀγόντων. οἷς ἀντίφωνα τῶν φιλοσόφων
 ἀκούοντας αὐτοὺς τὸ πρῶτον ἑκπληξίς ἴσχει καὶ ταραχὴ καὶ θάμβος, οὐ
 προσιεμένους οὐδ' ὑπομένοντας, ἂν μὴ καθάπερ ἐκ σκότους πολλοῦ μέλ-
 λοντες ἥλιον ὄραν ἐθισθῶσιν καθάπερ ἐν νόθῳ φωτὶ κεκραμένης μύθοις
 ἀληθείας αὐγὴν ἔχοντι μαλθακὴν ἀλύπτως διαβλέπειν τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ
 μὴ φεύγειν. προακηκοότες γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασι καὶ προανεγνωκότες

f τὸν φύντα θρηνεῖν εἰς δσ' ἔρχεται κακά,
 τὸν δ' αὖ θανόντα καὶ πόνων πεπαυμένον
 χαίροντας εὐφημοῦντας ἐκπέμπειν δόμων

καί

ἐπεὶ τί δεῖ βροτοῖσι πλὴν δυεῖν μόνον,
 Δήμητρος ἀκτῆς πώματός θ' ὕδρηχόου;

καί

ἰὼ τυραννὶ βαρβάρων ἀνδρῶν φίλῃ

37a καί

ἢ βροτῶν τ' εὐπραξία
 τῶν τάλάχιστα γίγνεται λυπουμενῶν

ἥττον ταραττονται καὶ δυσκολαίνουσι παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἀκούον-
 τες ὥς “ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς” καὶ “ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος ὠρι-
 σται” καὶ “τὸ εὐδαιμον καὶ μακάριον οὐ χρημάτων πλῆθος οὐδὲ πραγ-
 μάτων ὄγκος οὐδ' ἀρχαί τινες ἔχουσιν οὐδὲ δυνάμεις, ἀλλ' ἀλυπία καὶ
 πραότης παθῶν καὶ διάθεσις ψυχῆς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ὀρίζουσα.” διὸ
 καὶ τούτων ἕνεκα καὶ τῶν προειρημένων ἀπάντων ἀγαθῆς δεῖ τῷ
 νέῳ κυβερνήσεως περὶ τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν, ἵνα μὴ προδιαβληθεὶς ἀλλὰ
 b μᾶλλον προπαιδευθεὶς εὐμενὴς καὶ φίλος καὶ οἰκεῖος ὑπὸ ποιητικῆς ἐπὶ
 φιλοσοφίαν προπέμπηται.

36d τοῖς χρησίμως m: αὐτοῖς χρησίμως m προανοίγει m: προσ- m προκινεῖ
 m: προσ- m **36e** τὴν ἀρετὴν m: καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν m τῶν φιλοσόφων m: τὰ τῶν φ. m

COMMENTARY

CHAPTER 1

Our sons, Marcus Sedatius, have reached the stage where they need guidance in their reading of poetry, to save them from being misled. I am sending you a version of the lecture I gave on this subject the other day. Poetry is not only valuable, but also contains things that can result in false and harmful views and attitudes, unless good guidance is offered. The boys must not be deterred from poetry altogether, as Epicurus would advise, but rather shown how to read it as an introduction to philosophy, which they will have to study later on.

14d–e P. often begins his essays with a (sometimes far-fetched) comparison or contrast, cf., e.g., the openings of *Virtue and vice* (100b), *Brotherly love* (478a–b), *On curiosity* (515b), *Life of Theseus* 1, *Life of Pericles* 1, and often with a quotation (cf., e.g., *Friends and flatterers* (48e–f)). Here an amusingly matched pair of anecdotes about a gourmet Greek and a stern Roman opponent of *luxuria*, both famed for their sharp wit, mark Plutarch, with his Greek name, and his addressee whose name is Roman as well-read *pepaideumenoi* at home in both cultures.

14d εἰ μὲν . . . οἱ μὴ ἰχθύες: what Philoxenus meant by his *bon mot* remains mysterious, as perhaps he meant it to be: ancient riddles often take the form of ‘X which is not X’. Gourmets like surprises – meat which is ‘just meat’ is like a philosophy lecture which is ‘just a philosophy lecture’. Perhaps Philoxenus was referring to meat which tastes more like fish (e.g. waterfowl) or fish with a meat-like texture (e.g. tuna), or offal as ‘meat which is not meat’ and shellfish, squid etc. as ‘fish which are not fish’ (so von Reutern 1933: 2), or perhaps rather we have an early foreshadowing of Trimalchio’s gifted cook in Petronius’ *Satyricon* who could turn anything into anything; gourmets like food to be prepared in such a way that its original ingredients are disguised, just as children, so P. is about to claim, like ‘disguised’ philosophy. In P.’s application of the anecdote to education, it assumes something of the force of Lucretius’ famous ‘honey on the cup’, whereby the charm and mythic quality of poetry helps the philosophy to slip down (Lucretius 1.933–42, cf. Hunter 2009a: 188); for this rôle of poetic myth cf. Strabo 1.2.8, above p. 13. For the ‘honey on the cup’ at the beginning of a work cf. Quintilian 3.1.3–4 (apologizing for the shortage of *uoluptas* inevitable in a dry subject such as the history of rhetoric): ‘I have tried to add some touch of elegance . . . to lure young people into learning what I regarded as necessary for their studies, in the hope that they might be attracted by some pleasure in reading . . . This is the reason Lucretius gives for writing philosophy in verse . . . [citation of Lucretius 1.936–8 = 4.11–13] . . . But I fear this book may appear to have too little honey and too much wormwood, and be more healthy for the student than agreeable . . .’ (trans. DR). Φιλόξενος: three figures of this name, constantly confused in the ancient evidence, might be relevant. (i) Philoxenus of Cythera, a famous dithyrambic poet

of the late fifth–early fourth century BC. Athenaeus (4.146f, cf. *PMG* 836) tentatively ascribes to him the fragments of a lyric *Deipnon*, a description of a lavish dinner, and reports anecdotes about his love of food. Two anecdotes about him by the third-century poet Machon also survive (64–90 Gow); Machon calls him an ‘amazing gourmet’ (ὑπερβολῆι . . . ὀψοφάγος), and one of Machon’s anecdotes, strangely enough (cf. 15b), involves Philoxenus eating a whole octopus but for the head. (ii) Philoxenus of Leucas, the other poet who, according to Athenaeus, may have a claim to the lyric *Deipnon* and to whom modern scholars normally ascribe that poem, is identified by Athenaeus (1.5b) as the poet of a hexameter *Deipnon* cited and parodied by the comic poet Plato (fr. 189 K-A). Gourmet anecdotes are also told about this Philoxenus, some the same as ascribed to Philoxenus of Cythera. (iii) Philoxenus, son of Eryxis, another gourmet though not, as far as we know, a poet, is mentioned elsewhere by P. (668c, 1128b, fr. 134.36 Sandbach) and in other sources. It is sometimes thought that P. is here paraphrasing verses by ‘Philoxenus’ (cf. *CA* p. 251), but (despite a certain rhythmic quality to Philoxenus’ reported words) it is much more likely that P. is citing an anecdote or *chreia* (as he is about to do for Cato), and as ‘Philoxenus the poet’ would most naturally suggest the man from Cythera, who was the subject of a large anecdotal tradition, as we see particularly in Machon who thought his bon mots worth recording, it seems very likely that P. at least thought that he was here citing (i). For attempts to sort out the Philoxenoi cf. Wilamowitz 1900: 85–8, Degani 1998, Olson-Sens 2000: xxxix–xliii. Μάρκε Σηδάτιε: nothing is known of P.’s addressee. Sedatius is a known family name, Sedatus a very common cognomen. The best known Sedatius is the later M. Sedatius Severianus, Verus’ general who was disastrously defeated at Elegeia on the Euphrates in 161 AD; Lucian calls him ‘that foolish Celt’, but P.’s friend may well be no relation, and his son certainly has a Greek name. As far as is known, however, P. does not address his Greek friends by their Roman names.

ἐκείνοις ἀποφαίνεσθαι παρῶμεν . . . ἔχειν ‘let us leave the making of the decision [as to whether . . .] to those who Cato said possessed a more sensitive palate than a mind’. παρῶμεν is the first pers. pl. aor. subj. of παρίημι, cf. *LSJ* s.v. IV 2. P. reports the same witticism, said to someone who wanted to join Cato’s circle, at *Life of the Elder Cato* 9.7. καρδία is here the seat of intelligence, and presumably represents Latin *cor* (*OLD* s.v. 2). οἷς . . . ὑπάρχειν of most MSS could be right, but the text adopted here reflects the version of *Life of the Elder Cato*.

14e τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λεγομένων: lit. ‘what is expressed in the context of philosophy’, i.e. philosophical discourses, both spoken and read in books.

οἱ σφόδρα νέοι: i.e. those who have not yet started the formal study of philosophy. The statement is a general one, but P. will already have his eye on his and Sedatius’ sons.

ὑπηκούς . . . καὶ χειροθήθεις ‘responsive . . . and receptive’. P. is again thinking of all forms of reception, both oral and written.

οὐ γὰρ μόνον . . . ἐνθουσιῶσι 'By going through not only Aesop's fables and summaries of poetic plots but also the *Abaris* of Heraclides and the *Lycon* of Ariston, they become pleasurably enthused for doctrines concerning the soul which are mixed with mythical material.' Correctors of some of the MSS saw that οὐ γὰρ μόνον required an ἀλλὰ καί, but differed over where to make the division between kinds of work. It is however clear that, whatever the nature of the *Abaris* and the *Lycon* (cf. further below), they were in a different class from Aesop's fables and 'tales from poets', which could not be described as τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίαι λεγομένων, and that is where the distinction should be drawn. It is possible that a verb has also dropped out with ἀλλά, e.g. (RH) ὑποθέσεις <ἀγαπῶσιν, ἀλλά> καί. For <περί> . . . ἐνθουσιῶσι (DR) cf. P's account of the 'enthusiastic' reaction of the Roman νέοι to the visit of Carneades in 155 BC: 'they abandoned their other pleasures and pastimes and ἐνθουσιῶσι περὶ φιλοσοφίαν' (*Life of the Elder Cato* 22.3); alternatively, <πρὸς> τὰ περὶ κτλ. would avoid the awkwardness of the repeated περὶ, cf. Julian, *Or.* 4.136b–c οἱ μάντις ἐνθουσιῶντες πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Proposals which make 'doctrines concerning the soul which are mixed with mythical material' a second or third category by itself are unattractive, as there is no reason why P. should not have been specific; it is unlikely that he is thinking of the 'very young' reading Plato's eschatological myths (so Babbitt 1927:75, Bréchet 1999: 240). Crönert proposed διερχόμενοι <καί> τὰ <ἄλλα> περὶ ψυχῶν . . . τὰ Αἰσώπεια μυθάρια: traditionally the first reading of children and the basis of the earliest exercises in composition, cf. Quintilian 1.9.2, Morgan 1998a: index s.v. Aesop, Cribiore 2001a: 202–3; the diminutive μυθάριον has a slightly dismissive tone. All such fables which did not otherwise belong to a specific type (e.g. 'fables of Sybaris') could be labelled 'Aesopic', whether or not they were associated with Aesop, cf. Aelius Theon 2.73 Spengel = p. 31–2 Patillon-Bolognesi. The concluding 'moral' gave such fables an educative value as preparation for serious moral philosophy – Theon notes that their point is 'useful advice' (2.74.1 Spengel = p.32 Patillon-Bolognesi) – and the standard definition of a μῦθος, namely λόγος ψευδῆς εἰκονίζων ἀλήθειαν (Theon 2.72.28 Spengel = p.30 Patillon-Bolognesi, cf. 348a), reflects the practical use to which they could be put. Cf. further Philostratus, *Life of Apollonius* 5.14. Plato begins his account of the supervision necessary in the education of the Guardians with μῦθοι (*Rep.* 2.377c), and P. here echoes and varies that beginning. τὰς ποιητικὰς ὑποθέσεις: prose (and sometimes verse) summaries of poems or episodes from poems, notably Homer, and of plays (Attic tragedy, Menander) often circulated as independent texts, and P. implies that these were common entertainment for the young, cf. Lamb's famous *Tales from Shakespeare*, though they were also read by older readers alongside the originals. For texts and discussion cf. *POxy* 2455 (with Turner 1968: 101), 4640, Rossum-Steenbeek 1998, Morgan 1998a: 198–220, Cameron 2004: 57–9. τὸν Ἀβαριν τὸν Ἡρακλείδου: Heraclides of Pontus was a prolific writer and philosopher of the fourth century BC; he was a pupil of Plato's successor Speusippus and apparently also of Aristotle, but his

work was also strongly characterized by an interest in Pythagorean doctrines. His dialogues were famous for their elaborate settings and myths, which enjoyed a very mixed reputation in antiquity: it may be relevant to the current context that Cicero says that he ‘stuffed volumes full of *pueriles fabulae*’ on the subject of the gods (*Nat. D.* 1.34 = fr. 111 Wehrli = 72 Schütrumpf), and P. elsewhere calls him *μυθώδης καὶ πλάσματίας* (*Camillus* 22.3). Abaris was a legendary ‘Hyperborean’, associated with Apollo and Delphi, to whom shaman-like skills were attributed; Herodotus knew a story that he carried an arrow all over the world without eating anything (4.36.1). Heraclides’ work, which is presumably that which elsewhere is cited as *The speeches assigned to Abaris* in at least two books, may have been a kind of fabulous biography or autobiography (cf. Philostratus’ *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*) and is often assumed to have contained a *katabasis* to Hades; in Iamblichus’ *Life of Pythagoras* the two wise men meet, and this may derive from Heraclides (fr. 149B Schütrumpf). Cf. further Wehrli 1969: 84–5, Gottschalk 1980: 113–27. **τὸν Λύκωνα τὸν Ἀριστωνος**: Lycon from the Troad was head of the Peripatetic school for forty-four years in the third century BC; Diogenes Laertius says that his work is very well suited ‘to the education of children’ (5.65). Ariston is presumably Ariston of Ceos who was perhaps Lycon’s successor. Cicero describes Ariston’s style as ‘polished and elegant’ but without *auctoritas* and his thought as lacking the *grauitas* ‘one expects in a great philosopher’ (*De finibus* 5.13). Unfortunately we know nothing about the form or content of Ariston’s *Lycon*. **μεθ’ ἡδονῆς ἐνθουσιῶσι**: this passage, and perhaps also *Life of the Elder Cato* 22.3 (cited above), seems to echo Plato, *Philebus* 15e1 on the delight of a young man at being exposed to a philosophical puzzle, ἡσθεὶς ὥς τινα σοφίας ἡύρηκώς θησαυρόν, ὕψ’ ἡδονῆς ἐνθουσιᾷ κτλ.

διὸ δεῖ . . . διώκειν: P. picks up the opening analogy between bodily and intellectual nourishment in a sustained comparison which will recur. Cf. further on 15b τρόφιμον.

14f ἐν ταῖς ἀκροάσεσιν καὶ ἀναγνώσεσιν ‘in what they hear and read’; the distinction is here not important – P. is fond of doubling up nouns and adjectives (cf. above p. 22) – and ‘hearing’ and ‘reading’ are used almost interchangeably in this essay, cf. 15b–c, 37a etc. In Plato’s *Laws* the Athenian Stranger says that Athenians believe that ‘proper education’ consists in making the young πολυηκόους τ’ ἐν ταῖς ἀναγνώσεσιν . . . καὶ πολυμαθεῖς by learning ‘whole poets’ off by heart (7.810e11–12); ἀκροατής is a standard term in the Homeric scholia for ‘the audience’ (through whatever mode of reception), cf. Nünlist 2009: 12 n.41 and, in general, Schenkeveld 1992. It has been suggested that ἀκροάσεσιν and δι’ ἀκοῆς immediately below point not just to how poems were actually received from a teacher, but also to the importance which Stoics attached to the φωνή or sound of poetry (cf., e.g., DeLacy 1948: 245–6, 250, Valgiglio 1973: 59–60, 65), but it is difficult to see how this could be grasped in the context.

ἐθίζειν . . . διώκειν '[we must, i.e. δεῖ] accustom them, making use of the pleasurable element moderately like a relish, to pursue the useful and beneficial element that comes from it'. The young man is to be trained in reading practices which will stay with him throughout life: at *Progress in virtue* 79c–80a it is adults who in their reading of both philosophy and poetry should, like a bee seeking honey in a flower, pursue 'the useful and substantial (σάρκινον) and helpful', rather than just what is pleasurable or unusual. The χρήσιμον . . . ἡδύ opposition, which is to be so prominent throughout the treatise, was the central dichotomy around which all Hellenistic poetic criticism turned. Horace's expressions of the idea are perhaps the best known, cf. *Ars Poetica* 333–4 (*aut prodesse uolunt aut delectare poetae* . . .) and 343–4 (*omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci* . . .), Brink 1971: 352; behind Horace stood Neoptolemus of Parium (? late third century) who seems to have argued that the complete poet offers not just ψυχαγωγία but also ὠφέλησις and χρησιμολογία (Philodemus, *On Poems* 5, xvi Mangoni). ὄψωι: ὄψον is anything that accompanies the staple bread, i.e. usually vegetables, fish or meat, but the word may also carry the sense of a food which is a bit extra or special (and specially pleasant), but not strictly necessary (cf., e.g., 125d, 668d, 686d, Davidson 1997: 21–6); at 713b–c music and rhythm are the ὄψον in contrast to the solid nourishment of the words of poetry and song. This must be the sense here. What is really important in the reading of poetry, what keeps you alive (σωτήριον), is the 'staple' nourishment of moral lessons; pleasure is an added extra, which has its purposes (like 'the honey on the cup', cf. 13d) but must not be allowed to dominate (μετρίως). ἀπ' αὐτοῦ suggests that the benefit of poetry is to be sought in the pleasurable element itself (cf. 16a), but Bernardakis' ἀπ' αὐτῶν, i.e. ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκρόάσεων καὶ ἀναγνώσεων, may well be right; Valgiglio adopts ἀντ' αὐτοῦ from one late MS. P.'s analogy has much in common with the standard distinction in stylistic discussions between the substance of a work and the stylistic devices which embellish it as ἡδύσματα, cf. 347f; for the language of food and the language of style cf. Gowers 1993 *passim*. τῶι τέρποντι: cf. already Thucydides' famous programmatic declaration that the 'lack of the mythological element' in his *Histories* might make them 'short on pleasure . . . when they are heard' (ἐς μὲν ἀκρόασιν . . . ἀτερπέστερον, 1.22.4). τέρπειν is Horace's *delectare* (cf. *SVF* III 401, 403). τὸ σωτήριον: there is a slight medical resonance, 'that which supports life'; at 122e the study of medicine is said to offer τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν.

οὔτε γὰρ πόλιν . . . προέμενος αὐτόν: P. is fond of such comparisons with doubled οὔτε, cf. Fuhrmann 1964: 39. Vice and pleasure are always looking for ways into the 'city of the body' (cf. 76e, 645e, 705e, Plato, *Rep.* 8.560b–1c); Diogenes the Cynic is reported to have mocked those who put locks and seals on their stores but kept their bodies wide open (Stobaeus 3.6.17), and cf. Lucian, *Nigrinus* 16 '[in Rome] one can receive (καταδέχεσθαι) pleasure through every gate, through the eyes, the ears, the nostrils, the throat and the genitals'. P. opens *On listening to lectures* with a disquisition on ἀκοή (38a–d) in which he makes almost

the reverse point: many parts of the body offer channels through which vice may enter, but only the ears give an opening to virtue. Cities are often betrayed from within when a spy (or young girl in love with one of the enemy) opens a gate and admits (παράδῃται) the enemy; so too, pleasure can be the Achilles' heel which destroys the whole person. For an extended example of the metaphor cf. Apuleius, *Met.* 5.19.5 'So, the gates thrown open, these wicked women [the sisters] occupied Psyche's defenceless heart, and discarding attempts at a concealed siege, drew the swords of their treachery and attacked the panic-stricken thoughts of the simple-minded girl' (trans. Kenney, adapted). ἄν τῇ: sc. ἡδονῇ. The expression ἡδονὴ δι' ἀκοῆς occurs several times in the discussion of pleasure in Plato, *Hipp. Mai.* (e.g. 297e6, 300a1–3). προέμενος: aor. mid. participle of προίημι. 'Deserting, abandoning, betraying' continues the metaphor of the young man as a city.

15a ἀλλ' ὅσον . . . παραδεδάμενον 'but the more this [pleasure] affects the natural capacity for thought and reasoning, the more it damages and corrupts the person who lets it in, if it is neglected'. αὕτη is better taken as 'this pleasure which we get from literature' rather than 'hearing' (ἀκοή); others take τοῦ . . . πεφυκότος as masculine, 'the person with a natural capacity for . . .', but the neuter suits a general statement. The point is not affected with either interpretation: reading and its pleasures affect our intellectual capacities, and it is they which will be damaged if we do not take proper care. ὅσον μᾶλλον . . . μᾶλλον: Gärtner's ὅσον μᾶλλον . . . <τοσοῦτο> μᾶλλον may be correct. P's normal form is ὅσωι μᾶλλον . . . τοσοῦτωι μᾶλλον (82d, 283d, 340a etc.), but ὅσωι μᾶλλον . . . μᾶλλον is transmitted at 81f and adopted by editors at 463c where ὅσωι is a conjecture for ὅπου. βλάπτει: another very familiar element of the discussion of literature which will recur, cf. above pp. 4–5, Hunter 2009a: 25–9. At 769c, in a comparison between poetry and a seductive woman, P. notes that poetry 'has joined song and metre and rhythm to ordinary language and thus made its educational element more effective and its harmful element (τὸ βλάπτον) harder to guard against'.

ποιημάτων ἀπείργειν: at 1044e P. asks about Chrysippus 'Why does he keep the citizens [of his state] away (ἀπείργει) from the pleasures of the ear and eye?' (= *SVF* III 714); the meaning there is uncertain (cf. DeLacy 1948: 266), but there may be reference to some forms of poetry.

Σώκλαρος . . . Κλέανδρος: P. probably called this son after his friend T. Flavius Soclarus of Tithorea, an archon and *epimeletēs* of Delphi, cf. Ziegler 1951: 684–5 = 1964: 48–9; if, as seems likely, Soclarus was P's eldest son, he died young (*Consolation* 609d). It is debated whether the L. Mestrius Soclarus of Chaeronea who appears in an inscription from Daulis (*IG* 9.1.61, 41–2) was the son or friend of Plutarch. Cf. further Babut 1981, Teodorsson 1989: 239–40, Puech 1992: 4879–83.

ταῖς ὁδοῖς: a primary function of a slave παιδαγωγός was to escort a child in public, in part of course to keep unwanted admirers away.

ἂ δ' οὖν ἐμοὶ . . . δέλωθε 'In any case, please read through the remarks about poetry which, after making them the other day, it occurred to me now to send on

to you.’ P. has various ‘excuses’ which he offers to addressees, but the sending of the written text of a lecture is a common one, cf. 37c, 86c (particularly close to the current passage), 826a etc. There is, however, serious doubt about the text. An alternative to that adopted here would be εἰπεῖν . . . ἐπῆλθε ‘[which] it occurred to me to say’, cf. 86c (ἄπερ οὖν εἰς τοῦτο πρόωιν εἰπεῖν μοι παρέστη κτλ.); this, however, necessitates finding another verb and πέμψαι διενεώθηεν· καὶ λαβὼν ταῦτα κτλ. looks precisely like an effort to mend syntax. περὶ ποιημάτων: a clear allusion to the title of the essay.

15b τῶν ἀμεθύστων καλουμένων: at 647b–c we are told that there was a plant and a stone called ‘amethyst’ (‘not-drunk’), believed, as indeed many plants were, to protect against drunkenness; the colour of amethysts resembled a very weak mixture of wine and water. The plant was probably wild celery and the stone was what we still call amethyst; either could be hung around the neck (περιπίπτουσι) or the plant, perhaps in a drink, consumed before serious drinking began (προλαμβάνουσι). Cf. further Heliodorus, *Aeth.* 5.13.4, Teodorsson 1989: 302–3. P. will soon elaborate on the comparison of poetry and its dangers to wine; both were intimately connected to Dionysus. For the necessity of ‘charms’ against poetry cf. n. on 16d ὁ μεμνημένος.

προκαταλάμβανε . . . οὔσαν ‘fortify his nature in advance, which – because it is not slow in any area but impetuous and wide awake in all matters – is more easily swayed by such things (i.e. the pleasurable dangers of poetry)’. P. will now proceed to say more about the good and bad sides of poetry. Quintilian also finds it appropriate to praise his dedicatee’s son’s intelligence, *cuius prima aetas manifestum iam ingenii lumen ostendit* (1 *proem* 6). **δεδορκός**: cf. 281b ‘The body is like a lantern surrounding the soul. The soul within is the light and the intelligent and understanding part of it should always be open ready and seeing (δεδορκός) and never closed or remaining hidden (ἄποπτον)’.

πουλύποδος . . . **ἔσθλόν**: an anonymous hexameter which became proverbial and was variously explained, cf. *CPG* I 299, II 616. At 734e–f P. reports the view that beans and the head of the octopus should be avoided before attempting dream-divination for the same reason as given here. The omission of any introduction, such as ‘just as . . .’, to what is essentially a simile (cf. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ποιητικῇ κτλ.) makes the image more striking; for such a ‘paratactic simile’ cf., e.g., Theocritus 13.62–3, above p. 23. The absence of an introduction also strongly demarcates what has gone before as the ‘introductory epistle’, which also began with an anecdote about food; the ‘real treatise’ starts now.

ἔνι: shortened form of ἔνεστι (which P. uses immediately below) or ἔνεισι, cf. 15c.

βρωθῆναι: aor. pass. infinitive of βιβρώσκω, ‘sweetest for eating’.

δεχόμενον ‘(sleep) which accepts/is liable to . . .’.

τρόφιμον picks up the food metaphor with which the essay opened. St Basil similarly notes that Christians ‘must not accept simply all [pagan literature], but

as much as is useful (χρήσιμα). For it is shameful to reject harmful (βλαβερὰ) foods, but to take no account of knowledge (μαθήματα) which nourishes (τρέφει) our souls' (*Greek lit.* 8.2–5 Wilson). Basil is echoing Plato, *Protagoras* 313c4–e2 where Socrates plays with the idea that sophists are travelling salesmen of μαθήματα 'by which the soul is nourished'; that passage is also one of the distant ancestors of the framework of 'bodily v. intellectual' nourishment which informs P.'s opening.

τὸ παρακτικὸν καὶ παράφορον 'the disturbing and deluding element'.

παιδαγωγίας ὁρθῆς looks forward to the image of the Sirens which is to follow. In another context it is symposia which require 'correct guidance' if shipwreck is not to follow (622b).

15c τῆς Αἰγυπτίων χώρας: P. now compares poetry to Egypt, through a quotation of *Odyssey* 4.230 where the origin of the drug which Helen puts into the wine of Menelaus and Telemachus to make them forget past sorrows is described. The passage was a famous one, often cited (cf., e.g., *Nicias* 9.1) and evoked; at 614c P. interprets Helen's drug as in fact the encomiastic *logos* about Odysseus which she told (cf. also Callimachus fr. 178.20 Pf. = 89.20 M). As suits this essay, P.'s point here is simpler than that mildly allegorical one, but even behind this comparison we sense a long tradition, which continues into modern scholarship, of exploring the links between the Helen of *Odyssey* 4 and the nature of poetry. The *Helen* of Gorgias, who is about to be mentioned, holds an honoured place in that tradition; at *Helen* 10 Gorgias describes the bewitching power of *logoi* as ἐπαγωγοὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπαγωγοὶ λύπης, a phrase which certainly evokes Helen's νηπενθέος drug of *Odyssey* 4.221.

μειμιγμένα: in Homer 'it is not quite clear whether the poet means that the wholesome and the poisonous grow together . . . or whether μειμιγμένα simply picks up ἐπεὶ κρητῆρι μυγείη (222)' (S. West ad loc.). The former would suit Plutarch's purposes here.

ἀναδίδωσιν replaces Homer's φέρει (*Od.* 4.229) but 'yields' is appropriate to the land of Egypt, cf. LSJ s.v. II, and evokes the whole Homeric phrase φέρει ζείδωρος ἄρουρα. The markedly non-dactylic rhythm of τοῖς χρωμένοις ἀναδίδωσιν forms a clear barrier between the two Homeric citations.

ἐνθ' ἐνι . . . φρονέοντων 'in it is love-making, in it is desire, in it sweet talk, deceitful persuasion which steals the wits even of the shrewd'. To describe the dangerous charms of poetry, P. uses Homer's description (*Iliad* 14.216–17) of Aphrodite's magical love-charm, the 'cestus' (cf. Janko ad loc.), which Hera borrows to bewitch Zeus with sexual desire, cf. 19f below; the philosopher Crantor (late fourth – early third century BC) seems to have used the same verses to describe pleasure (Sext. Emp. *Eth.* 54 = fr. 7 Mette). Homer makes the point that even the very shrewd, such as Zeus, can succumb to passion (cf. bT-Scholium ad loc.), but P.'s point (cf. 15a–b) is that the intelligent are *particularly* susceptible to the deceits of poetry, and he develops this with the following anecdotes about Simonides and Gorgias. P. may want the triple anaphora of ἐν to evoke magical charms. **πύκα:** an adverbial

form from πυκνός found only in epic; for the intellectual sense of πυκ(ι)νός cf. LSJ s.v. A V.

τὸ ἀπατηλόν: the newly directed focus upon poetry's deceit has been prepared both by the 'strange and disturbing fantasies' which the head of an octopus can produce, and by the figure of Helen who has just been evoked: Helen is not only the mistress of good and bad drugs of the *Odyssey* citation, but also embodies, as no other, the bewitching power of Aphrodite from the *Iliad* citation. Again, we realize that the imminent appearance of Gorgias, author of the *Helen*, comes as no surprise. P. introduces 'the deceit' of poetry as a well-known fact, as indeed it had been since Homer, even if Gorgias was to re-focus the nature of that 'deceit'; Alcinous told Odysseus that the Phaeacians knew that he was not one of the many ἡπεροπῆες and ἐπικλοποῖ who spread their ψεύδεα around the world (*Odyssey* 11.363-6), and ἡπεροπεύς was understood in antiquity as 'deceiver' (cf. *Lfgre* s.v.).

ἀβελτέρων κομιδῇ καὶ ἀνοήτων 'the altogether stupid and foolish'. P.'s condemnation of 'the uneducated' carries also a social charge; P.'s concern is of course with the education and moral values of an élite.

Σιμωνίδης: Simonides of Ceos (late sixth – early fifth century) was one of the great figures of archaic lyric and elegiac poetry; for the latter cf. especially the 'new Simonides' of fr. 1–22 West (2nd edn.). A rich anecdotal tradition grew up around him (cf., e.g., 17f below, 644f, Bell 1978), some of it concerned with his alleged love of money and some with his relations with his patrons, among whom Thessalian noble families were prominent, cf. Theocritus 16.34-9 (with Gow's notes), Molyneux 1992: 117–45. The present anecdote is not known from elsewhere. P., who cites and refers to Simonides frequently (cf. Carmen Barrigón 1996), uses it to make a similar point about poetry to that of the Gorgias anecdote which follows, but its original context, and hence the contextual sense of 'deceive', is unclear; Thessalians seem to have had a reputation for being untrustworthy (Dem. 1.22, [Dion. Hal.] II 379.3-4 V-R, Schol. Ar. *Plut.* 521) rather than stupid. Cf. further Bell 1978: 81–2, and (with caution) Van Groningen 1948.

15d Γοργίας: Gorgias from Sicilian Leontini was one of the prime figures in the theory and practice of rhetoric in the late fifth century, the title-figure of Plato's *Gorgias* and a key influence on the whole tradition of Greek rhetoric and stylistics. P. also cites this saying (= Gorgias fr. 23 D-K) at 348c, where he explains that the deceiver is 'more just' because he has fulfilled what he promised to do (i.e. deception is central to the very idea of what poetry is), whereas the deceived is 'wiser' because the aesthetically sensitive are susceptible to the pleasure of words, which is also the point here. This perceptive *bon mot* about (inter alia) the contract between poet and audience, which constitutes dramatic illusion, and its relations with Gorgias' remarks about the bewitching power of *logos* at *Helen* 8–11 have been very much discussed, cf., e.g., Lanata 1963: 204–7, Taplin 1978: 167–70, Eden 1986: 26 n.2, Wardy 1996: 36–7, Ford 2002: 172–3.

ἦν ὁ τ' ἀπατήσας: ἦν is best understood as an 'internal' or 'cognate' accusative, for ἀπάτην ἀπατήσας.

πότερον οὖν . . . παραφυλάττωμεν 'So shall we plug up our young men's ears, like the Ithacans', with some hard and indissoluble wax, and so force them to hoist the Epicurean sail and flee from poetry and get safe past her? Or shall we rather, by standing their judgement up against right reason and binding it firm, steer and protect it from being swept away by pleasure into what will do it harm?' P. now picks up the idea, already stated more personally in the introductory epistle (15a), that it is unthinkable (and impractical) to imagine forbidding young men access to poetry, cf. above p. 5. This is one of many ancient passages which explore the episode of the Sirens from *Odyssey* 12 as an image for the nature and power of poetry, cf. Kaiser 1964: 113–36, Wedner 1994, and on this particular passage Hunter 2009a: 176–7. Like poetry itself, the Sirens seem to offer knowledge as well as pleasure (*Odyssey* 12.186–91), but in fact are the ruin of those who hear them, unless proper preparation has been taken. P's young men are, like the wise proto-philosopher Odysseus, to have the opportunity of exposure to the deceitful pleasures of 'hearing' poetry (for ἀκούειν etc. in the Sirens episode cf. *Odyssey* 12.48–9, 52, 187), but they will be saved by proper education and guidance, not by physical restraint. The nautical image is developed through παρεξελάυνειν (cf. *Odyssey* 12.47 παρέξ ἔλαν, 12.55, 109, 186), παραφέρηται, ἀπευθύνωμεν, and the comparison of 'upright reasoning' to the mast to which Odysseus was bound 'upright' (*Odyssey* 12.51, 179). Whereas Cicero applies the image of the Sirens to the attractions of knowledge derived from serious and humane studies (*De finibus* 5.49), Sextus Empiricus applies it not to poetry itself, but to the pretensions of γραμματική, the study of poetry (*Against the grammarians* 41–3), and St Basil, probably in imitation of P., urges us to flee with our ears barricaded not from all pagan poetry, but from the representation of wicked men (*Greek lit.* 4.8–10 Wilson).

σκληρῶι . . . ἀτέγκτωι: the adjectives are here used of the wax, but suggest the kind of educator and/or education that would ban all exposure to poetry; to be used to stop up the ears, wax would in fact have to be softened, cf. *Odyssey* 12.47–8, 173–7, and this apparent inconsistency calls attention to the boldness of Plutarch's transference and the mildly allegorical reading of the episode which he offers. P. may here evoke Plato, *Republic* 10.607b where Socrates says that they should remind poetry of the 'ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry' so that she would not condemn their σκληρότης and ἀγροικία for having banned her from the city they are creating. For σκληρός of a 'harsh, austere' character cf. LSJ s.v. II 2 and for ἀτεγκτός of persons cf. 44a, *Tiberius Gracchus* 12.3, LSJ s.v. τὸ Ἐπικούρειον ἀκάτειον ἀραμένους 'hoisting the Epicurean sail'. A corrupt text at Diogenes Laertius 10.6 (= Epicurus fr. 163 Usener) is usually restored (from P.) to have Epicurus telling his pupil Pythocles in a letter παιδείαν δὲ πᾶσαν, μακάριε, φεύγε τἀκάτειον ἀράμενος. ἀκάτειον is a light boat which would allow a swift getaway, and Epicurus' *bon mot* is then understood to mean 'launch your (small) boat and flee', although the middle of αἶρω is not normally used transitively to

mean 'launch', cf. LSJ s.v. ἀείρω I 5. In P.'s text at any rate, it seems more natural to assume that the boat is already underway when it approaches the Sirens of poetry, not that it needs to be 'launched'. ἀκάτειον, originally an adjectival form from ἀκάτιον, is a rare word for a sail, and 'hoisting sail' is often used in connection with sudden and speedy flight (cf. *Malice of Herodotus* 870b, Hdt 8.56 etc.); this would seem to be how P. interpreted the Epicurean instruction, which he cites again at 1094d and seems to allude to at 662c εἰ μὴ τὰ ἱστία ἐκάτερ' ἐπαράμενοι τὴν ἡδονὴν φεύγοιμεν. Cf. also Quintilian 12.2.24, 'Epicurus bids us flee all learning *navigatione quam uelocissima*', and *Catalepton* 5.8, *nos ad beatos uela mittimus portus*, i.e. away from all conventional learning to the safe harbour of Epicureanism. Dio 12.36-7 turns the image of the Ithacan sailors and the Sirens against the Epicureans themselves. ποιητικὴν φεύγειν: *paideia* in the saying attributed to Epicurus (cf. above) covers all conventional education: poetry (esp. Homer), rhetoric, music etc. So too 'Heraclitus' (*Hom. Probl.* 4.2 = Epicurus fr. 229 Usener) reports that Epicurus 'abominates all poetry indiscriminately as a lethal allurements of fable (ὀλέθριον μύθων δέλεαρ)', and in his essay *Not even a pleasant life is possible on Epicurean principles* P. lists at length the educated pleasures from which Epicurus would ban us (cf. esp. 1092d-6c). For the later Epicurean attitude to poetry, which was by no means as straightforwardly condemnatory as fr. 163 might suggest, cf. Asmis 1991, 1995, Obbink 1995b, Blank 1998: 298-301, Halliwell 2002: 277-86, Pace 2009. ὀρθῶι τινι λογισμῶι: on the evocation of Odysseus' mast cf. above. ὀρθός also helps to link this passage to the next dominant image, that of the dangers of wine: those who are drunk are rarely ὀρθοί. τῶι τέρποντι: for this idea in the Sirens episode cf. *Odyssey* 12.52, 188.

οὐδὲ γάρ... Λυκόοργος 'For not even Lycurgus, the mighty son of Dryas...' (Homer, *Iliad* 6.130). In *Iliad* 6 Diomedes tells Glaucus that he will not fight him if Glaucus is an immortal, and he adduces the example of the Thracian king Lycurgus who scattered away the 'nurses' of Dionysus and the young god himself; Dionysus plunged into the sea where Thetis received him. The passage was the subject of a rich allegorical tradition, in which Lycurgus was often represented, as here, as a vine-grower; and the need to mix wine (Dionysus) with water (Thetis) was prominent. For various versions cf. 'Heraclitus', *Hom. probl.* 35, Cornutus, *Theol. Graec.* 30, the scholia to the *Iliad* passage, Eustathius, *Hom.* 629.22-6, Hunter 2009a: 179. In keeping with the needs of his argument about young men and poetry, P. here interprets Lycurgus' action as a stupid attempt utterly to get rid of wine, once he saw its damaging effects, rather than using water to make wine beneficial, not harmful; for a very similar use of the figure of Lycurgus cf. 451c-d, above p. 8. Total 'prohibition' is self-defeating, whether what is prohibited be alcohol or poetry or irrational emotion; the proper use (and mixing) of wine, no less than the proper attitude to literary *paideia*, are crucial hallmarks of élite culture, cf. Hunter 2009a: 178. γάρ: P. elegantly takes over the Homeric particle into his own syntax and argument. ὕδης: disyllabic, with the first syllable short, as ι is treated as a semi-vowel, cf. K-B I 507.

15e Πλάτων: at *Laws* 6.773d Plato compares the need to produce children from contrasting parents to the need to temper wine with water; as in a mixing-bowl οὐ μαινόμενος μὲν οἶνος ἐγκεχυμένος ζεῖ, κολαζόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ νήφοντος ἑτέρου θεοῦ καλὴν κοινωνίαν λαβὼν ἀγαθὸν πῶμα καὶ μέτριον ἀπεργάζεται, ‘where raging wine seethes as it is poured in, but it is chastened by another god, a sober one, and finding a noble partnership it makes a fine and moderate drink’. P.’s text, while elegantly varying the Platonic model, suggests that Plato himself is here ‘interpreting’ Homer, as in Homer it is Dionysus who is μαινόμενος (*Iliad* 6.132), whereas Plato, while accepting the divinity of wine, uses the participle only of ‘wine’, not explicitly of the god. The image of *Laws* 6.773d was a familiar subject of discussion, cf. 791b–c, ‘Longinus’, *De subl.* 32.7.

μηδ’ ἡμεῖς . . . πιέζωμεν ‘Therefore, let us not cut down or destroy the poetic vine of the Muses, but where the fabulous and theatrical parts of poetry, wantonly emboldened in their search for glory by unadulterated pleasure, grow unrestrained and out of control, let us take it in hand and prune it and keep it in check’. Some understand ἡδονῆς ἀκράτου πρὸς δόξαν together, ‘pleasure with no admixture of (thought of) reputation’ (cf. 391d), but πρὸς δόξαν, which points to the self-conscious ‘showiness’ of the ‘theatrical’ parts of poetry, seems to go more naturally with what follows (cf. 749d for a verbal parallel). P.’s image gains particular power from the fact that the excesses of natural growth and of poetry also suggest the excesses to which young men were believed to be naturally inclined, and which required control by their wiser elders, cf. further Whitmarsh 2001: 95–6. τὴν ποιητικὴν ἡμερίδα τῶν Μουσῶν: the phrase hardly needs the explanatory ποιητικὴν, which DR would thus excise. αὐθάδως: cf. *Theseus* 1.3 (P. asks for indulgence) ‘wherever the mythical element (τὸ μυθῶδες) wantonly (αὐθάδως) scorns credibility and does not admit an admixture of the probable . . .’. ἀκράτου ‘unmixed’ continues the ‘wine’ image, cf. ‘Longinus’, *De subl.* 32.7 (on this same Platonic image). ἐξυβρίζει καὶ ὕλομανεῖ: P. borrows (and varies) a phrase from Theophrastus, *CP* 3.1.5. ὕλομανεῖν of plants is ‘run away’ or ‘bolt’, producing useless foliage; the verb is applied to style also later by Synesius (*De insomniis* 14.148b). ὕβρις, like αὐθάδεια, is a characteristic not just of plants which get out of control (cf. Theophrastus, *CP* 3.15.4, LSJ s.v. ὕβριζειν I 3), but also of young men. θεατρικόν ‘stagey, theatrical, (over-) dramatic’, cf. Di Gregorio 1976: 170–2, Hunter 2009a: 81. When poetry wants to flaunt its inventions, that is when it needs pruning; P. often associates the ‘dramatic’ or the ‘theatrical’ with the false and the mythical.

ἀληθινῆς μουσῆς: if this emendation of the transmitted μουσῆς is correct (DR, cf. Babbitt’s ‘a true kind of culture’), there is an allusion to Plato, *Rep.* 7.548b8 (in the context of education). When poetry suggests some real truth, i.e. offers openings to philosophical investigation, and is not simply seeking the pleasure of its audience, we should introduce the student to a philosophical consideration of it.

15f τὸ γλυκὺ . . . καὶ ἀγωγόν 'the sweetness and attractiveness'; the former is particularly appropriate both to poetry and to wine.

εἰσάγωμεν καὶ καταμινύωμεν: both verbs continue the equation of philosophical guidance to the water which tempers wine; cf. Lycurgus' foolish failure τὰς κρήνας ἐγγυτέρω προσαγαγεῖν (15e).

ὁ μανδραγόρας . . . πίνουσιν: three varieties of this famous plant are known; in antiquity they had very many uses (medical, aphrodisiac, narcotic) and a rich folklore, cf. 652c, Pliny, *HN* 25.147-50, *RE* XIV 1028-37, Huss on Xen. *Symp.* 2.24. Some of its soporific effects were believed to resemble those of alcohol, and its juice, sometimes mixed with wine, was used as a 'sleeping-pill'. Here its effect upon wine and drinkers is beneficial, like the effect of philosophy added to poetry, but it is in fact not quite clear what particular effect is being ascribed to this plant; the idea that planting it alongside vines affects the nature and effects of the wine is not attested elsewhere, though analogous folk-beliefs are known from the modern Mediterranean. καταφορά is 'lethargy' (LSJ s.v. II 2b), and it is perhaps being claimed either that the mandragora 'softens' the otherwise brutally tiring effects of wine or that it makes wine-induced sleep 'softer' (μαλακός is a standard epithet of sleep) because it helps prevent a hangover. In either case, mandragora here plays much the same rôle as the 'amethysts' of 15b. One might think that a philosopher, particularly a Platonist, would not welcome the comparison of philosophy to mandragora (cf. esp. Plato, *Rep.* 5.488c5), but P. very likely recalls that in Xenophon's *Symposium* Socrates compares the soothing effects of wine to those of mandragora (2.24); the effect of the plant here is apparently to allow the moderate pleasures of the symposium to be prolonged, not to numb the intelligence of the drinkers.

οὕτω τοὺς λόγους . . . μάθησιν 'So poetry, accepting from philosophy propositions blended with the fabulous, offers an education to the young which is light and agreeable.' The text has been doubted, as it might seem better for it to be clear that it is the teacher who will do the mixing of philosophy and the fabulous (note εἰσάγωμεν, καταμινύωμεν); thus, ἀναλαμβάνουσα <καὶ προσφέρουσα> 'accepting . . . and applying them mixed with . . .' (Paton) or ἀναλαμβάνουσα <καὶ> μινύουσα 'accepting . . . and mixing them . . .' (Hartman). Such a doubling of the participle would indeed be very Plutarchan (cf. above p. 22), but slight unclarity of imagery is also not untypical of either P. or this essay, and the sense of the whole is not in doubt. That poetry does contain within itself the lessons of philosophy is fundamental to P's message.

οὐ φευκτέον shows that we have reached an answer to the question posed in 15d about 'fleeing poetry'.

μέλλουσιν . . . ἐπιζομένους: verbal adjectives are classically constructed with the dative or, less commonly, the accusative (*MT* §1597, Smyth §2152), but the combination of the two in such juxtaposition is striking, cf. Thuc. 8.65.3.

προφιλοσοφητέον: the compound occurs nowhere else and may have been invented for the occasion. Cf. further n. on 37b below.

16a εἰ δὲ μή: i.e. if there is no χρήσιμον in the τέρπον.

διαμάχεσθαι 'to fight against/resist' (the poetry).

ἀρχή: the beginning of education is acquiring the ability to discern what is useful and reject the merely pleasurable. The quotation which follows caps the ἀρχή of the treatise itself.

ἔργου . . . ἔχειν: Sophocles fr. 831 R. The thought, equivalent to the proverbial ἀρχὴ ἥμισυ παντός, is commonplace, but the context in Sophocles might also have been education, as it is in the allusion to the verses at Antiphon fr. 60 D-K/Pendrick (where see Pendrick's notes). At the start of Plato's discussion of literary education for the very young, Socrates cites as proverbial 'the beginning is the most important part of every action' (*Rep.* 2.377a11), and P. here alludes to and embellishes that passage with a Sophoclean quotation.

CHAPTER 2

The young must understand that poets 'tell many lies', either deliberately or not. The charm of poetry depends much more on the fictitious element than on metre or verbal ornament. To be aware of this is to be conscious of the fact that absurd or unpalatable statements made by characters in poetry are not to be taken as true; rather, they are deliberate falsehoods, made for the sake of the plot. Often, however, the objectionable features are involuntary, due to false beliefs about the gods or the Underworld (16f–17d). Again, then, let us bear in mind that poetry is not concerned with the truth about such matters, which even philosophers cannot unravel.

16a πρῶτον μὲν . . . ἄκοντες 'Let us introduce the young man to (the reading of) poetry with no principle so ingrained and ready to hand as 'many are the lies of poets', some of which they tell deliberately, others unintentionally'. The theme of 'poetic lies' goes back at least to Homer's *Odyssey* and Hesiod's Muses who famously declared that 'we know how to tell many lies like true things, and we also know, when we wish it, to speak the truth' (*Theogony* 27–8), cf. above p. 6; Dio's *Trojan Oration* (11) is an extended consideration of Homer's 'lies'. P. here offers another 'charm' which the young can use to ward off these dangers, cf. n. on 16d ὁ μεμνημένος. πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἄοιδοί would fit into a hexameter and is said to have appeared in Solon's elegiacs, cf. fr. 29 W, where West gathers the ancient attestations; for the idea of carrying helpful quotations around with one cf., e.g., 87e–f, 92e. A distinction between deliberate and involuntary falsehoods has an obvious importance in historiography, and the distinction is common in Polybius (12.7.6, 12.12.4–7, 29.12.12 etc.). There is some doubt about the text here. Most MSS omit τὸν νέον, and Paton emended ἔχοντα to ἔχοντας so that the object of εἰσάγωμεν is the unexpressed generality of young men, in keeping with the plurals which have immediately preceded (note, however, 17e, the opening of chapter 3); one MS offers εἰσάγειν . . . δεῖ for εἰσάγωμεν. μεμελετημένον 'practised, rehearsed'.

πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀκοῆς καὶ χάριν ‘with regard to a pleasurable and charming effect for the ears . . .’.

αὐστηροτέρων: ordinary people find the truth ‘drier’ than falsehood, cf. Dio 11.1 ‘for truth is bitter and unpleasant to the foolish, whereas lies are sweet and agreeable’, Isocrates, *To Nicocles* 48. Elsewhere P. uses αὐστηρόν as a term of commendation for serious literature and thought, cf. 68b, 396f, *Demosthenes* 11.5; here there may be a memory of Plato, *Rep.* 3.398a8–9, where Socrates, having dismissed a mimetic artist such as Homer from the ideal state, notes that they will use in his place a poet who is αὐστηρότερος καὶ ἀηδέστερος. P.’s distinction between truth and falsehood is founded on an implicit distinction between prose and poetry, just as he is about to evoke historiography, ‘what has really happened’; cf., e.g., Sextus Empiricus, *Against the grammarians* 297, ‘[prose-writers] aim at truth, whereas [poets] wish to entertain (ψυχαγωγεῖν) by any means, and lies are more entertaining than the truth’. This familiar distinction makes P.’s claims about poetry all the more easily acceptable. Near the head of this long critical tradition stand Thucydides’ claims (1.21–2) for the distinction between his own ‘true’ account, which may however seem ἀτερπέστερον (~ αὐστηροτέρων), and those of the poets and logographers who use τὸ μυθῶδες to make their works more attractive (ἐπὶ τὸ προσαγωγότερον).

ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἔργῳ . . . λυποῦντος ‘For truth, which has really happened, does not deviate from its course, even if the dénouement is unpleasant, whereas a fictional story very easily wanders off and is turned away from the painful to what is more pleasant.’ The extended metaphor is of a journey from the beginning of its course to the end; P.’s account of ‘truth’ sits most comfortably with the truth of historical events, which cannot be changed once they have happened, but he is no doubt also thinking of more general philosophical and moral ‘truths’. Fiction, on the other hand, prefers a ‘happy end’, and fictional plots and ideas can readily be changed (‘wander off and be turned’) to produce that; the idea is dramatized in the birth of *uoluptas* at the end of Apuleius’ ‘Cupid and Psyche’ (*Met.* 6.24.4), and theorized in Chariton’s introduction to the final book of *Callirhoe* (8.1.4) and in the sudden changes and ‘happy end’ of the fictitious *argumentum in personis* described by Cicero (*De inuentione* 1.27) and the *Ad Herennium* (1.13), cf. Hunter 2009b: 58–60. **οὐκ ἐξίσταται:** there is perhaps an echo of the claim of the Thucydidean Pericles (2.61.2) to the Athenians that it is not he who has changed (ἐγὼ μὲν ὁ αὐτός εἰμι καὶ οὐκ ἐξίσταμαι), but they themselves, as a result of the reverses of the war and τὸ λυποῦν.

16b μέτρον . . . σύνθεσις: two disyllabic nouns and two trisyllabic ones frame a pair of noun phrases arranged chiasmically.

τρόπος ‘figures of speech, tropes’. There is a certain overlap with μεταφορά, but τρόπος covers a much wider field than just metaphor; in other contexts τρόπος may refer to the whole ‘style’ of a composition, cf. Pl. *Rep.* 3.400d5 ὁ τρόπος τῆς λέξεως . . . καὶ ὁ λόγος, Callimachus, *Epigram* 27.1 Pf. Ἡσιόδου τό τ’ αἶσιμα καὶ ὁ τρόπος.

εὐκαιρία μεταφορᾶς ‘timely/appropriate use of metaphor’. This was a crucial matter for ancient style in both prose and poetry, cf. Aristotle, *Poetics* 1458a20–59a13, *Rhetoric* 3.1404b26–5b21, ‘Longinus’, *De subl.* 32; writers were constantly warned of the dangers of excessive or forced use of metaphor: here, as everywhere, what should rule is τὸ πρέπον (cf. *Poetics* 1459a3). εὐκαιρία covers both moderate use and use to striking effect, cf. 736e, Demetrius, *On style* 157. For P.’s use of the term μεταφορά cf. Hirsch-Luipold 2002: 124–9.

ἁρμονία καὶ σύνθεσις ‘harmonious word-arrangement’; the near synonyms form a kind of hendiadys, cf. ‘Longinus’, *De subl.* 39, Cannatà Fera 2000: 94. Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ *On composition* (περὶ συνθέσεως ὀνομάτων) is the most important surviving ancient discussion of the subject.

αἰμυλίας καὶ χάριτος ‘seductiveness and charm’. On the sources of χάρις in literature cf. esp. Demetrius, *On style* 128–186.

εὖ πεπλεγμένη διάθεσις μυθολογίας ‘a well interwoven organisation of mythical narrative’. This difficult phrase seems to combine Aristotle’s stress on the importance of plot construction with the link between τὸ μυθῶδες and τὸ ἥδύ to which Plutarch has just alluded; poets need an admixture of fabulous elements for the charm they bring (cf., e.g., 1092f–3a, Strabo 1.2.9 on Homer’s practice), but these elements need to be properly organized and arranged. For διάθεσις as how a writer organizes his material cf. 347c, Polybius 34.4.1–3, Brink 1963: 92 n.3; the phrase is discussed at length by Van der Stockt 1992: 88–95 and cf. also Meijering 1987: 32–5. An amusing manifestation of P.’s point is the anecdote he tells at 347f–8a of how Corinna warned Pindar that his poetry was ξιμυσον because, though he paid great attention to stylistic effects, it lacked μῦθοι; Pindar then went astray in the other direction. That it is μῦθοι which are crucial to the popular appeal of poetry is a common idea (cf., e.g., Isocrates, *To Nicocles* 48), but P.’s insistence on the centrality of content is characteristic of his ethical view of poetry, cf., e.g., Tagliasacchi 1961: 99–104, and need not be aimed at a particular ‘school’, such as the κριτικοί about whom we learn in Philodemus, *On Poems*, who gave primacy rather to form.

ὥσπερ ἐν γραφαῖς . . . κατασκευῆς ‘As in paintings colour is more stimulating than the use of line because of its lifelikeness and illusionist quality, so in poetry a mixture of the plausible and the false produces greater amazement and pleasure than the artistic elaboration of metre and language without mythical and fictional elements.’ The comparison between literary and visual arts is one of the oldest critical procedures in antiquity, cf., e.g., 17f below, Plato, *Rep.* 9.605a–b, Arist. *Poetics* 1448a4–6, Quintilian 12.10 (with Austin’s notes), Brink 1971: 368–71. Here the artful mixture of types of material in poetry is compared to the effective use of colour and shade. A rather similar image in a quite different context is found in a passage of ‘Metopos’ περὶ ἀρετῆς (Stobaeus 3.1.116, p. 75 Hense = Thesleff 1961: 121), where colour is the most important factor in producing effects of τὸ ἐμψυχον καὶ τὸ ἀπαταλὸν [Valckenaer: ἀπαλὸν] καὶ τὸ μεμιμαμένον τὰν ἀλάθειαν, ‘life, illusion, and the representation of the truth’. κινητικώτερον: this

epithet is common in P. (cf. 769c of poetry), but it is a word which came readily to Stoics and is found of poetry in Stoic contexts, cf. *SVF* III 71, De Lacy 1948: 248. γραμμῆς ‘line (drawing)’, often contrasted with σκιαγραφία, illusionist painting creating effects of light and shade through colour, and P.’s comparison here may owe something to an ancient debate about the relative merits of the two, cf. 58d, Pollitt 1974: 247–58, 392–7. The connection between colour and illusion, τὸ ἀπατηλόν, is central to P.’s comparison; the world is, after all, a coloured one. At *Isaeus* 4 Dionysius of Halicarnassus compares the difference between Lysias and Isaeus to that between ‘old paintings which have a simple use of colour and no variety in the mixture of tints, but where the outlines are very clear (ἀκριβεῖς τὰς γραμμαῖς) and contain great charm, and later paintings which are less well drawn (εὐγραμμοί) but more elaborated and draw their power from the variety of shade and light and their many shades of colour’. Cf. also Plato, *Pol.* 277c ‘Like a living creature, our discussion seems to have a reasonable external outline (τὴν ἑξωθεν περιγραφὴν), but has not yet received the clarity (ἐνάργεια) which pigments and the mixing of colours bestow.’ μεμειγμένον πιθανότητι ψεῦδος both looks forward to the second discussion of *mimesis* in chap. 7 and makes the point that ‘pure ψεῦδος’, i.e. without any admixture of plausibility, would be far less effective; the plausibility corresponds to the illusion in painting, τὸ ἀνδρείκελον καὶ ἀπατηλόν. ἐκπλήττει: ἐκπληξις, ‘emotional amazement’, was a crucial effect for grand literature of all types, and is particularly associated with the pleasure (cf. ἀγαπᾶται) of τὸ μυθώδες, cf. 17a, 25d, Polybius 34.4.3, Strabo 1.2.17, [Plutarch], *Homer* 5–6, Heinze 1915: 466–8 [= 1993: 370–3], Russell on ‘Longinus’, *De subl.* 15.2, n. on 25b τῆς μιμήσεως . . . ἐχούσης. When Socrates asks ‘Who would not be knocked out [by Agathon’s speech]?’ he is clearly (inter alia) alluding to its falsehood (Pl. *Symp.* 198b5). ἐκπλήττει picks up κινητικώτερον to bind the two halves of the comparison together; as both words were commonly used in a transferred sense of intellectual or emotional effects, their juxtaposition re-literalizes them and gives new life to the metaphors. τῆς ἀμύθου . . . κατασκευῆς ‘stylistic elaboration of rhythm and language which lacks mythical or fictional elements’: P. is probably thinking of what we call didactic poetry, cf. 16c below, Aristotle, *Poetics* 1447b17–19. The expression evokes Hellenistic definitions of poetry, cf. Schol. Dion. Thrax p. 449.21–3 Hilgard, ‘poetry (ποιητική) is a report of events in metre and rhythm, together with elaboration (κατασκευή), which contains mythical material (τὸ μυθώδες) and sometimes an admixture of truth’, Posidonius fr. 44 Edelstein-Kidd = 458 Theiler, ‘a poem (ποίημα) is a metrical or rhythmical utterance which by elaboration (μετὰ σκευῆς [κατασκευῆς Kaibel] has passed beyond the prosaic’; for discussion of these passages cf. Kaibel 1898: 20–2, DeLacy 1948: 244, Brink 1963: 65, Theiler and Edelstein-Kidd on the Posidonius fragment. By evoking these definitions P. stresses again that it is the ‘mythical and fictional elements’, the ψεῦδος in other words, which form the essence of the poetic, and about which the young must be under no illusions; the point is repeated immediately below. κατασκευῆς ‘elaboration’, cf. 41c

μετ' ὄγκου τινὸς καὶ κατασκευῆς, 396f, Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 2 αἱ κατασκευαὶ 'elaborate passages (of Plato)', id. *Dem.* 5.3 πάσης ὑπεριδούσα κατασκευῆς ἐπιθέτου (of Plato's plain style), Strabo 1.2.6 ἡ ποιητικὴ κατασκευή. For the Stoics κατασκευή was one of the five linguistic virtues and was defined as λέξις ἐκπεφυγυῖα τὸ ἰδιωτισμὸν (Diog. Laert. 7.59 = Diogenes of Babylon fr. 24, *SVF* III p. 214).

ὁ Σωκράτης: the reference is to *Phaedo* 60c-61b. Socrates, released from his fetter, reflects on the symbiosis of pleasure and pain and observes that Aesop could have made a μῦθος about it. This prompts Cebes to ask about the fact that he has heard that, in prison, Socrates has versified Aesopic fables and written a προσίμιον to Apollo, though he has never written poetry before; Socrates explains that he has had a repeated dream telling him 'make *mousikḗ* and work at it', and though he has always interpreted this as a reference to philosophy, imminent death has made him err on the side of caution, in case the dream was actually referring to poetry. As he knew that a poet should compose μῦθοι rather than λόγοι, and he himself was not μυθολογικός but did know Aesop's fables, he versified some of these. P.'s account is part summary, part interpretative gloss.

ἐκ τινων ἐνυπνίων: cf. Pl. *Phaedo* 60e2 ἐνυπνίων τινων ἀποπειρώμενος.

16c ἀληθείας ἀγωνιστής 'striver for truth' (cf. Aeschines 3.180), rather than 'champion of truth'. The phrase, like ψευδῶν δημιουργός which follows, picks up Socrates' claim not to be μυθολογικός (*Phaedo* 61b5).

εὐφυής 'naturally gifted', cf. Pl. *Rep.* 3.400c3-4 τοὺς δημιουργοὺς τοὺς εὐφυῶς δυναμένους κτλ.

ψευδῶν δημιουργός evokes the discussion of poetry in *Republic* 10 in which poetry is constantly set alongside other δημιουργίαι, such as carpentry; at *Rep.* 10.599d3 Homer is addressed as εἰδῶλου δημιουργός, and at 348b P. refers to poets as ἐπικῆς . . . ποιήσεως . . . δημιουργοὶ . . . μελικῆς. In the extant epitome of Book 2 of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On imitation*, Aeschylus is described as 'everywhere the manufacturer and creator (δημιουργός καὶ ποιητής) of words and actions unique to him' (2.10).

τοῖς ἔπεσι: the Platonic Socrates gives no indication of what metre he used; P. will probably have been familiar with Aesopic fables in iambic trimeters (cf. the Latin fables of Phaedrus) and/or choliamb, as the fables of Babrius (perhaps roughly contemporary with P.).

ἐντέτεινεν 'adapted/set in'. If this conjecture (Wytenbach, Hercher) is correct, P. has taken the verb from the passage in the *Phaedo* to which he is referring, 60d1 ἐντένας τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους, cf. also *Solon* 34.3-4 γνῶμας ἐντέτεινε φιλοσόφους . . . τοῖς ποιήμασιν . . . καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἐντένας εἰς ἔπος κτλ., Plato, *Prt.* 326b1, *Vita Arati* I p. 8.9 Martin (Antigonos asked Aratus μέτρῳ ἐντεῖναι the work of Eudoxus). An alternative worth mentioning is ἐνῆρμοζεν (Wytenbach). Both Valgiglio and Bernardakis-Ingenkamp adopt ἐνέμιξεν, but no convincing parallel has been adduced.

ὥς ποίησιν οὐκ οὔσαν 'on the grounds that there was no poetry . . .'. ὥς may be followed by an 'accusative absolute' of the verb 'to be' or of a personal verb, cf. 31f, Smyth §2078, *MT* §853.

θυσίας . . . ἀχόρους καὶ ἀναύλους 'sacrifices without dancing and pipes'. On Paros sacrifices were offered to the Graces without pipes or garlands, cf. 132f, Callimachus fr. 5–9 M = 3–7 Pf. (with Massimilla's notes). It may or may not be relevant that we are told that Tiberius offered sacrifice without pipes in the senate on the day after Augustus' death (Suetonius, *Tiberius* 70.6, Dio Cassius 56.31.3). Herodotus says that Persians sacrifice without libations, pipes or garlands (1.132.1).

τὰ δ' Ἐμπεδοκλέους . . . Θεόγνιδος: at 402f P., following Aristotle, lists Orpheus, Hesiod, Parmenides, Xenophanes, Empedocles and Thales as philosophers who used verse. Empedocles, about whom P. wrote a ten-book work (*Lamprias* Cat. 43, cf. fr. 24 Sandbach, Ziegler 1951: 767 = 1964: 131, Hershbell 1971), had been a paradigm of verse which was not poetry (ποίησις) since Aristotle, *Poetics* 1447b18; P. is here very close (again, cf. n. on 16b τῆς ἀμύθου . . . κατασκευῆς) to Schol. Dion. Thrax: 'A poet is marked out by these four features – metre, myth, narrative and diction of a particular kind, and any poem which does not have these four is not a poem. Thus we do not call Empedocles . . . and those who speak about astronomy poets, even if they use metre, because they do not employ the characteristics of poets' (p. 168.8–13 Hilgard). Parmenides falls into the same category as his pre-Socratic colleague. Nicander of Colophon was a famous and influential didactic poet of the Hellenistic period; Plutarch wrote a commentary or essay upon his (extant) *Theriaka*, a work on snakes and other poisonous creatures (cf. fr. 113–15 Sandbach). γνωμολογίαι Θεόγνιδος: this was a common way of conceiving of Theognis' elegiac poetry, in which moralizing played a major rôle, cf. the testimonia at *IEG* I 172; Dio makes Alexander describe Phocylides and Theognis as poets who 'counsel and give advice to the masses and to private citizens' (2.5). We cannot draw conclusions from this phrase about the nature of the texts of Theognis and the *Theognidea* with which P. was familiar or assume that he is making a distinction within the corpus, such as the *Suda* makes (θ 136) between Theognis' 'maxims' and his 'foul paederastic verse and other things from which the virtuous life turns away'. On the history of the *Theognidea* cf. West 1974: 40–61, Bowie 1997, Selle 2008.

λόγοι . . . διαφύγωσιν 'are compositions which have borrowed grandeur and metre from poetry as a carriage, so as to avoid what is pedestrian'. λόγοι is in pointed opposition to the μῦθος about which P. has been writing. That prose is 'pedestrian' (πρὸς λόγος, *pedestris oratio*), whereas poetry rides in a carriage or even soars through the sky in the 'chariot of song', is a common idea, cf. 406e, Strabo 1.2.6 'that non-metrical discourse is called "pedestrian" shows that it has come down from a height and a chariot (δχημα) to the ground', Norden 1898: 32–3, Whitmarsh 2006: 369–71. As at 406e, this idea is connected with innate connections between prose and truth and between poetry and falsehood, cf. n. on 16a αὐστηροτέρων. It is perhaps no coincidence that the chariot of song plays

so prominent a role in Parmenides' proem (fr. 1 D-K), and cf. also Empedocles fr. 3.5 D-K. 'Didactic poetry' meets two of P.'s criteria for poetry, metre and an elaborated diction, but lacks the all-essential mythical element; for Parmenides and Empedocles themselves, however, there is no necessary disjunction between poetry and truth (cf. e.g., Empedocles fr. 17.26 D-K, 1.299 Martin-Primavesi).

εἰσι κεχρημένοι 'have borrowed' (LSJ s.v. χράω (B) B I). The perfect participle with the verb 'to be' (*MT* §45, Smyth §599) stresses that the result of a past action continues into the present: these texts are still read today and so the result of the borrowing is still very visible.

τὸ πεζὸν διαφύγωσιν looks like a variant of τὸ λογοειδὲς ἐκβεβηκυῖα in Posidonius' definition of ποίημα (n. on 16b τῆς ἀμύθου... κατασκευῆς). The image may be of Homeric warriors leaving the battlefield in their chariots.

16d ὅταν οὖν ἀτοπὸν τι κτλ.: P. now moves, as it were, from theory to practice.

δαίμωνων: P., like many learned men of his time and later (cf. Apuleius, *De deo Socratis*), accepted a belief, descending from Plato, *Symposium* 202d-3a, in δαίμονες as intermediate beings between human and divine, cf. the treatises *De defectu oraculorum* and *De genio Socratis* where the matter is discussed at length. P. was, it appears, uncertain whether there were evil δαίμονες, but it is here at any rate implied that δαίμονες are good, and evil things should not be said about them. Cf. further Soury 1942, Dillon 1977: 216-24, Brenk 1977 index s.v. *daimon*, *daimones*.

ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς ἐλλογίμου καὶ δόξαν ἔχοντος 'by a man of repute and with a (good) reputation'. P. will soon turn to the importance of observing the character of the speaker in poetry.

οἴχεται φερόμενος... τὴν δόξαν 'is carried away/swept off course and corrupted with respect to his views/opinions'. The appearance of δόξα twice but with quite different meanings within such a short space is perhaps surprising.

ὁ δὲ μεμνημένος κτλ.: P. offers a 'charm' against the bewitchment of poetry's lies. In the background is the Platonic Socrates' idea that the arguments against poetry must be repeated as a 'charm' (ἐπωιδή) for protection, until such time as poetry offers an acceptable defence of herself (*Rep.* 10.608a). Both Plato and P. envisage a direct confrontation with Poetry herself, cf. above p. 4.

γοητεῖαν takes us back to the comparison of poetry to Aphrodite's magical *kestos* in 15c. The Stoics defined γοητεία as 'pleasure brought about by deceit or magic' (*SVF* III 401).

ὦ μηχανήμα λυγρὸς αἰολώτερον 'O trick more dappled than the lynx' (*adesp. trag.* fr. 349 K-S). There is a play on two senses of αἰόλος, both 'fast-moving', hence 'shifty, tricky', cf. Pind. *Nem.* 8.25 αἰόλωι ψεύδει, and 'dappled', with reference to the spotted coat of the lynx (cf. Eur. *Alc.* 579 βαλῖαι λύγκες, Virgil, *Aen.* 1.327, *RE* XIII 2474). The original context is unknown, and so we cannot say whether μηχανήμα refers to an actual plot or trick or to a cunning person (? Odysseus). λυγρὸς is an almost certain emendation (Wolf, Nauck). σφιγγός in

one MS seems both more obvious and less witty; DR suggests ἰνυγος. We do not know what followed this trimeter in the play from which it is taken, but it is not inconceivable that P.'s indignant questions which follow vary something similar in the original. The iambic or trochaic rhythm of τί δ' ἑξαπατῶσα προσποίῃ διδάσκειν; is very marked.

τί παίζουσα τὰς ὀφρῦς συνάγεις; 'Why do you knit your brows when you're only playing?'. Knitted brows can be a sign of worry (Ar. *Lys.* 8) and/or seriousness (cf. 715c); in Lucian, hypocritical philosophers are regularly marked by such facial gestures, cf., e.g., *Icaromenippus* 29 'raising their brows and wrinkling their foreheads and growing long beards'. So here, the sensible man will see through poetry's pretensions.

ἐπιλήψεται μὲν . . . Αἰδῶν 'he will check himself when he is afraid of Poseidon and fearful that he will break open the earth and lay Hades bare'. During the Battle of the Gods in *Iliad* 20 Poseidon so shakes the earth that Hades is afraid that the Underworld may be broken open and exposed (20.56–74, note ἀναρρήξειε, v. 63). This same passage is discussed by 'Longinus', *De subl.* 9.6–7, who recognizes its power but also notes that such a passage is 'absolutely impious and does not preserve appropriateness (τὸ πρέπον), unless it is understood allegorically'. Some parallels of language suggest that 'Longinus' and P. may share a common source (or indeed that one may know the other). P. is concerned that the inexperienced reader will be 'swept away' by the power of Homer's writing into accepting the truth of what he hears or reads, that he will, if you like, put himself in the place of the fearful Hades. In the Platonic scheme of things, such passages cannot be true, because gods do not work harm and hence encourage hostile emotions in their audiences; Plato in fact had explicitly banned θεομαχίαι from his ideal state, based on enmity and hostility as they were (*Rep.* 2.378b8–e3). Cf. further Hunter 2009a: 179–81.

φοβουμένου . . . ταρβοῦντος: a typically Plutarchan variation.

16e ἐπιλήψεται δέ: for anaphora as a mark of Plutarch's more rhetorical style cf. Kowalski 1918: 153. αὐτοῦ is to be understood from the immediately preceding matched clause. As P. is concerned with a young man's own reactions to poetry, emendations which introduce a third party (τοῦ τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι χαλεπαίνοντος Hercher, τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι χαλεπαίνοντος Bernardakis) weaken P.'s argument.

τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι: at *Republic* 2.383a–b (the very end of Book 2) Socrates cites with disapproval a passage of Aeschylus (= fr. 350 R) in which Thetis complains bitterly of the golden promises about the future which Apollo sang at her wedding to Peleus, when – as it has turned out – it was Apollo who killed Achilles. That Apollo himself told lies is an idea which has no place in the ideal state. With P.'s abbreviated quotation, however, the point rather is that the fact that Apollo killed 'the first of the Achaeans' must be a poetic lie, which a young man must recognize as such. This difference from Plato fits P.'s argument, and it is conceivable that

P. is drawing the quotation from a source other than Plato; note that where P. has δαίτηι, the manuscripts of Plato offer θοίνηι. Nevertheless, without the fuller context which the Platonic citation provides, the reference of τόδ' is not clear, and χαλεπαίνοντος seems to pick up χαλεπανοῦμεν (383c1) immediately following Plato's quotation of the passage. It is very likely that P. is here explicitly directing our attention to the *Republic*, but again offering an alternative – a proper understanding of the nature of poetry – to Plato's simple banning of such verses. Cf. further Hunter 2009a: 181–3.

P.'s ὃν αὐτός integrates the quotation into his own syntax (Aeschylus has ὁ δ' αὐτός), allows a seamless transition from his prose to poetic quotation (ὃν 'completes' the first trimeter), and supplies ὑμῶν and κτανῶν with an object. For such citational practices cf. Hunter 2010.

παύσεται δὲ . . . δακρύων 'He will stop himself weeping for . . .'. The pathetic scenes in the Underworld in *Odyssey* 11 must be fictions because they show great men behaving in unbecoming ways and – Plato's principal point at *Rep.* 3.386c–7b – they inculcate a wrong attitude to death; for such grieving as womanish cf. also *Rep.* 10.605d9–e1.

ἀδυνάτους . . . ὀρέγοντας: Achilles grieves (*Od.* 11.471) and, in verses to which Plato took particular offence (*Rep.* 3.386c), declares that he would rather be a slave on earth than rule among the dead (*Od.* 11.489–91); he does not actually stretch out his arms. Agamemnon, on the other hand, does indeed weep and stretch out his strengthless arms (*Od.* 11.391–5, paraphrased by P. here), though his object seems to be to embrace Odysseus, rather than 'in a desire for life'. This last interpretative gloss might, however, be influenced by Achilles' famous declaration at lines 489–91, and so P.'s picture of the shared plight of the two heroes in the Underworld draws together details from Homer's two individual portraits. Agamemnon's weeping makes Odysseus himself weep, and – just as with the example of Hades' fear of Poseidon – P. is again concerned that the young reader is not carried away to imitate emotions which are themselves inscribed within the text. Cf. further Hunter 2009a: 183–4.

ἂν δὲ που συνταράττηται τοῖς πάθεσι 'if he is in some way thrown into confusion by their sufferings . . .'; the συν- prefix in this verb is often either very weak or implies (as here) 'disturbed into confusion'. An alternative is to understand 'is disturbed in sharing their emotions' (see previous note), but this seems to sit less well with the previous sentence.

φαρμασσόμενος picks up γοητεῖαν in 16d.

ἀλλὰ φάωσδε . . . γυναικί: *Odyssey* 11.223–4, spoken to Odysseus by his mother; P. here reads these verses as a sign by Homer that the scenes in the Underworld, traditionally the greatest challenge to any straightforward 'belief' in Odysseus' veracity, are purely fabulous and thus fit matter for women, cf. the proverbial 'old wives' tales' (γραῶν ὕθλος). Cf. further Hunter 2009a: 184–5.

χαριέντως 'elegantly, gracefully'.

εἰς τὴν Νεκύϊαν ‘with regard to the Nekyia’. Νέκυια is first found as a title for *Odyssey* 11 in Diodorus Siculus (4.39.3), but was probably current well before that; it occurs in Aelian’s list of standard book titles (*VH* 13.14).

16f γάρ presumably indicates that Homer’s comment on the *Nekyia* shows that he knew it was fictitious and thus that it was clearly a ‘deliberate’ (ἐκὼν) invention. The transition remains slightly awkward; Hartman proposed τοιαῦτ’ ἄρα, and DR τοιαῦτα γὰρ ἔστιν ἃ κτλ., ‘For there are things of this kind (i.e. mythical) which poets deliberately invent’.

πλείονα δ’ sc. ἐστί.

προσαναχρώννυνται τὸ ψεῦδος ἡμῖν ‘make the fiction rub off on to us’. The metaphor is that the poets stain us (cf. χρώμα) with their falsehoods.

οὖν ἐπὶ τοῦ Διὸς κτλ.: the example is introduced very briefly, and this may mislead. It will turn out that the image of the scales, in both Homer and Aeschylus, is a manifest fiction in which both poets do not believe, which is then set against views about the gods in which they do believe, with Homer again followed by Aeschylus. The alternative (so, apparently, Taplin 1977: 431) is that Homer did not believe in the scales, but Aeschylus did, because Homer had described them; this, however, sits less well with the rhetoric and structure of the argument, and note ἤδη in 17b, ‘now, at last’.

17a ἐν δ’ ἐτίθει . . . Ἀπόλλων: *Iliad* 22.210–13. ἐ (213) is the enclitic third person pronoun; the original digamma before it is observed, hence the hiatus δέ ἐ. These verses, like Aeschylus’ use of them (see below), were much discussed in antiquity; the fourth century critic Zoilus, ‘the scourge of Homer’, mocked the idea of the Fates sitting (or standing?) in the scales (T-Scholium on v. 210).

ὁ Αἰσχύλος: Aeschylus’ *Psychostasia* (fr. 279–80 R) dealt with the battle of Achilles and Memnon, the son of Eos, the goddess of dawn. The souls of the two were apparently weighed before the battle, and it was standard critical doctrine in antiquity (i) that Aeschylus was inspired by the verses of Homer which P. quotes and (ii) that Aeschylus misunderstood Homer, taking κῆρ to refer to ‘souls’ rather than to ‘fates’; cf. the testimonia gathered in Radt’s introduction to the fragments. According to Pollux (4.130), ‘Zeus and those [masculine] around him’ appeared on a structure up above the *skênê*. The actual reconstruction of the play is, however, very uncertain (cf., e.g., Taplin 1977: 431–3), and it may be that Aeschylus’ principal inspiration was not the *Iliad*, but rather the cyclic *Aithiopis*. P. is the only text to claim explicitly that the mothers of the dead stood on either side of the scales to plead their cases, and P. may here reflect later theatrical elaborations of a simpler Aeschylean structure. Nevertheless, art regularly juxtaposes the mothers to the duel and the weighing of souls (cf., e.g., Pausanias 5.19.2 (the chest of Cypselus), *LIMC*s.v. Eos nos. 293–9, Memnon 16, 17, 19 etc.); moreover, it is not improbable that the weighing-scene in Aristophanes’ *Frogs* parodies the Aeschylean play, though conclusions from that source about the Aeschylean original would be dangerous. Whatever the truth, P.’s choice of

example combines a striking mythic image, remarkable dramaturgy and use of the resources of the theatre, and the emotional power of mothers pleading for the lives of their sons; in other words, a very convincing example of ‘pleasure’ and ‘amazement’.

ἐπιγράφας ‘giving it the title of . . .’, cf. LSJ s.v. ἐπιγράφω II 2.

ἐκπλήξιν: cf. on 16b ἐκπλήττει.

Ζεὺς . . . τέτυκται: *Iliad* 4.84, from the scene in which Zeus sends Athena to earth to engineer a breaking of the truce. P. is here following the pattern of quotations at Plato, *Rep.* 2.379e–80a, cf. Hunter 2009a: 185–6.

17b θεός . . . θέλει: these verses from Aeschylus’ *Niobe* (fr. 154a.15–16 R) were cited, as from Aeschylus and about Niobe, by Plato, *Rep.* 2.380a, and it is this citation of which P. will principally be thinking. The verses were, however, also very much anthologized and cited in antiquity, cf. esp. Menander, *Aspis* 412–14; P. uses them again at 1065e, where he calls them a δυσφήμημα. In Aeschylus the verses are essentially critical of Niobe’s ‘recklessness of speech’, not of Zeus’s malevolence, cf. Sommerstein 2008: 160–5.

ταῦτα δ’ ἤδη . . . μεταδιδόντων ‘These things, at last, are stated in accordance with the opinion and belief of the poets, as they express and try to make us share their delusion and ignorance about the gods.’ As with the example of what poets do not actually believe, so Plutarch has chosen examples where it is very easy to accept that the poets did believe what they wrote, as these are standard Greek views, rejected only by those of a very philosophical bent. ταῦτα δ’ ἤδη ‘these things at last . . .’. δέ is not infrequently repeated when a demonstrative pronoun picks up a preceding phrase which itself had δέ, cf. Denniston 184–5; for ἤδη cf. LSJ s.v. 4a.

πάλιν αἱ περὶ τὰς νεκυίας . . . σκυθρωπῶν: P. now turns to the horrors of the poetic Underworld (cf. also 167a), to which Plato had taken great exception, *Republic* 3.387b8–c6, cf. Hunter 2009a: 187. Here again he contrasts poetic fantasies in which the poets do not believe (the rivers of fire, the terrible punishments) with the piteousness of death which they do (mistakenly) believe and fear. πάλιν often introduces a new example, cf. n. on 26e πάλιν. τὰς νεκυίας: although Homer has two Underworld episodes, P. is clearly thinking much more widely than this. Various Orphic poems dramatized the Underworld, and Aeschylus’ *Psychagōgoi* dealt with the summoning of the dead, as in *Odyssey* 11; Aristotle, *Poetics* 1456a3 seems to refer to tragedies set in Hades. τερατουργίαι καὶ διαθέσεις ‘wondrous scenarios’, a hendiadys. Poets actually claim to set out the geography of the Underworld. ὀνόμασι φοβεροῖς is taken from *Republic* 3.387b8 where it refers to names such as Kokytos (‘the Wailing River’) and Styx (‘the Hateful/Hated River’). ἐνδημιουργοῦσαι ‘producing in (our minds)’. φάσματα καὶ εἰδωλα is a pairing found in Plato (*Timaeus* 71a5) and elsewhere in P. (101a, 404d etc.). ποταμῶν φλεγόμενων: the river of fire, Pyriphlegethon, occurs already in Homer (*Od.* 10.513) and is a standard fixture of Underworld descriptions (cf., e.g.,

Plato, *Phaedo* 113b5, Virgil, *Aeneid* 6.265). In the myth of the *De genio Socratis* 'rivers of fire' empty into a celestial sea (590f). P.'s plural is generalizing 'things like rivers of fire', cf. Plato, *Rep.* 3.387c1 (the passage which is in P.'s mind) Κωκυτούς τε καὶ Στύγας κτλ. τόπων ἀγρίων: in the Underworld geography of the *Phaedo*, one of the rivers 'first discharges into a grim and wild region (τόπον . . . δεινόν τε καὶ ἄγριον) . . . which they call Stygian . . .' (113b7-c1); cf. also Plato, *Laws* 10.905b1-2 'Hades or a place wilder than this'.

οὐ πάνυ πολλούς . . . ἐγκέκρται 'do not make many at all fail to notice that a great deal of the fabulous and the false is mixed into them, like a drug into food'. τροφαῖς takes us back to the opening food metaphors. οὐ πάνυ πολλούς 'not many at all', i.e. 'very few'; for this elegant understatement ('litotes') cf., e.g., Plato, *Meno* 71c7, 73d5, LSJ s.v. πάνυ I 3. Such fictions are readily recognizable and hence less dangerous than the fictions which poets really believe. αὐταῖς: i.e. αἱ περὶ τὰς νεκρίας τερατουργίαι καὶ διαθέσεις. τὸ φαρμακῶδες perhaps conjures up images of Circe or (again) of Helen, cf. Hunter 2009a: 187-8. ἐγκέκρται: 3rd pers. sing. perfect passive ἐγκέκραννυμι.

17c πεπεισμένοι ταῦτ' ἔχιν οὕτως 'persuaded that these things were (really) so'. For intransitive ἔχιν with adverbs cf. LSJ s.v. B 2.

ἔνθεν . . . ποταμοί 'from where sluggish rivers of gloomy night belch forth endless darkness' = Pindar fr. 130 Maehler, from Pindar's *Thrēnoi* ('Laments'); the metre is dactylo-epitrite. At 1130c-d P. matches this quotation with another (fr. 129.1-3 Maehler) from the same poem to contrast the blessed afterlife with the oblivion of the wicked. In that passage the fate of the wicked is not in fact the traditional torments, but rather oblivion and eternal ignorance, concealed as they are in these dark rivers; P. may there have been following the interpretation of Heraclides Ponticus (cf. fr. 100 Wehrli = 48 Schütrumpf). For P. and Pindar cf. n. on 21a τοῦ Πινδάρου.

πάρ δ' Ἰσαν . . . πέτρην: *Odyssey* 24.11, from the so-called 'Second Nekyia'. On the problems of the geography of this passage of the *Odyssey* cf. Heubeck ad loc., Nagy 1973.

στενωπὸς Ἄιδου καὶ παλιρροία βυθοῦ 'the narrows of Hades and the ebb and flow of the abyss' = Sophocles fr. 832 R; nothing further is known about this verse.

ὅσας . . . ἐξενηνόχασι 'All the utterances, however, which they have expressed as they lament and fear death as something piteous and lack of burial as something terrible . . .'. ὅσας . . . φωνάς is picked up by αὐταὶ immediately following the citations. The transmitted ὅσοι was an easy error, given the hyperbaton of φωνάς.

μή μ' . . . καταλείπειν: *Odyssey* 11.72, spoken by the ghost of Elpenor.

ψυχὴ . . . ἥβην: *Iliad* 16.856-7 (Patroclus) = 22.362-3 (Hector); these are, of course, the two most significant deaths in the *Iliad*. Plato too cites these verses among passages which cannot be allowed because they inculcate wrong attitudes,

including fear, to death (*Rep.* 3.386d9–10). **πταμένη:** aorist participle of πέτομαι. **ἀνδρότητα:** for the anomalous scansion of the first syllable as short cf. Janko on *Iliad* 16.857.

μή μ' . . . ἀναγκάσει: Euripides, *Iphigenia at Aulis* 1218–19; the pathetic pleas of a young virgin obviously carried a powerful emotional effect – here is someone who had very good reasons to fear death. In 1219 the MSS of Euripides have βλέπειν τὰ δ' ὑπὸ γῆς. P's λεύσσειν could be an error of memory, but it is also the kind of change that happens regularly when verses are anthologized, and P. is presumably taking this passage from an earlier collection of such material, cf. above pp. 15–16; ὑπὸ γῆς and ὑπὸ γῆν compete throughout classical and Hellenistic Greek, cf. LSJ s.v. ὑπὸ A I 2, C I 2.

17d αὔται . . . λέγονται 'These (expressions) are those of persons who have suffered and have been prejudiced by opinion and delusion. For this reason they touch and disturb us the more, because we are filled with the emotions and the weakness on which these sayings are based.' P. here varies Plato's conclusion to his dismissal of such passages: '[We cannot allow them] not because the lines are not poetic and give pleasure to most hearers; rather, the more poetic they are, the less are they to be heard by children and men who must be free and fear slavery more than death' (*Rep.* 3.387b2–6). Nussbaum 1993: 124–5 suggests a Stoic source (? Chrysippus) for this passage. **προεαλωκότων:** perfect participle, active in form, of προαλίσκομαι.

παρασκευάζωμεν: sc. τοὺς νέους.

εὐθύς ἐξ ἀρχῆς gives particular emphasis to the fact that there is no time to waste; proper education must begin as soon as possible.

ἐχειν ἔναυλον ὅτι 'to have ringing in their ears (the knowledge) that . . .'

οὐ πάνυ: for the elegant understatement cf. n. 17b οὐ πάνυ πολλούς. P. does not deny poets all concern with the truth, and in chapter 7 he will stress the important element of 'likeness to the truth', but the subject of death and the Underworld is a special case. Nevertheless, his declaration here is distinctly un-Stoic, cf. Strabo 1.2.9 ὁ ποιητῆς (i.e. Homer) ἐφρόντιζε πολὺ μέρος τάληθους.

μέλον ἐστὶ here replaces μέλει, uniquely in P; cf., e.g., Soph. *OC* 653.

ἡ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα . . . αὐτοί 'and the truth about these matters, even for those who have made their sole undertaking the knowledge and study of reality, is very hard indeed to track down and hard to capture, as they themselves admit'. The long periphrasis for 'philosophers' emphasizes how difficult a subject eschatology is: poets have many other things to think about than the afterlife, and so we will hardly expect them to have accurate knowledge. **μηδέν**, rather than οὐδέν, is used in a generalizing statement almost equivalent to a condition, 'any people [there may be] who have undertaken . . .', cf. Smyth §§2688–9; P. in any case uses μή more freely than do classical authors, cf. above p. 21.

πρόχειρα 'ready to hand'. Here are some more 'charms' for the young man to carry around with him.

ταυτί: the emphatic deictic (Smyth §339) gives particular emphasis to the citations which follow.

17ε οὕτως . . . περιληπτά 'In this way these things are neither visible nor audible for men nor graspable with the mind' = Empedocles fr. 2.7-8 D-K. Empedocles was in fact not despairing of being able to give an account, but rather only of one possible way of doing so, cf. KRS 285. Moreover, neither Empedocles nor Xenophanes in the passage immediately following was speaking specifically about eschatology. For P. and Empedocles cf. n. on 16c τὰ δ' Ἐμπεδοκλέους . . . Θεόγνιδος.

καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν . . . πάντων = Xenophanes fr. 34.1-2 D-K; on this passage cf. KRS 179-80. It has often been thought that Aristotle alludes to this same passage at *Poetics* 1460b36, but that is far from clear (cf. Lucas ad loc.).

τὰ Σωκράτους: Socrates' 'ignorance' of the afterlife is fundamental, e.g., to the close of the *Apology* and the finale of the *Republic*; such knowledge is, after all, something which only the dead can have. After his description of the Underworld in the *Phaedo*, Socrates does, however, claim justified belief about such things: 'To insist that these things are just as I have described them is not fitting for a man of sense; but that this or something like it is true of our souls and their dwellings, since indeed it is clear that the soul is something immortal, does seem to me fitting and a risk worth running for someone who thinks that this is the case' (114d1-6, cf. 63b5-c3). For Socrates' 'ignorance' on the subject of the divine more generally cf., e.g., *Cratylus* 400d-1a, *Critias* 107a-b.

ἐξομνυμένου 'denying on oath', 'formally disclaiming'.

ἥττον . . . ὀρώσιν 'For [the young] will [then] pay less attention to the poets, as having some knowledge of these matters, when they see the philosophers in a daze about them.'

λίγγωδντας 'dizzy, in a daze', like someone drunk or after a blow to the head. The word was a favourite of Plato's, and P. perhaps here evokes those places where it is used (ironically or otherwise) of philosophers 'in the real world' or non-philosophers confronting 'truth', cf. *Theaetetus* 175d2, *Gorgias* 486b2, 527a2.

CHAPTER 3

We must remind our students that poetry is an imitative art, and is to be admired for its success in representing its subject; when we admire representations of ugly sights or sounds, it is the skill of the imitation that we find admirable. Characters who are by no means to be commended (e.g. Eteocles in tragedy or a miser in comedy) will naturally say unacceptable things, and the young must realize that these do not represent the poets' own views. Consider for example the episode where Paris goes to bed with Helen after he has run away from battle: this is unique in Homer, and it is meant to show that only bad men have sex in the daytime.

After dealing with one major Platonic problem – the lies poets tell – P. turns to another, *mimēsis*. His concern is, however, not the metaphysical problems of

mimêsis with which Plato deals in *Republic* 10, but the rather simpler fact that because poets aim to imitate the world around them, and that world contains much that is immoral, it is inevitable that poetry will contain much which we would not wish the young to take to heart. Plato had, however, been very concerned with the effects of ‘imitation’ on the souls of both actors and audience, and P.’s warnings here are not unrelated to that, cf. above p. 7. The fact that human beings take great pleasure in imitations in both art and literature makes it necessary that the young should be taught that our pleasure derives from an appreciation of the likeness of the imitation to its subject, as likeness is itself a kind of appropriateness (πρέπον, εἰκός, προσηκόντως). P. discusses these matters in very similar terms in *Symposium* 5.1 (cf. Van der Stockt 1992: 49–55). Behind P., and the Hellenistic tradition in general, lie of course Plato and Aristotle. One of Plato’s difficulties with poetry was that it makes us take pleasure in sharing represented suffering and pain and makes us behave in ways and with feelings that we would do everything to avoid outside the theatre, if we found ourselves in similar situations (*Rep.* 10.605c–6d); it is a short step from there to wondering why we feel that pleasure, and that is a step which Aristotle took. In the fourth chapter of the *Poetics* Aristotle discusses the natural human propensity to imitation and the fact that we derive pleasure from the inferences which likenesses cause us to draw, even if what is being imitated is painful ‘in real life’ (1448b3–16, cf. *Rhet.* 1.1371b4–10); P.’s defence of the pleasure of *mimêsis* in this chapter ultimately goes back to Aristotle, cf. Tagliasacchi 1961: 85–9, Bréchet 1999: 217–18, above pp. 5–6.

17e ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον . . . ποιήμασιν ‘Let us even more give him [i.e. the young man] proper direction as we introduce him to poetry . . .’. ἐπίστημι may mean ‘catch (and hold) the attention of’, 27a below, 157d ἐπιστήσαντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου τὸ συμπόσιον, cf. LSJ s.v. A VI 2. The subjunctive is in parallel with, e.g., εἰσάγωμεν in 16a and cf. also 17d and 18a, but the less well-attested future is perhaps more natural with ἔτι μᾶλλον and may be correct.

17f ὑπογράφοντες ‘sketching the fact that, giving a general indication’.

ἀντίστροφος ‘which is the counterpart to, analogous to . . .’. P. inherits this word from classical discussions of the relations between different skills or arts, cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 464b8, 465e1, Arist. *Rhet.* 1354a1, and he here echoes Plato, *Rep.* 10.605a8 – the mimetic artist is to be counted as ἀντίστροφος τῷ ζωγράφῳ.

ἐκεῖνο τὸ θρυλούμενον ‘that very familiar saying’. P. elsewhere attributes this famous saying to Simonides (346f, 748a; contrast 58b); for other citations cf. *Rhet. ad Herennium* 4.39, [Plut.], *Homer* 216 (‘one of the wise men said . . .’). For Simonides in the anecdotal tradition cf. 15c above, and for a helpful account of what Simonides may or may not have meant by the saying cf. Ford 2002: 96–101 (older bibliography in Valgiglio 1973: 106); for the *ut pictura poesis* comparison in general see on 16b ὥσπερ ἐν γραφαῖς . . . κατασκευῇς.

ἀκηκῶς ἔστω: this periphrastic form stresses the continued significance of a past event, i.e. the young man is to ‘be in the state’ of having heard this, and he is to remember it in the present, cf. *MT* §45.

18a σάραν: cf. Aristotle, *Poetics* 1448b10–12, ‘we enjoy (χαίρομεν) contemplating the most detailed images of things the sight of which is painful, such as the forms of the most worthless animals and corpses’. Lizards are common in ancient statuary and on gems, and were presumably also common in painting, cf. Toynbee 1973: 220–1, Keller 1909/13: II 272–3, *RE* XI 1960–1.

πίθηκον: representations of monkeys and apes are common in ancient art, cf. McDermott 1938: 159–324, Keller 1909/13: I 3–11, Toynbee 1971: 55–60. P.’s choice here will have been influenced by: (i) Thersites was often likened to an ape – see next note. (ii) Apes and monkeys were themselves regarded as habitual imitators and mimics (cf., e.g., Arist. *Poetics* 1461b34, McDermott 1938: 86–7, 141), and in this context thoughts turn ‘naturally’ to them. (iii) Monkeys were regarded as very ugly and like deformed humans, cf. Cingano on Pindar, *Pyth.* 2.72–5; Semonides’ ‘monkey-woman’ is dreadfully ugly (ἄσχιστα πρόσωπα), misshapen and bent only on mischief (7.71–82 W).

Θερσίτου πρόσωπον: Thersites was ‘the ugliest (ἄσχιστος) man who went to Troy’ (*Iliad* 2.216), and Homer’s description of this misshapen creature (*Iliad* 2.217–19) was a standard school example of Homer’s descriptive power, cf. Aelius Theon 118.10–15 Sp. (= 66–7 Patillon-Bolognesi), Hermogenes 22.11–12 Rabe, [Plut.] *Hom.* 75. In the ‘Myth of Er’ Thersites’ soul chooses an ape for its next incarnation (Plato, *Rep.* 10.620c2), the Hellenistic poet Lycophron describes Thersites as πθηκόμορφος (*Alex.* 1000), and at least one scholium on the Homeric passage associates him in his ugliness with an ape (T-Scholium on v. 216). We may ask how we can judge a representation of Thersites when we have never actually seen him (contrast a lizard); in the *Laws* Plato insists that only someone with an accurate knowledge of the original can judge the quality of a representation (2.668c–9b), and Aristotle explicitly distinguishes the pleasure we derive from representations where we know the original from those where we do not (*Poetics* 1448b17–18). The point seems to be that, whereas from a strictly Platonic point of view Homer’s description of Thersites is itself a ‘representation’, for us it amounts to ‘the original’: Homer’s descriptive power is such that we have a very clear mental image of Thersites (we have ‘seen’ him) and we judge any representation of him, which will inevitably be based on Homer’s verses, against that original image. When P. moves to represented actions immediately below, he will certainly be referring to things of which he and his students can only have mental images. For Thersites in ancient art cf. *RE* VA 2468–70, *LIMC* Suppl. s.v. Thersites.

ἠδόμεθα καὶ θαυμάζομεν: for the Aristotelian origins of this argument cf. the Introductory Note above. ‘Wonder’ is an important element in this argument, cf. 18b below, Arist. *Rhet.* I.1371b1–11; perhaps in *On imitation*, Dionysius of

Halicarnassus observed that depictions may be θαυμαστόν, even where what is depicted is not (cf. Radermacher 1940).

οὐσία 'in its essence'.

καλὸν . . . αἰσχρόν: these are key terms for P. here, as they have both aesthetic ('beautiful', 'ugly') and moral ('honourable', 'shameful') senses and thus ease the transition between the representation of images and of deeds.

ἐφίκεται τῇς ὁμοιότητος 'attain likeness'.

τοῦναντίον: adverbial, cf. LSJ s.v. ἐναντίος II 1c.

εἰκόνα καλήν: i.e. a 'beautiful' picture, as opposed to a καλῶς made picture of an ugly body.

τὸ πρότερον: the equivalent in literature will soon be revealed, cf. n. on 18d καλῶς . . . αἰσχρά.

ἀτόπους: an all-purpose adjective applied to anything which P. regards as outside acceptable behaviour and attitudes; applied to kin-killing it suggests 'unpleasant', with regard to pornography 'inappropriate, offensive'.

Τιμόμαχος: the date of this painter from Byzantium is uncertain: Pliny makes him a contemporary of Julius Caesar (*HN* 35.136), but on stylistic grounds modern scholars often push him back to early Hellenistic times. His picture of Medea's killing of her children was clearly famous; Caesar purchased it and placed it in the temple of Venus Genetrix (*HN* 35.136-7), and it is often thought to lie behind a surviving wall-painting of Medea from Herculaneum, cf. *GP* II 43-4, Page 1938: lxxvi-iii, *LIMC* VI 1.388-9 (with 'Medeia' no. 11). Pliny uses it as one of his examples for the fact that last works and unfinished pictures win particular admiration, and an admiration tinged with sadness (*HN* 35.145). The power of this picture inspired a number of epigrams (*Anth. Plan.* (= *AP* 16) 135-40) which all stress the mix of emotions which Medea is feeling: love and jealousy, anger and pity, hesitation and the drive to action. This was a very good example for P. to choose of how art draws us in, even to repellent actions, so that we 'sympathize' (in both senses) with Medea, and here lies the danger to the young man's judgement; one of the epigrams (140) ends with an appeal to our θάμβος at the sight of the picture, cf. θαυμάζομεν immediately above and τὸ θαυμαζόμενον below.

Θέων: Theon of Samos is placed by Quintilian (12.10.6, where see Austin's notes) in a golden age of painting in the later fourth century BC. P. is probably referring to the picture which Pliny (*HN* 35.144) calls *Orestis insania*, though in the same passage he refers to a painting by 'Theorus' of 'Orestes killing his mother and Aegisthus'; confusion in such matters is not uncommon in ancient authors – see the next note on Parrhasius. Quintilian praises Theon as outstanding *concupiendis uisionibus quas φαντασίας uocant*; i.e., Theon's pictures had the power to create very vivid mental images, going beyond the mere subject of the painting, in those who saw them (cf. the anecdote at Aelian, *VH* 2.44). Art criticism and rhetorical criticism are here particularly close, and 'Longinus' illustrates rhetorical and poetic *phantasia*, where 'through inspiration and emotion you seem to see what you describe and bring it before the eyes of the audience' (*De subl.* 15.1),

from the mad scene of Euripides' *Orestes*. Theon's picture may have been inspired by Euripides' famous play.

18b Παρράσιος: nothing else is known of this picture by Parrhasius of Ephesus (c. 440–380 BC), though the subject given here was painted by Euphranor of Corinth (fourth century BC), cf. Pliny, *HN* 35.129, Vasic 1987. Lucian, *De domo* 30 describes such a painting in some detail, but does not name the artist. In a story going back to the cyclic *Cypria*, Odysseus, who knew of the long wanderings which awaited him, tried to avoid the Trojan War by feigning madness (he yoked an ox and a horse (or ass) together and ploughed salt into the earth); he was unmasked by Palamedes who placed the infant Telemachus in front of the plough, thus causing Odysseus to stop and provoking Odysseus' bitter hatred against him. Cf. Soph. *Phil.* 1025–8, Ovid, *Met.* 13.36–9 with Bömer's notes. The danger in admiring this picture lies in the possibility that we will transfer our admiration for the artist's skill to admiration for Odysseus' very unheroic behaviour.

Χαιρέφανης: otherwise unknown. Some have seen confusion here with Nicophanes of Sicyon, a fourth-century painter praised by Pliny for *uenustas* and *diligentia* (*HN* 35.111, 137), who is one of three painters listed by Athenaeus (13.567b) as deserving the title πορνογράφος and as having been mentioned by Polemo fr. 249 Preller (early second century BC) as good painters of erotic subjects.

ἀκόλαστους ὁμιλίας could cover any number of 'positions', though oral sex is likely to have been among them; Parrhasius, who painted smaller erotic pictures (Pliny, *HN* 35.72), painted Atalanta fellating Meleager (Suetonius, *Tib.* 44.2), and Chrysippus too seems to have been interested in divine *fellatio* (Diog. Laert. 7. 187–8 = *SVF* II 1071, Nussbaum 1993: 133–4). Erotic art was extremely common in private houses and much survives, cf., e.g., Terence, *Eun.* 583–91, Fedeli on Propertius 2.6.27–30, Clarke 1998. We might wonder what danger comparable to infanticide pornographic art poses to the young man, but P.'s point seems clear: if very vividly depicted, such sexual acts, which are ἀκόλαστοι and hence morally reprehensible (οὐ καλόν), will arouse 'sympathy' in the young viewer, such that he will place himself in the depicted (masculine) rôle, and this is bad for his moral training. As with the scenes from myth immediately preceding, there is (of course) no suggestion that the young man has himself actually seen or taken part in such ὁμιλίας.

τὴν τέχνην . . . τὸ ὑποκείμενον '[we praise] the art if it has imitated its subject appropriately'. Others take τὸ ὑποκείμενον as the subject and the verb as passive, but cf., e.g., 648f, 839f. τὸ ὑποκείμενον is 'that which lies behind/under the representation', cf. LSJ s.v. 8, and n. on δεῖ . . . οἰκεῖον below.

πάθη 'emotions/passions', rather than 'experiences', which is all but covered by ἔργα; Strabo 1.2.3 says that poetry teaches ἡθὴ καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις μεθ' ἡδονῆς.

μιμητικῶς ἀπαγγέλλει 'describes by imitation', i.e. 'represents mimetically'. In a famous passage of the *Republic* Plato distinguishes poetry such as drama which

is ‘wholly mimetic’, that which is wholly ‘report’ (ἀπαγγελία) such as dithyramb, and that which is ‘mixed’ such as epic (3.394b10–c5). P. however does not here exclude any poetry, even if his language owes something to Plato; ἀπαγγελία was now a standard term in such discussions, cf. Schol. Dion. Thrax cited on 16b τῆς ἀμύθου . . . κατασκευῆς.

δεῖ . . . οἰκεῖον ‘it is necessary that the young man should neither accept as true that which is admired and successful in [such representations] nor approve it as morally good, but only praise it as suitable and fitting for the character represented’. ἀληθές here refers not so much to the lies which poetry tells, but rather to moral truths: base actions and sentiments offer a distorted picture of the world, cf. ψευδεῖς in 18e. τῶι ὑποκειμένῳ προσώπῳ picks up ὑποκείμενον above, and cf. [Dion. Hal.] *Rhet.* II 361 U-R on Homer’s wonderful skill at depicting the different characters τῶν ὑποκειμένων προσώπων; the phrase is a standard one, cf. also Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 13 (I 156.7 U-R), 48 (I 234.4 U-R), De Lacy 1948: 249.

18c P.’s argument that we take pleasure in the representation of unpleasant things looks back ultimately to Aristotle (cf. *Poetics* 1448b11–17, above p. 98), but his examples look to two adjacent passages of the *Republic*. At 3.396b4–6 any imitation by would-be Guardians of ‘horses neighing and bulls bellowing and roaring rivers and the crash of the sea and thunder and all such things’ is outlawed; at 397a4–8 the list is ‘thunder and the sound of winds and hail and axles and pulleys and the music of trumpets and pipes and pan-pipes and every kind of instrument and the noise of dogs and sheep and birds’. P. mixes variation (e.g. πνευμάτων ῥοίζον for ψόφους ἀνέμων) and borrowing in a ‘textbook’ example of literary imitation.

ἐνοχλούμεθα καὶ δυσχεραίνομεν: cf. 673d (in the same context) ἀχθόμεθα καὶ δυσκολαίνομεν.

Παρμένων: probably the comic actor mentioned by Aeschines 1.157, who also appears on an inscribed list of actors victorious at the Lenaia (Pickard-Cambridge 1988: 116). The story of ‘Parmeno’s pig’ became proverbial and is told by P. in a very similar context at 674b–c. Parmeno’s imitation of a pig squealing was so good that when someone hid a real pig under his arm and made it squeal the audience cried out ‘That’s nothing compared with Parmeno’s!’ The anecdote is one of several (others concern painters) which point to the possibility that art may surpass life.

Θεόδωρος: probably the famous tragic actor of the fourth century (Pickard-Cambridge 1988: Index s.v., Ghiron-Bistagne 1976: 157–8, Stefanis 1988: 210–12, Easterling-Hall 2002: Index s.v., Csapo 2010: Index s.v.), although imitation of the disagreeable noise made by a windlass or block and tackle mechanism seems remote from tragic acting. Aristotle, *Rhet.* 3.1404b22–4 praises Theodorus’ ability to make his voice seem to be that of the character impersonated.

νοσώδη . . . φεύγομεν: the words immediately evoke Philoctetes who is about to be mentioned; the Greeks did indeed abandon Philoctetes with his diseased foot on Lemnos and ‘flee’.

τὸν δ' Ἀριστοφῶντος Φιλοκτήτην: Aristophon of Thasos (mid to late fifth century BC) was a brother of the famous Polygnotus; Pliny places him in the second rank of painters (*HN* 35.138). His 'Philoctetes' is nowhere else cited, though a late epigram refers to a 'Philoctetes' of Parrhasius which showed the hero in great pain (*Anth. Plan.* 111). Philoctetes was a common subject in art, cf. *LIMC* VII 1.384-5, and for the post-classical reception of the suffering hero cf. Bowersock 1994: 55-76. In the corresponding section of *Symptotic questions* 5.1 P. refers to a painting of Philoctetes, but does not name an artist (674a).

τὴν Σιλανίωνος Ἰοκάστην: Silanion of Athens (late fourth century BC) was a sculptor in bronze; although P. does not name him at 674b, there can be little doubt that it is his 'Jocasta' which is there said to have given a realistic impression of 'someone passing away and fading', because the artist mixed silver with the bronze for the character's face. Cf. *LIMC* V 1.683. Silanion's image was perhaps inspired by Euripides, *Phoenissae*, where Jocasta stabs herself over the bodies of Eteocles and Polynices (vv. 1455-9).

φθίνουσι 'dying, fading away'. At 674b P. refers to our pleasure at representations of (apparently non-mythological) φθισικοί, i.e. people emaciated through consumption, though the sight of such people in reality is unpleasant.

ὀρῶντες χαίρομεν: the language is very close to Aristotle's χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες in the passage of the *Poetics* which makes this same point (1448b11), but that does not of course mean that the *Poetics* was P.'s immediate 'source' here.

Θερσίτης ὁ γελωτοποιός: P. echoes Plato, *Rep.* 10.620c2, a passage (the 'Myth of Er') already in his mind at 18a. Homer had said that Thersites would say 'whatever he thought the Greeks would find funny' (*Iliad* 2.215-16), and for the later élite tradition he became not just a model of political insubordination, but also of a type of humour which could be hurtful, lacked grace and moderation, and did not respect ordinary social feelings; this is what Aristotle calls βωμολοχία, cf. *EN* 4.1128a4-7, 33-6, Hunter 2009a: 87-8, 101-2. In calling him γελωτοποιός Plato and P. assimilate him to the type of 'professional' buffoon best known from the figure of Philip in Xenophon's *Symposium*.

Σίσυφος: a notorious trickster and one of the legendary sinners punished in Hades, cf. *Odyssey* 11.593-600, Pearson 1917: II 184-5. Various tales were told of his clashes with the gods, but relevant here seem to be the fact that in some versions he seduced Anticleia and was Odysseus' real father; a fact that characters in drama like to throw in Odysseus' face (cf., e.g., Eur. *Cycl.* 104 with Seaford's note), and a story in Hyginus (*Fab.* 60) that he seduced his own niece Tyro. Sisyphus was the subject of satyr-plays by Aeschylus, Euripides and perhaps also Sophocles and the politician and poet Critias (fr. 19 Snell-Kannicht).

φθορεύς: a word of Hellenistic and imperial prose; P. suggests that 'seducer' was Sisyphus' 'profession', as Batrachos was a pimp by trade; cf. Lysias 1.16 (the informant speaks) 'Eratosthenes has seduced many other women as well, for he has this *techné*.' The Atticist lexicographer Moeris says that the proper Attic term for φθορεύς is ὁ βιασάμενος (148.16 Hansen).

Βάτραχος: presumably a character in a (? Menandrian) comedy, cf. adesp. 69 K-A; the name is well attested, particularly in Athens (*LGPN* II s.v.). Some have wanted to see confusion here with Battaros, the *pornoboskos* speaker of Herodas 2; P. might well have known Herodas' poetry (cf. Pliny, *Epist.* 4.3.4), but comedy seems a more probable reference here. *pornoboskoi* were bywords of shameless greed, cf. Arist. *EN* 4.1121b32, Thphr. *Char.* 6.5, Hunter 1983: 179.

18d ὅς δὲ . . . κακίζειν 'but to censure and reprove the attitudes and actions which he represents'. προβάλλεσθαι 'to censure', cf. *C. Gracchus* 4 μισεῖν καὶ προβάλλεσθαι, *LSJ* s.v. B IV.

οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ . . . καλῶς: P. here pushes an 'Aristotelian' line to extremes; in the *Laws* Plato, by contrast, explicitly made the approbation of καλῶς, if predicated of artistic performances, necessarily refer to both content and form (2.654b11–c), cf. von Reutern 1933: 96–8, Halliwell 2002: 299–300. The repetition of καλόν and καλῶς has resulted in corruption in some MSS, but both text and sense seem certain.

καλῶς . . . αἰσχρά: a very mannered sentence with an oppositional pair framing a pointed chiasmus. The idea of 'appropriateness' to characters (good and bad) goes back ultimately to Plato (cf. *Ion* 540b2–e9) and Aristotle (*Poetics* 1454a21–3); for the history of the idea cf. Pohlenz 1933. Cicero's discussion of *decorum* at *De officiis* 1.93–9 draws on Stoic sources, and in chapters 97–8 (cf. Dyck ad loc.) he uses an example from Roman tragedy to make the same point as P: immoral ideas and expressions are 'appropriate' to wicked characters in drama. There is an important (though flexible) distinction between this use of the terminology and πρέπον/πρέπει to express a sense of what is generically or socially 'proper'; thus, for example, the epitome of book 2 of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On imitation* draws a contrast between Aeschylus, who observed 'τὸ πρέπον of characters and emotions', and Euripides who, because he strove for the greatest possible realism, 'everywhere fell short of τὸ πρέπον καὶ κόσμιον' (12). *πρεπόντως καὶ οἰκείως*: in as much as the two terms can be distinguished (cf. above p. 22 on P.'s fondness for synonyms), the latter perhaps just suggests 'appropriate/what you would expect of the character', whereas the former also conveys a sense of literary and generic appropriateness.

Δαμωνίδα: this anecdote is reported by Theon (100 Sp. = 23 Patillon-Bolognesi) as a typical example of a *chreia* 'in the form of a wish'; Theon attaches the story to 'Damon the gymnastics trainer', and Athenaeus cites a version which gives it to a fourth-century musician with a club-foot called Dorion (8.338a). P.'s point is that, just as deformed bodies wear clothes that match them, so deformed souls say things appropriate to their moral deformity.

εἴπερ . . . ἀδικεῖν: Euripides, *Phoenissae* 524–5, spoken by Eteocles; P. cites these famous verses (cf. Cic. *De off.* 3.82) again at 125d, 814e, *Crassus* 37.3. The *Phoenissae* was perhaps the most commonly used Euripidean play for teaching in school, cf. Criboire 2001a: 109–9, 2001b. Plato had already noted with disapproval the praise for tyranny expressed in tragedy (*Rep.* 8.568a–b).

τοῦ μὲν δίκαιου . . . κερδανεῖς ‘Strive for the reputation of a just man, but the actions of one ready to do anything from which you will profit . . .’ = Euripides fr. **426a K, also cited by Stobaeus 3.3.38 (περὶ φρονήσεως) in a nest of unascrbed passages shared with *How to study poetry*. P. says that the words are spoken by Ixion and the fragment very likely comes from the *Ixion* (cf. 19e below); Ixion was one of the traditional sinners, a kin-murderer condemned to eternal punishment for abusing divine hospitality and trying to seduce Hera. The sentiment sounds not unlike the Odysseus of the opening scene of Sophocles’ *Philoctetes* (cf. v. 111 on κέρδος as an overriding motive); τοῦ πᾶν δρῶντος suggests ὁ πανούργος. Nauck’s κερδανεῖ is attractive for Euripides, ‘. . . anything from which he will profit’, but the second person may well have been in P.’s text; others punctuate after δρῶντος.

18e τάλαντον . . . ἀργυροῦν; ‘The dowry’s a talent. Aren’t I to take it? Can I continue living if I pass up a talent? Shall I get any sleep if I let it go? Shall I not be punished in Hades for impiety towards a silver talent?’ = adesp. 707 K–A. The lively rhetorical questions, the miser’s obsessive repetition of τάλαντον, and the witty conceit of eternal punishment for ‘impiety’ against money clearly made this a memorable comic passage and one which would certainly have appealed to gifted actors; this very attractiveness increased its dangers. The τοκογλύφος (‘interest-notcher’) or τοκιστής lent (often small sums of) money at (often very) high rates, and Aristotle pairs such people with *pornoboskoi* for their sordid love of gain (*EN* 4.1121b34), cf. further 34d below, Diggle 2004 on Thphr. *Char.* 6.9, Millett 1991: 180–8. Τοκιστής comedies are known for Nicostratus and Alexis. P.’s essay *Against borrowing money* (827d–832a, cf. Russell 1973) also contains much abuse of money-lenders. προέμενος: aor. mid. participle of προίημι.

ψευδεῖς: for P., Eur. *Phoen.* 524–5 is both literally ‘untrue’ and reveals a warped moral sense; fr. **426a preaches a corrupt morality; and the money-lender’s speech reveals a warped ἦθος and a willingness to joke about impiety.

πρεσβύτηι: money-lenders may well have tended to be old rather than young, but the old were also thought of, and often depicted on stage as (cf. Smikrines in Menander’s *Aspis*), more miserly than the young. Aristotle counts profit as an important motive for the old, whom he in fact describes as ‘slaves to profit’ (*Rhet.* 2.1390a16); chapters 13 and 14 of *Rhetoric* 2 have much of interest on this subject.

18f ἄτοπα . . . ἄτόποις: another typical chiasmus cf. πράγμα . . . λόγον . . . λεγόμενον . . . πραττόμενον immediately below.

οὐκ ἐπαινοῦντες οὐδὲ δοκιμάζοντες: poets give immoral words to immoral characters, but that does not mean that poets themselves do not have a proper moral sense; indeed, they want the audience to form appropriate moral judgments about the characters.

τούναντιον: cf. n. on 18a τούναντιον.

ἡ πρὸς τὸ πρόσωπον ὑποψία ‘mistrust of the character’.

τὸ τῆς συγκοιμήσεως τοῦ Πάριδος ‘the episode of Paris having sex . . .’. After Paris is worsted in his duel with Menelaus in *Iliad* 3 he is rescued from the battlefield by Aphrodite, who then brings Helen to him and they make love. The passage was notorious and P. refers to it again in very similar terms at 655a, where such ‘indulgence in the daytime’ is the mark of a ‘crazed adulterer’. Much the same moral reading is offered by the bT-scholia: Paris’ desire to make love at such a time is ἀκρασία or indeed λαγνεία, ‘randiness’ (Schol. 3.383, 441), and he himself is ἀκόλαστος (Schol. 3.382), whereas the scene is also designed to show Helen’s σωφροσύνη, cf. n. on 19a ἐμφάσεις; Maximus of Tyre calls Paris an εἰκὼν ἀκολάστου ἔρωτος (18.8). Homer’s alleged condemnation of Paris leads into the next subject – the indications that poets themselves give. Not every ancient interpretation of this Homeric ‘problem’, which had already been discussed by Aristotle (fr. 374 Gigon = 150 Rose), was so unfavourable to Paris, cf. Porphyry cited by Erbse with the Scholia to *Iliad* 3.441, Hunter 2009a: 21.

ἀποδράντος: P’s choice of verb (cf. 655a δραπετεύσαντα) suggests that Paris was a ‘slave’ to pleasure.

οὐδένα . . . ἀκρασίαν: the subject of the sentence is Homer.

CHAPTER 4

Readers must learn to look out for hints that the poet gives, or ways in which he recommends or discredits what his characters do or say. These indications may be explicit or may emerge from the events which are related. Homer is very rich in instances of this. Allegorical interpretations of apparently disreputable actions are not needed, because the poet himself offers the solution. Poetry in fact does by its inventions what philosophers do by citing examples. Moreover, we can use the diversity of opinions expressed and contradictions between poets to direct the young in the right direction.

19a ἐν δὲ τοῦτοις: i.e. in the matter of discerning between good and bad characters.

ἐμφάσεις ‘hints, indications’, cf. 35a, Konstan 2004: 10. This and the corresponding verbs are standard terms in the Homeric scholia for how the poet ‘suggests’ interpretations, cf. Nünlist 2009: 211. Thus, for example, the bT-Scholia on *Iliad* 3.441 note that Paris’ invitation to Helen to go to bed (cf. 18f immediately above) ‘makes clear (ἐμφανίζει) that randiness is the cause of all his misfortunes’, and this is much the same observation as P.’s which concludes the previous chapter. For ἐμφασίς as a technical term in rhetoric cf. Lausberg 1990: §§905–6, W. Rutherford 1905: 264–6, I. Rutherford 1988.

ἐμοὶ μὲν . . . ἀεί: Menander fr. 163 K-A, presumably the very first lines of the *Thais*, one of Menander’s most famous plays in antiquity. Without further evidence, there is no reason to think that these verses were spoken in the figure of the poet or by an impersonal prologue figure such as we find in Roman comedy; they could easily have been delivered by a human character ‘striking a

pose' or even by a divine prologist, which would lend the address to the divine Muse a certain wit. P.'s point is that these opening verses tell us how to interpret what Thais says and does in the play; we do not of course have to take this didactic point too seriously: Thais may have proved herself a quite different sort of *hetaira*. The reworking of the opening of the *Odyssey* suggests that Thais is the γυνή πολύτροπος who 'knew the minds of many men and sacked their cities'. For citations of Menander in P. cf. the essays of Di Florio and Casanova in Casanova 2005; Menander was, for P., one of the greatest figures of classical poetry, cf. Hunter 2009a: 78–89. *πιθανήν*: a common description of *hetairai*, cf., e.g., Asclepiades, *AP* 5.158.1 (= *HE* 824), Dioscorides, *AP* 5.53.1 (= *HE* 1475), but also very appropriate to a female Odysseus. *ἀδικοῦσαν*: the verb is standard in erotic language for one partner 'wronging' the other, cf. Sappho fr. 1.20 etc. *ἀποκλείουσαν*: the motif of the woman who 'locks out' her would-be lover is very common in comedy and epigram, cf. Copley 1956: 1–27, Tarán 1979: 52–114. An epigram of Strato, perhaps P.'s contemporary, commemorates a comedy entitled *Ἀποκλειομένη* (*AP* 12.193 = 34 Floridi, Giannuzzi), and Posidippus, a major figure of the New Comedy, is known to have written a play of this title (fr. 2–5 K-A).

προδιαβάλλει... λεγομένων 'what is said which is bad he discredits in advance and what is good he commends in advance'. These verbs are found together at [Dion. Hal.] *Rhet.* II 362.20 U-R in a discussion of how the orator should prepare the audience for what they are going to hear, and *προσυνίστημι* is a standard term in the Homeric scholia for Homer's control and organization of his material: he is always preparing the ground for what will come later, cf. Nünlist 2009: 31, 316–18. For the use which P. makes of it here cf., e.g., bT-Scholium on *Iliad* 1.248 ('Nestor the sweet of speech stood up, the clear-voiced Pyliaian orator') 'he commends in advance Nestor's words as gentle and able to calm anger'. P.'s general point about Homeric speech-introductions is found at greater length and with more illustrations in Porphyry: 'When the poet is about to introduce words spoken by a character, he first gives a prior indication (*προλέγει προσημαίνων*) what sort of speech it is or with what attitude it is spoken. Thus, taking our reference from the poet, we will listen to the speech in the same way as he himself suggested' (*Quaest. Hom.* I 86–7 Sodano), cf. Nünlist 2009: 317. *προδιαβάλλειν*, however, does not occur in the scholia and *διαβάλλειν* normally refers to the words of a character; note however the A-Scholium on *Iliad* 17.460 'Homer compares the Trojans to geese as he is criticizing (*διαβάλλων*) their lack of success.' P. chooses again to illustrate his observation in chiasmic order, and with two verses, one from each Homeric poem, both introducing speeches by Odysseus.

19b *αὐτίκα... μῦθον*: *Odyssey* 6.148, the introduction to Odysseus' first speech to Nausicaa. *κερδαλέον* is here taken in a positive sense, 'helpful'; that other interpretations were current is shown by the scholiastic gloss *πανοῦργον, κέρδος*

αὐτῷ φέρον. The example may have been a standard one, as the scholiast on the verse states the general principle of speech introductions: ‘Homer gives the reader a standard for judging (κωνών) the speech which is coming’, cf. Nünlist 2009: 316.

τὸν δ’ ἀγανοῖς . . . παραστάς: *Iliad* 2.189, describing how Odysseus restrained any of the Greek leaders who were heading for the ships after Agamemnon’s *peira*-speech. P. clearly interpreted ἀγανός as ‘mild, gentle’, cf. the glosses in the D-Scholia, πράοις, προσηνέσιν. It is noteworthy that P. chooses an example which shows Homer’s endorsement of political hierarchy and good social order.

μονοῦ μαρτύρεται καὶ διαγορεύει ‘he virtually gives a solemn warning and instructs us . . .’

ἀπηνῶς ‘harshly, brutally’. This is one of P.’s glosses on Homer’s κακῶς (*Iliad* 1.24–5); the others, ἀγρίως etc., are explicitly marked as glosses by τούτέστιν, cf. Hunter 2009a: 171. This example forms a direct counterpoint to the previous one, as ἀγανῶς, as the scholiasts understood it, and κακῶς are virtual opposites; the bT-Scholium on *Iliad* 8.40 contrasts τυραννικὴ ἀπηνεία with βασιλικὴ προσήνεια. P. here again reflects a standard critical line. The bT-Scholia on the second half of v. 25 gloss κρατερόν of Agamemnon’s speech as ἀπηνῆ, and the Scholia on v. 29 describe Agamemnon as generally ‘very ἀπηνῆς to the enemy’; Achilles uses this word of Agamemnon at 1.340. Agamemnon’s cruel speech to the priest was a much-discussed critical ‘problem’, and Aristarchus had athetized vv. 29–31. As the next examples also show, *Iliad* 1 was perhaps the most discussed of all the Homeric books, as it was also the most read in schools, cf. Morgan 1998a: 308, Cribiore 2001a: 194–5.

ἀλλ’ οὐκ Ἀτρεΐδῃ . . . ἀφίει: *Iliad* 1.24–5.

19c οἰνοβαρές . . . ἑλάφοιο: *Iliad* 1.225, Achilles abusing Agamemnon. The verse was a famous one (P. cites it again at 35b below and 678b, and see the testimonia gathered in West’s edition), and the scholia offer many different ways of exonerating Agamemnon from Achilles’ charges, if these are taken literally. P. is here again following Plato (*Rep.* 3.389e12) who cited this verse and the speech from which it came as things to which the young Guardians must not be exposed, cf. Hunter 2009a: 194. Zenodotus athetized vv. 225–33.

τὴν αὐτοῦ κρίσιν ὑπειπὼν ‘prefacing them with his own judgement’; cf. LSJ s.v. ὑπέειπον 2.

Πηλειδης . . . χόλοιο: *Iliad* 1.223–4. P. clearly understood ἀταρτηροῖς in some such way as do the D-Scholia, ἀτηροῖς (‘full of ἄτη’), χαλεποῖς; other ancient glosses include βλαβερός and ὑβριστικός, cf. *Lfgre* s.v.

αὐστηρῶς ‘harshly, severely’. In this negative sense (contrast, e.g. 180c, 396f) this term is found as a gloss on κακῶς in the bT-Scholia to *Iliad* 1.25 (cf. 19b above), and P. may still here be reflecting scholarly discussion of that scene, which was the classic paradigm of the dangers of anger. For the educational theme of Achilles’ anger cf. 31a–b below.

τῶν πράξεων: P. now shows that Homer ‘commends’ or ‘discredits’ in advance actions as well as speeches. The example he gives is *Iliad* 23.24–5: Achilles’ stretching out of Hector’s body ‘face down beside Patroclus’ funeral bier’ is labelled by Homer as ἀεικές. The example is perhaps not as clear as one would have wished (Eustathius was at a loss to know what ἀεικέα ἔργα were here referred to, *Hom.* 1285.32, though the bT-scholia refer to the importance of the fact that he is stretched out face down), and the other occurrence of v. 24 (= 22.395) might have made the point more obvious: there the verse introduces Achilles’ maltreatment of Hector’s body. P. seems to make his view of ἀεικέα clear enough – this is Homer’s negative judgement on Achilles’ action, but the word and its focalization have been a battleground for both modern and ancient scholars, cf. Richardson on *Iliad* 22.395, De Jong 2004: 138, n. on 31b ἡκισμένον.

ταῖς ἐπιρρήσεσι ‘closing comments’, cf. Philodemus, *Rhet.* 1.31 Sudhaus προρρήσεως καὶ ἐπιρρήσεως.

καθάπερ . . . λεγόμενοις ‘as though giving his own vote on the action or the speeches’; the datives are governed by ἐπι- in the participle. For the politico-legal metaphor cf. the bT-Scholium on *Iliad* 6.162 quoted in the next note.

19d οὐκ ἀρετᾶι . . . ὥκύν ‘Evil deeds do not prosper: the slow catches up with the swift’, *Odyssey* 8.329, spoken by ‘one of the gods to another’ (i.e. this is the sort of thing they all said) as they saw Ares and Aphrodite caught in bed together by Hephaestus’ invisible bonds. This verse and the speech which it introduces (vv. 329–32) are not by any means the end of the episode, but they mark Hephaestus’ triumph, and the proverbial character of v. 329 made it easy to apply to the episode as a ‘moral’, as the Scholium on v. 267 does. A point very similar to P.’s, and in a similar context, is made by a bT-Scholium on *Iliad* 6.162 (‘[Anteia] could not persuade the noble-minded and sensible Bellerophon [to sleep with her]’): ‘noble-minded: the poet himself made this pronouncement (ἐκπεφώνηκεν), as elsewhere too he says in passing judgement (νομοθετῶν) against adulterers “so may anyone else who did such a thing [as Aegisthus] perish” (*Odyssey* 1.47) and “evil deeds do not prosper” (*Odyssey* 8.329)’. It may be that students indeed only read as far as vv. 329–32 in the ‘Song of Ares and Aphrodite’: the male jesting of Hermes and Apollo which follows (vv. 333–42) was omitted in some ancient texts, and teachers may have preferred not to complicate the moral certainty of v. 329 by the rather more ambiguous balance of the rest of the episode; cf. further Hunter 2009a: 189.

ὤς . . . Ἥρη: *Iliad* 8.198. Hector’s speech in vv. 184–97, which has caused much modern critical trouble (cf. Kirk ad loc.), was held in antiquity to have been rashly overconfident (as indeed it proved to have been), cf. T-Scholium on v. 198, Eustathius, *Hom.* 708.6–10 (Hector is ἀλαζονεύμενος and Hera ‘hates his excessive confidence’). There is some pro-Greek bias in the strong reading of the critical tradition here (cf. also next n.), as Homer’s νεμέσθησε probably means no more than ‘was angry (and worried for the Greeks)’; the verb need not imply

‘righteous’ or ‘justified’ anger. The Scholia on Hesiod, *WD* 199–200 distinguish, with a quotation of the same Iliadic verse, divine νέμεσις from divine φθόνος, and this note may well go back to Plutarch’s commentary on that poem (= fr. 31 Sandbach).

ὦς . . . πείθεν: *Iliad* 4.104, Athena persuades ‘the foolish’ Pandaros to shoot at Menelaus, thus breaking the truce, cf. 32b below, 405b. This scene was a strong plank in the ancient argument that the Trojans were morally at fault in the war; the scholia and Eustathius draw the inference that it is foolish to follow divine advice when that advice is for a wrong course of action, and Dio notes that Homer’s depiction of Pandaros is a paradigm of ‘bribe-taking and impiety and folly (ἄφροσύνη) generally’ (55.15–16). Behind the critical tradition to which P. belongs lies the fact that Plato had outlawed any poetry which suggested that Pandaros broke the truce ‘at the instigation of Athena and Zeus’ (*Rep.* 2.379e4). For Proclus ‘Pandaros does not obey Athena, but the greedy and foolish element of his own soul’ (*On the Republic* I 104.30–105.1 Kroll), and elsewhere Proclus uses this same Iliadic verse, exactly as P. does, to illustrate that Homer ‘everywhere brings his own judgement to bear on the action’ (*On the Republic* I 201.9–11 Kroll): τοῖς πραττομένοις τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κρίσιν ἐπιφέρων looks like a variation of P.’s ψῆφον ἰδίαν ἐπιφέρων τοῖς πραττομένοις.

αὐταὶ αἱ τῶν λόγων . . . προσέχοντος ‘These verbal declarations and opinions may be observed by anyone who pays attention.’

19e παρέχουσι: sc. οἱ ποιηταί.

ὁ Εὐριπίδης: P. had almost certainly used Euripides’ *Ixion* in 18d above. After killing his father-in-law, Ixion went mad but was released from his madness by Zeus; he then tried to rape Hera, but Zeus tricked him with a cloud-phantom resembling Hera, and he was punished by being nailed to a flaming wheel for eternity in Hades. Behind the criticism to which Euripides responds in this (presumably Hellenistic) anecdote lies the sense that characters of tragedy should not be unnecessarily wicked. Aristotle noted that οἱ μοχθηροί were unsuitable as the central figures of tragedy, which should not show τὸν σφόδρα πονηρὸν falling from prosperity to adversity (*Poetics* 1452b35–53a2); the latter description might have suited an *Ixion* play. Aristophanes of Byzantium’s *hypothesis* to Euripides’ *Orestes* notes that it ‘is successful when acted, but the characters are terrible: everyone except Pylades is of little worth (φᾶυλοι)’. In the anecdote, as P. uses it, Euripides does not deny his *Ixion*’s moral worthlessness, but claims a didactic purpose for the play because it showed or forecast his punishment; one can imagine other interpretations of the anecdote, which would give less emphasis to a simple moralism. It is not a safe inference from the anecdote that the play, or at least its original fifth-century staging, did indeed show Ixion on his wheel, rather than, for example, having his fate forecast by a *deus ex machina*. A similar anecdote about another Euripidean play is told by Seneca, *Ep.* 115.

προσηλώσαι ‘nail to, fix to’, the aorist infinitive of προσηλόω.

παρὰ δ' Ὀμήρῳ . . . διδασκαλίας 'In Homer this kind of instruction is given tacitly . . .'. Although Homer could of course (and did) show bad men coming to a bad end, epic lacks the striking visual didacticism of drama which, in P.'s account here, makes the meaning clear; nevertheless, we can, if we read with attention, make the connections which P. believes Homer wants us to make between bad actions and bad ends. Homer's relative 'silence' in fact provides a welcome opportunity for deeper (or renewed) consideration (ἀναθεώρησις) of some scandalous episodes, and that consideration will lead us to the conclusion that we do not need to read allegorically, because Homer has made things clear; such apparently difficult stories are indeed a good place to look for 'silent instruction'. P.'s language of σιωπώμενον ('what Homer does not explicitly say') and his insistence on the active role of the reader both reflect important motifs of ancient Homeric criticism, cf. Nünlist 2009: 157–73.

ἔχει δ' 'but it [i.e. this silent kind of instruction] offers (the chance for) . . .'. Neither text nor interpretation is secure. It is possible that there is a lacuna before ἀναθεώρησιν (RH).

τῶν διαβεβλημένων μάλιστα μύθων 'the most-criticized stories'. The adultery of Ares and Aphrodite and the love-making of *Iliad* 14 are paired as particularly outrageous at Plato, *Rep.* 3.390b–c, and already the fourth-century critic Zoilos, the 'scourge of Homer', took moral exception to the light-hearted reception of the discovered lovers on Olympus (*FGrHist* 71 F18 = Schol. *Odyssey* 8.332). Athenaeus 3.122c (reflecting much earlier criticism) pairs these as episodes 'for which everyone condemns Homer', and Proclus juxtaposes elaborate neo-Platonist readings of the two episodes (*On the Republic* I 132–43 Kroll, cf. Lamberton 1986: 227–9). Cf. further St Basil, *Greek lit.* 4.24–28 Wilson, 'Divine adultery and love-affairs and intercourse in the open, involving moreover the highest and leading god of all, Zeus, as the pagans themselves claim, things which one would blush to ascribe to beasts – these we shall leave to stage-performers.'

οὕς . . . Ἥλιον '[stories] which some people force and twist through what were once upon a time called *hupoioiai* but are now called *allēgoriai*; they say that Helios informs upon Ares' adultery with Aphrodite, because . . .'; as often, the relative pronoun is governed by participles, rather than the verb (φασίν) of the relative clause.

πάλαι μὲν ὑπονοίαις ἀλληγορίαις δὲ νῦν: ὑπόνοια is the term used at Plato, *Rep.* 2.378d6–7, where Socrates observes that blasphemous episodes in Homer must not be part of education, whether composed with or without ὑπόνοια, because the young cannot recognise a ὑπόνοια and are therefore affected by 'the literal truth' of what they read; for echoes of this passage cf. 20e below. ὑπόνοια is certainly found in later texts (e.g. Cornutus, *Theol.* 74.3 Lang), though ἀλληγορία comes to predominate. Elsewhere P. himself is very ready to use elaborate allegorical interpretations, cf. *Isis and Osiris*, fr. 157, 200 Sandbach (an allegory of Circe's transformation of Odysseus' men), Bernand 1990:183–274, Russell 1972: 81–3, but here he is focused on the moral and literary education of the young;

Proclus too notes that allegorical interpretation is unsuitable for the young (*On the Republic* I 79–80 Kroll). Criticism of Demodocus' second song in *Odyssey* 8 is attested early (e.g. Xenophanes frs. 11–12 D-K), and allegorical interpretation of it also had a rich history. It was common to see in the story some version of an Empedoclean balance between *φιλία* and *νεῖκος*, cf. 'Heracitus', *Hom. probl.* 69, [Plut.], *Hom.* 101, Buffière 1956: 168–72, Hillgruber 1994/9: 226–8, Pontani 2005: 227. *παραβιάζόμενοι καὶ διαστρέφοντες*: cf. *Lycurgus* 6 (the Spartans tended to pervert public decisions) *τῶν πολλῶν ἀφαίρεσι καὶ προσθήσει τὰς γνώμας διαστρεφόντων καὶ παραβιάζομένων κτλ.*, Porphyry, *On the cave of the nymphs* 36 (= 81.1–2 Nauck), 'one must not regard such [allegorical] interpretations as forced (*βεβιασμένως*) and as inventive attempts to persuade...'. In playful mood elsewhere, P. offers a Platonizing and quasi-allegorical interpretation of a poetic reference to Iris as in fact a reference to the refraction of light, and notes that this interpretation is compelled (*βιάζεται*) by the phenomenon (765e).

ὅτι... λανθάνουσιν 'because the conjunction of the planet Ares with Aphrodite produces adulterous births, but when the sun returns and discovers them they are not concealed'. This astrological interpretation which P. rejects is not attested elsewhere; it is not impossible that P. has at least embellished existing allegorical readings for the sake of parody. A scholiast on Proclus (*On the Republic* II 372 Kroll) explains that the sun reveals the *κοινωνία* of Ares and Aphrodite because this happens in the visible world which the sun rules; Eustathius (*Hom.* 1597.59–61) ascribes an astrological interpretation, though not P.'s, to Demo, a (female) critic of uncertain date who specialized in astronomical and astrological rationalizations, cf. Kroll, *RE Suppl.* III 331–3. *μοιχικάς... γένεσεις* 'adulterous births', i.e. 'children who will be adulterous'. Unsurprisingly, in astrological texts both Ares and Aphrodite, and particularly their conjunction, mark those born under their influence as *μοιχικός*, cf., e.g., Ptolemaios, *Apotelesmatika* 3.14.29, 4.5.19, Vettius Valens 187.20, 188.6, 189.13 Pingree etc. Others understand 'produces births resulting from adultery'; this is possible, and perhaps suits *οὐ λανθάνουσιν* rather better (illegitimate unions and children were conventionally 'shrouded in darkness', *σκότιοι*, cf. LSJ s.v. I), but astrology is concerned with the prediction of the future. Both *ἀποτελεῖν* and *γένεσις* are standard terms in astrological literature.

ἐπαναφερομένου: this verb has a technical sense in astrology: the sun may occupy a cardinal point on the ecliptic (*ἐπίκεντρος*), a position after that (*ἐπαναφερόμενος*) or one before it (*ἀποκεκλικώς*), cf., e.g., Vettius Valens 55.18 Pingree. P. certainly evokes that usage here, though it is uncertain whether he is accurately reporting a genuine interpretation of Homer.

19f *τὸν δὲ τῆς Ἥρας καλλωπισμόν*: P. also discusses Hera's preparations to seduce Zeus in *Iliad* 14 at 693b–d, a passage with links to the Homeric scholia, which take a simple moralizing line on this scene about the dangers that attractive

women pose and the lengths to which they will go to trick men, cf. bT-Scholium to v. 188; the bT-Scholium on *Iliad* 14.176 claims that Plato criticizes τὸν κόσμον τῆς Ἥρας, but the relevant passage of the *Republic* (3.390c1) in fact refers to Zeus's sexual desire, to the open-air love-making and to Zeus's reference to childish incest, rather than explicitly to Hera's beautifying of herself. The more elaborate allegorizing which P. here rejects depends upon a standard identification of Hera with ἄηρ (the words are anagrams) which goes back at least to the pre-Socratics, cf. 878a citing Empedocles fr. 6 D-K, Plato, *Cratylus* 404c, Pease on Cicero, *Nat. D.* 2.66, Buffière 1956: 96–117. The identification of Zeus with fire or the fiery αἰθήρ (cf., e.g., fr. 157, p. 294 Sandbach, [Plut.] *Hom.* 96) is attested in several intellectual traditions, but this, together with the idea of a 'purification' of the air, makes it not improbable that P. has in mind here cosmological allegories of a Stoic flavour, cf. 31e below, Babut 1969: 375–6.

ἐπὶ τὸν Δία 'to attract Zeus'.

τὴν περὶ τὸν κεστὸν γοητείαν: cf. 15c above, 693c. γοητεία evokes the description of the *kestos* at *Iliad* 14.215–17, θελκτήρια πάντα... ἣ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονούντων.

κάθαρσιν: the starting-point for such an interpretation will be *Iliad* 14.170–1, where Hera is said to have 'cleansed (κάθηρεν) all impurities (λύματα) from her lovely body with ambrosia'. The discussion at 693c–d distinguishes between such necessary and praiseworthy 'cleansing' and the unnecessary cosmetic elaboration which follows; the point of the discussion there is a comparison with the purifying of wine.

πλησιάζοντος 'drawing near'; the word is chosen because it may also mean 'have sex with', cf. LSJ s.v. II 3.

λύσεις 'solutions', the standard grammarians' term for the removal of objections to a puzzling or apparently contradictory detail or to an immoral tale, cf. 21d, Aristotle, *Poetics* 1460b6, Pfeiffer 1968: 69–71.

τοὺς προσέχοντας: P. never tires of reminding us that reading is an activity requiring alert engagement.

φαῦλη... πονηρά... μοχθηράς: three synonyms, all denoting 'morally corrupt', give stylistic variety. P.'s principal discussion of the connection of musical and literary styles with morals is *Sympotic questions* 7.5.

λόγοι μοχθηράς ὑποθέσεις λαμβάνοντες 'stories with wicked plots'.

20a ἀνθρώπους... ἀγαπῶντας: the ancient reputation of the Phaeacians as weak hedonists took its cue, as P.'s citation recognizes, from Alcinous' description of his society at *Odyssey* 8.249–50: 'What we hold dear is the feast and lyre-playing and dancing and changes of clothes and warm baths and bed.' The negative interpretation of Phaeacian society can be traced at least to the fourth century BC and is very common later, cf. 27a–b below on Nausicaa, Philodemus, *On the Good King* xix.31 Dorandi (they are τρυφερόβιοι), Hor. *Epist.* 1.2.28–31, Scholia to *Odyssey* 8.100 (they are ἄπιονοι) and 8.267 (they are ἡδυπαθεῖς, 'Heraclitus', *Hom. probl.* 69.7 (they are 'slaves to pleasure'), Kaiser 1964: 217–20, Dickie 1983.

Non-allegorical defences of Homer's presentation of this song noted that such a song suited such hedonists (e.g. Athenaeus 1.14c), i.e. an argument from τὸ πρέπον, or that Homer and Demodocus were trying to teach them something (e.g. Scholia on *Odyssey* 8.267, cf. Heath 2009: 268–71), or – as P. here – that Homer is teaching us something; it is clear that P. here implicates Demodocus himself in Phaeacian τρυφή. Philodemus may have used a similar argument in *On the good king*, cf. xx Dorandi, Asmis 1991: 36–7.

γυναικοκρατίαν 'rule by women', a reference to Arete's remarkable rôle in Phaeacian society (*Odyssey* 7.65–74), cf. *Cleomenes* 33 ἀσέλγειαν καὶ παροινίαν καὶ γυναικοκρατίαν, a reference to Ptolemaic society where – as on Scherie – women exerted an unusually dominant role (for the similarities between Homer's Scherie and the Ptolemaic court cf., e.g., Hunter 1993: 161). The MSS predominantly here and exclusively at *Cleomenes* 33 read γυναικοκρασίαν, but this is a doubtful formation in the sense 'womanishness' (with κρᾶσις presumably being 'temperament'), whereas –κρατίαν is a standard formation; the same error seems to have been made at *Antony* 10.6. γυναικοκρατεῖσθαι occurs in the AbT-Scholia on *Iliad* 9.590 and may have been familiar to the grammatical tradition.

εἵματα . . . εὐνάς: *Odyssey* 8.249. εἵματα τ' ἐξημιοιβά 'clothes in exchange', i.e. 'changes of clothing'; the scholiast interprets this as a reference to successive changes 'on the same day' and draws the inevitably negative moral conclusion. εὐνάς: P. adapts Homer's εὐναί to his own syntax. Alcinoüs did not mean to imply 'sex' by εὐναί, but in P.'s context it is hard not to hear that nuance, cf. *Iliad* 15.32 cited just below, Mimnermus fr. 1.3, LSJ s.v. 4.

τῶι κιθαρῳιδῶι: this description of Demodocus, which picks up *Odyssey* 8.248, reinforces P.'s point, by evoking the loose, sexy music associated with κιθαρῳιδία; at Plato, *Symp.* 179d4–5 Phaedrus suggests that the gods did not give Orpheus' dead wife back to him 'because he seemed to be soft (μαλθακίζεσθαι) in as much as he was a κιθαρῳιδός'. Plato allows the *kithara* into the ideal city (*Rep.* 3.399d7), but not the fancy types with many strings which were most associated with the κιθαρῳιδία of the classical period (*Rep.* 3.399c10–d1). Whether or not Homer does represent Demodocus as a kitharode and the question of how we are to imagine the 'Song of Ares and Aphrodite' actually being performed have much exercised modern scholarship. In the *Odyssey* the normal word for 'lyre' is φόρμιγξ; κίθαρις occurs at 1.153 of Phemios and in parallel descriptions of the suitors and the Phaeacians (1.159, 8.248), a parallelism which may have been very influential in running them together as hedonists, as in Horace, *Epistles* 1.2.

ἀλλ' ἄγε . . . ἄεισον: *Odyssey* 8.492, a verse which still puzzles interpreters and has often been thought to have nothing at all to do with the 'Song of Ares and Aphrodite'; the Scholia on v. 267 make the same point as P. does here and also cite v. 492. It is a pity that P. does not make clear how he understood κόσμον, which the scholia gloss as τὴν κατασκευὴν ἢ τὴν οἰκονομίαν ἢ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. P. passes in teacherly silence over the pleasure which Odysseus took in the 'Song of Ares and Aphrodite' (*Odyssey* 8.367–8), a pleasure for which Eustathius hastens to

find face-saving explanations, including the possibility that Odysseus interpreted the song allegorically, whereas the hedonistic Phaeacians took it at face value (*Hom.* 1601.16).

ὕφηγούμενος ‘indicating, pointing out’; the prefix may here do added work as ‘subtly, unobtrusively’. The object of the verb is τὸ χρῆναι λαμβάνειν ‘the fact that one must take’.

παρὰ τῶν φρονίμων καὶ νοῦν ἔχόντων ‘from the wise and sensible’, i.e. one must take advice from the proper people as to which are proper subjects. Others understand ‘[take subjects] from (the lives of) the wise and sensible’, but this would seem to require the addition of, e.g., τῶν πράξεων or τῶν βίων. The example from the *Odyssey* would fit either interpretation, for Odysseus, who is *the* φρόνιμος for most ancient Homeric criticism, there suggests a song in which he himself is the principal character.

τὴν ἀπὸ φαρμάκων . . . χάριν ‘the pleasurable intercourse (of women) with men which is the result of potions or magic or brought about by deceit’. ὁμιλία covers sexual as well as social intercourse, cf. LSJ s.v., with ὁμιλία καὶ χάρις forming a virtual hendiadys. DR, however, suggests the deletion of καὶ before χάριν, thus making this noun the predicate: ‘the intercourse (of women) with men which . . . is a pleasure which . . .’; he also suggests deleting καὶ before μετὰ δόλου.

ἀψίκορον ‘soon sated’. At *Amatorius* 759f ‘the delight (χάρις) of Aphrodite (i.e. love-making) is weak and soon sated, if not inspired by Eros’, and at 756e ἀνέραστος ὁμιλία is ‘like hunger and thirst – it may be sated, but it never reaches an honourable conclusion’.

20b ὅταν τὰ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἀπομαρανθῇ ‘when the delights of pleasure wither away’. The lesson which P. draws from this Homeric episode is not found in quite this form elsewhere, cf. nn. on 19e above.

ὄφρα ἴδῃς . . . ἀπάτησας ‘so that you may see whether you get any profit from the love-making which you had, when you came from the gods and deceived me’, *Iliad* 15.32-3. The text may not exactly reproduce Homer’s (cf. West’s apparatus and Janko ad loc.), but there is no good reason to doubt that it represents the text of Homer of P. and/or his source.

ἢ γὰρ τῶν φαύλων . . . ἀκροώμενον ‘For if the description and imitation of evil deeds also includes the disgrace and damage that befall the doers, it benefits, not harms the hearer.’ προσάποδῶ ‘adds by way of completion’. ὠφέλησεν οὐκ ἐβλαψε: ‘gnomic’ aorists, expressing a general truth; the asyndeton points the importance of the conclusion.

ἐξ ὑποκειμένων ‘from situations that exist’, i.e. ‘from real life’, cf. LSJ s.v. ὑπόκειμαι Π 8b. Socrates’ constant recourse to ‘down to earth’ examples to explain moral issues is the kind of thing which P. has in mind here.

20c οἱ δὲ ποιηταὶ . . . μυθολογοῦντες ‘and poets do the same (ταῦτά, Hartman) by themselves making up events and telling stories’. Poets have the same end in

view as philosophers, but the material they work with is fiction. P. proceeds to compare poets to men in public life, as he had just compared them to philosophers. The example of Zeus and Hera showed one of the ways in which poets make their own views clear. Another way of preventing their representations of immorality from damaging us is by finding 'moral' representations and statements to set against the immoral.

For the new direction taken by the remainder of this chapter cf. above p. 18.

Μελάνθιος: probably a fifth-century tragic poet (*TrGF* 23), who was also famed (and mocked) as a glutton and who seems to have been the subject of a large anecdotal tradition; at 144b P. tells a *chreia* about Gorgias and a 'Melanthius' who is likely to have been this same figure, cf. also 41d with Hillyard 1981: 108–9. Other possible identifications include a member of the oligarchic 400 at Athens (*Xen. Hell.* 2.3.46), a parasite of the tyrant Alexander of Pherai, who clearly also attracted an anecdotal tradition (cf. 50d), and (less likely) a philosopher and tragic poet of the second century BC (*TrGF* 131). Melanthius' witty observation uses a novel variation on the 'ship of state' image known from archaic poetry onwards; its application to Athens is most familiar from Plato, *Rep.* 6.488a–9a.

διασωζέσθαι: the nautical image which follows shows that the sense is not just 'is preserved' but 'comes safely through'.

οὐ γὰρ ἀποκλίνειν . . . πολιτευομένων 'for they do not all move over to the same side (of the ship), but there is a counterbalance to the harmful in the differences among politicians'. **τοῖχος** is a standard term for the side of a ship (LSJ s.v. 2), but it may have had more pointed force (both 'side' and 'wall of a city'?) in the original context of the Melanthius anecdote. **ἄνθολεκή** is not known to have had a special nautical application, and it prepares the way for the shift to the image of a pair of scales (cf. **ροπήν**) in the next sentence.

αἱ δὲ τῶν ποιητῶν . . . βλάπτων 'Poets' contradictions of themselves offer a compensating weight to our belief and do not allow a strong swing towards the harmful'. **ἀνταναφέρουσαι** is lit. 'restoring (our belief) in counterpoise'. As will become clear from what follows, P. here refers both to contradictory statements within the work of the one poet and contradictions between different poets. The Epicurean attack on poetry and grammar in Sextus Empiricus uses precisely the fact that poets contradict each other as an argument against the usefulness of both (*Against the grammarians* 279–81); Sextus notes that people tend to choose the morally worse of two assertions (280), a fact which makes poetry harmful (**βλαπτική**) and which is of course an argument for the rôle which P. assigns to parent and teacher; Sextus' language and his use of the image of a balance closely recall P., **ἐπιρρεπέστερον ἔχουσιν ἄνθρωποι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ χείρονος ἐκλογήν**. Cf. above p. 14. The matching of opposing quotations for humorous purposes is, in literature, at least as old as Aristophanes and flourishes in writers such as Lucian. In the *Laws* Plato contrasts the contradictory statements of poets with the need for the lawgiver to express only one view about each thing (4.719c–d2).

τῶι τιθέναι σύνεγγυς 'by putting them close together'. The natural inference from P.'s words is that the three examples which follow are all consecutive verses from scenes of stichomythia, and this is confirmed for the third instance by a papyrus. The text is uncertain, but it is difficult to construe τὸ τιθέναι as the subject with quasi-passive force 'the fact that passages are put together by the poets (αὐτοῖς) . . .', and we have adopted Paton's conjecture.

δεῖ τῶι βέλτιονι συνηγορεῖν '[the teacher] must support the better opinion'.

20d πόλλ' . . . θεούς: Euripides fr. 254 K. from the *Archelaos*; the speakers are unknown, cf. further Harder 1985: 252-3. P. quotes the second verse again at 1049f, as having been admired by Chrysippus.

χρυσοῦ . . . εἰδέναι '(A). You may rejoice in the large amount of gold, but not in these things. (B). It is foolish indeed to be wealthy and understand nothing else', Euripides fr. 1069 K, from an unknown play. Stobaeus' quotation (4.31.59) of the second verse has τό for P.'s γε. The reference of τοῖσδε, if this is the correct reading, is uncertain, but presumably something like 'these things which have just been mentioned'.

τί δῆτα . . . θεούς; Euripides, *Hypsipyle* fr. 752k.20-1 K = fr. IV 20-1 Bond; Hypsipyle, a priestess at Nemea, responds to the request of the seer Amphiaraos, who has foreseen his own death in battle, for help in finding spring-water. A papyrus text confirmed Cobet's conjecture θύειν.

λύσεις . . . προδῆλους: P. again distinguishes between 'difficulties' where the poet himself has all but provided the solution and those where readers need to do more work.

πρὸς τὰ βελτίονα . . . κατευθύνωμεν 'we direct the young in their judgement towards the better side'. This seems more pointed than 'direct . . . by our judgement'; the purpose of education is the shaping of the pupils' critical and moral sense. κατευθύνωμεν evokes the image of education as a sea-voyage which has appeared intermittently throughout (cf. esp. 15d).

εὐθύς: as happens with stichomythia. Note again P.'s fondness for chiasmic word order.

ταῦτα . . . ἀνταναιρεῖν 'we must cancel these out by opposing them to things which the poets have said on the opposite side elsewhere'. ἀναιρεῖν (Hartman) would be easier, but the idea of 'matching' in ἀντ- fits the context excellently, even if this use is hard to parallel.

20e μηδὲ χαλεπαίνοντας . . . δεχομένους 'nor getting angry [at the poet], but accepting them as said in character and in jest'. The text is uncertain, and what is adopted here is a combination of DR with Bernardakis' δεχομένους. Paton suggested a lacuna after χαλεπαίνοντας, which may have conveyed something like 'not being angry at things spoken <as though they were meant seriously and believed by the poet> but . . .'. It must be admitted that there is little παιδιὰ on show in the examples which follow. Cf. further von Reutern 1933: 25-6.

εὐθύς 'for example', cf. LSJ s.v. B II.4.

πρὸς τὰς Ὀμηρικὰς . . . χαλεπότητας: we must understand something like 'we will say' before the Homeric verse which follows. It was Homer's depiction of the gods which had always caused critics the greatest difficulty. Plato began his account of what stories were to be allowed in the ideal state with traditional and Homeric stories of the gods, and it is this passage (*Rep.* 2.377e–8e) which P. particularly has in mind here: cf. θεῶν ῥίψεις ὑπ' ἀλλήλων ~ Ἡφαίστου ῥίψεις ὑπὸ πατρός (378d2), διαφορὰς καὶ χαλεπότητας ~ ἔχθρας πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς (378c4–5, cf. also 378b7–c1). It is also in this passage that Plato rejects the use of ὑπόνοιαι (cf. n. on 19e πάλαι μὲν ὑπονοίαις ἀλληγορίαις δὲ νῦν); P. has already rejected such a solution (19e–f), and the present passage tacitly confirms that rejection: the young must be made to see that allegorical interpretation of difficult passages is not necessary, because either the poet has made the correct explanation clear (19f–20a) or things are said elsewhere in the poems which paint a different picture (20e–f). 'Longinus', however, found allegorical interpretation inevitable for such scenes, in a passage which is close to P.'s list here: '[These passages, e.g. the 'battle of the gods'] are completely impious and improper unless they are taken allegorically. For Homer, in giving us the gods being wounded (τραύματα), their disputes, acts of vengeance, tears, bonds and every sort of suffering, seems to me to have done his utmost in the *Iliad* to make the men gods and the gods men' (*De subl.* 9.7).

τῶν θεῶν ῥίψεις ὑπ' ἀλλήλων: at *Iliad* 1.586–94 Hephaestus recalls how Zeus hurled him from heaven when he tried to assist Hera against her husband; Zeus himself recalls this incident at *Iliad* 15.18–24 (note ῥίπτασκον at v. 23), in the same speech which P. has already quoted at 20b, where he does not name Hephaestus but says that he threw out anyone whom he caught trying to help Hera after he had hung her up with anvils on her feet. The *Iliad* knows in fact of two Ἡφαίστου ῥίψεις, for Hera herself once hurled her son from heaven (*Iliad* 18.394–9, cf. A-Scholium on 1.591), but P.'s plural is generalizing, 'hurlings (and things like that) . . .'. These ῥίψεις remained standard elements in any list of poetic impieties, cf. Philodemus, *On piety* 247, 5, 8–23 Schober (= *CErc* 18 (1988) 78), Sext. Emp. *Gramm.* 289–91 (with Blank 1998: 315–17). Hera's hanging-up by Zeus and Hephaestus' ejection from heaven were the subject of a large allegorical tradition, cf. 'Heraclitus', *Hom. probl.* 26 (where it is noted that the episode had brought criticism down on Homer's head), 40, Cornutus, *Theol.* 19, Buffière 1956: 166–7, Lamberton 1986: 204–5, Pontani 2005: 200. P.'s point is that such interpretative extravagances are unnecessary.

τρώσεις ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων: Diomedes wounds Aphrodite at *Iliad* 5.335–40 and (with Athena's help) Ares at 5.855–67; these scenes too had roused the allegorizers, cf. 'Heraclitus', *Hom. probl.* 30–1, bT-Scholium on 5.335–6 (Diomedes overcomes 'desire and anger'). 'Longinus' also may be thinking of Aphrodite's wounding when he refers to the gods' tears (*De subl.* 9.7, quoted above), though Aphrodite is not explicitly described as weeping. The plural τρώσεις is again generalizing.

οἶσθα . . . νοῆσαι: *Iliad* 7.358 (Paris to Antenor after the latter's proposal to return Helen to the Greeks) = 12.232 (Hector to the seer Polydamas). P. invites us to say this to Homer when he apparently tries to persuade us of terrible things about the gods. At 809e–f P. praises this verse (together with *Iliad* 17.171) as worthy of a statesman, because it offers reproof while also implying praise of the person criticized, and P.'s own criticism of Homer here falls into that category.

θεοὶ ῥεῖα ζῶντες: *Iliad* 6.138 = *Odyssey* 4.805, 5.122, cf. [Plut.] *Hom.* 112. Athenaeus 12.512d also cites this phrase, together with the commentary of Heraclides Ponticus (fr. 39 Schütrumpf = 55 Wehrli) that Homer here shows 'that hardship and labour in living is the greatest of evils'.

τῷ ἐνι . . . πάντα: *Odyssey* 6.46, concluding a lustrous description of Olympus (the reference of τῷ ἐνι).

ὥς γάρ . . . εἰσὶν 'For thus did the gods assign to wretched mortals, that they should live in grief; they themselves are free from cares', *Iliad* 24.525–6, from Achilles' speech of consolation to Priam; P. uses it again for a different purpose at 22b below, and cf. Stobaeus 4.34.45 ('That life is short and mean and full of cares'). The second half of v. 526 might suggest an Epicurean view of the divine, and this was picked up by the T-Scholium, which also points out that Homer's gods, being the creations of poetry, are certainly not free from care; here, however, Homer is referring to that which is naturally divine. **ἐπεκλώσαντο:** mid. aorist of ἐπικλώθω.

20f ἐκπλήξιν: cf. n. on 16b ἐκπλήττει.

πολλαῖσι . . . πεφυκότες: Euripides fr. 972 K, also cited at 431a and by Stobaeus (3.3.36).

21a οὐ χεῖρον 'it is as well', 'it is a good idea', cf. n. on 28e οὐ χεῖρόν ἐστι.

ὑπενεγκεῖν 'to add on', cf. 'Longinus', *De subl.* 16.4, LSJ s.v. ὑποφέρω III 2.

εἰ θεοί . . . θεοί: Euripides fr. 286b.7 K from *Bellerophon*; the speaker is not known. This is another Euripidean verse which P. elsewhere (1049e) tells us was admired by Chrysippus. At 1049e and in Stobaeus 4.36.5 the verse has αἰσχρόν rather than φαῦλον or φλαῦρον; it must be uncertain which of the last two P. quoted here.

τοῦ Πινδάρου: P. knew the works of his compatriot Pindar well (he wrote a *Life* of the poet, fr. 9 Sandbach), and very often quotes or alludes to him, cf. Castagna 1991, Russell 1972: 47–8. Here P. urges us to address the poet directly when we hear or read something inappropriate and remind him of what 'he himself' has said elsewhere.

σφόδρα πικρῶς καὶ παροξυντικῶς 'very harshly and provocatively'. πικρός may elsewhere be a term of stylistic criticism, referring to the harshness (as opposed to smoothness or sweetness) of sound (cf. Battisti 1997: 108–9), and it is a quality regularly associated with Pindaric verse, cf. Dion. Hal. *Comp. verb.* 22.12, id. *On imitation* epitome 5, Pindar's verse is characterized by πικρία μεθ' ἡδονῆς. P. has perhaps here transferred a stylistic judgement about Pindar to a

quasi-moral one; he particularly wanted to use this word because of *πικροτάτα* in the quotation which follows.

χρή . . . *ἐχθρόν* ‘one must do anything to diminish one’s enemy’, Pindar, *Isthmian* 4.48 (= 3/4.66 Maehler); the cretic rhythm is part of a dactylo-epitrite system. In Pindar (cf. the Scholium on this verse, II 234 Drachmann), the primary reference is to tactics in the *pankration*, but P.’s point is that, out of context, the verse urges us to pay no attention to considerations of justice or fairness; in P.’s citation, *πάν ἔρδοντ’* evokes *πανούργος*, cf. 18d above. In Pindar the context of this *gnômé* is the myth of Bellerophon, and the previous quotation came from Euripides’ *Bellerophon*. This may be chance, but it may reflect a mode of organization in P. or his source. After the quotation ‘it is not a bad idea to add . . .’ must be understood from what has preceded.

τό πᾶρ δίκαν . . . *τελευτά* ‘a most bitter end awaits sweetness which exceeds justice’, Pindar, *Isthmian* 7.47 (with omission of Pindar’s connecting *δέ*); the metre is aeolic.

τοῦ Σοφοκλέους: sc. *εἰρηκότος*.

τό κέρδος . . . *ἴη*: Sophocles fr. 833 R; nothing further is known of the original context. The scholiast on Pindar, *Isthmian* 7.47 (III 268 Drachmann), cited immediately before, glosses that verse as ‘those who make unjust profits do not feel pleasure to the end’, and that is very like this Sophoclean verse; here too we may see traces of an earlier organization of material.

οὐκ ἐξάγουσι . . . *λόγοι*: Sophocles fr. 834 R; nothing further is known of the original context. *ἐξάγουσι* is ‘bring forth, produce’, cf. LSJ s.v. III.

21b *ἐκεῖνα*: the pronoun suggests ‘those notorious (verses)’, cf. 21c below.

δεινός γάρ . . . *ιδεῖν* ‘Wealth is capable of penetrating sacred places and (?) the profane [reading *βέβηλα* with Vater], and to where a poor man, even if he gained entry, would not be able to obtain what he desires. For wealth makes an ugly body and . . . clever in tongue and beautiful to behold’, Sophocles fr. 88.6–10 R; in his anthology on wealth (cf. P.’s introduction here), Stobaeus 4.31.27 quotes a fuller version of the passage and assigns it to Sophocles’ *Aleadai*, which concerned part of the legends of Telephus. P. joins v. 1 of this passage (not cited here) to a quotation of Euripides at 497b, but what follows here shows that P. knows, and assumes we know, that Sophocles is the poet. The verses present serious textual difficulties; for *δυσώνυμον* Jebb proposed *δύσθρουν στόμα*. Given the Stoic sources of some at least of this essay, it is to be noted that Dio 7.102 says that ‘one major philosopher’ spoke against verses of Sophocles on wealth, and this is usually taken to refer to Cleanthes (*SVFI* 562) and to this fragment of the *Aleadai*, cf. further n. on 33c φίλοις . . . σῶσαι.

ἀντιπαράθῃσι: the verb picks up *τίθησιν* in the final verse of the citation to reinforce the idea of ‘tit for tat’ quotations; *παράτιθῃμι* is often used of serving food, and for quotations as ‘food’ cf. above pp. 76–7. The subject of the verb is presumably an understood *ὁ νέος*, unless it is the second person singular of

the middle future, 'you will oppose . . .'; it may, however, be worth considering ἀντιπαράθεσις (Larsen).

γένοιτο . . . ἀνήρ: Sophocles fr. 835 R; nothing further is known of the original context.

οὐδέν . . . φρονεῖ: Sophocles fr. 836 R; nothing further is known of the original context.

ἀλλὰ τῶν πολλῶν . . . πλοῦτον; 'What pleasure is there in many good things, if evil-counselling thought [or perhaps 'worry'] nourishes the happiness of wealth' = Sophocles fr. 592.1-3 R; the metre is dactylo-epitrite, and the verses have been ascribed to the *Tereus* on the basis of identity of metre and similarity of theme to three further verses which Stobaeus 4.34.39 explicitly ascribes to Sophocles' *Tereus*. ἐκτρέφει is rather awkward, but not impossible – wealth would thus be the result of evil thought – and P. may well have read it; modern editors favour Herwerden's ἐκτρίψει, 'will wipe out', in Sophocles' text.

21c ὁ δὲ Μένανδρος . . . ἐκείνοις 'Menander certainly exalted the pursuit of pleasure and puffed it up a bit with those erotic and passionate verses . . .'. Cf. [Plut.], *On education* 9a 'when praising children one must not exalt and inflate them (ἐπαίρειν καὶ φυσᾶν), for they get puffed up (χαυνοῦνται) and spoiled by too much praise'. ὑποχαυνοῦν does not reappear before Procopius, though Athenaeus has ὑπόχαυνος (14.624c). For ἐκείνοις cf. n. on 21b ἐκείνα. ἀμέλει 'of course'. P. often uses this adverb after ὥσπερ or (as here) within μέν . . . δέ pairings, cf. 82c, 1101c, Blomquist 1969: 103-7. διαπύροις: a favourite word of P., often used of emotions; for 'fiery love' cf. 406a, *Aratus* 15.5.

ἄπανθ' . . . ἡδονῆς: Menander fr. 599 K-A. Without P.'s introduction we might not have described the verses as 'erotic and passionate'; P. perhaps implies that the (? young) speaker was a lover justifying his passion.

πάλιν . . . ἐξεκόψεν 'But he has turned us round and drawn us towards the good and cut away the boldness of our licentiousness . . .'. Here, and at *Demosthenes* 23.2, P. probably remembers Plato, *Charmides* 155c6 καὶ μου ἡ πρόσθεν θρασύτης ἐξεκέκοπτο; cf. further 46b (with Hillyard 1981: 221). The metaphor in ἐκκόπτειν may be from surgery (cf. 98b) or from pruning or cutting trees; it is common in philosophical texts of 'the extirpation of vices and passions' (Renehan 1972: 233), and this is how P. uses it at 26d below.

ὄνειδος . . . ἥϊ: Menander fr. 600 K-A, also cited by Stobaeus to illustrate ἀκολασία (3.6.9); P. and Stobaeus may here share an anthological source.

δυσὲν . . . τὴν πίστιν 'Such comparison and consideration of opposites will produce one of two things: either it will lead [the young man's] belief towards the better path or at least cause it to abandon the worse.' παράθεσις καὶ κατανόησις virtually form a hendiadys, 'comparative observation', cf. above p. 22 on this verbal habit. ἡ καὶ seems here to introduce the 'second best' of two alternatives, a nuance not illustrated in the classical examples at Denniston 306-7.

21d αὐτοί: i.e. the poets themselves.

λύσεις: cf. n. on 19f λύσεις.

οὐ χεῖρον . . . βέλτιον 'it is not a bad idea, by setting against them statements of other reputable authorities as in a balance, to make it incline to the better side'; for the image of the balance in this context cf. 20c above. Dübner's conjecture (ρέπειν ποιεῖν) seems an improvement over the simple ρέπειν; for the idea cf. 76e (nature) ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ζυγοῦ ρέπειν ἐθέλει, 372e (nature) ρέπουσα δ' αἰὲ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον; the object is still the young man's πίστις. οὐ χεῖρον: cf. n. on 28e οὐ χεῖρόν ἐστι.

τοῦ Ἀλέξιδος: a major figure of Attic comedy whose career spanned both the Middle and New periods, cf. Arnott 1996.

τάς ἡδονάς . . . καλεῖν: Alexis fr. 273 K-A; for a detailed commentary see Arnott 1996: 762-4. P. cites the final two verses also at 445f. The comic paradox of the pursuit of pleasure as a mark of σωφροσύνη made this citation particularly dangerous for P's educational programme. At 445f the close of the final verse is ἀπανθ' ἐγὼ καλῶ, and Arnott 1996: 764 notes that the text given here may have been 'depersonalised' to make it more suitable for a gnomic anthology.

τὴν δύναμιν . . . βίωι 'which possess the capacity to make a genuine contribution to life'. τὸ πῖνεν τὸ φαγεῖν: Alexis' text may have had the verbs in the reverse order, though ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν which immediately follows in 21e does not settle the order in P's text. With either order, the first metron of the verse is, by a licence allowed only in comedy, formed by two anapaests. προσθήκας 'extras'.

21e Σωκράτης: P. cites a *bon mot* attributed to Socrates which was presumably known to every schoolboy, cf. Diog. Laert. 2.34, Aul. Gell. *NA* 19.2.7, Quintilian 9.3.85 etc. The rhetorical term for such pointed switching of terms was ἀντιμεταβολή, cf. Lausberg 1990: §801. At Athenaeus 4.158f this anecdote about Socrates is, as here, put next to one about Diogenes.

ποτὶ .. πονηρία: Anon. Dor. fr. 5 K-A; the verse has often been attributed to the Sicilian poet Epicharmus (fr. 32 D-K), but one citation describes it as 'Laconian', cf. Kassel 1991: 375-6. The two other citations of this verse, including one by P. himself (534a), read ποτὶ πονηρόν, thus giving a catalectic trochaic tetrameter; with ποτὶ τὸν πονηρόν of all MSS here we have a less expected iambic tetrameter, but it is not impossible that P. knew the verse also in this latter form.

κελεύοντα: sc. ἡμᾶς.

τὸ τοῦ Διογέους παραβαλεῖν ἔστιν 'one may offer in response the story of Diogenes'. P. uses this anecdote about Diogenes the Cynic again at 88a, cf. Giannantoni 1990: V B.421.

τῶι Διογέει: for this second Diogenes anecdote cf. Diog. Laert. 6.39, and Julian 7.25 (238a), where the wicked are tax-collectors.

ἐμβέβληκεν εἰς ἀθυμίαν: ἐμπέπληκεν ἀθυμίας, 'filled with despair', of most MSS may be correct.

ὡς τρισόλβιοι . . . κακά: Sophocles fr. 837 R, very likely echoing *Homeric hymn to Demeter* 480-2, cf. Richardson 1974: 311. Initiation into the Eleusinian mysteries

offered (inter alia) the promise of a blessed afterlife, as for example is led by the chorus of the initiated in the parodos of Aristophanes' *Frogs*. *τέλη* 'rites'. *πάντ' ἔχειν κακά*: sc. ἔστι. The text cannot be considered entirely secure.

21f–22a P. concludes the section on 'ripostes' with two rather jokey ones, thus showing that we are not to attach undue importance to worthless sentiments in literature or performance.

21f *τι τοιοῦτον* 'something of this kind'; in other words, Diogenes' retort is not to be taken to be a response to these Sophoclean verses in particular, and in the two other citations of this anecdote Diogenes is responding to advice that he himself should be initiated.

Παταικίων: mentioned with disdain at Aeschines 3.189; whatever the reality of this man's existence, the name was used for a proverbial thief and rascal and probably became familiar from mockery in comedy, cf. Dio Chrys. 52.9, *Suda* π 776, Wankel on Dem. 18.24.

Επαμεινώνδας: Theban general and politician of the first half of the fourth century, who became for the later tradition one of the great figures of classical Greece. P. wrote a (now lost) *Life* of his fellow Boeotian, whom he paired with Scipio, and very frequently refers to him in terms of the highest praise as a paradigm of justice and fairness; for Epaminondas' reputation cf. *RE* VA 2703. In the versions of this anecdote in Diogenes Laertius and Julian (n. on 21e τῷ Διογένει), the just are exemplified by Agesilaos and Epaminondas (paired also by P. at 52f).

22a **Τιμοθέω**: Timotheus of Miletus was one of the great innovators in citharody of the late fifth–early fourth century and for later times was a classic figure in the history of Greek music, cf. 32d below, Hordern 2002, Prauscello 2009. A very early fourth-century papyrus has given us extensive parts of his *Persai*, a lyric (and verbally extraordinary) account of the battle of Salamis (*PMG* 791). The *Artemis* may have been a poem in honour of the Ephesian cult of the goddess, cf. Hordern 2002: 101–2; P. also cites this verse at 170a, where he specifies (what we would have assumed anyway) that the theatre of the anecdote was at Athens.

μαινάδα θυιάδα φοιβάδα λυσσάδα 'raving, possessed, inspired, crazed', Timotheus, *PMG* 778(b), cf. Hordern 2002: 102–4 for a full commentary. At 170a the MSS present the four words in a different order, but there is no good reason to change what is transmitted here. The four words in the accusative singular form four dactyls, a verse-length found also at v. 139 of Timotheus' *Persai*. The implication of P's anecdotes here and at 170a is that the verse originally referred to Artemis herself, but this cannot be regarded as certain. Here the point presumably is that one should not allow unfavourable presentations of the divine to pass unchallenged, but it must be admitted that this anecdote comes rather awkwardly in P's argument.

Κινησίας: a contemporary and (presumably) professional rival of Timotheus, whose dithyrambic style and weak physique were mocked in comedy, cf. Dover on Ar. *Frogs* 152.

τοῦ Βίωνος: Bion of Borysthenes (late fourth – first half of the third century BC) was a philosopher of Cynic flavour whose moralizing essays and public lectures set an important fashion within Hellenistic ‘popular philosophy’, cf. Kindstrand 1976; he attracted a large anecdotal tradition, and the Cynic colouring of his thought made him a very good match for Diogenes.

χαρίεν: grammatical theory placed the accent on the first syllable of χαρίεν when it was adverbial (LSJ s.v. χαρίεις IV, K-B I 528), and *Suda* χ 103 extends this to the neuter adjective; there can be no certainty, however, that P. observed this convention.

πᾶς γὰρ ἀνὴρ . . . δέδεταί: Theognis 177–8, which – as West’s collection of testimonia shows – were frequently cited verses; Lucian, *Apology* 10 introduces an allusion to Theognis 175–6 with ‘Who does not know Theognis’ verses . . . ?’. For Theognis in P. cf. n. on 16c τὰ δ’ ἔμπεδοκλέους . . . Θεόγνιδος.

πῶς οὖν . . . ἡμῶν ‘How is it then that you, a poor man, talk so much rubbish and weary us with your idle chatter?’, Bion fr. 52 Kindstrand. Anecdotes have very little regard for chronology, but it is unlikely that we are to imagine a confrontation between Theognis and Bion. Bion may have adduced the Theognidean verses as an example of the misleading things which poets say about lack of wealth and then, in the lively style very typical of him, apostrophized the poet directly, cf. Kindstrand 1976: 260–1; for a preacher such as Bion, poverty was no bar to freedom of speech.

ἡμῶν is governed by the prefix κατα- in the verb.

CHAPTER 5

Close attention to the meaning and reference of words in their context can help to explain apparently objectionable sentiments.

22a δεῖ δὲ μὴ δέ ‘And one must also not . . .’

τὰς ἐκ τῶν παρακειμένων ἢ συμφοραζομένων . . . ἀφορμάς ‘the starting-points offered by the close or immediate context’; for rhetorical and philosophical ἀφορμαί cf. above p. 13, Wilamowitz on Eur. *HF* 236, Obbink 1995b: 191. There is a striking parallel to P.’s language at Philodemus, *On the good king* xliii.15–20 Dorandi (the conclusion of the essay), ‘If, Piso, I have omitted (παραλελοίπαμεν) any of the starting-points which one can take from Homer for the correction (ἐπανόρθωσιν) of princes . . .’.

ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ . . . δύνανται: as often, P. introduces a new subject with a simile, cf. above p. 23. τῆς καθαρίδος ‘the blister-beetle’, a term covering a number of species which produced the blistering agent cantharidin, cf. Davies-Kathirithamby 1986: 92–3. This was believed to be fatal if taken internally in a drink, but external applications had medicinal purposes (Pliny, *HN* 29.930, Dioscorides 2.61); Pliny reports that there was no agreement as to which part of the insect contained the poison. P. refers to the belief that parts of the beetle itself

could provide the antidote to its poison again at 554a, and Disocorides loc. cit. agrees that it is the wings and the feet which are beneficial in this regard. Like the octopus (15b above), the blister-beetle thus resembles poetry in containing both good and bad. P.'s image here should be seen as a further variation on the medicinal 'honey on the cup': here poetry needs no additional 'sweetener' to work its effects.

22b κἄν ὄνομα κἄν ῥῆμα 'if a word or expression...'. In descriptions of language ὄνομα is the standard term for a noun and ῥῆμα for a verb, or sometimes an adjective (LSJ s.v. II), and the two examples which follow might encourage us to understand that sense here, cf., e.g., Plato, *Symp.* 198b5; nevertheless the more general use seems more appropriate to P.'s argument here, cf. 80d, 166b, 855b.

τὴν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἀπαγωγὴν 'the pull of the passage towards the worse (interpretation)'; ἀπαγωγή is hard to parallel in this usage, but the sense seems clear:

ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ προσδιασαφεῖν '[it is necessary – δεῖ at the head of the chapter] to grasp it and use it in an expanded interpretation'. The προσ- of the second verb implies that this is something to be added to, and hence alter; our original interpretation.

τοῦτο . . . παρειῶν 'this no doubt is the task of men struck with grief, to cut their hair and let tears run over their cheeks', *Odyssey* 4.197–8 (with minor textual differences), spoken by Nestor's son Peisistratus to Menelaus. γέρας here is taken to mean 'task' or 'privilege', i.e. what grieving mortals properly should do; taken as a general statement, however – a reading helped by πον in place of Homer's καί – it could be understood to imply that such a mournful lot is the ordinary human condition, just as Latin poets regularly use *miseri mortales* of all humanity (e.g. Lucretius 5.944, Virgil, *Georg.* 3.66, discussed by Seneca, *Ep.* 108.24–9). Any such (perhaps unlikely) interpretation is forestalled by understanding διζυρός as οἰκτρός 'pitiable', and stressing that such men are pitiable on account of wickedness. The standard scholiastic glosses for διζυρός are ἐπίπρονος, ἄθλιος, ταλαίπωρος, cf. the D-Scholia on *Iliad* 1.417, 3.112, 17.446.

ὥς γάρ . . . ἀχνυμένοις = *Iliad* 24.525–6 (Achilles to Priam), cf. 20e above. The couplet was commonly adduced to illustrate the wretchedness of human life, cf. [Plato], *Axiochus* 367d, Stobaeus 4.34.45. One way out of such a grim sentiment was to see the verses as consolatory (cf. Stobaeus 4.56.14, Eustathius, *Hom.* 1362.35), and P. here shows another: one can understand δειλοῖσι 'wretched' not of all humanity, but of a particular class, the δειλοῖσι, i.e. the 'wretched' in a very negative sense, those 'of no account', here again explained as the result of wickedness. Such an interpretation would be assisted by the classical sense of δειλός as 'cowardly, unmanly', rather than 'wretched, unhappy', and the D-Scholia on *Iliad* 5.574 explain that δειλός refers to the κακὸς καὶ ἀνανδρος. δειλῖος is in fact a standard gloss of δειλός, cf. the D-Scholia to *Iliad* 5.574, 22.76. The interpretative practice to which P. refers will work only when the verses are

considered as a *gnômé* out of their original Homeric context, for P.'s reading is hardly appropriate to the scene of Achilles and Priam, and this particularly clear case says much of the educational situation envisaged by P.

τοῖς ἄφροσι καὶ ἀνοήτοις: on P.'s fondness for doubling up synonyms for emphasis and stylistic grace, cf. above p. 22.

CHAPTER 6

It is also important to study the verbal practices of the poets, more important in fact than the study of glosses and rare words. Close attention should be given to words which may have more than one meaning and to various forms of metonymy; in particular, we must not be misled into error by how the names of gods are used. Of great importance also is attention to how poets use moral terms such as 'virtue' and 'happiness' for states which are really quite different.

22c ἄλλος τοῖνυν . . . γλώττας 'There is another method for shifting the passages in poetry to which suspicion attaches from a worse to a better meaning, namely the method which studies the normal usage of words, and it is better for the young man to be thoroughly trained in this method than in the so-called glosses.' τοῖνυν introduces 'a fresh item in a series' (Denniston 575). συνηθείας 'customary usage or practice'; the term is regularly used to denote 'ordinary', as opposed to rare or special, language, cf. LSJ s.v. II 2. Here P. urges the study of the regular verbal practices of poets, rather than of the rare and exotic exceptions. τὰς λεγομένας γλώττας: γλώττα/γλώσσα in the sense of a rare or obscure word is found in connection with the study of Homer as early as the fifth century (cf. Democritus T 33 D-K, Ar. fr.233 K-A, Pfeiffer 1968: 42–3). Aristotle established 'glosses' as one of the elements of language and defined them, in opposition to κύρια ὀνόματα, as words that 'others' use, so that words from other dialects will be κύρια for the speakers of those dialects, but 'glosses' for us (*Poetics* 1457b1–5, cf. *Rhet.* 3.1410a28, 1410b12 etc.); as P.'s examples will show, this connection between Homeric 'glosses' and dialect forms remained central throughout the post-Aristotelian tradition. Works on Homeric and other γλώσσαι are known for (among others) Clearchus, Aristophanes of Byzantium, Neoptolemus of Parium and Apollodorus, and the Homeric scholia often refer to 'the glossographers', cf. Latte 1925, Dyck 1987, Schironi 2009; for the scholiastic interest in dialect glosses cf. Erbse's edition of the *Iliad* scholia, Index V s.v. dialecti. The Ἀτακτοὶ γλώσσαί of Philitas of Cos was probably an important model for later works. Studying 'glosses' was a standard part of the education offered by a γραμματικός, cf. Dionysius Thrax, *Ars* 1, Sext. Emp. *Gramm.* 77–8; Quintilian sees no harm in introducing the young to glosses at an early stage (1.1.35, 1.8.15). The D-scholia to Homer probably give a fairly accurate flavour of some of this teaching.

φιλόλογον 'scholarly'; here there is a tinge of irony in the word, but elsewhere it may be straightforwardly positive, cf. Hillyard 1981: 154–5, Pfeiffer 1968: 156–9. Seneca too is somewhat deprecating about this activity in comparison to the

pursuit of philosophy: 'So that I myself . . . should not slip into being a *philologus* or a *grammaticus*, I advise . . . not to be on the lookout for archaic or made-up words . . . ' (*Ep.* 108.35); P's attitude here is similar, though at a somewhat lower level on the educational scale. Cf. further n. on 28b πικρῶς.

ῥίγεδανός is used by Achilles to describe Helen at *Iliad* 19.325; it is standardly glossed by words such as στύγητή, χαλεπή, φρικτή and φρικώδης (cf. the Scholia ad loc. and to *Iliad* 3.242, Hesychius ρ 299–300), and Apollonius seems to reflect this interpretation in his only use of the adjective in the *Argonautica* (4.1343, cf. πεφρίκασι at 4.1341). The possible link between the first part of the word and the coldness of ῥίγειν/ῥιγοῦν was also familiar (cf., e.g., Oppian, *Hal.* 1.457) and used by P. himself at 735f. κακοθάνατος normally means 'one who dies miserably' (the word is common in the astrological predictions of Vettius Valens), and this barely fits the context in the *Iliad*; moreover, the fact that the explanation P. offers is entirely removed from the ordinary explanations of the grammatical tradition perhaps suggests that he has a particular target in view, and that he wants to stress the arcaneness of this useless, if pleasant (οὐκ ἀηδές), piece of knowledge. Elsewhere, however, P. shows an interest in Macedonian dialect. At 292e he notes, as do other grammatical texts, that Macedonian, which there – as here – he treats as a dialect of Greek, uses β for φ (e.g. Βερενίκη); Et. Mag. 317.24–5 records a similar use in Macedonian of δ in place of θ, and δάνος in place of θάνατος, paralleled in a couple of other Macedonian glosses (ἄδραία for αἰθρία, ἄδῃ for αἰθήρ, Hesychius α 1180, 1182), is presumably an instance of this. The matter is disputed, but some linguists accept that IE *dh and *bh lost the aspirate in Macedonian (δ and β), whereas in other Greek dialects they moved to become voiceless aspirates (θ and φ), cf. Panayotou 1992: 190–2, 2007: 438–9. There is no other evidence for δάνος as a Macedonian word for 'death', but Hesychius (δ 236) presents δανῶν as a Macedonian gloss for κακοποιοῶν and/or κτείνων, cf. Hoffmann 1906: 75–6. It may be relevant that one (presumably early Hellenistic) author of a book of γλῶσσαι was Amerias of Macedon, cf. Hoffmann 1906: 2–17.

καμμονίην: this noun, which is formed from (the unattested) καταμονή 'remaining, steadfastness' with 'apocope' of the second syllable of the disyllabic prefix, a common feature of (principally) Aeolic and Doric dialects (cf. K-B I 176–80), occurs at *Iliad* 22.257 and 23.661; in both places the standard ancient explanation 'victory arising from persistence/staying-power' (καταμονή) is apt. P's explanation here is therefore in line with standard grammatical lore, though he replaces καταμονή, which he never uses, with ἐπιμονή which is found in three other places in his works. That such apocopated forms were distinctly Aeolic is a standard doctrine of ancient grammarians, cf. [Plut.] *Homer* 10, Hillgruber 1994/9: I 106–7.

πόπους: the idea that the interjection ὦ πόποι meant 'o gods!' was one known already to Hellenistic poets (cf. Lycophron, *Alex.* 943, Euphorion fr. 136 Powell), and is common in the grammatical tradition, cf. Hesychius π 3006, Pontani on Schol. *Odyssey* 1.32, which also traces the usage to the language of the Dryopes;

the *Etymologicum Magnum* (823.24-32 Gaisford), however, explains that πόποι is a Scythian term for images of the gods. To what extent *Odyssey* 1.32, where Zeus's opening words addressed to the gods, and the very first words of character-speech in the poem, are ὦ πόποι influenced these interpretations is uncertain. The Dryopes were believed to have been a very ancient, Pelasgian people from Thessaly who moved into different parts of the Greek world, and thus this piece of glossography connects an old term with a people lost in the mists of time; the Homeric scholia identify two further 'Dryopian' glosses, βηλός (*Iliad* 1.591) and βλωθρός (*Iliad* 13.390).

τοὺς δαίμονας: here 'gods', not mediating *daimones*, as standardly in P. (above p. 88).

τουτί, in counterpoint to ἐκείνο, looks forward to τὸ γινώσκειν κτλ.

μέλλοιμεν: P's usage in conditional sentences is variable, and there is no need to change to μέλλομεν.

22d τοῖς τῶν κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν 'the [words] for bad and good things'; as will become clear, the neuter covers the full range of emotions and moral feelings and qualities.

καὶ τί τὴν Τύχην . . . πολλά 'and what they have in mind when they use the words Tyche and Moira, and whether these belong to the words which poets use with single or multiple meanings, as many other words are used'. The distinction between words used ἀπλῶς and those used πολλαχῶς or πλεοναχῶς was standard in linguistic theory (cf., e.g., Arist. *Topica* 5.129b30-130a13, 8.158b9-11), and had an obvious importance for the discussion of poetry, as one can see as early as the discussion of Simonides, *PMG* 542 in Plato's *Protagoras*. A modern linguist would, however, say that the examples which P. proceeds to adduce fall into various different categories; P's first two examples, οἶκος and βίος, are linked by the fact that in both cases one of the two senses is 'property, livelihood'.

οἶκον ἐς ὑπόροφον occurs three times in the *Odyssey* (5.42, 7.77, 10.474).

ἐσθιέται μοι οἶκος: *Odyssey* 4.318. P's gloss οὐσία for οἶκος is also given by the A-Scholium on *Iliad* 15.498. In an early instance of ὀρθοπέπεια, Xenophon had distinguished between οἶκος and οἰκία (*Oec.* 1.5-6).

ἀμενήνωσεν . . . μεγῆρας 'Dark-haired Poseidon took away the force of his [Adamas'] spear, begrudging him [Antilochos'] life', *Iliad* 13.562-3. The interpretation of βιότοιο μεγῆρας has in fact been disputed since antiquity (cf. the bT-Scholia on v. 563), but P's gloss accords with that in the D-Scholium, τοῦ βίου, ὃ ἐστὶν τῆς ζωῆς.

22e βίον . . . ἔδουσι: *Odyssey* 13.419, where all MSS read οἱ ἄλλοι; as Odysseus is speaking, P's μοι is comprehensible and could easily have arisen when the half-verse was quoted out of context.

ἀλύειν means 'to show the signs and behaviour of extraordinary emotion (whether positive or negative)' and is not uncommon in P. himself (*Romulus* 5, *Timoleon* 3 etc.). Modern linguists would thus say that the word has only one 'meaning', as the bT-Scholium on the *Iliad* verse which P. cites also suggests:

‘[ἀλύειν] comes from ἄλη (‘wandering’), as the soul of those in pain wanders, as do those who are excessively happy’. It was, however, standard ancient grammatical lore that ἀλύειν had two ‘senses’, and some sought to distinguish ἀλύειν in the negative sense from ἄλυσιν in the positive, though Didymus wanted both senses to have the aspirate (p. 103, 185 Schmidt). The most common ancient gloss for the verb is ὀδημονεῖν, cf. *Lfgre* s.v., Schol. Eur. *Or.* 277.

δάκνεσθαι: P. is fond of the emotional use of this verb, cf. 62d, 77b etc.

κέχρηται: sc. Homer; there is no need to accept the plural of some late MSS to conform with καλοῦσιν and σημαίνουσιν, even though Homer only uses the verb four times, twice of painful emotion (*Iliad* 5.352, 24.12) and twice – in a repeated verse – of elation (*Odyssey* 18.333 = 393, cited below). It may be important that Plato (*Rep.* 3.388b1) outlawed the representation of Achilles in *Iliad* 24.12.

ὦς . . . αἰνῶς: *Iliad* 5.352, a much quoted description of Aphrodite after her wounding by Diomedes.

γαυριᾶν καὶ χαίρειν: the same glosses are found in the Scholia on *Odyssey* 18.333, which also allude (ἀλύεις νῦν ἀντὶ τοῦ χαίρεις, γαυριᾶς) to the fact that the word is also used of painful emotion.

ῆ . . . ἀλήτην; *Odyssey* 18.333 = 393, spoken by Melanthis and then (if 393 should stand) Eurymachos to Odysseus. This verse was the standard example for the ‘happy’ sense of ἀλύειν, cf. Schol. Soph. *El.* 135. The sound play ἀλύεις . . . ἀλήτην may have been influential on the ancient etymology of the verb from ἄλη or ἄλᾶσθαι, cf. n. on ἄλυσιν above.

θοάζειν: there appear to be in fact two verbs of this form, one – which is unique to Euripides – means ‘to move quickly’ (cf. θοός, θέω), and one means ‘to sit’ (cf. θαάσσω, θαός); we therefore would place this instance of homonyms in a different category from the previous examples, but for P. they all represent instructive verbal difficulties for the student.

κῆτος θοάζον ἐξ Ἀτλαντικῆς ἁλός ‘a monster rushing from the Atlantic sea’, Euripides fr. 145.2 K, from the *Andromeda*; this verse seems to have been a standard illustration of the Euripidean θοάζειν, cf. Schol. Eur. *Or.* 335.

After θοάζειν the words καὶ θαάσσειν are transmitted; they appear to be intrusive and were excised by Reiske; θαάσσειν is a Homeric word which P. would not have used as a gloss, and the single καθέζεσθαι balances κινεῖσθαι, as the two ‘meanings’ of ἀλύειν were both illustrated by pairs of verbs.

τίνας . . . ἐξεσπεμμένοι; Sophocles, *OT* 2–3. That θοάζετε there means ‘you sit’, with ἔδρας as an ‘internal accusative’, was the standard ancient view (cf. also *Et. Magn.* 460.10, Bollack ad loc.), but it has been doubted in modern times, as has the very existence of θοάζειν ‘to sit’, cf. further Dawe on Sophocles loc. cit.

22f χαρίεν . . . λαμβανόντων ‘It is an elegant procedure also to accommodate the use of words to the subject in hand, because, as the grammarians teach us, words take on a different force in different contexts’. For χαρίεν cf. n. on 22a χαρίεν. συνοικεῖον ‘to accommodate’, occurs in a number of grammatical

and scholastic contexts. The bT-Scholium on *Iliad* 4.222 notes that the poet ‘accommodated the verbal form [of that verse] to the speed of the arming’, a use which is not too far from that of P. here. So too, συνοικείωσις (Lat. *conciliatio*) is a rhetorical figure which unites or ‘reconciles’ two words or ideas which might seem contradictory, by applying them to the same person or thing, cf. Quintilian 9.3.64 (with Russell’s note), Lausberg 1990: §783; this does not quite fit the Hesiodic example which is to follow, though a mode of interpretation in which ‘to praise’ is taken as ‘to refuse’ is not too far from this. The noun is found in a rhetorical context as early as *Rhetoric to Alexander* 1425b38: μὴ προσόντων συνοικείωσις is the ‘accommodation’ or ‘attribution’ in encomiastic rhetoric of laudable acts or qualities to someone who has not in fact displayed them. We also find the verb in the context of ‘accommodating’ early poetic views to later philosophical ideas, cf. n. on 36d συνοικειοῦν.

νῆϊ . . . θέσθαι ‘praise a small ship, but put your cargo in a large one’, Hesiod, *WD* 643. Clear similarities between P.’s discussion which follows and the Scholia on this verse show that P. discussed this verse also in his commentary on the *Works and Days* (fr. 83 Sandbach).

τῷ μὲν γὰρ “αἰνεῖν” . . . κέχρηται ‘For in this passage (νῦν) he here uses αἰνεῖν (‘to praise’) in the sense of παραιτεῖσθαι (‘to decline’), a simple statement which accords with the report of the Hesiodic scholiast that ‘some people took αἰνεῖν in the sense of παραιτεῖσθαι’, and cf. Hesychius α 2008. The transmitted text, without Paton’s deletion (of σημαίνεται τὸ ἐπαινεῖν, αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ ἐπαινεῖν, transmitted following αἰνεῖν), can only mean ‘By αἰνεῖν is meant ἐπαινεῖν, and in this passage he uses ἐπαινεῖν in the sense of παραιτεῖσθαι’; in other words, we must first understand that Hesiod has used the simple verb for the compound, and it is the use of the compound in the sense of ‘to refuse politely’ with which we are familiar and to which P. ‘accommodates’ Hesiod’s usage. The argument is not a silly one, but it is very doubtful that P. would describe Hesiod as ‘using ἐπαινεῖν’ when it is αἰνεῖν which stands in the text; P. clearly has the common ‘refusal’ use of ἐπαινεῖν in mind (cf. further below), but this middle step in the argument, if spelled out, merely confuses the issue and is not required for the example of ἐπαινήν Περσεφόνειαν which follows. The alternative transmitted nominatives (see the apparatus) are impossible as they would require taking κέχρηται as passive.

ἐν τῇι συνηθεῖαι ‘in ordinary usage’, cf. 22c. Just as ἐπαινεῖν was regularly used for polite refusal (LSJ s.v. III), so one could say καλῶς ἔχει ‘it’s fine, i.e. I don’t want whatever you are offering me’ (LSJ s.v. καλός C II 6, Gow on Theocritus 15.3) or, rather more harshly, ἔω χαίρειν, λέγω χαίρειν, κελεύω χαίρειν (Ar. *Ach.* 200) etc., ‘I say “farewell” to . . .’, cf. 23c below, LSJ s.v. χαίρω III 2c.

23a ἐπαινήν Περσεφόνειαν: ἐπαινός occurs as an epithet of Persephone six times in Homer (only *Iliad* 9.569 in the accusative). The T-Scholium on *Iliad* 9.457 explains the word as an ‘antiphrasis’, i.e. the use of a word apparently opposite

in sense to the sense intended (cf. Lausberg 1990: §587, 904); so in this case, as the D-Scholium on that verse expresses it, '[Persephone is called ἐπαινὴ] because she is someone whom one would not praise (ἐπαινέσειεν)'. The T-Scholium precisely adduces αἰνεῖν in Hesiod, *WD* 643 as a parallel, thus showing again how close P. stands to standard school exegesis. Another explanation of the epithet is 'terrible, frightful', through a supposed connection with αἰνός; see further the following note.

παραιτητήν: the most common sense of this epithet is 'who can be/should be placated', but this does not seem to fit P.'s argument very well. The D-Scholium on *Iliad* 9.457 offers as one explanation of ἐπαινὴ 'whom one would decline (παραιτήσαιτο) to praise', and it seems probable that by παραιτητός P. here means 'to be declined/refused', as very few willingly accept death's invitation; with such an interpretation, the case is indeed closely parallel to the Hesiodic one which precedes.

διαίρεσιν καὶ διάκρισιν 'distinction and discrimination', a typically Plutarchan pairing of synonyms.

ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἀρχώμεθα: an allusion to the familiar tag of 'beginning from Zeus', cf. Hunter on Theocritus 17.1. P. now proceeds to the 'metonymic' use of divine names, which is a familiar feature of ancient poetry, has an obvious relationship to allegorical interpretation and was much discussed by ancient critics, cf. 757b-c (very critical of Stoic practices), Quintilian 8.6.23-4, Lausberg 1990: §568, Pease on Cicero, *Nat. D.* 2.60, Maltby on Tibullus 1.2.3, Hunter 2006: 67-79. 'Metonymy' is the transferred use of a word to refer to something which is semantically close to the word actually used or stands in some other relationship to it; the use of divine names for the forces they control or the gifts they give ('Hephaestus' for 'fire') is one of the most prominent types in poetry.

ποτὲ μὲν . . . προσαγορεύοντες 'sometimes intending to refer to the gods themselves [lit. 'grasping the gods themselves in their intention'] and sometimes calling by the same name the forces of which the gods are the givers or over which they hold sway'. **καθηγεμόνες** has a philosophical flavour; Zeno perhaps called Zeus καθηγεμών . . . τῆς τῶν ὄντων διοικήσεως (Diog. Laert. 7.88 = *SVF* I 182). Elsewhere P., like others (cf. LSJ s.v.), uses the word of the founders of philosophical schools, cf. 1048e, *Theseus* 1.2 etc.

εὐθύς 'for example'; cf. n. on 20e εὐθύς.

κλύθ' ἄναξ . . . χαρίζαι: Archilochus fr. 108 West (catalectic trochaic tetrameters); P. cites and refers to Archilochus very frequently. This example is presumably chosen because it apparently offers a clear distinction between the god and his gift (οἷά περ χαρίζαι), though the poet's self-conscious play with the metonymic use of the god's name shows how such 'metonymies' are often not as simple as P. would wish. The original context may have been mock solemn; cf. the anecdote of how, having listened to Socrates for the first time, Plato burned his poetry after exclaiming the parodic hexameter 'Hephaestus, come hither! Plato has need of you' (Diog. Laert. 3.5).

23b κατακαλούμενος is somewhat rarer than ἐπικαλούμενος would be, though P. uses both.

λέγει . . . ἐνεγκεῖν ‘he says that he would bear the disaster more easily’.

εἰ κείνου . . . ἀμφεπονθή ‘if Hephaestus had busied himself with his head and his graceful limbs in their pure garments’, Archilochus fr. 9.10–11 West (elegiacs), cf. 33a–b below. This couplet illustrates again the nuanced use which poets make of metonymy. Homer has the expression τάφον ἀμφιπονέσθαι of those in charge of a burial (*Od.* 20.307, cf. *Iliad* 23.159), and so Archilochus’ use in fact hovers between ‘Hephaestus’ as the god and ‘Hephaestus’ as fire, though such a nuance will not fit P.’s educational scheme.

μά τόν . . . φοίνιον: Euripides, *Phoenissae* 1006, Menoikeus swearing that he will not betray his fatherland by refusing death; this is the only ancient citation of this verse. The continuation of the passage, which P. does not cite, and the epithet ‘blood-stained’ show that here again ‘metonymy’ is not quite as straightforward as P. claims: ‘. . . blood-stained Ares who once established the Sown Men who had risen from the earth as rulers of this land’ (*Phoen.* 1007–8). Is this ‘Ares’ or ‘war’? So too, the Scholia on the Euripidean verse suggest that ‘the Zeus amidst the stars’ is in fact Helios. Once again, more complex ancient discussion lies behind P.’s example.

τυφλός γάρ . . . κακά ‘For Ares, women, blind and unseeing, stirs up all kinds of trouble with a pig’s snout’, Sophocles fr. 838 Radt, also cited at 757a; the image is of a pig rooting about in the mud.

23c ὑπακοῦσαι ‘to understand’ something not made explicit, cf. 34b, LSJ s.v. III.

τὸν χάλκόν: sc. ἔστιν ὑπακοῦσαι. The D-Scholium on *Iliad* 2.381 notes that Homer uses ‘Ares’ in four ways, as ‘war’, ‘iron’, ‘a blow or wound’, and as the god himself; the metonymic use of ‘Ares’ for war is very common in Greek poetry and allegorical discussions, cf. *SVF* II 1076 (Chrysippus), ‘Heraclitus’, *Hom. probl.* 31. χάλκεος is a standard epithet of Ares in the *Iliad*, and ‘Heraclitus’ 31.8–9 explains this as a reference to the bronze armour of the warriors (‘for iron was scarce in that distant past’).

τῶν νῦν . . . Ἄρης: *Iliad* 7.329–30; the example is presumably chosen because ὀξύς, a standard epithet of Ares in the *Iliad*, points to a metonymy if it is taken in the sense ‘sharp’. Eustathius, *Hom.* 683.49 notes that σίδηρος is one possible interpretation of ὀξύς Ἄρης here.

Διὸς καὶ Ζηνός: P. gives both genitive forms, not just because of the importance of this particular case, but perhaps also to recall the significance of etymologizing these forms and especially the discussion at Plato, *Cratylus* 396a–b. Δία/Διός/Δί were often connected with διά (note ταῖς αἰτίαις immediately below), cf. Hesiod, *WD* 2–3, Plato, *Cratylus* 396b1, *SVF* II 1021, 1076, and Ζῆνα/Ζηνός/Ζηνί with ζεῖν ‘to boil’ or ζῆν ‘to live’, cf. Aesch. *Suppl.* 583–4, Plato, *Cratylus* 396b1, *SVF* II 1021, 1076 (Chrysippus), Ramelli 2003 on Cornutus 2.

τύχην... εἰμαρμένην: the identification of Zeus with Providence or Fate or Nature is common, especially (though not exclusively) in Stoic contexts, cf. 425e, 1050b (cf. below on 23d οὐ γὰρ τὸν θεὸν... κακῶς ἀπαλλάττειν), fr. 21 Sandbach, *SVF* I 102, II 1076 (Chrysippus), Pontani on Schol. *Odyssey* 1.283a; Seneca, *NQ* 2.45 notes that ‘every name’ will suit Jupiter, whether it be *fatum* or *providentia* or *natura* or *mundus*, and [Aristotle], *De mundo* chap. 7 discusses many of Zeus’s names, including ἀνάγκη, εἰμαρμένη, πεπρωμένη and μοῖρα. For Zeus and ‘fortune’ cf. 23f below.

Ζεῦ πάτερ Ἰδθην μεδέων: this verse, completed by κύδιστε μέγιστε occurs four times in the *Iliad* (3.276, 320, 7.202, 24.308); cf. 31d below.

23d ὦ Ζεῦ... σοφώτερος;: trag. adesp. 351 K-S; this is one of the citations which Elter 1893 argued was drawn by Plutarch from Chrysippus, cf. above, p. 11.

ὅταν... τὸν Δία ‘when they attach the name of Zeus to the causes of everything that happens’; αἰτίας and Δία resonate meaningfully against each other (cf. n. on 23c Διὸς καὶ Ζηνός).

πολλὰς... βουλή: *Iliad* 1.3, 5b. The subject of v. 3 is ‘the wrath of Achilles’, but P.’s quotation suggests that it is ‘Zeus’ plan’, as suits his argument.

τὴν εἰμαρμένην: sc. λέγουσιν.

οὐ γὰρ τὸν θεὸν... κακῶς ἀπαλλάττειν ‘For the poet does not think that the god devises evil for men, but he is correctly pointing out the necessity of things, namely that even cities and armies and leaders are destined to prosper and prevail over their enemies if they behave wisely, but if – like these men [the Greeks] – they fall into passions and errors and dispute and quarrel with one another, they are destined to disorder and confusion and a bad end.’ The Stoics had argued that the Homeric Διὸς βουλή was εἰμαρμένη, ‘predetermined destiny’ (1050b (= *SVF* II 937), D-Scholium on v. 5, Eustathius, *Hom.* 20.10–11), but P. refers rather to an inexorable law that those who do wrong, as the Greeks did when they quarrelled among themselves, shall suffer; the moral aspect of this law makes it acceptable to P.’s Platonist convictions that god cannot be the cause of evil. Such a ‘conditional’ or ‘hypothetical’ view of individual fate – something ‘is fated’ to happen, if such and such behaviour occurs – was a standard Middle Platonist position, cf. [Plutarch], *Fate* 570a–b, Dillon 1977: 322–3. The ‘law of Necessity’ explained at *Phaedrus* 248c was an important Platonic support for this view. The discussion of fate and human responsibility at [Plut.] *Hom.* 120, which focuses on the human folly mentioned at the start of both Homeric poems, is close to P. here, cf. Hillgruber 1994/9: II 261–5. Another ancient interpretation saw the Διὸς βουλή as ‘those who do wrong shall pay an appropriate penalty for their crimes’ and pointed to the end of the *Iliad* (bT-Scholium on 1.5c). ὑποδείκνυσιν need not carry a sense of ‘slyly indicating, hinting’, as the prefix might suggest; cf. 27e, 31a of the teacher’s indications to a pupil. πάθη ‘passions’, cf. Horace, *Epist.* 1.2.8 (the *Iliad* *stultorum regum et populorum continet aestus* ‘seething passions’); the two most relevant ‘passions’ were, in the ancient reading of *Iliad* 1, anger

(μῆνις) and love. In the same passage of Horace *seditione* (v. 15) corresponds to P's διαφέρωνται . . . καὶ στασιάζωσιν, which is a prose rewriting of *Iliad* 1.6 διαστήτην ἐρίσαντε. ἀσχημονεῖν 'to become disordered', though the verb is normally used of improper or embarrassing behaviour; at 73e ἡσχυμόνησας is counted as a harsh rebuke on a par with ἡδίκησας (though the text there is uncertain). For an extended account of Agamemnon's and Achilles' ruinous passions cf. Dio 57.6-9.

23e εἰμαρμένον . . . βροτοῖς 'for it is fated for men to harvest an evil requital for evil plans', trag. adesp. 352 K-S; P's γάρ, for the δέ of the other witnesses, accommodates the quotation to his own argument. Why a late hand in one manuscript thought the author was Sophocles is not known. The thought is of course a commonplace from Hesiod, *WD* 265-6 onwards, cf. n. on 36a ἡ δὲ . . . κακίστη. One of Stobaeus' two citations of this fragment (1.3.8) is in a section on the divine punishment of human mistakes, and this is also the context in which P. uses it.

μή ποτε δῶρα . . . ἀποπέμπειν: Hesiod, *WD* 86-7, where δῶρον (read by one MS here) is unanimously transmitted. These verses are also cited at the conclusion of P's essay Περὶ τύχης and interpreted much as here: 'Hesiod's Prometheus gives Epimetheus excellent advice . . . meaning the gifts of *tyché* and external goods. As if he were advising him not to play the pipes if unmusical or to read if illiterate or to ride a horse if he cannot, so he advises him not to hold a magistracy if he is a fool, not to be rich if he is ungenerous and not to marry if ruled by a woman . . . for undeserved good fortune is the source of wretchedness for those without understanding (τοῖς μὴ φρονούσιν)' (99f-100a).

πλούτους . . . τὰ ἐκτός: the division of 'good things' into goods of the soul, goods of the body and external goods (or goods given by Fortune, *fortuita* (Sen. *Ep.* 87.12)) was familiar from the classical period on, cf., e.g., Plato, *Laws* 3.697b, 5.743e, 8.870b, Arist. *EN* 1.1098b12-14, Sext. Emp. *Eth.* 45, and is common in P., cf. 35a, e below, *Pericles* 2 etc. P's three examples of such external goods all occur also in the parallel passage at 100a (previous note). The Stoics denied that such externals were 'goods' at all, and all were of course 'indifferent' (ἀδιάφορον) as far as virtue is concerned and, as here, can be used well or ill (cf., e.g., *SVF* IV index s.v. ἐκτός). That such externals need to be used well was not, however, a distinctively Stoic position, cf. 'Alcinous', *Handbook of Platonism* 180.9-13, 'As for the things which the many call good, such as health and beauty and strength and wealth and suchlike, none of these, according to Plato, is ever good, unless they are used in accordance with virtue. Without such use, they have the position simply of matter, and prove harmful to those who use them badly. Plato sometimes also called them "mortal goods" (*Laws* 1.631b6).'

ἀνόνητος 'profitless'.

23f καὶ τὸν Ἐπιμηθέα 'Epimetheus as well', i.e. as other foolish people.

ἀνόνητον: the jingle with ἀνόνητος reinforces the point being made.

μηδέ ποτ'...έόντων: Hesiod, *WD* 717–18. P's discussion here is very close to the scholia on these verses, which suggests that the scholia go back to P's commentary: 'Poverty is either of our own making, in one of two ways, laziness or extravagance (δι' ἀργίαν ἢ δι' ἄσωτίαν), or we have it allotted to us by the Universe. It is this latter kind he thinks we should not taunt a man with, since the kind that we have ourselves to thank for deserves a million reproaches, if we do nothing to relieve it. Similarly one should not make a disease for which fate is responsible a subject of reproach, but when a disease comes from our own self-indulgence (ἀκρασία), reproach is called for, because of that self-indulgence: owing to it we are not well, although we could have been' (fr. 88, trans. Sandbach). P. here seems to interpret the second half of v. 718 as 'if it is a gift of the blessed ones who live for ever [i.e. and not of our own making]'; as, however, in that case, 'the blessed ones' would be responsible for something terrible, the reference cannot be, so the Platonist P. argues, to 'the gods' and must therefore be to 'fortune'.

θεόδοτον occurs only here in P., and is a poetical word in the classical period; Aristotle, however, uses it of εὐδαιμονία (*EN* 1.1099b12).

ἄξιον ὄν: for such impersonal constructions cf. n. on 16c ὡς ποιήσιν οὐκ οὔσαν, Smyth §2076c. Paton's addition of ὄν is probable rather than certain.

24a τὴν...ἀπορίαν is governed by ἐγκαλεῖν, which takes an accusative of the charge you make and a dative of the person whom you charge; ἀπορίαν κακίζειν in one MS is probably an attempt to ease the syntax.

μετ' ἀργίας καὶ μαλακίας καὶ πολυτελείας: the contrast between two types of poverty seems to have been a commonplace, cf., e.g., Favorinus fr. 105 Barigazzi (πενία is either διὰ τὴν γνῶμην or διὰ τὴν τύχην), Apollonius of Tyana, *Epist.* 97 Penella (poverty κατὰ φύσιν is no disgrace, but poverty 'for a disgraceful reason' should be reproached). Although the combination of μαλακία and πολυτέλεια is not uncommon in P. (and cf. 32f below ὑπὸ πλούτου καὶ μαλακίας), the expression here may contain a faint echo of Thucydides 2.40.1 (Pericles' funeral speech), which also concerns the moral status of τὸ πένεσθαι: 'We pursue beauty with moderation of expenditure (μετ' εὐτελείας) and we pursue wisdom without softness (ἄνευ μαλακίας). We use wealth as an opportunity for action rather than as a matter for boastful language, and it is no disgrace for anyone to confess to straitened circumstances (τὸ πένεσθαι), but it is more disgraceful not to take steps to escape from them'; P. cites the last sentence of this passage at 533a. Cf. also the Scholium on Hesiod, *WD* 717–18 cited above which may go back to P: poverty 'deserves a million reproaches, if we do nothing to relieve it'. P's allusion, if so it be, suggests – as have some modern critics – that Hesiod lies behind the famous Thucydidean passage.

οὕτω...λέγοντες: it was familiar from at least the Hellenistic period that the word τύχη did not appear in the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey*, cf. Pausanias 4.30.4–5 (noting the earliest occurrence as *Homeric hymn to Demeter* 420), Macrobius, *Sat.*

5.16, Richardson 1974: 289, Hunter 1995: 25–6. Such an absence stood in sharp contrast to the mindless ease with which the concept was later evoked, cf. Pliny, *HN* 2.22, Juvenal 10.365–6 etc.

εἰδότες . . . ἐξέφραζον ‘but knowing the force of the irregularly and indeterminately moving cause, a force which was strong and cannot be guarded against by human reasoning, they expressed [this force] by the names of the gods’. At *Caesar* 63.1 P. describes ‘what is fated’ (τὸ πεπωμένον) as οὐχ οὕτως ἀπροσδόκητον ὡς ἀφύλακτον, and cf. also *Aemilius* 27.2, ‘reckoning (λογισμός) on the circling of Fate which settles now on one, now on another, brings great dependency to the man happy in his success’. The spurious essay *Fate* notes ‘Some of the ancients regarded chance as a cause which could not be foreseen and was not clear to human reasoning (ἀπρονόητον . . . καὶ ἄδηλον ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῳί)’ (571c–2c), and then proceeds to echo Aristotelian definitions of chance as a cause; for Aristotle chance belongs to the indefinite or indeterminate (ἀόριστον), and is therefore ‘unclear to man’ (*Physics* 2.197a8–10). P.’s language here in fact has (as often) affinities to more than one intellectual tradition. The Stoics too held that τύχη was a cause which was ἄδηλος ἀνθρωπίνῃ διανοίᾳ/λογισμῳί, *SVF* II 965–6, 970 etc., but the idea was very widely familiar, cf. Chariton 2.8.3 ‘Fortune, which is the only thing against which human reasoning has no power’.

ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς . . . προσαγορεύειν: P.’s argument is that the old poets’ habit of assigning chance events to gods is analogous to our habit of calling any exceptional thing or person ‘divine’ or ‘daemonic’. νῆ Δία marks how strange it actually is to call men and what they say ‘divine’. Strange it may be, but it was in fact a regular Greek turn of phrase, cf. LSJ s.v. θεῖος I 3, Bieler 1967, Du Toit 1997: 45–7; ὦ δαίμονι is a standard form of address in Plato and elsewhere, cf. Brunius-Nilsson 1955.

οὕτω . . . ἐπανορθώτεον ‘The majority of seemingly bizarre statements about Zeus are to be corrected in this way . . .’; the sentence is then resumed (at ὡς περὶ τῆς τύχης) after the citations, which are treated as a kind of parenthesis, to say *how* they are to be corrected.

δοιοὶ γὰρ . . . δειλῶν: *Iliad* 24.527–8 (Achilles to Priam). The Homeric transmission gives v. 528 (almost unanimously) as δῶρων οἶα δίδωσι κακῶν ἕτερος δὲ ἑᾶων, which has been variously interpreted since antiquity (two jars or three?), cf. the Scholia ad loc., Schol. Pind. *Pyth.* 3.81–2 (II 82 Drachmann), Labarbe 1949: 276–81. P.’s different and unambiguous text, ‘full of destinies, one of good, but one of wretched’, goes back, as do several other ancient citations (cf. West ad loc.), to Plato’s quotation of these verses at *Rep.* 2.379d; P. gives this same (Platonic) version at 600c and cf. also 369c, 473b, whereas the spurious *Consolation to Apollonius* gives the ‘Homeric’ version at 105c. The origin of the Platonic version is unclear. P. had already used verses from this scene of *Iliad* 24 at 20e and 22b. Here again P. finds a way of allowing young men to read Homeric verses which might seem to be critical of the gods, rather than simply censuring them *more Platonic*. Another way of defending these verses (bT- and D-Scholia ad loc.) was

to explain that the idea was a one-off fiction devised by Achilles to console Priam, i.e. a λῦσις ἐκ προσώπου, cf. Nünlist 2009: 116–17.

24b *δρκα* . . . *ἀμφοτέροισι*: *Iliad* 7.69–70 (Hector to the assembled Greeks and Trojans). P. cites v. 69 also at 742e in the course of a discussion of whether the agreement between the two sides before the duel of Menelaus and Paris had indeed been broken. It was of course not Zeus who had ‘failed to bring (his) oaths to pass’; on Hector’s rhetorical strategy here cf. Kirk ad loc. P. does not ‘solve’ the problem of these verses by appealing to the identity of the speaker, though this was a perfectly familiar critical procedure, cf. previous note.

τότε γάρ ῥα . . . *βουλᾶς*: *Odyssey* 8.81–2, the closing verses of the report of Demodocus’ song of a quarrel between Odysseus and Achilles which brought joy to Agamemnon. The implication of the verses, as indeed of the whole of the song, has been debated since antiquity, cf. Danek 1998: 142–50. A scholiast reports that the verses were not to be found in some copies and were therefore athetized, presumably by Aristarchus. P.’s interest is not that which most ancient discussion concerned – why does Agamemnon rejoice? – but rather (again) the imputation of wickedness to Zeus.

λεγομένων picks up οὕτω . . . δοκούντων in 24a.

ἐν αἷς . . . *καθ’ ἡμᾶς* ‘in both of which is to be found the type of cause which is beyond our calculation and entirely outside our grasp’; the verb must be understood, and one MS (D) has supplied *σημαίνεται* to make the construction clear. Fortune and fate operate in ways entirely unlike, and incomprehensible from the point of view of, the ways in which men operate.

ὅπου δὲ . . . *ἔστιν* ‘but where appropriateness, reasonableness and probability are present’. The only acts to be regarded as really due to the god are those which have the moral qualities which we must believe are present in him.

κυρίως ‘in the strict sense’, LSJ s.v. IV.

αὐτὰρ . . . *μάχοιτο*: *Iliad* 11.540, 542–3, a description of Hector; v. 540 also occurs as v. 264 of the same book. P. omits v. 541 (= 265), *ἐγχεί τ’ ἄορί τε μέγαλοισί τε χερμαδίοισιν*, but cites a verse (543) which is completely absent from the Homeric manuscripts, though it was known to Aristotle (*Rhet.* 2.1387a35); cf. n. on 36a *Ζεύς* . . . *μάχοιο*, 164c, Hainsworth on v. 543. Whatever the status of the verses (West follows Lachmann in expunging them, cf. Bona 1991: 158–9), P.’s point here is that Zeus’s anger when an inferior challenges a better fighter is appropriate, for it upholds a correct order of things, cf. [Plut.] *Hom.* 132 where vv. 542–3 are cited in a discussion of *νέμεσις* and *ἔλεος* in Homer. It is best therefore to keep the second half of v. 543 as part of P.’s citation, although the majority of MSS omit it.

24c *Ζεύς* . . . *ἔῃ* ‘Zeus takes thought for the major affairs of mortals; small things he gives up and leaves to other gods’, trag. adesp. 353 K-S; P. is clearly here not thinking of a distinction between *θεός* and *δαίμων*.

κατὰ πολλὰ . . . ποιητῶν 'as they suffer changes and shifts at the hands of the poets in many matters'. P. is not speaking of changes in the meaning of words over time, but changes brought about by poetic techniques, such as metonymy.

παρέχεται '[*areté*] renders [men] . . . '.

ἀγαθούς 'courageous', to match the cardinal virtues implied by ἔμφρονas . . . καὶ δίκαιους.

ἐπιεικῶς 'often', 'commonly', cf. LSJ s.v. ἐπιεικής III 4; this sense is common in P. (43e, 148a, 264b etc.).

περιποιεῖται 'procures', cf. 762b 'love περιποιεῖ many good things'. Paton's περιτίθησιν is, however, attractive, cf. περιτιθέντες at 18f.

παρὰ τοῦτο . . . φέρουσιν 'accordingly [the poets] treat good reputation and power as *areté*, calling the fruit by the same name as the tree that bears it, like 'olives' from the olive tree and 'acorns' [φηγός] from the oak [φηγός]'. The relation between a tree and its homonymous fruit is again one of metonymy. Olives and acorns appear together at Pl. *Rep.* 2.372c (the diet of early men), a passage which P. knew well (cf. 664a).

24d λέγωσι: sc. 'the poets'.

τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς . . . ἔθηκαν: Hesiod, *WD* 289, a very famous verse which P. certainly discussed in his commentary on *WD* (cf. fr. 41 Sandbach), though the extant scholia cannot be traced to him. By ἀρετή Hesiod meant 'prosperity' and the social position which went with it (cf. West on vv. 287-92), so that P. could in fact have cited it along with the instances in 24e below, but he was far from the only ancient reader who turned Hesiod's ἀρετή into a moral virtue.

τῆμος . . . φάλαγγας: *Iliad* 11.190, where ἀρετή in fact means 'courage', as indeed ἀρετή was often glossed in antiquity, cf. the Scholia to *Iliad* 20.242 cited on 24e Ζεύς δ' . . . μινύθει τε.

εἰ δὲ θανεῖν . . . βίον 'If it is right to die, it is honourable to die thus, dissolving our lives in virtue', Euripides fr. 994 K, which P. also cites at *Marcellus* 33.4. The rhythm, two dactylic tetrameters, suggests that these are words of a chorus; ἀρετή in Euripides will be primarily 'courage', rather than 'virtue' in general.

εὐθύς . . . νοοῦμεν 'let him immediately consider that these things are said about the best and most divine state within us, which we conceive as rightness of reason, excellence of rational nature, and a consistent disposition of soul'. Much of this terminology has a Stoic flavour (Babut 1969: 88-9); Zeno had defined the goal as 'living consistently', and cf. 441b-c (= *SVF* I 202, III 459) 'All of these [Stoics] in common suppose that virtue is a certain state (διάθεσιν) of the governing part of the soul and a faculty which comes about through reason, or rather reason itself which is consistent and firm and unshaken (ὁμολογούμενον καὶ βέβαιον καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον)', Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.34 (= *SVF* III 198) *virtus est affectio animi constans conueniensque . . . ipsa virtus breuissime recta ratio dici potest*, id. *De legibus* 1.25 (= *SVF* III 245) *virtus nihil aliud nisi perfecta et ad summum perducta natura*, Diog. Laert. 7.89 (= *SVF* III 39, 197) 'virtue is a διάθεσις ὁμολογουμένη', 7.94 (= *SVF*

III 76), *SVF* IV Index s.v. ὁμολογούμενος, Schofield 2003: 241-2, Brennan 2005: 135-41, and cf. 32d below. There is, however, nothing here in the stress upon the dominance of reason which is inconsistent with P.'s Platonism, and much of this terminology also occurs in Middle Platonist texts, cf. 'Alcinous', *Handbook of Platonism* 182.15-16 'Virtue is a divine (θεῖον) thing, and it is a disposition of soul (διάθεσις ψυχῆς) which is perfect and best (βελτίστη)', Apuleius, *De Platone* 2.227 'Plato says that virtue is a disposition of mind (*habitus mentis*) which is organized in the best possible (*optime*) and noble manner, and it makes the person in whom it is properly implanted in harmony with himself (*concordem sibi*), calm and consistent', Dillon 1993: 177-8. For P.'s view of virtue cf. further Dillon 1977: 193-8.

24e Ζεὺς δ' . . . μινύθει τε: *Iliad* 20.242 (Aeneas to Achilles). ἀρετή here means 'courage in battle', but P.'s point is that the word cannot mean 'moral excellence', because that cannot be enhanced or damaged in this way, and it must therefore refer here to external goods. The Scholia on this verse (and cf. Eustath. *Hom.* 1206.23) offer two interpretations of ἀρετή, either 'courage' or βασιλικὴ δόξα, and this seems close to P.'s ἀντὶ δόξης ἢ δυνάμεως ἢ εὐτυχίας below. Cf. also the D-Scholia which gloss ἀρετήν as εὐδαιμονίαν, ἀνδρείαν.

πλούτῳ . . . ὀπηδεῖ: Hesiod, *WD* 313. For P. it would of course make no sense to say that 'moral excellence' follows upon wealth; the Platonic Socrates claims that he goes around Athens telling young men that 'aretê does not come from possessions (χρήματα), but possessions and all the other good things for men, both private and public, from aretê' (*Apology* 30b2-4). The Hesiodic scholia explain the matter differently by taking ἀρετή as indeed 'moral excellence': 'wealth' actually means the agricultural plenty which is a sign of justice and virtue, as it results only from hard work, and thus virtue 'follows' wealth in the sense of being co-existent with it. The scholium may well be Plutarchan (fr. 43 Sandbach), though the treatment of the verse differs from that in the current passage.

μὴ καθήσθω . . . νομίζων 'let him not sit idle, amazed and gaping at the rich as though their virtue was something instantly obtainable for cash, or in the belief that it is up to Chance to increase or diminish his wisdom . . .'. καθήσθω: for this nuance cf., e.g., 99d, LSJ s.v. 3. ἐκπεπληγμένος καὶ τεθηπώς: ἐκπεπληγμένος, the perf. pass. participle of ἐκπλήσσω, regularly takes a direct object (e.g. Thuc. 6.11.3) and τεθηπώς, the participle of the 'defective' verb τέθηπα, also does so in later prose (cf. 25e, LSJ s.v. 2). Some have seen here an echo of Empedocles fr. 17.21 D-K, μηδ' ὄμμασιν ἦσο τεθηπώς, which P. cites at 756d. τῇ τύχῃ: P. is clearly referring back to *Iliad* 20.242, though he is not here explicitly considering cases of 'Zeus' in the meaning 'Fortune', as at 23e-24a. Just, however, as ἀρετή in that verse cannot mean 'moral excellence' or 'intelligence' (φρόνησις), if 'Zeus' refers to the god himself, as for P. (as for Plato) Zeus would not damage anyone's moral excellence, so 'Zeus' also must mean something other than the supreme god, such as τύχη. P.'s reasoning is consistent, but his breaking up of the argument into small sections leads to some unclarity.

τῇ ἀρετῇ . . . τῇ κακότητι ‘the word *aretê* . . . the word *kakotês*’. P. here distinguishes κακία, ‘vice, wickedness’ (i.e. the ‘opposite’ of ἀρετή), from κάκωσις, ‘ill treatment, suffering’.

ιδίως ‘in its strict sense’.

τὴν μὲν . . . ἐλέσθαι: Hesiod, *WD* 287, a much cited verse in antiquity. The Scholium on this verse claims that, in his commentary, P. took the verse to mean that one can embrace the whole of κακία at once (fr. 41 Sandbach), whereas modern interpreters understand ἰλαδόν as ‘in crowds’ or ‘in great quantity’. For Hesiod κακότης is not ‘vice’, but the wretchedness of poverty and low social prestige, not in fact far from the following Homeric example, which P. takes as reflecting a quite different sense. P.’s view of Hesiodic κακότης reflects the fact that Hesiod makes it the opposite of ἀρετή. Most of P.’s MSS read γάρ for Hesiod’s τοι, as do (e.g.) the MSS of *Xen. Mem.* 2.1.20, and this may well have been the form that P. here used or took over from an anthological source.

24f αἴψα γάρ . . . καταγερᾶσκουσιν: *Odyssey* 19.360 (Penelope speaking to Eurycleia about the disguised Odysseus). The scholia gloss ἐν κακότητι as ἐν κακώσει καὶ ἐν ταλαιπωρίαι, which is very close to P.’s explanation. In his comment on this verse, Eustathius (*Hom.* 1868.1) makes exactly the same comparison with Hesiod as does P: he may be drawing on P. or reflecting a scholiastic source which also lies behind P.

ἐπει . . . εὐδαιμονίαν ‘For someone would be deceived if he thought that poets used the word *eudaimonia* also in the philosophers’ sense of “complete possession or acquisition of good things” or “the perfection of a life flowing smoothly according to nature”, but not [realizing] that, by a misuse of the term, they often call the rich man *eudaimôn* or *makarios* and power or reputation *eudaimonia*.’ P.’s language evokes, as serves his purpose, more than one philosophical tradition. For Aristotle *eudaimonia* requires ‘complete virtue and a complete life’ (*EN* 1.1100a4–5, 1101a14–21), and the second half of P.’s definition is exactly one ascribed to the third-century Peripatetic Critolaos, τελειότητα . . . κατὰ φύσιν εὐροοῦντος βίου (fr. 20 Wehrli). Critolaos may, however, have been influenced by the Stoics: the Stoics are said to have defined εὐδαιμονία as εὐροία βίου (*SVF* I 184, cf. III 4, M. Aur. 2.5.3 etc.) and virtue as τελειότης τῆς ἐκάστου φύσεως (*SVF* III 257), cf. 1060c τῆς κατὰ φύσιν τελειότητος. Both Critolaos and the Stoics were concerned with the ἀγαθὰ necessary for happiness, cf. Critolaos fr. 19 Wehrli, *SVF* III 113, Erskine 1990: 16–17. For the life ‘in accordance with nature’ cf. the texts gathered in *SVF* III §I 1 and n. on 37a τὸ εὐδαιμον . . . ὀρίζουσα. St Basil too warns against how poets use the term εὐδαιμονία (*Greek lit.* 4.18–20 Wilson, evoking the life of the Phaeacians). καταχρωμένους: cf. 25b καταχρήσει. κατάρχησις (Lat. *abusio*) is applied by grammarians to various transferred and quasi-metaphorical uses of words, and was a standard term to describe some kinds of poetic language (cf. 347f). The term is said properly to refer to the use of a word to describe an analogous feature which has no name of its own, like ‘lip of a pot’ or ‘neck of

a mountain' (Lausberg 1990: §§562, 577), but Quintilian notes that poets extend this trope more widely: 'Some also say that it is *catachrêsis* when 'courage' is said for 'rashness' or 'generosity' for 'extravagance', but I disagree: for in these cases it is not that one word is replacing another, but that one thing is replacing another' (8.6.36). This, which is not too far from P.'s point, suggests that Thucydides' famous analysis of the change of ἡ εἰωθυῖα ἀξίωσις τῶν ὀνομάτων in times of *stasis* (3.82.4–5, cf. Hornblower ad loc. for interpretation) became a central text for linguistic theory as well (the pained criticism of Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 29–33 speaks volumes). Be that as it may, P.'s discussion and the grammatical lore which lies behind it may be traced all the way back to the fifth-century concern with ὀρθόπειρα (note ὀρθῶς immediately below), cf. Hunter 2009a: 23. τὸν πλοῦσιον εὐδαίμονα: the use of εὐδαίμων and μακάριος in the sense 'wealthy, prosperous', as also *beatus* in Latin, is very common; Horace, *Epodes* 2.1 is a good example of how poets can make pointed use of the 'catachresis'. The true nature of εὐδαιμονία was a subject dear to any Platonist's heart, cf., e.g., *Gorgias* 470d–71d, on whether the tyrant Archelaos of Macedonia or the Great King of Persia is really εὐδαίμων, *Theaetetus* 175c. In the *Republic* Socrates notes that 'poets and story-tellers speak ill about the most important human matters, such as that many unjust people are happy (εὐδαίμονες) and the just wretched . . .' (3.392a12–b2), but the misuse of the term *eudaimonia* was thematized as early as Prodicus' fable of the young Heracles which Xenophon reports; the sexy lady introduces herself to Heracles there with the words, 'My friends call me *Eudaimonia*; but those who loathe me have given me the name *Kakia*' (*Mem.* 2.1.26). That Prodicus is the thinker most closely associated with 'the correct use of words' (ὀρθόπειρα) is important for the long tradition which P. here reflects, cf. ὀρθῶς immediately below, Hunter 2009a: 22–3. For another satirical use of this idea cf. Lucian, *Hermotimus* 7.

25a ὦς . . . ἀνάσσω: *Odyssey* 4.93, Menelaos lamenting his brother's murder, thus an example of the prosperous man who is not εὐδαίμων. The Scholium on this verse makes precisely the same point: 'For pleasure does not consist in the possession of wealth, nor are the wealthy εὐδαίμονες; there are at any rate many very rich people who never cease from lamentation. Homer is teaching us that we must not look to the wealth of houses, but to the state of those who live in them.' Neither in this verse nor the immediate context is there a word for 'lucky, happy' (unless P. took χαίρων in a very strong sense); so P. either used a different text of this verse, which has been corrected to the Homeric vulgate in the course of transmission (Babbitt suggested ὦς οὐκ εὐδαίμων and Hartman ὦς οὐ τοι μάκαρ ὦν), or (more probably in view of the tradition represented by the scholium) he used a verse which made some, but not all, of the point he wanted.

ἔχω . . . οὐδενός: Menander fr. 601 K-A. The insistence on using μακάριος in its 'correct' sense seems to have been something of a comic commonplace, cf. Apollodorus fr. 11 K-A, Men. *Kitharistes* fr. 1 Arnott.

ταραχὴν καὶ σύγχυσιν ‘disturbance and confusion’.

μή μοι .. βίος: Euripides, *Medea* 598, a verse familiar to more than one excerpting tradition (cf. Stobaeus 4.31.58 (‘criticism of wealth’) and Doxopater 2.294–5 Walz). *Medea*’s pointed expression in which εὐδαίμων means ‘prosperous’ causes linguistic and moral ‘confusion’.

25b τί . . . τιμᾶις: Euripides, *Phoenissae* 549–50, cf. n. on 18d εἴπερ . . . ἀδικοῦν. When Mastronarde ad loc. describes ἀδικίαν εὐδαίμονα as ‘a striking oxymoron’, he is expressing P.’s sense of ‘confusion’ from a modern, positive perspective.

καταχρήσει: cf. n. on 24f καταχρωμένους.

ἐπηται ‘goes along with’, i.e. ‘pursues the interpretation which takes the words as . . .’.

CHAPTER 7

We must insist repeatedly that poetry is an imitation of reality, its charm rests on its plausibility, and the actions and characters it represents are therefore a mixture of good and evil. Moreover, variety and paradox actually enhance its power, and not even the gods, when they are shown as involved in human affairs, can be exempt from danger and conflict.

25b ἐνδεικνύμενον: the agent with an impersonal in –τέον is sometimes expressed by the accusative rather than the dative, Smyth §2152; the singular here, if correct, avoids the awkwardness of νέους ἐνδεικνυμένους.

ὑπόθεσιν ‘basis’, ‘essence’, i.e. *mimēsis* is its starting-point, cf. LSJ s.v. IV; at 14e and 20a P. had used the word in rather different ways.

κόσμω . . . ἥθη ‘employs embellishment and splendour on the actions and characters which are its subject’. **λαμπρότητι:** this noun and the corresponding adjective occur in various critical contexts. τὰ λαμπρά can be ‘brilliant passages’ (Ar. *Birds* 1388, Philostr. *VS* 1.23.2), cf. perhaps Horace, *AP* 15 *late qui splendeat*, and Quintilian 8.5.28–9; the *Life of Aeschylus* describes how he ‘embellished (ἐκόσμησεν) the stage and amazed the audience’s sight with his brilliance (λαμπρότης)’ (§14, cf. §2 τὴν λαμπρότητα τῆς χορηγίας). Hermogenes 264–9 Rabe offers an extended discussion of λαμπρότης of both style and thought. The application of λαμπρός to verbal style is found as early as Aristotle, *Poetics* 1460b4–5 (‘style which is λίαν λαμπρά obscures character and thought’) and is common, of both words and individual letters, in Philodemus and the critics from whom he quotes: cf. *On Poems* 1 (Janko) 24, 185, combining the ideas of εὐκοσμεῖν and λαμπρύνεσθαι with regard to Homer, 18.26 μεγάλην [λαμπρ]ότητα [καὶ κ]άλλος, 21.7–10 etc., Gutzwiller 2010: 347–8.

τῆς μιμήσεως . . . ἐχούσης ‘as imitation owes its appeal to its convincingness’, cf. 16b above. These same ideas are put to a rather different defence of poetry in Strabo 1.2.9, and the rôle of τὸ πιθανόν in myth and poetry is also thematized in Philostratus, *Heroicus*, e.g. 7.8–8.3. For ‘Longinus’, whose concern is with sublime transport rather than *mimēsis*, ‘plausibility’ is a very secondary consideration, cf.

De subl. 1.4; P., like ‘Longinus’, is much concerned with ἐκπληξίς (cf. n. on 16b ἐκπλήττει), but the latter has a much stronger conception of the term.

διὸ . . . μίμησις ‘So imitation, not being altogether neglectful of reality, mixes indications both of vice and of virtue in the actions which it represents.’ P. is thinking, not for example of Aristotle’s preferred tragic hero who, though a great man of distinction, is neither ‘outstanding in virtue and justice’ nor evil and wicked (*Poetics* 1452b34–53a11), but rather of the nature of mankind in general, cf. 439b, ‘It is not possible to find an action that is faultless with regard to virtue or a character untainted by passion or a life untouched by disgrace; even if nature does spontaneously produce something excellent (καλόν), this is clouded over by much that is foreign to it, like wheat mixed with wild and impure stuff’, 369c ‘as nature brings us many experiences in which bad and good are mixed together (πολλὰ καὶ μειγνύμενα κακοῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς), or rather, to put it simply, nothing which is not mixed . . .’. These truths are a prominent theme of the *Lives*. On P.’s conception of *mimēsis* in this treatise cf. above pp. 96–7, and on this passage Halliwell 2002: 300–1.

μὴ παντάπασι: another elegant litotes, here almost echoing and reversing 17d ποιητικῇ μὲν οὐ πάνυ μέλον ἐστὶ τῆς ἀληθείας (see n. ad loc.).

25c ἡ Ὅμηρου: sc. μίμησις. That Homer contains paradigms of both virtue and vice was fundamental to the ancient view of his poetry, cf. Hor. *Epist.* 1.2, Dio 55.9, [Plut.] *Hom.* 2.5 (cited below on τῷ ποικίλῳ . . . καὶ πολυτρόπῳ) etc.

πολλὰ . . . ἀστεῖον ‘bidding a very firm farewell to the Stoics, who claim that nothing bad attaches to virtue and nothing good to vice, but that the ignorant man is always mistaken in everything and the good man, on the other hand, universally successful’. This satirical summary of Stoic ethics takes aim at the idea of the perfect sage and the idea that all moral faults are equally ruinous, which is why only the wise man is good, cf., e.g., 449d–e, 1037c–d (= *SVF* III 520), *SVF* I 216 (the σπουδαῖος ἀεὶ κατορθοῦν ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς προστίθεται, III 563 πάντα τε εὖ ποιεῖ ὁ νοῦν ἔχων . . . ὁ δὲ φαῦλος . . . πάντα κακῶς ποιεῖ καθ’ ἣν ἔχει διάθεσιν ἐνεργῶν, 589 καθόλου δὲ τοῖς μὲν σπουδαίοις πάντα τάγαθὰ ὑπάρχειν, τοῖς δὲ φαύλοις πάντα τὰ κακά. Behind the wedge that P. drives between Homer and the Stoics may lie a history of criticism which sought to bring them together, cf. Long 1992, above pp. 13–15. χαίρειν φράζουσα: cf. n. 22f ἐν τῇ συνθεῖαι. κατορθοῦν: a technical term of Stoic ethics, cf. 1037d (= *SVF* III 520), ‘the φαῦλοι are unable κατορθοῦν’, *SVF* I 216 (cited above), IV index. s.v. κατορθόω, κατόρθωμα; a κατόρθωμα was an action done in accordance with the ὀρθὸς λόγος (*SVF* III 501). The ‘opposite’ of κατορθοῦν was ἁμαρτάνειν. τὸν ἀστεῖον: originally meaning ‘witty, clever’ or ‘urbane’ (cf. 29b, e, 35e), this became one of the regular Stoic terms for the wise man, cf. *SVF* III 362 πάντα φρονίμως ποιεῖ ὁ ἀστεῖος, 601, Schofield 1999: 136–40.

ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς ‘in philosophical lectures’. At 76a–b P. similarly contrasts Stoic theory, as expressed ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς, according to which all faults are equally

reprehensible, with the actual attitudes and behaviour of Stoics ἐν τῷ βίῳ καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν; so too, he begins his essay *Contradictions of the Stoics* by insisting that philosophers should ‘practise what they preach’, something which the Stoics plainly did not do (1033a-c). Here ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν καὶ τῷ βίῳ τῶν πολλῶν takes us back to the close links between poetry and ‘real life’. It is appropriate that this is illustrated with a citation from Euripides, more than any other poet (except Menander) the poet of βίος.

οὐκ ἄν . . . σύγκρασις: Euripides fr. 21.3-4 K, from the *Aeolus*. The original context is the necessity of rich and poor to live together to constitute a society, but P.’s quotation gives these verses a wide moral sense. P. cites these verses again at 369b and 474a; for the importance of the idea of ‘mixture’ for P. cf. Duff 1999: index s.v. ‘mixing’.

ἄνευ δὲ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ‘veracity apart’; for this usage cf. 71a ἄνευ δὲ τῆς ὕβρεως, 650d ἄνευ δὲ τούτων. P. now moves from the idea that actions and characters habitually show a mixture of good and bad to the (not entirely) different idea that poetry likes to show change and surprise; just as no one is perfectly good, so no one is always successful.

μάλιστα μὲν ‘preferably’, ‘for choice’; the μὲν is not answered.

τῷ ποικίλῳ . . . καὶ πολυτρόπῳ ‘variety and diversity’, cf. *Marius* 33.1 ὁ πόλεμος τοῖς πάθεσι ποικίλος γινόμενος καὶ ταῖς τύχαις πολυτροπώτατος. The importance of change and the unexpected occurs in several critical contexts. Aristotle’s distinction between ‘simple’ (ἀπλοῖ) plots without περιπέτειαι and ‘complex’ (πεπλεγμένοι) ones with them (*Poetics* 1452a10-21) is clearly an important ancestor of P.’s discussion here. So too, the importance of variety and emotional ‘ups and downs’ is a standard motif of discussions of historical and narrative writing, cf. Cicero, *Fam.* 5.12.4-5, *Inu.* 1.19, *Rhet. Her.* 1.13, Hunter 2009a: 191. [Plut.] *Hom.* 2.5 makes a similar point, in a similar sequence of argument, about Homer: ‘If he presents in his poems not just virtues but also vices of the soul, griefs and joys and fears and desires, we must not hold this against him. As a poet he must imitate not just good characters but also bad (for without these unexpected (παράδοξοι) deeds do not happen), from which the listener can choose the better’; for the language of ‘mixing’ cf. *ibid.* 218 (the close of the essay). Plato’s attitude to ποικιλία in literature was, however, much more ambiguous. For Plato, it is the irrational part of the soul which has πολλήν μίμησιν καὶ ποικίλην, whereas the reasoning part is ‘virtually always the same’ (*Rep.* 10.604e1-3), and this too is an argument against emotionally involving poetry; when Socrates describes Agathon’s speech as παντοδαπός, this is ironic praise (*Symp.* 198b2). At *Laws* 2.665c27, however, the Athenian seems to prescribe constant change and ποικιλία for the choral songs of the new city.

25d ἐκπληξις: cf. n. on 16b ἐκπλήττει. The anaphora of πλείστη is of a common type in P., cf. Kowalski 1918: 155.

αἱ μεταβολαί ‘changes of fortune’.

τὸ δ' ἀπλοῦν ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἄμυθον 'the simple lacks emotion and fictional quality'. In 16b P. had contrasted the ἐκπληξίς produced by a mixture of falsehood and plausibility with verse which is ἄμυθον καὶ ἄπλαστον, and had then (16c) claimed that 'we do not know of any poetry which is ἄμυθος or ἀψευδής'. Here similar ideas about the general qualities of poetry are in play – μῦθοι involve emotion and surprise – though P. is not here denying the possibility of ἄμυθος poetry. Emendation (Kronenberg proposed ἄμουσον) seems unnecessary.

ὁθεν . . . κατορθοῦντας: descriptions of the Stoic wise man resonate again here, cf. n. on 25c πολλὰ . . . ἀστέϊον.

τοῖς θεοῖς: [Plut.] *Hom.* 2.5 (cf. n. on 25c τῷ ποικίλῳ . . . καὶ πολυτρόπῳ) also moves from the mixed and unexpected events in Homer to the part played by his gods in human affairs; here too ἐκπληξίς is at issue.

ἵνα μηδαμοῦ . . . γινομένων 'so that the disturbing and exciting element of poetry should in no place lapse because [the gods] are free from danger and struggle'. The transmitted text is not impossible, but Paton's emendation puts an appropriate emphasis upon the gods, who are key to the sentence, and the fact that the excitement of poetry should not be damaged by exempting them from danger and conflict. P. here accepts that the portrayal of the gods in Homer contains 'poetical' elements which carry no 'real' theological implications; for him, as a Platonist, the gods are indeed free of passion and error. ἀναγωνίστων: ἀναγ – (in the form –ον) is attested only in one manuscript; P. elsewhere uses both this word and ἀνανταγώνιστος 'without rivals', but note *Agesilaus* 5.3 χάριν ἀργὴν καὶ ἀναγώνιστον (cf. ἀργῇ here), where a minority of MSS have ἀνανταγώνιστον.

CHAPTER 8

In accordance with the general principles just stated, young readers must accept that the heroes of poetry are not always to be praised, but are also subject to blame. In reading Iliad 1, for example, they must make critical judgements about the conduct of Achilles and Agamemnon, and similar cases occur throughout poetry. The student must learn to interpret such matters in a way that will help his own moral development. This is particularly important in tragedy, where characters often offer plausible excuses for objectionable actions.

25e ἄρα points to the fact that this idea will prove to be false, cf. Denniston 38.

ἄκροι . . . ὀρθότητος 'outstanding kings and standards of every virtue and correctness'.

βλαβήσεται μέγала 'he will be greatly damaged', cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 5.3.30; μέγала is a kind of 'retained accusative' with the passive verb.

τεθηπώς: cf. n. on 24e ἐκπεπληγμένος καὶ τεθηπώς.

μὴ δυσχεραίνων . . . λέγοντας 'if he feels disgust at nothing in his reading and does not accept the view of someone who criticizes them when they do and say things such as the following. . .'. ἀκούων is subordinate to δυσχεραίνων; for

ἀποδεχόμενος followed by the genitive cf. LSJ s.v. I 4a. There is a doubt about the text (see apparatus), but the meaning seems clear.

αἶ γάρ... λύωμεν: *Iliad* 16.97-100 (Achilles to Patroclus). The verses were athetized by Zenodotus and Aristarchus; the scholia give various reasons, but prominent is the view that they were composed by someone who believed that Patroclus was Achilles' *erōmenos*. P's objection is (and ours should be) perhaps rather to the idea of a great hero wishing for the death of his comrades; cf. the comment of the T-Scholium, 'what have the Myrmidons done wrong?', and Eustath. *Hom.* 1047.36-50. νῶϊν δ' ἐκδύμεν ὄλεθρον 'and we two may escape destruction'; ἐκδύμεν is an optative form, though West prints the uncontracted ἐκδυῖμεν.

οἰκτροτάτην... ἀμφ' ἐμοί: *Odyssey* 11.421-3 (Agamemnon to Odysseus in the Underworld). It is not quite clear what P's objection to these verses is; it is unlikely that there is any danger of P's male students 'approving' Clytemnestra's murder of her husband. Agamemnon is perhaps showing too much womanly emotion over the death of a concubine, but the scholia and Eustath. *Hom.* 1692.62-93.2 do suggest a tradition of disapproval of Agamemnon's action in taking Cassandra back to his home and wife, and it may be that this whole sequence involving adultery on both sides of a marriage and the killing of the king by his wife is meant to incur our disapproval. θυγατρός is the reading of one of P's MSS and most Homeric MSS; it is clearly correct. θυγατρῶν is perhaps just possible, 'among the daughters of Priam the most pitiable voice I heard was Cassandra's', but it seems very likely that P. read the singular.

25f παλακίδι... ἔρεξα 'to have sex first with the concubine, so that she would hate my father. I obeyed her and did the deed', *Iliad* 9.452-3. Phoenix here explains that he had sex with his father's mistress in order to please his aggrieved mother; this episode recurs at 26f below. The citation is syntactically incomplete, and it is possible that v. 451, ἧ δ' αἰὲν ἐμὲ λισσέσκετο γούνων, has fallen out of the text. The scholia and Eustathius (*Hom.* 763.2-8) find various ways to defend Phoenix from the charge of outrageous behaviour towards his father, including the argument that he acted unwillingly but in an effort to reconcile his parents, cf. further on 26f ἔχει... ὀρθῶς. The scholia also report that as early as the fourth century v. 453 was rewritten to read τῇ οὐ πιθόμην (Sosiphanes fr. 6 K-S).

Ζεῦ... ἄλλος: *Iliad* 3.365 (Menelaus exclaims after his sword has broken in the duel with Paris); P. cites this verse again at 743b in the course of a discussion of whether the pre-duel agreement was actually broken by the result. For P., of course, Zeus cannot really be ὀλοός, but there seems to have been a lively ancient discussion of this verse (cf. bT-Scholia on *Iliad* 17.19a); one of Alciphron's parasites (3.42.2) says that he heard the verse from the γραμματικός Autochthon (mentioned several times in the *Iliad* scholia), and it is just such a milieu that P. reflects here. Various efforts were made to defend Menelaus: his anger is just and

‘not blasphemous’, the point is not that Zeus is δλοός per se but that he is ‘more δλοός to Menelaus’, cf. the D-Scholia ad loc. and Schol. Hes. *WD* 127c. Such interpretations are precisely the προφάσεις καὶ παραγωγαὶ εὐπρεπεῖς against which P. is about to warn us; in other contexts, of course, P. himself is very happy to recommend such strategies.

26a μηδὲν ἐπαινεῖν . . . πανοῦργος ‘let not the young man acquire the habit of praising any such passage, and let him not be specious and unscrupulous in producing excuses or contriving specious evasions for wicked acts’. λέγων is rather weak and could be excised, with μηχανώμενος governing both nouns; Hartman proposed εὐπρεπεῖς <λόγων>. παραγωγάς ‘evasions’, ‘escape-routes’, cf. *Fabius Maximus* 3.4 οὐ περιπλοκάς οὐδὲ παραγωγάς . . . πιθανὸς . . . καὶ πανοῦργος; cf. 27f, 673f πανουργία καὶ πιθανότης.

οὐ τελείων . . . ἀγνοίαις ‘who are not perfect or pure or utterly irreproachable, but involved with emotions and false opinions and areas of ignorance’; the spectre of the perfect Stoic wise man rises again: τέλειος is very common in such contexts. For καθάρως in a general moral sense cf., e.g., *Comparison of Alcibiades and Coriolanus* 5.2 τοῖς ἀρίστοις καὶ καθαρωτάτοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων.

διὰ δ’ εὐφύιαν . . . κρεῖττον ‘but who often change themselves for the better through their natural gifts’. P. generally makes a distinction between φύσις, which is given to us, and ἥθος which we develop by education and habit, cf. Duff 1999: chapter 3. εὐφύια is necessary for any improvement, cf. 636b. For the possibility of change for the better cf. 551d–f, where the principal examples are tyrants who ruled beneficently (Gelon, Hieron, Pisistratus etc.), and fr. 172 Sandbach.

ἡ γὰρ . . . δυσχεραίνοντος ‘This kind of preparation and attitude in the young man, being roused and inspired by noble words and actions, but not accepting and showing distaste for the bad . . .’.

συνενθουσιῶντος: P., who uses this verb quite commonly, has a milder form of enthusiasm in mind than that described at Plato, *Ion* 535b–c, but there is a line of descent from such ‘irrational’ engagement with powerful poetry to the reasoning assent to what is honourable that P. wishes to inculcate.

26b πάντα θαυμάζων: this would be completely the wrong attitude for a young man who will eventually turn to philosophy, which preached rather a doctrine of *nil admirari* (Hor. *Epist.* 1.6.1), not to be confused with ‘show contempt for everything’; at 44b–d P. discusses Pythagoras’ τὸ μηδὲν θαυμάζειν, in the context of the proper attitude with which to listen to lectures, i.e. in the stage of education after that which P. is here discussing, cf. Hunter 2009a: 173–4.

πᾶσιν ἐξοικειούμενος ‘accommodating himself to everything’, i.e. finding everything equally acceptable.

καταδεδουλωμένος . . . ὀνομάτων ‘with his judgement made a slave to common reputation by the heroic names’. τῇ δόξει is rather awkward here (Babbitt understands ‘because of his preconceived opinion’), and there is something to be said for Paton’s deletion of the noun (but cf. 927d). The idea of ‘enslavement’

when reading the classics seems to have been common: Dio recommends the reading of more recent literature as well, so that 'we shall not read [such writers] with our judgement (γνώμη) enslaved, as happens when we read the ancients' (18.12). Quintilian, on the other hand, stresses that great writers do make mistakes, so it is folly to imitate every feature of them (cf. 'Aristotle's lisp'); it is, however, a worse fault to criticize what one does not understand, so that if a choice has to be made, it is better to 'approve everything' in the classics rather than to 'criticize many things' (10.1.24–6).

ὥσπερ... τραυλότητα: the same examples of mindless imitation illustrate the behaviour of the flatterer at 53c. Plato's 'round shoulders', his 'stoop', is not otherwise attested, and would seem to sit ill with the claim that the name Πλάτων referred to his sturdy physique (Diog. Laert. 3.4), cf. Riginos 1976: 36–8. That Aristotle lisped is reported by Diog. Laert. 5.1 on the authority of 'Timotheus of Athens in *On Lives*' and cf. also *Suda* α 3929. Diogenes cites this Timotheus on three other occasions (3.5, Plato's weak voice, 4.5, 7.1) for physical characteristics of philosophers, and it is not improbable that he is also the source of Plato's stoop (so Gigon 1958: 151); for Timotheus cf. Mensching 1964, Hahm 1992: 4086. P's argument does not seem a very good one: unquestioning admiration of everything in literature may lead to bad moral habits, but that is rather different from imitating the physical peculiarities of philosophers because one admires their philosophy. Nevertheless, the satirical tone, continued in the following comparison of superstitious behaviour, serves P's rhetoric, and the attempted imitation of gestures and mannerisms, no less than of literary or lecturing style, remains as much a phenomenon of mindless hero-worship today as in antiquity. Seneca, *Ep.* 114.17–19 discusses the unintelligent imitation of features of Sallust's writing.

δεισιδαιμονίας: P's satirical tone here is seen also in his description of the superstitious in his essay *Superstition*: 'When garlanded [for worship] he is pale, he sacrifices and is afraid, he prays with a quavering voice and offers incense with trembling hands, and in general he shows what nonsense Pythagoras talked when he said that we are at our best as we approach the gods; at that time the superstitious are in the most wretched and worst state, since they approach the halls or shrines of the gods as they would the lairs of bears or the holes of snakes or the deep caves of sea-monsters' (169e). Cf. further n. on 34e δεισιδαιμονίας.

θαρραλέως ἐθιζόμενον ἐπιφωνεῖν 'to exclaim confidently, as a matter of habit'. Hartman proposed deleting ἐθιζόμενον or reading ἐθίζεσθαι θαρραλέως ἐπιφωνεῖν, and the latter may be some improvement: having the courage to criticize the characters of literature requires training and habituation; εἰθισμένον (RH) would make a similar point, cf. 28e εἰθισμένοι λέγωμεν. For ἐπιφωνεῖν of cries of approbation or disapproval cf. 46a, LSJ s.v. 3. ὀρθῶς and πρεπόντως are abundantly paralleled in ancient scholia: P's young men are not just undergoing moral training, they are also being prepared to follow in the footsteps of the scholars upon whose work P. draws in this essay.

ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς: the quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon in *Iliad* 1 was perhaps more discussed in ancient Homeric criticism (of all types) than any other scene. Homer merely says that it was Achilles who summoned the assembly which led to the quarrel because Hera put him up to it (vv 55–6), but subsequent criticism (typically) sought more complex reasoning both in Achilles' psychology and medical knowledge and in the structure of the Greek forces. On this passage cf. Hunter 2009a: 191–3.

26c ἀργοῦντι τῷ πολέμῳ 'with the standstill in the war'.

ἰατρικός . . . αἰτιῶν 'and because he had medical knowledge and realized after the ninth day on which these [illnesses] usually come to a crisis that the plague was not of the ordinary type nor the result of common causes'. Achilles' medical knowledge, here suggested also by the 'technical' terms κρίνεσθαι and αἰτία, came, as Homer himself reports (*Iliad* 11. 829–32), from his education by the centaur Chiron, cf., e.g., 677f, [Plut.], *Hom.* 202, Schol. *Iliad* 1.53–5. In some ancient discussions this fact was combined with the allegorical interpretation of Ἥρα as ἥρ: Achilles realized from the quality of the air that something was very wrong, cf., e.g., Schol. *Iliad* 1.53–5, 'Heraclitus', *Hom. probl.* 15. κρίνεσθαι 'reached a *krisis*'. It was standard medical lore, from early Hippocratic treatises on, that illnesses moved in cycles punctuated by κρίσεις, which fell on regularly predictable days (counting from the onset of the disease) and on which the body may or may not expel the harmful influences upon its ordinary working. A standard division is into illnesses with *kriseis* on even days (i.e. the second, fourth, sixth etc.) and those on odd days; 'Heraclitus', *Hom. probl.* 14.6, like P., associates Homer's 'for nine days' (*Iliad* 1.53) with this view. συνεστῶσαν 'arising from', cf. LSJ s.v. συνίστημι B IVc; this word also may be intended to have a medical flavour.

ἀναστὰς δ' . . . ὄχλον 'When [Achilles] stood up he did not make a rousing speech to the common soldiers . . .', cf. *Iliad* 1.58 τοῖσι δ' ἀνιστάμενος μετέφη ποδᾶς ὥκυσ Ἀχιλλεύς. P.'s approval for the fact that Achilles did not, unlike Thersites (cf. Dio 2.22), try to rouse 'the rabble' sits within his general approval for literature that reinforces the social and political hierarchies with which he himself felt comfortable, cf. 26d below. P. normally uses δημαγωγεῖν with a simple accusative, but this need not have been an unchangeable rule, and there are analogous uses with πρὸς, e.g., πολιτεύεσθαι πρὸς τινα (*Marius* 7.1 etc.).

Ἀτρεΐδη . . . ἀπονοστήσειν: *Iliad* 1.59–60, here standing for the whole of Achilles' first speech in which he recommends consulting a seer (vv. 59–67), as the following τοῦ δὲ μάντεως κτλ. makes clear. This speech generated a large body of criticism in antiquity. Some features of P.'s discussion are found also in the analysis of the speech at [Dion. Hal.] *Rhet.* II 336–8 U-R, which sees it as an example of 'figured speech' in which the true meaning is hinted at and foreshadowed implicitly before, in a later speech, it is stated explicitly: Achilles really knows the cause of the trouble but pretends otherwise and suggests seeking for the causes (σχῆμα ζητήσεως καὶ ἀπορίας). This analysis, intended for

students of rhetoric, also makes the speech a model of urbane politeness, of τὸ εὐπρεπές (337.1, 340.1 cf. πρεπόντως). For other details shared with P. cf. 336.19 ἐν συμβούλου σχήματι, 337.19–24 (Achilles addressed himself to Agamemnon, not εἰς τὸ κοινόν). In another analysis (Syrianus, *On Hermogenes* 185.5–14 Rabe), the speech becomes a model for how to make the audience realize the seriousness of the situation without plunging them into despair.

δεδιέναι: cf. *Iliad* 1.78–83.

26d ἐπομόσας . . . εἶπης: a paraphrase of *Iliad* 1.86–9, followed by direct quotation of the second half of v. 90. For P., Achilles' words are grossly insubordinate (Hunter 2009a: 193–4), though the scholia defend them as an example of rhetorical 'hyperbole' in which Agamemnon is flattered (v. 91) and it is almost as though Agamemnon too was encouraging Calchas to speak.

ἐκ δὲ τούτου . . . γενόμενον: P.'s analysis of Achilles' first angry impulses and then, at the instigation of Athena, his putting away of his sword (*Iliad* 1.188–222) interprets this scene as the victory of reason (λογισμός) over passion; this Platonic reading was very common in antiquity, where it was usually combined with an allegorizing view of Athena as 'wisdom' or φρόνησις, cf., e.g., 757b–c (the Stoics), 'Heraclitus', *Hom. probl.* 20, [Plut.] *Hom.* 129. In accordance with the practice of this essay, P. omits the allegorizing interpretation, but keeps the reference to Athena in v. 221 which can be seen as encomiastic of Achilles. At this educational level, P. will not expect the student to ask how Achilles' change of mind can be a victory for reason if he was merely obeying a god; elsewhere, however, P. offers a sophisticated account of precisely such issues, cf. *Coriolanus* 32.3–7, Hunter 2009a: 197–8. P.'s non-allegorical interpretation conforms to his view of the right relation between the reasoning and passionate parts of the soul in *On moral virtue*, cf. n. on 31d ὥσπερ . . . ἄγουσι.

οὔτε . . . συμφέρον 'wrongly, both from the point of view of honour and from that of expediency'; for this pairing cf. 27b below.

ἄψ . . . Ἀθηναίης: *Iliad* 1.220–1.

ἐκκόψαι: cf. n. on 21c πάλιν . . . ἐξέκοψεν; here the philosophical flavour of 'eradicate [passion]' is very clear. P. believed strongly that passions should be controlled, not extirpated, cf. 443c 'reason does not wish to eradicate passion completely (παντάπασιν), for that is neither possible nor desirable', above pp. 8–9. That Achilles is not freed of all anger when he decides not to kill Agamemnon is used by 'Heraclitus' *Hom. probl.* 20.9–11 as evidence that Athena is merely an allegorical figure, for 'a goddess coming to help would surely have contrived a complete pacification of passion'.

μή δυνηθείς: like many post-classical writers, P. often uses μή where classical prose would use οὐ, cf. Radermacher 1925: 212, Bernardakis 1888: lxxviii–iii, above p. 21. Here μή also avoids hiatus after παντάπασι.

μετέστησε . . . γενόμενον 'he put it aside and held it in check, made obedient to reason', cf. n. on 31b ἐπισφαλῶς. That the irrational part of the soul is and should

be subservient to the rational is fundamental to P.'s Platonizing psychology, as set out most fully in the essay *Moral virtue*. Like a young Achilles, Marcus Aurelius prides himself upon the fact that, though he was often angry with his teacher, he never went further and did something which he would regret (1.17.1).

26e πάλιν is frequently used as a connective between instances, cf. 17b, 27b, 29a, 33a etc.

καταγέλαστος: it is not completely clear to what P. is referring. P. may have in mind Agamemnon's assertion (vv. 113–15, referred to immediately below) that he prefers Chryseis to Clytemnestra, for the former is in no way inferior to his wife; the scholia produce various exculpatory defences for this (Agamemnon is emphasizing what a sacrifice he is making in giving her up etc.), and this may suggest a tradition of criticism into which P. here taps. We may also think of vv. 137–9 where Agamemnon threatens to take in compensation the γέρας of Achilles or Ajax or Odysseus, followed subsequently by the actual decision to take Briseis; as was to become clear, this was disastrous folly for a leader.

ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ Χρυσήϊδα: as becomes clear, the reference is to *Iliad* 1. 308–11, and P. may perhaps also be thinking of vv. 140–7, where Agamemnon switches from angry threats to the practical details of returning Chryseis to her father, cf. the next note.

βασιλικώτερος: cf. bT-Schol. *Iliad* 1.140 (see previous note) '[Agamemnon] changes the subject εὐσεβῶς καὶ βασιλικῶς'. We find such approval for Agamemnon again at bT-Schol. *Iliad* 2.273–4, and the T-Schol. on *Iliad* 8.523 distinguishes between Hector acting τυραννικῶς and βασιλικῶς.

δακρύσας . . . λιασθείς: *Iliad* 1.349. P.'s disapproval of Achilles' show of emotion (for P. his tears are αἰσχροὶ καὶ ἔρωτικόν, cf. below) was balanced by scholarly admiration for Homer, cf. the bT-Scholia ad loc.: 'Heroes shed tears readily . . . What is more, Achilles who pursues honour (φιλότιμος ὢν) feels grief at the outrage done to him in being deprived of the love he has had for a long time; perhaps too he feels pity for the slave-girl who is taken away against her will. [Homer] here depicts a lover perfectly: they seek out lonely places so that they can indulge their passion without being disturbed by anyone.' Eustathius (*Hom.* 115.35–40) emphasises φιλοτιμία as a motive for Achilles' tears here and points out that the good man is not ἀπαθής but rather μετριοπαθής (cf. [Plut.] *Consolation to Apollonius* 102d).

οὗτος . . . ἐποίησε: cf. *Iliad* 1.308–11.

τὴν ἀνθρωπον: a dismissive description of a female slave (LSJ s.v. II), here in pointed contrast to τῆς γαμετῆς.

ὁ Φοῖνις: cf. n. on 25f παλλακίδι . . . ἔρεξα.

26f τὸν μὲν . . . καλεοίμην: *Iliad* 9.458–61; like Achilles in the scene cited immediately above, Phoenix changes his mind about an act of violence and does not give way to anger. P. cites vv. 459–60 again at *Coriolanus* 32.5, but with τρέψε φρένας for παῦσεν χόλον, and v. 461 at 72b, cf. Hunter 2009a: 195–8.

ὁ μὲν οὖν . . . φοβηθείς: Plutarch is in fact our sole source for these verses, and there is no trace of them elsewhere, cf. Apthorp 1980: 91–9; West 2001: 208, 250–2 argues that P.’s source for both the role of Aristarchus and for the verses themselves was Seleucus ‘the Homerist’ who worked at Rome under Tiberius (cf. *Suda* σ 200, *RE* II A 1251–6, *LGG* A s.v. Seleucus ‘Homericus’). There are difficulties in taking P.’s assertion here at face value, because Aristarchus did not ‘remove’ (ἐξαιρεῖν, cf. Solon 20.1 West) verses as such, but rather signalled his *athetêsis* of them, so that they did not in fact disappear from the tradition, cf. Ludwig 1884: 73–4, Valgiglio 1973: 178–80, S. West 1982, Montanari 1998, Hainsworth and Griffin ad loc. Moreover, the claim that Aristarchus excised them ‘out of fear’ is strangely abrupt; Hartman suggested that the reason for his fear has dropped out of the text, and this may be correct. Whatever the truth about Aristarchus (and it cannot be certain that he even knew the verses), it is not difficult to imagine an ancient critic shocked by such behaviour from the wise Phoenix, teacher of Achilles (cf., e.g., Lehrs 1865: 340), and/or by the whole thought of a hero contemplating parricide.

ἐχει . . . ὀρθῶς ‘but they are correct for the place where they stand’. P.’s comment reflects the importance to ancient rhetoric and grammar of the idea of *καίρος* – the need to have the right arguments for the right occasion. The requirements of *καίρος* are often invoked by the Homeric scholia, cf. Erbse’s edition of the *Iliad* scholia index s.v., Nünlist 2009: 323 n.20, and Porphyry’s discussion of v. 453 (pp. 139–40 Schrader) of this passage is instructive. Porphyry notes that Phoenix’s account of what he did to his father is *ἀπρεπές*, and among the ‘solutions’ he cites is one ἀπὸ τοῦ καιροῦ, namely that he is criticizing mistresses (*παλλακίδες*) to Achilles, who is precisely angry about what has happened to his mistress. Porphyry also notes that, just as the best doctors are those who have themselves been ill, so the best advisors are those who have erred and recognized their mistakes; this is why Peleus entrusted Achilles to Phoenix, despite the latter’s past. P.’s point on vv. 458–61 is slightly different, but the affinity of approach to Porphyry’s note is striking.

τοῦ . . . διδάσκοντος: Phoenix here plays the rôle of P. and Achilles that of one of P.’s students, or one of the young men at whom this essay is aimed. That Homer ‘teaches’ us is a constant refrain of both P. (cf., e.g., 19f above) and the scholia.

27a λογισμῶι: Phoenix’s behaviour is again made to fit the pattern of that of Achilles, cf. 26d above. It is almost as though P. is making Phoenix’s ‘teaching’ responsible for Achilles’ restraint in Book 1, though of course the chronology of the poem is against that.

μή . . . μηδέ: the participles are probably conditional in sense, though that is not proved by the use of μή, cf. n. μη δυνηθείς in 26d above.

τοῖς παραγοροῦσι forms a link to the example of Meleager which follows, as Meleager refused to listen to very many requests to relent before he finally

yielded to those of his wife (*Iliad* 9.574–96). Although P. says nothing explicit, he may also be thinking of the cases of Achilles and Phoenix. After the verses just quoted, Phoenix tells how he could not bear to stay in his father's house, despite the many entreaties and watchfulness of his kinsmen (*Iliad* 9.462–77). As for Achilles, *πειθόμενοι* might suggest Athena as ἡ παρηγοροῦσα (cf. *Iliad* 1.220–1), but it is perhaps more likely that the critical tradition had placed Nestor in this role, cf. *Iliad* 1.247–91 where he seeks to calm the anger of both Achilles and Agamemnon; the scholia on vv. 247–9 note that Nestor's style is 'able to keep anger in check' (cf. Horace, *Epist.* 1.2.11–12).

τὸν Μελέαγρον: in *Iliad* 9, as part of his plea to Achilles to relent, Phoenix tells the story of how Meleager, angry at his mother who had cursed him for 'the death of her brother', like Achilles withdrew his services from his fellow-citizens who were being besieged by the Kouretes; eventually, however, the pleas of his wife caused him to relent and save the Aetolians, though they did not then honour their promises to reward him (*Iliad* 9.529–99). Phoenix's whole speech to Achilles is designed to make him regain control over the passion of anger (cf. v. 496 δάμασον θυμὸν μέγαν), but P.'s account of the Meleager *paradeigma* is a relatively extensive gloss on what is at best implicit in the Homeric text; Phoenix says merely that his wife's pleas 'stirred [Meleager's] *thúmos*', there 'heart' rather than 'anger' (vv. 595, 598).

ἐπεισάγει '[Phoenix] brings on as well', i.e. in addition to using himself as a *paradeigma*; the verb perhaps suggests the 'introduction' of characters, as in a drama.

τὸ δὲ μὴ . . . συμφέρον 'and praising refusal to follow [the passions] but resisting and overcoming them and changing one's mind [for the better] as honourable and expedient'.

ἡ διαφορά 'the difference', i.e. between praiseworthy and reprehensible attitudes and statements.

ὅπου δ' ἄσαφῃ . . . τὸν νέον 'but where there is uncertainty about the author's view, we should make distinctions, somewhat as follows, and draw the student's attention to them'. The instances which follow concern two characters, Nausicaa and Odysseus, whose essential 'goodness' is not in doubt, but there are, even so, moments at which the student will need guidance between very different interpretations. **ἐφιστάντας:** cf. n. on 17ε ἐτι δὲ μᾶλλον . . . ποιήμασιν, LSJ s.v. VI 2.

ξένον ἄνδρα: ξένος is a crucial term in Nausicaa's meeting with Odysseus, cf. *Odyssey* 6.209 etc., and indeed in the whole of the Phaeacian books of the *Odyssey*.

θεασαμένη picks up *θηεῖτο* at *Odyssey* 6.237; cf. n. on θαυμάσασα in 27b below.

27b τρυφῶσα: as a Phaeacian, Nausicaa might have been affected by the same weaknesses as were habitually ascribed to them (cf. n. on 20a ἀνθρώπους . . . ἀγαπῶντας), and Phaeacian τρυφή is indeed one of the explanations for *Odyssey* 6.244–5 offered by the scholia. It was a familiar idea that

pampered idleness led to mischief; Theophrastus declared that ἔρως was a πάθος ψυχῆς σχολαζούσης (fr. 558 Fortenbaugh), and this commonplace fits P.’s sentiment and expression here.

γάμων ὥραν ἔχουσα: cf. *Odyssey* 6.27, 33–5, 66 etc.

αἶ γάρ . . . μίμνειν: *Odyssey* 6.244–5; the scholia tell us that Aristarchus athetized these verses, though he was in doubt about the status of v. 244, and they – like P. – adduce arguments both for and against Nausicaa. καὶ οἱ ἄδοι: the initial digamma of both οἱ and ἄδοι prevent hiatus or correption here.

τὴν ἀκολασίαν: here again (cf. n. on τρυφῶσα above) P. shares language with the scholia which note ‘the words seem inappropriate for a young girl and immoral (ἀκόλαστοι)’.

εἰ δέ . . . ἄγασθαι ‘But if, having perceived the man’s character in his words and wondered at the deep intelligence of his conversation, she prays to live with such a man rather than some nautical person or dancer from among her own citizens, we should admire her.’ The scholia cite Ephorus’ praise for the verses as revealing a soul with a natural gift for *aretê* (*FGrHist* 70 F 227). P.’s favourable interpretation rather glosses over the fact that the two occasions on which Nausicaa ‘wondered’ at Odysseus (cf. next note) were just after he had had a bath and was looking particularly handsome. St Basil, however, is full of praise for the scenes, as the naked Odysseus is in fact ‘clothed with virtue’ (*Greek lit.* 5.28–32 Wilson). θαυμάσασα: Nausicaa’s reactions to Odysseus’ beauty are marked by ‘wonder’; θεῖτο (*Odyssey* 6.237) was regularly glossed by θαυμάζειν (*Lfgre* s.v. θεέομαι) and cf. *Odyssey* 8.459 θαύμαζεν δ’ Ὀδυσῆα κτλ.

πλωτικῶι . . . πολιτῶν: a disparaging view derived from Alcinous’ statement at *Odyssey* 8.252–3 that the Phaeacians excel in ‘sailing and running and dancing and song’. We may also feel that traditional élite disparagement of rowers and sailors may resonate in P.’s choice of words, cf. 630c, πλωτικοί contrasted with οἱ κομπότεροι, *Demosthenes* 7.2, ‘drunken and ignorant sailors’, Plato, *Laws* 4.707a–b, *Phaedrus* 243c7.

πάλιν: cf. n. on 26e πάλιν.

τῆς Πηνελόπης: cf. *Odyssey* 18.250–80. Modern critics of this famous scene have been more interested in what was in Penelope’s mind as she addressed the suitors, but P.’s interest is centred rather on Odysseus’ pleasure at his wife’s words. For helpful guidance and bibliography on the modern discussion cf. De Jong 2001: 449–51.

οὐκ ἀπανθρώπως ‘not impolitely’, another adverbial litotes.

ἱμάτια . . . ἄλλων: at 18.279 Penelope seems to suggest that the suitors should bring her ἀγλαὰ δῶρα, and then in vv. 291–301 there is a catalogue of what was in fact offered: a robe with golden brooches, a golden necklace, earrings, neck chains and ‘other gifts’.

ἡδόμενος: cf. *Odyssey* 18.281 γήθησεν . . . Ὀδυσσεύς.

27c οὐνεκα . . . θυμόν ‘she was craftily (παρὰ-) eliciting gifts from them, and charming their hearts . . .’, *Odyssey* 18.282. The scholia reveal that some exception

had been taken, notably by Aristophanes of Byzantium, to this description as suggesting, in παρέλκετο, a rather 'low' action; one solution was to separate the prefix from the verb and have it simply govern τῶν, 'she was taking from them'.

τὸν . . . Πολιάγρον 'he surpasses in pandering Poliagros who is mocked in comedy . . .'. Poliagros became a figure proverbial for extracting money from his wife's lovers, cf. Alciphron 3.26.4. He presumably reached P. through one of the works on κωμωιδούμενοι, i.e. prosopographical notes on those mocked in comedy which we know to have been compiled, inter alios, by Ammonius of Alexandria, a pupil of Aristarchus, and Herodicus of Babylon, cf. Steinhausen 1910. Aelian, *VH* 5.8 claims that Poliagros hanged himself after being κωμωιδούμενος. Wilamowitz 1962: 551–2 suggested that the Poliagros mocked in comedy was to be identified with an Athenian who moved an honorary decree for Klazomenai in 387 BC (*IG* ed. min. II 28). It is tempting to think that Odysseus himself had been portrayed in (? fourth-century) comedy as a pimp.

εὐδαίμων . . . τρέφων: adesp. com. 708 K-A. The 'heavenly goat' was originally Amaltheia on whose milk the infant Zeus was nourished, but the phrase came to be proverbial for those who provided great opportunities for money-making (δωροδοκία) to others, cf. Kassel-Austin on Cratinus fr. 261. The verses are almost certainly lacunose iambic trimeters, though more exotic rhythms have been suggested.

εἰ δὲ μάλλον . . . θαρροῦν 'But if rather he thought that he would have them [sc. the suitors] in his power because, on account of their hopes, they were not expecting what was to happen, his pleasure and confidence are justified.' There is some uncertainty about the text (Bernardakis' διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα θαρροῦντας καὶ κτλ. adds little and seems improbable before θαρροῦν), but not about the intended sense.

τῇ διαριθμήσει τῶν χρημάτων: when Odysseus wakes up on Ithaca, he does not know where he is, suspects the Phaeacians of having deceived him and counts the gifts that they had given him to make sure that they are all still there, cf. 13.215 ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ τὰ χρήματ' ἀριθμήσω κτλ. P.'s phrase is derived from this Homeric verse, but is also evocative of the ancient titles of Homeric episodes (Aelian, *VH* 13.14), several of which at least pre-date the division of the poems into books. P.'s analysis is clearly in touch with the same strands of criticism as are reflected in the scholia on v. 215: '[He says this] not because he is greedy (μικρολόγος), but using this as evidence as to whether [the Phaeacians] have wronged him concerning his return to his fatherland . . . If none of the gifts are missing, then he has not arrived in a foreign land.' Cf. 27d below, Hunter 2009a: 198–9.

ἄ . . . ἀπέπλευσαν: just as a relative pronoun sometimes depends on a participle in its clause rather than on the finite verb (K-G II §490.5), so here, where we might have expected a subordinate participle (συνεκθέντες . . . ἀπέπλευσαν), we have rather two verbs (II §490.2), only the first of which governs the relative pronoun.

ἐν ἐρημίαι . . . γεγονώς ‘being in such isolation and with such uncertainty and obscurity in his affairs’. ἐρημία suggests both the apparent lack of anyone to help him and the fact that he has no idea where he is – there are no familiar landmarks because Athena has changed the appearance of everything (vv. 194–6).

27d μή τί . . . ἔχοντες: *Odyssey* 13.216, with οἱ rather than μοι to accommodate the verse to P.’s syntax. ἐπὶ νηὸς ὄγοντες is the reading of most MSS of Homer; ἔχοντες is a very familiar kind of anthological substitution (but cf. also Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.658), but ἐκ νηός, which most MSS read here and which has probably come into some Homeric texts from 13.283 where it is obviously correct, could here only give the sense ‘having something [from the things] from the ship, i.e. something which should be on land’. This is perhaps just about tolerable, but P. or his source probably read ἐπὶ.

τὴν φιλοπλουτίαν: the subject of an essay in which P. condemns all forms of this vice (523c–8b).

περὶ τῆς Ἰθάκης . . . χρημάτων ‘being uncertain about Ithaca he thinks that the safety of the gifts is proof of the fair-dealing of the Phaeacians – for they would not have brought him to a strange land [i.e. a land other than Ithaca] and cast him ashore and abandoned him without profit, keeping away from the gifts . . .’. P., who clearly approves this reasoning, is here very close to the argument and wording of the Scholia on v. 215 (cited in n. on 27c τῇ διαριθμήσει τῶν χρημάτων).

τεκμηρίω: cf. τεκμαιρόμενος in the Scholium on v. 215 cited above.

τὴν πρόνοιαν: for *Odysseus’* πρόνοια cf. Horace’s *providus* in an adaptation of the opening verse of the *Odyssey* at *Epist.* 1.2.19.

ἄξιον ἐπαινεῖν: a variation on ἄξιον ἔγασθαι with which P. concluded his analysis of the two possible interpretations of Nausicaa’s statement (27b).

τὴν ἔκθεσιν αὐτῆν: that *Odysseus* slept through his arrival and depositing on Ithaca and the departure of the Phaeacians led to much ancient discussion, cf. Hunter 2009a: 199–201. Already Aristotle refers to τὰ ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐαι ἄλογα τὰ περὶ τὴν ἔκθεσιν (*Poetics* 1460a35); Heraclides Ponticus explained that the Phaeacians wanted to keep their way of life and location of their land secret from possible enemies and so made a quick getaway (fr. 175 Wehrli = 104 Schüttrumpf, cf. Schol. *Od.* 7.318, 13.119, Heath 2009: 261–3). Heraclides and the scholia focus principally on the reasoning and motivation of the Phaeacians; P., appropriately for the general thrust of his argument, is more concerned with the character to whom his students will be drawn, namely *Odysseus*. It is very instructive of the whole approach to Homer of the traditions which P. reflects in this essay that the depositing of the sleeping *Odysseus* on Ithaca is treated as a ‘historical fact’; what is at issue is only whether the sleep was real or feigned.

καθεύδοντος ‘while *Odysseus* slept’.

Τυρρηνοῦς: a rich ancient tradition, starting for us with Hesiod, *Theogony* 1011–16 (*Odysseus* and *Circe*, whose location in this tradition was near the Bay

of Naples, were the ancestors of the rulers of ‘all the Tyrrhenians’), connected Odysseus with Italy, and specifically Etruria, both during and after his *nostos*, cf. 294c–d (= Aristotle fr. 511 Gigon), Theopompus, *FGrHist* 115 F 354 (Odysseus died at Cortona ‘greatly honoured by the citizens’), Lycophron, *Alex.* 805–6, Malkin 1998: 156–209. The story of Odysseus’ habitual drowsiness is not, however, attested elsewhere; it sounds almost like a joke from comedy.

27e δυσεντεύκτου ‘difficult to converse with, forbidding’; contrast τὴν ἐντευξιν αὐτοῦ πολλὸν νοῦν ἔχουσιν in 27b.

εἰ δ’ οὐκ . . . ἀποδέχονται ‘but if his sleep was not genuine, but both being ashamed to send the Phaeacians away without gifts and hospitality and unable to escape the notice of his enemies if they were with him, he found a way of concealing his dilemma by feigning to be asleep, [the critics] approve [his action]’. The second part of Odysseus’ alleged calculation sounds like a variant on Heraclides’ explanation that it was the Phaeacians who wished to escape the notice of the Ithacans. τῆς ἀπορίας covers both Odysseus’ ‘embarrassment’ and his ‘resourcelessness’. i.e. the fact that he has nothing with which to thank the Phaeacians.

καὶ ταῦτα . . . προαίρῃσιν ‘By pointing these things out to the young we shall prevent an inclination to favour bad characters and encourage an admiration and preference for the good.’ The language has a philosophical flavour – φορὰ (cf. LSJ s.v. A II 4), προαίρῃσις – as befits what is at stake, no less than the students’ own moral development.

εὐθύς ‘unhesitatingly’.

27f πιθανοὺς καὶ πανούργους ‘specious and unscrupulous’, cf. 26a; for this combination cf. 673f.

οὐκ . . . καλὰ: Sophocles fr. 839 R, also cited by Stobaeus 3.3.32 in the section περὶ φρονήσεως.

αὐτός ‘Sophocles himself’. The transmitted οὗτος is less rhetorically effective than Emperius’ conjecture: Sophocles himself disproves the claim of fr. 839.

λόγους . . . αἰτίας ‘smiling words and generous motives’. ἐπιγελῶντας may be a variation for λόγοι εὐπρόσωποι ‘(false) words with a fair face’, cf. Dem. 18.149 (with Wankel’s note), LSJ s.v. 2; the standard term in this sense is εὐπρεπής.

ὁ σύσκηνος αὐτοῦ ‘his fellow worker in the theatre’, i.e. Euripides.

τὴν τε Φαίδραν . . . Ἰππολύτου ‘he has represented Phaedra as actually reproaching Theseus on the grounds that it was his transgressions that made her fall in love with Hippolytus’. τε is answered only by τοιαύτην δέ below. The reference will be to Euripides’ first (lost) *Hippolytus*, cf. test. v Kannicht. There is no modern consensus on how like the extant *Hippolytus* the first play was, cf. Collard-Cropp 2008: 466–71; no fragment of the lost play seems to fit the situation envisaged here. παρανομίας: Theseus’ reputation as a womanizer and rapist was perhaps second only to that of his friend Heracles, cf. *Theseus* 20.1–2 (= Hesiod fr. 298 M–W), 29.1, Istros, *FGrHist* 334 F 10 who contrasts Theseus’

rapes (Helen, Ariadne etc.) with his νόμιμοι γάμοι; P.'s disapproval of Phaedra's argument is probably based not so much on a view that (married) men should be allowed to have 'affairs', but rather on the fact that there can be no excuse for Phaedra's actions, certainly not one that implicated her husband in guilt. This false reasoning is then of a piece with Helen's self-exculpatory rhetoric in the *Trojan Women* (next note).

28a τῇ Ἑλένῃ: in her defence speech in Euripides' *Trojan Women* Helen begins by blaming Hecuba for having given birth to 'the source of the troubles' (vv. 919–20). P.'s worry is very like that of the chorus after Helen's speech: λέγει | καλῶς κακοῦργος οὔσα· δεινὸν οὖν τόδε (vv. 967–8). P. could have used this as an instance where the poet himself tells us how to judge the characters.

κολάζεσθαι: Helen's only hope of herself escaping punishment is to find someone else for the Greeks to blame, but she does not explicitly urge Menelaus to 'punish' Hecuba. She does, however, ironically urge him to 'punish Aphrodite' who gave her to Paris (v. 948).

πανοῦργον ('admirably') clever', rather than 'unscrupulous' as at 27f.

μηδὲ . . . εὐρησιλογίαις 'nor let him smile at such ingenious arguments'.

μᾶλλον ἤ: probably an emphatic way of saying 'no less than', but the phrase is perhaps to be taken literally: words of justification for wicked actions in literature are more dangerous and potentially influential than the actions themselves.

CHAPTER 9

Finally, it is important to ask why something is said. This does not matter so much with sayings of merely scholarly or antiquarian interest, as it does with those which affect moral character. Readers must learn to be critical and, if no proper justification is given, must reject the sentiment. This concludes the discussion of how to ensure that reading poetry does no moral harm. More positive consideration will follow.

28a ἐπὶ πᾶσι 'finally'.

ὁ . . . Κάτων: P. tells the same story about Cato the Younger at *Cato minor* 1.5; there he adds that the *paidagōgos*, whose name was Sarpedon, was a cultured man who used λόγος more than violence (cf. λόγον in this sentence). Here the literature we read, and by implication the teachers who guide our reading, take the place of the *paidagōgos*.

28b τοῖς δὲ ποιηταῖς . . . τὸ ὑποκείμενον 'and poets, like *paidagōgoi* or lawgivers, are not to be believed unless their material has a reason'. μὲν . . . δέ here points, not a contrast, but a likeness. τὸ ὑποκείμενον is here 'what [the poets] lay down', almost 'the subject of the text'.

μάταιον ὄν: the addition of the participle (DR) seems to improve the balance, cf. Paton's conjecture at 23f (ἄξιον ὄν).

τῶν τοιούτων looks forward to the following examples.

πικρῶς ‘relentlessly’, with the nuance also of ‘pedantically’, cf. 41a, 45a, 659f (a contrast between interpreting a word πικρῶς καὶ σοφιστικῶς and interpreting it κοινῶς), Dion. Hal. *Lysias* 6.4, Demosthenes used the ‘rounded style’ περιέργως καὶ πικρῶς. P.’s attitude here is not unlike that which he takes to the pursuit of arcane glosses (22c above) and reflects one important strand of the educational and grammatical traditions. The scholiast on Sophocles, *Electra* 539 says that we should not worry about minor inconsistencies in literature, such as about the names of Menelaus’ children, but rather concentrate on ‘ethical and useful’ material. Seneca contrasts pointless antiquarianism, not with a philosophical approach to poetry, but with philosophy itself (*Ep.* 88.6–8).

μηδέ . . . πινόντων ‘and do not place the pouring-ladle above the mixing-bowl while the drinking is going on’, Hesiod, *WD* 744–5. The verses seem to have been a notorious puzzle for grammarians; ‘Tryphon’, *De tropis* 23 West gives them as a standard example of an ἀνίγμια (cf. n. on 28f πλεῖται . . . ἔλωμεν). The scholia offer two allegorical interpretations, ‘do not put private interests ahead of the common good’ and ‘do not think the part greater than the whole’, which may go back to P.’s commentary (fr. *93 Sandbach); for the style of such interpretations cf. the ‘Pythagorean’ ἀνίγμια cited and explained at [Plut.] *The education of children* 12d–f, but P.’s allusion to the Hesiodic passage at 156d suggests the rather simpler meaning ‘do not stint on the wine during a symposium (of the uneducated)’.

ὅς δέ . . . ὀρεξάσθω ‘whoever from his own carriage reaches another chariot, let him stab with his spear’, *Iliad* 4.306–7 (Nestor giving instructions to his comrades). The initial digamma of ὦν avoids elision of ἀπό. The verses puzzled ancient commentators: Was the ‘other chariot’ a friendly or an enemy one? Just what action with the spear was Nestor suggesting? Eustathius (*Hom.* 475.26–476.5) reports four different explanations, all of which he considers ‘reasonable’, whereas, for his present purposes, P. considers the matter of interest only to pedants. This passage was also of interest to grammarians as one where, as they saw it, Homer switched from the ‘narrative’ to the ‘mimetic’ mode without warning, cf. bT-Schol. on *Iliad* 4.127a, Fantuzzi 1988: 47–85.

28c τῶν δὲ . . . πίστιν ‘but they accept the validity of more important passages without questioning . . .’. P. offers two examples which he then discusses in reverse order.

δουλοῖ . . . κακά ‘even a bold-hearted man is enslaved by knowledge of disasters which befell his mother or his father’, Euripides, *Hippolytus* 424–5, much cited in the gnomological and anecdotal traditions (e.g. Bion fr. 53 Kindstrand, and cf. also [Plut.] *The education of children* 1c).

μικρὸν . . . πεπραγότα ‘the man of misfortune must pitch his thoughts low’, Euripides fr. 957 K; for the thought cf. also Eur. fr. 81 K.

ἄπτεται ‘affect’, ‘influence’.

ἂν μὴ . . . λέγωμεν, διὰ τί . . . ‘unless we respond to each of them, as a matter of habit, by saying: “Why . . .”’. P. encourages us to debate with the words of characters, cf. Hunter 2009a: 172–4.

ἀνταίρειν ‘resist’, ‘confront’, cf. LSJ s.v. II.

ἀταπείνωτον: cf. 33d below ἄδεῃ καὶ μεγαλόφρονα καὶ ἀταπείνωτον.

ἂν ἐκ πατρὸς . . . ἀμαθίαν: P. gives a predominantly intellectual and moral sense to the κακά of *Hippolytus* 425, perhaps – though this would not be necessary for P. – under the influence of the following verses in Phaedra’s speech, where she makes a somewhat unexpected switch (cf. Barrett ad loc.) to the claim that the only thing which matters is γνώμη δίκαια καὶ ἀγαθή (vv. 426–7). For P. virtue was indeed teachable, and so its opposite could be ἀμαθία, cf. 31f below, 72a, 439a–d (the opening of the essay ‘Can virtue be taught?’); on P.’s ideas of inherited characteristics cf. Albini 1997.

28d μέγα φρονεῖν picks up μικρὸν φρονεῖν from the other Euripidean example which P. has adduced. A proper pride in one’s virtue and wisdom is to be encouraged, cf. 32d–e below (μέγα φρονεῖν again).

ὁ γὰρ οὕτως . . . ἑαυτὸν ‘The man who thus confronts and resists and does not commit himself, broadside on, to any argument, as to a wind . . .’. The nautical metaphor in πλάγιον . . . παραδιδούς ἑαυτὸν – being broadside to the wind is a dangerous position for a ship – recurs at 66b and 706e (cf. Teodorsson 1996: 85); for the literal use of this expression cf. *Themistocles* 14.2.

βλάξ . . . ἐπτοῖσθαι ‘a silly man tends to get all excited at every word’, Heraclitus fr. 87 D–K, also cited (and attributed) at 41a; P. encourages a cool rationalism, unimpeded by emotional excitement, cf. Euripides, *Ba.* 214 (of Pentheus) ὡς ἐπτόηται. Modern scholars debate whether Heraclitus was referring to ‘a silly man’ or ‘all mankind (who are silly)’ and whether the verb means ‘get carried away’ or ‘gets frightened’. Ancient scholars saw that βλάξ was connected with μαλακός, cf., e.g., *Et. Mag.* 198.57–199.13, Olympiodorus, *Commentary on Plato’s Gorgias* 147 Westerink (on 488a8).

διακρούσεται ‘will thrust aside’, cf. 70d, 168f, LSJ s.v. II.

ταῦτα . . . ἀκρόασιν: a formal closure to the ‘preventative’ part of the subject.

CHAPTER 10

As grape-clusters are often concealed by foliage, so the valuable things in poetry may be concealed by the language and the fiction. It is for the reader to isolate what is valuable and fix his mind upon them. First, he must attend to the differing reactions attributed to different persons and see how the nobler characters react more appropriately. Examples in Homer are easy to find. So too, nations, as well as individuals differ: the Greeks in the Iliad are morally far superior to the Trojans.

For the framing structure of Chapters 10, 11 and 12 – opening simile and closural summary – see above pp. 20–1. The device of opening a new topic with a simile is common in P., cf., e.g., 22a–b above, 471a, 486a.

28d ὥσπερ . . . κατασκιαζόμενος ‘as amidst the leaves and shoots of a vine, when they grow in profusion, the fruit is often concealed and lies hidden in their

shadow . . .'. Vine-imagery for literature and its effects takes us back to 15e–f. P. uses an image related to this one in *On listening to lectures* to prescribe a similar attitude for his students at the next level: 'Therefore one should strip off the excess and emptiness of the style and look for the fruit, imitating not garland-weavers but rather the bees. These women . . . weave a work which is pleasant but ephemeral and fruitless, whereas bees . . . take [from the flowers] something useful and fly back to their particular work. So too the keen and genuine student . . .' (41e–42a).

28e ἐν ποιητικῇ . . . περιεχυμένοις 'amidst the surrounding profusion of poetic diction and stories'; the participle goes with both nouns. Poetic language and stories are the *dulce* which may conceal the *utile*.

ἀποπλανᾶσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων 'be distracted from the facts', i.e. from the hard core of valuable (moral) information in the text.

ἐμφύεσθαι 'cling to' 'fasten on to', cf. n. on 30d ἐμφύεται, 131e.

οὐ χεῖρόν ἐστι 'it is not a bad idea', 'one could do worse', i.e. (as also in English) 'it is a *good* idea', cf. 21a, 21d, 544f, Pl. *Phaedo* 105a6, Chrysippus, *SVF* II 908, LSJ s.v. χείρων III 2. This is now the main clause of the sentence; everything which preceded was part of the ἐπεὶ clause.

ἀψάμενον τύπῳ τῶν πραγμάτων 'touching the subject in outline'; με (as the author) is understood as the subject of διελθεῖν and the participle. For τύπῳ cf. Pl. *Rep.* 3.414a6, Arist. *EN* 2.1104a1–2, Dio Chrys. 7.114, all contrasting a treatment τύπῳ with one δι' ἀκριβείας or ἀκριβῶς, LSJ s.v. VIII 2.

κατασκευάς 'elaborations', cf. n. on 16b κατασκευῆς.

ἐπιδεικτικώτερον: P. modestly contrasts his little utilitarian essay with 'showier' treatises where the author is concerned to offer a display (ἐπιδείξις) of his style; at *Comp. Dem. Cic.* 1.2 ὄγκος and μεγαλοπρέπεια are marks of the epideictic style. It suits P.'s rhetoric to downplay the style of this treatise: what matters, as with poetry itself, is the moral guidance, not the fine style. P. may have specific works in mind, but, if so, it would be hazardous to try to identify them.

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν seems to cover the topic of 'difference' between characters which is closed at 29d, and is then picked up by ἔτι δὲ καί which introduces the subject of difference between nations.

γινώσκων 'as he gets to know'.

προσηκόντως takes us back to the earlier discussion of τὸ πρέπον in relation to characters (18d–f).

28f οὐ γὰρ σοί . . . πολλίεθρον: *Iliad* 1.163–4, with γὰρ for Homer's μὲν, perhaps to avoid an unanswered μὲν in the quotation. P. may (as often) have in mind more of this speech than he actually quotes: at 167 Achilles says σοὶ τὸ γέρας πολὺ μέζον, which is close to Thersites' sentiment, and it is the similarity of the two characters' sentiments, as well as the actual language used, which is important here. At 541c–d P. collects various passages, including *Iliad* 1.128–9,

to demonstrate the difference between Achilles with and without his anger; here what he says is appropriate, despite his anger. Cf. further 31a–b below.

πλεῖται . . . ἔλωμεν: *Iliad* 2.226–8; Zenodotus had athetized vv. 227–8, just as he athetized 2.231–4, part of which P. is about to cite. The similarity between Thersites' abusive speech in Book 2 and what Achilles has to say in Book 1 was familiar to ancient readers of Homer and has been very much discussed by their modern successors. The ἀκαρία of Thersites' speech is stressed in the scholia (cf. AbT-Schol. on 2.226a, Eustath. *Hom.* 208.39–209.11), and P.'s point is that, whereas it was right for (even an angry) Achilles to say what he said, it was not appropriate for a Thersites to say similar things, because of his badness of character. Eustathius (*Hom.* 209.11) illustrates the point by citing Euripides, *Hecuba* 294–5: 'the same speech, when it comes from persons of no account and from those of repute, does not carry the same weight'. Quintilian 11.1.37 makes exactly the same point and proceeds to illustrate it with Thersites: 'Thersites' words against Agamemnon are ridiculed, but give them to Diomedes or someone of that rank and they will seem signs of greatness of mind' (trans. DR). It may or may not be an accident that 'Tryphon', *De tropis* 22 West [= West 1965: 246] cites these verses as an example of one type of σύλληψις, in which one individual is counted in a plural group, immediately before citing Hesiod, *WD* 744–5 as an example of an ἀνιγμῶς (cf. 28b above); when 'Tryphon' explains that in these verses Thersites 'numbers himself among the heroes, though he is a weak nobody', he makes exactly the same point as P. is about to do with the citation of *Iliad* 2.231.

29a αἶ κε . . . ἐξολοπάξαι: *Iliad* 1.128–9, Achilles urges Agamemnon to return Chryseis and offers (128a, not cited) three or four times the compensation, should the Greeks be successful; P. quotes these verses also at 541c as an example of Achilles' μετρίότης.

ὅν κεν . . . Ἀχαιῶν: *Iliad* 2.231, Thersites mocks Agamemnon's greed for the gold which a Trojan would offer as ransom for the son 'whom I or one other of the Achaeans may bring back in bonds'. For P., Achilles had spoken with a wise generosity of spirit and was in a position to speak of military conquest; Thersites, on the other hand, is a buffoon whose proud ἐγὼ absurdly places him on the same level as Achaean fighters, cf. 'Tryphon' cited on 28f πλεῖται . . . ἔλωμεν. He is, in other words, a 'mock Achilles', a parody of 'the best of the Achaeans'; the scholia on v. 231 make a similar point without explicitly mentioning Achilles, and cf. also Eustath. *Hom.* 209.38–43. This verse is one of two extracts from Thersites' speech cited by Philodemus, *On the good king* xxxv Dorandi as 'the parody of a man who talks rubbish'; this is presumably a reference to Thersites' echoes of Achilles, and the context may be rather similar to that of P.

τῇ ἐπιπώλῃσει 'the review' or perhaps 'Review', a title which became attached, presumably during the Hellenistic age, to *Iliad* 4.223–421 in which Agamemnon goes around and encourages the Greeks; Eustathius (*Hom.* 435.12)

claims that this title was sometimes extended to all of Book 4. This title, which derives from *Iliad* 4.231, 250 ἐπεπωλείτο στίχος ἀνδρῶν, is not in the list of Homeric episode titles at Aelian, *VH* 13.14, but is first attested in Strabo (9.1.10); it also occurs in the Scholia to *Iliad* 3.320 and 9.34.

λοιδορήσαντος: Agamemnon (*Iliad* 4.370–400) accuses Diomedes of avoiding battle and contrasts this with the martial prowess of Diomedes' father, Tydeus.

αἰδεσθεις . . . αἰδοίσιοι: *Iliad* 4.402. The scholia praise Diomedes' σωφροσύνη because he preferred to let his deeds do the talking; cf. further n. on 29b ὁ Διομήδης below, and for the importance of silence before one's commanders 29d. At 781c P. explains why αἰδοῖος is an appropriate epithet for kings, for 'those who are least afraid have most cause for αἰδώς'. On Diomedes' silence in Book 4 cf. further Martin 1989: 71–2.

οὐ μηδεις λόγος 'a man of no account', cf. LSJ s.v. λόγος I 4, οὐδαμινός of Thersites in 'Tryphon' loc. cit. (n. on 28f πλεῖται . . . ἔλωμεν).

Ἀτρεΐδῃ . . . εἶναι: *Iliad* 4.404–5. Agamemnon had not contrasted Sthenelos unfavourably with his father, Kapaneus; in fact, Agamemnon had said nothing about Sthenelos, which perhaps suggests a second meaning for οὐ μηδεις λόγος, 'of whom there had been no word'. As with Achilles and Thersites, Sthenelos unfortunately places himself on the same level as fighters far better than he, but at 540e–f P. argues that he is not to be censured too strongly because he was defending a friend who had been abused (λοιδορηθέντος).

29b ἡ γὰρ . . . παρορωμένη 'Attention to such difference . . .', an example of a noun constructed with a participle where English uses two nouns, one dependent upon the other (sometimes referred to as the '*ab urbe condita*' construction, i.e. 'from the city having been founded' = 'from the foundation of the city'), cf. *MT* §829, K-G II 78.

ἀσπεῖον 'a good thing'.

ἀτυφίαν 'unpretentiousness'.

περιαυτολογία 'self-advertisement', 'praise of self', defined by Alexander, *Rhet.* III 4 Sp. and illustrated with a citation of Achilles' words at *Iliad* 21.108. The noun is found first in P. (cf. also 41c, 44c), although the verb is already in Philodemus, *On the good king* xxxix.29 Dorandi. How to praise oneself tactfully was a matter of great concern to rhetoricians (cf. Quintilian 11.1.15–28, Alexander, *Rhet.* loc. cit.) and moralizers, and P. wrote an essay on the subject (539a–47f).

ἀπροσαύδητον: in fact Diomedes himself rebukes Sthenelos and defends Agamemnon's harsh words (*Iliad* 4. 411–18).

τοῦ δ' Ὀδυσσεώς: Agamemnon accused Odysseus, in fairly harsh terms, of shirking the battle (*Iliad* 4.338–48), and Odysseus answers in kind (vv. 350–5). P. now praises the words with which Agamemnon immediately heals the rift, cf. Martin 1989: 70–1.

δηχθέντος is omitted by most MSS, but it explains χωόμενοιο in the Homeric text, just as the D-scholia gloss that word as ὀργισθέντα.

ἡμίψατο καὶ προσηγόρευσεν: P. likes doubling verbs up (above p. 22), but this is a Plutarchan version of a familiar type of Homeric speech introduction, here replacing *Iliad* 4.356, τὸν δ' ἐπιμειδήσας προσέφη κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων, to introduce v. 357, which is thereby integrated into P.'s own syntax; such rewriting followed by direct quotation is an elegance common in P., cf., e.g., 29d, 29f–30a below on the differences between the Greek and Trojan armies.

ὦς . . . μῦθον [Lord Agamemnon addressed him with a smile] when he realized that he was angry, and took back what he had said', *Iliad* 4.357.

παῖσιν . . . πάντων: masculine, rather than neuter: Agamemnon did not apologize to Sthenelos, but he did to Odysseus.

θεραπευτικὸν καὶ οὐκ ἀξιώματικόν 'shows subservience and lack of self-respect'.

ὁ Διομήδης: P. now picks up the story of Diomedes and Agamemnon by moving from Book 4 to the opening scenes of Book 9. The scholia comment on Diomedes' παρρησία in very similar terms to P.: in Book 4 Diomedes kept quiet, but after his great exploits of the intervening books, which are catalogued by the bT-Schol. on 9.31, he feels free to respond, cf. bT-Schol. on 4.402, 9.31, [Plut.] *Hom.* 2.168; for the treatment in [Dion. Hal.] *Rhet.* cf. below on 29c δαίνυ . . . βουλεύῃσι. The scholia also stress that Diomedes' words are now εὐκαιρα, in contrast (for example) to Thersites' attack upon Agamemnon and Calchas' statement to Agamemnon (at least as P. sees it).

29c ἀλκὴν . . . Δαναοῖσιν: *Iliad* 9.34, referring back to the scene of Book 4 discussed in 29a above.

εὖ δ' ἔχει καὶ introduces a new example of contrasted characters, Calchas and Nestor.

φρονίμου . . . πανηγυρικοῦ: the chiasmic order reinforces the difference between the two.

ὁ . . . Κάλχας: at *Iliad* 1.94–5 Calchas, encouraged by Achilles to speak, states that Apollo's anger is 'on account of his priest, whom Agamemnon dishonoured, not giving back his daughter or receiving ransom for her'. P. here regards this speech as an example of 'accusation and abuse' (29d) which showed a disregard for the καιρός (cf. n. on 26f), because it was delivered openly in front of the whole Greek army (cf. πανηγυρικοῦ). Even with allowance for the habitual deference which P. shows to Agamemnon in this essay, this is at best a minority view of Calchas' speech, and one which finds little resonance in ancient criticism; for a possible explanation cf. below on Nestor's speech.

πανηγυρικοῦ: Calchas makes, in P.'s view, a 'showy' appeal to a mass audience, cf. [Plut.] *The education of children* 6a–b, one should keep the young as far as possible from τῶν πανηγυρικῶν λήρων, 'for to please the many is to displease the wise'; the bT-Scholia on *Iliad* 1.93b note how Calchas wins the goodwill of τὸ πλῆθος, and P. lays stress upon this aspect of the contrast, ἐν πλῆθει . . . πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος.

οὐ συνέϊδε: there may be a sarcastic evocation of *Iliad* 1.69–70 Κάλχας... ὃς εἶδ' ἃ τ' ἔόντα τὰ τ' ἔσόμενα πρό τ' ἔόντα; one thing he did not know was the rhetorical καιρός.

ἐν πλήθει... ἐπαγαγόντος: P. rewrites Agamemnon's own abuse of Calchas at *Iliad* 1.109–13, καὶ νῦν ἐν Δαναοῖσι (~ ἐν πλήθει) θεοπροπέων κτλ.

διαλλαγῶν: cf. bT-Schol. on *Iliad* 9.104 (Nestor's second speech) ἐπὶ διαλλαγῆς τὸν βασιλέα φέρων κτλ.

δαίνυ... βουλεύσῃ: *Iliad* 9.70, 74–5. P. cites these verses together again at 714b. In vv. 71–3 Nestor notes that Agamemnon's tents are full of wine and that he is richly provided for; whether P. himself or his source is responsible for the omission of these verses, it is clear that they do not suit the point that P. is making, and they also seem uncomfortably like Thersites' words at 2.226–8 which P. has just reproved (28f).

In chapter 13 of the essay 'On figured speeches (α') transmitted with the *Rhetoric* wrongly ascribed to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (314–19 U-R, cf. Russell 2001, Dentiche di Accadia 2010), the author analyzes the speeches of Diomedes and Nestor in *Iliad* 9 at a more sophisticated level than does P., but the two discussions have much in common; for [Dion. Hal.] both speeches are 'figured' (ἐσχηματισμένοι). Diomedes' παρρησία (315.1, 23, 316.1, and cf. [Plut.] *Hom.* 168 with Hillgruber 1994/9:II 360–2) seems to be an example of 'untimely abuse' (314.20) and κατηγορία (315.19), and is puzzling because in Book 4 he had held his peace and even reproved Sthenelos; the explanation, which is that of P., [Plut.] *Hom.* 168 and the scholia, that Diomedes feels able to speak because of his intervening exploits, will not do because it would mark him as an ἀπαίδευτος who did not know how to behave when successful (315.16–18). The real explanation is that this is in fact a speech advising and helping Agamemnon, but it is 'figured' as a speech of accusation. As for Nestor's speech, the real aim of this is to begin to prepare the ground for the embassy to Achilles (317.8–10, cf. P.'s 'wishing to institute discussion about reconciliation with Achilles'), but he 'refuses to speak openly and explicitly to rebuke Agamemnon, and sends the younger men away, so that Agamemnon should not feel shame at being rebuked in their hearing' (318.1–5). [Dion. Hal.]'s citation omits, as does P., vv. 71–3 (318.11–15), and Nestor's speech in general is treated as an example of a speech which hints at what the speaker is later openly to advise (319.18–20). P. shares much of this analysis, without the more advanced rhetorical categorization and with considerable compression. Related material may lie behind P.'s discussion; Diomedes' speech, if taken at face value, i.e. ἀπλῶς rather than ἐσχηματισμένως, would – as [Dion. Hal.] states – be a clear example of 'accusation and abuse', and it is tempting to think that P. has replaced a negative assessment of Diomedes' speech, which he has just used as a positive example, by the example of Calchas, whose speech in Book 1 fits rather less well as an example of προπηλακισμός. What may have encouraged the choice is some similarity of language between Calchas' speech and Nestor's second (and more open) speech, 1.94 ἀρητῆρος ὃν ἡτίμησ'

Ἀγαμέμνων ~ 2.111 ἡτίμησας. It is perhaps also relevant that, whereas Calchas' speech was certainly heard by the whole army, some ancient commentators understood the first gathering of Book 9, in which Diomedes spoke, to be of the Greek leaders only, not of the whole army (cf. D-Scholia on 9.12, bT-Scholia on 9.11 ('he does not gather τὸ πλῆθος'), 9.70). By using Calchas from Book 1 instead, P. offers an undisputed contrast between 'public' and 'private' speech.

29d ἐξαποστέλλει 'despatches'. Nestor in fact nominates the ambassadors, gives them instructions and organises prayers at their departure (9.165–72); the scholia describe Nestor's actions as πέμπειν (bT-Schol. on v. 165b, 167d).

ἐπανόρθωσις ἁμαρτίας 'correction of a mistake'. Homer does not use the noun ἁμαρτία, but the scholia use this term to describe Agamemnon's action (bT-Schol. on 9.108–9); Agamemnon himself refers to ἄτη (2.111, 9.116), and the bT-Schol. on 2.111 gloss this as ἡ ἐκούσιος ἁμαρτία.

τὰς ἐν τοῖς γένεσι διαφοράς: whether or not there are important 'moral' differences between Homer's presentation of the Greeks and the Trojans has been much discussed by modern scholars, and the broad consensus is that there are not, cf. Hall 1989: 1–55; the strongest statement on the other side is van der Valk 1953. Be that as it may, it is clear that Hellenistic and Byzantine scholars saw Homer as pro-Hellenic and as very regularly showing the Trojan 'barbarians' in a bad light; Ἑλληνικόν and βαρβαρικόν are commonly applied to customs and moral qualities in the scholia, normally with positive and negative nuance respectively, cf. Nünlist 2009: 13. This too, here (cf. 29c below) and elsewhere, is – broadly speaking – also P.'s view both about Homer and about 'barbarian' peoples as a whole, cf. Nikolaidis 1986, Schmidt 1999 (esp. 100–2). The Greek-barbarian distinction is very important for P.'s educational programme – the young must understand what it is to be Greek.

ὥν τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὁ τρόπος 'the manner of which [i.e. the differences] is as follows'.

οἱ μὲν Τρῶες . . . σημάντορας: the contrast between the silence of the Greek attack and the clamour of the Trojans was a familiar *topos* of ancient criticism, cf. Hillgruber 1994/9:II 332–3; the AT-Scholia on *Iliad* 3.2b note that Homer there establishes a pattern for the two armies which 'he maintains to the end' and they cite the description from Book 4, σιγῇ δειδιότες σημάντορας, to which P. here also refers, and another from Book 7. P. cites this half-verse from a passage where the opposed noise of the Trojans is compared to countless bleating sheep (4.433–8). P.'s description of the Trojans here, however, is probably rather an allusion to 3.2–7 where the noise of the Trojans is compared to the κλαγγή and ἔνοπή of cranes; θράσος does not seem very appropriate to the penned sheep of Book 4. κραυγή, the word P. uses of the Trojans, is a standard gloss for both κλαγγή and ἔνοπή in this passage of Book 3 (cf., e.g., [Plut.] *Hom.* 2.149, D-Schol. on 3.2). The running together of these two related passages of Books 3 and 4 occurred at least as early as Plato, *Rep.* 3.389c who cites 3.8 (from ἵσαν) and 4.431 as a

continuous couplet, which is approved for its picture of Greek σωφροσύνη, cf. Labarbe 1949: 190-2; P. (or his source) may have been influenced by Plato here, or independently made the easy slip of associating σιγῇ δειδιότες σημάτωντορας, which he also cites at *Agis and Cleomenes* 30.6, with Book 3, or he may simply draw his contrast from two different passages. σιγῇ δειδιότες σημάτωντορας is also contrasted with the Trojans from Book 3 at Philodemus, *On the good king* xxv Dorandi and Dio 2.52.

θράσους is more 'recklessness' or 'bravado' than 'confidence', cf. 28e on Dolon below, Schmidt 1999: 69-106. For Aristotle the θρασύς is excessively confident and an 'imposter' (ἀλαζών) whose 'bravery' is merely a pretence (*EN* 3.1115b28-31); he notes that there are many people who might be called θρασύδειλοι, and this would be an apt summary of how the Homeric scholia very often treat the Trojans. No charge against 'barbarians' is more common in the scholia than ἀλαζονεία, cf. Scholia on 8.515, 11.288-9, 12.441, 18.293-4.

ἐν χερσὶ... ὄντων 'when the enemy are engaged in hand-to-hand fighting', cf. LSJ s.v. χεῖρ II 6h.

ἀνδρείας... σημῆϊον: it is a good sign if soldiers fear their commanders rather than the enemy: they will stand their ground in the face of death. Eustathius notes that the Achaean silence shows them to be εὐκοσμοί and allows them to hear their officers (*Hom.* 372.36-41, 493.11).

ὁ... Πλάτων: the primary reference may be to *Apology* 28b-d where Socrates answers the charge that he should be ashamed (αἰσχύνῃ) of the life which has led to the dangers (κινδυνεύεις) of the present trial. Socrates answers that the danger of death is nothing compared to what really matters, which is whether one acts justly or not. He adduces the example of Achilles who 'thought so little of danger in comparison with τὸ αἰσχρόν' that, though warned by his mother (*Iliad* 18.94-6), he proceeded to exact δίκη from Hector; the alternative, according to Socrates' Achilles, is to 'remain an object of mockery (καταγέλαστος) beside the ships' (~ *Iliad* 18.104), and this may be picked up by P.'s τοὺς φόγους. The theme is recurrent in P., cf. 528f (see below), *Agesilaos* 2.1.

ἐθίζει 'accustoms'; 'us' must be understood, but the object may have fallen out of the text.

πόνους is particularly appropriate in a work concerned with the education of the young, as in the parallel passages at 528f and *Agesilaos* 2.1.

29e ὁ... Κάτων: the anecdote occurs again at *Cato maior* 9.4 and 528f, where it seems to be run together with the Platonic example just adduced: 'Cato used to say that he preferred young men to blush rather than blanch, rightly accustoming and teaching them to fear censure rather than labour [πόνον Wytttenbach: ἔπαινον] and suspicion rather than danger.'

ἐρυθριῶντας: that blushing was a sign of good moral character was something of a commonplace, cf. Menander fr. 262 K-A, Ter. *Ad.* 643 etc. Diogenes is reported to have called blushing 'the colour of virtue' (Diog. Laert. 6.54).

ἔστι δὲ . . . χαρακτήρ ‘Promises too have their own characteristics’.

τόφρα . . . Ἀγαμεμνόνην: *Iliad* 10.325–6, Dolon undertakes his spying mission, in return for promised reward.

ὁ δὲ Διομήδης: *Iliad* 10.220–6, where Diomedes asks for a companion on his spying mission and then chooses Odysseus.

Ἑλληνικὸν . . . θρασύτης: Dolon is, as modern scholarship recognizes, the most morally worthless of the Trojans, and ancient scholarship had barely a good word for him; according to the T-Scholium on 10.317b his cowardice betrays someone ‘brought up with women’, and Dio 55.14 makes him a paradigm of δειλία and φιλοδοξία. The scholia too contrast Diomedes’ sensible planning and request for help with Dolon’s braggart foolishness (ἄλαζονεία again), cf. T-Schol. on 10.218 ‘it is Greek not rashly to undertake dangers’, A-Schol. on 10.218 ‘forward planning is a Greek characteristic’, bT-Schol. on 10.318 ‘Dolon [in contrast to Diomedes] foolishly sets out alone’, T-Schol. on 10.324 ‘Dolon asks for the impossible and makes [Hector] swear, and he promises everything, but Diomedes said nothing of this’ (cf. bT-Schol. on 10.321b). The bT-Scholia on 10.328 observe that Hector’s promise (ὁ ἐπαγγελλόμενος) to reward Dolon with Achilles’ horses is ‘more stupid’ than Dolon’s request for them, and P. could have used this too, had he wished to extend the analysis.

ἀστεῖον . . . φαῦλον: the contrast operates at more than one level, ‘elegant, cultivated, morally good’ v. ‘socially low, uneducated, morally worthless’. The Stoic opposition between the two (cf. n. on 25c πολλὰ . . . ἀστεῖον) is not central here.

θρασύτης: cf. n. on 29d θράσους.

ἔχεται . . . πάθος ‘What happens to the Trojans and Hector as Ajax is about to fight a duel with him also offers some not unhelpful material for consideration.’ P. interrupts the Greek–Trojan contrasts to adumbrate a contrast between brave men and audiences who merely watch them; the first example, however, continues the theme of speech and silence.

29f ὁ . . . Αἰσχύλος: P. tells this anecdote again at 79e where Aeschylus is said to have made the remark to Ion of Chios (*FGrHist* 392 F22 = fr. 5 Blumenthal = *108 Leurini = Aeschylus T149 Radt). Ion, presumably in the memoirs of the Ἐπιδημία, was probably therefore P.’s ultimate source; for P.’s use of Ion cf. Pelling 2007. It is easy enough to think of ways in which teachers could encourage their pupils with this anecdote about the need for ‘practice’.

τὸν Αἴαντα: cf. *Iliad* 7.205–14.

ἐπιόντα has very weak MS support but is close to the nonsensical εἰπόντα of most MSS; it presumably reflects ἤτε μακρὰ βιβός of Ajax at *Iliad* 7.213. The text must be regarded as uncertain; Hercher proposed προϊόντα.

λαμπρόν probably picks up Αἴας δὲ κορύσσετο νώροπι χαλκῶι at *Iliad* 7.206; λαμπρόν is the standard gloss in the D-Scholia for νῶροφ (2.578, 11.16, 14.383 etc.).

οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες ἔχαιρον ὀρώντες rewrites *Iliad* 7.214 Ἀργεῖοι μεγ' ἐγήθεον εἰσορόωντες; for the pattern of paraphrase followed by direct citation cf. n. on 29b ἡμείψατο καὶ προσηγόρευσεν.

30a Τρῶας . . . πάτασσε: *Iliad* 7.215–16, also quoted, to make the same point, at [Plut.] *Hom.* 2.135. Homer includes Hector in the alarmed Trojan reaction to Ajax's approach (note Ἐκτορι τ' αὐτῶι), though his reaction is certainly less strong than theirs, but P.'s strong reading interprets the verses to Hector's credit in a way which somewhat misrepresents; contrast Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.49. The bT-Scholia on v. 216 stress that Hector is, unlike Paris and Dolon, not given marks of δειλία, for he is an ἀξίόπιστον πρόσωπον.

τοῦ μὲν κινδυνεύοντος: so also the bT-Scholia on v. 215 and [Plut.] *Hom.* 2.135.

πηδαῖ: this verb is one of the glosses for πάτασσε in the D-Scholia on v. 216.

παλαίειν . . . μέλλοντος picks up the anecdote of Aeschylus watching athletic contests with which the Ajax example was introduced.

πάλλεται is a good Homeric word, but it is also not uncommon in P., and there need be no special resonance here; for the combination with τρέμει cf. 476a, *Cicero* 35.3.

ὁ . . . Θερσίτης: Thersites returns here somewhat awkwardly; the mention of Ajax leads P. to Achilles' good relations with that hero, in contrast to his feelings for Thersites.

ἔχθιστος . . . Ὀδυσῆι: *Iliad* 2.220; P. cites this verse again at 537e where, just as here it shows Thersites to be κάκιστος, it is said to reveal his moral viciousness 'very succinctly and in one verse'. So too the b-Scholium on this verse notes that it marks τὸ μισοπόνηρον of Achilles and Ajax.

30b νῦν μὲν . . . θυμολέοντα: *Iliad* 7.226–8, Ajax's opening words to Hector before their duel. Most ancient discussion of this speech is concerned with why, in vv. 229–30, Ajax tells Hector that Achilles is back beside the ships because of his anger with Agamemnon, cf. Aristotle fr. 381 Gigon, bT-Scholia on vv. 228–9, but this would merely complicate P.'s (elementary) discussion, particularly as he wants to make the speech encomiastic of Achilles, and so these verses are simply omitted. V. 228 is, however, as Aristotle already pointed out, ambiguous: is it 'after Achilles' in the sense of 'second to Achilles', or 'after Achilles' withdrawal or even death'? The first is more uncomplicatedly encomiastic of Achilles. οἶόνθεν οἶος 'alone and from one man only'.

ἡμεῖς . . . πολέες: *Iliad* 7.231–2. The scholia here and elsewhere report that 'the glossographers' explained τοῖος as ἀγαθός (fr. 31 Dyck). Whether or not this report is accurate, some such erudition may lie behind ἄριστον in P.'s explanation.

οὔτε μόνον . . . ἀμύνασθαι: P.'s explanation is close to that of the bT-Scholia on vv. 226–7 'He did not say "you will know what sort of man I am", but he makes

his comrades share in everything and says that he is one of many.’ Wyttenbach’s *δυναμένον* with the concomitantly necessary *ὁμοίω* seems to catch the sense best, though *ὁμοίως δυναμένων* is not impossible, cf. 34b below *περὶ πάντων ὁμοίως τῶν ἀπολέσθαι δυναμένων*.

30c *ἐαλώκασι* ‘are captured’, the perfect (active in form) of *ἐάλομαι*. Plato, *Rep.* 5.468a10 treats being captured alive as a disgrace.

τῶν μὲν ‘of the Trojans’.

ὑποπεπτώκασι ‘fell down before’, hence ‘pleaded (for their lives)’. That no Greek begs for his life is noted by the Scholia on *Iliad* 6.45 and 11.131 (P.’s first two instances). On 10.378 (Dolon) the Scholia note that it is *βαρβαρικόν* that Dolon’s first words to Odysseus and Diomedes are a plea to take him alive; Dolon is not among P.’s examples, perhaps because *Iliad* 10 does not describe ‘normal’ warfare (cf. below on *ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν*) and because Dolon is actually standing when he makes his plea.

ὁ Ἀδραστος: Adrastus begs Menelaus for his life at *Iliad* 6.45–50, but is unsuccessful due to the harsh intervention of Agamemnon; Agamemnon’s intervention indeed caused scholarly worry (cf. the bT-Scholia on vv. 58–9, Hunter 2005: 179–80), but P. passes over all such complications.

οἱ Ἀντιμάχου παῖδες are Peisandros and Hippolochos, who are captured by Agamemnon and plead for their lives at 11.131–5. That they also weep (v. 136) will have hardened moralizers’ hearts further against them.

ὁ Λυκάων pleads with Achilles in a famous scene at 21.74–96.

ὁ Ἑκτώρ: as P. notes, Hector at 22.337–43 does not beg for his life – he is already *ὀλιγοδρανέων* – but rather for the return of his body to Troy to receive proper burial rites. In common with Adrastus and the sons of Antimachos, however, he does offer Achilles a reward for granting his plea. Before his duel with Ajax in Book 7, Hector had already proposed that the loser’s body should be returned to his own side, and there the bT-Scholia on 7.79 note that such concern with burial is *βαρβαρικόν*.

ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν: this is a crucial point, as supplication in general was a recognized form of behaviour which did indeed confer particular power upon the request, cf. *Iliad* 24.570 (cited in 31a below), Gould 1973. The rules of warfare are, however, different; the bT-Scholia on *Iliad* 10.449–51 acknowledge the problem (‘Since it is not Greek to slaughter a suppliant . . .’).

νικᾶν . . . ἀποθνήσκειν: ‘win or die’ may remind us of the famous anecdote about Spartan mothers handing the shield to their sons as they set off for war and telling them to come back ‘with it or on it’ (241f etc.), but from P.’s point of view the Spartans had no monopoly upon such courage. On *Iliad* 13.426, Idomeneus’ desire to kill a Trojan or ‘himself to fall trying to ward off destruction from the Achaeans’, the bT-Scholia remark that ‘such spirit, to be prepared to die for one’s friends, is Greek’.

CHAPTER 11

Just as different animals seek different foods, readers also have various objects: some look for pleasure in story or language, others for morally valuable thoughts. These last are the readers we have in mind. They must be taught to pay attention to passages which demonstrate the value of the cardinal virtues – courage, wisdom and justice – or the control of anger or drunkenness or passion. Also valuable is the close study of words, but not the ingenious word-games of the Stoics or the pedantry of the grammarians. We can learn, by this means, that virtue is teachable and vice ignorance, because φρόνησις is the basis of all the virtues, directly linked to σωφροσύνη as σωφροσύνη is in turn linked to courage.

30c ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ . . . καρπὸν: P. is fond of such rural imagery: at 41e–f he urges the student to seek what is valuable in lectures as bees seek what is valuable in flowers, and he makes the same point about reading poetry at 79c–d, cf. also 673d–e, 765d. The current example is appropriately reminiscent of bucolic sequences such as Theocritus 10.30–1 and Virgil, *Ecl.* 2.63–5, though here the point is that different animals are attracted by different parts of the same plant. Of particular interest is a similar image at Seneca, *Ep.* 108.29 which, as in P. (cf. on 30d τὸν μὲν φιλόμυθον . . . φιλότιμον), introduces a contrast between different types of reader: 'There is no reason to be surprised that each man gathers from the same material what is appropriate to his studies; in the same meadow (*prato*, cf. νομαῖς), a cow looks for grass, a dog for a hare, and a stork for a lizard . . .' It seems very likely that common material lies behind P. and Seneca; Seneca frequently refers to his teacher, the Stoic Attalus, in this letter.

θαλλόν 'green shoots'.

ἄλλα δὲ ζῶια: primarily birds.

30d ἀπανθίζεται, 'gathers', picks up the image of the bee with which the sequence started; Lucian, *Lexiphanes* 22 advises the absurd would-be grammarian who is his addressee to move from classical genre to classical genre, collecting (ἀπανθισάμενος) the finest words, and cf. also *Vita Sophoclis* 88–9 Radt, Sophocles was called 'the bee' because τὸ λαμπρὸν ἀπανθίζει from each of his predecessors, Lucian, *The fisherman* 6–7. According to the extant epitome of Book 2 of his *On imitation*, Dionysius of Halicarnassus advised students to collect (ἀπανθίζεσθαι) for imitation the best parts of the great classics (fr. VI, p. 204.2 U-R), and here too the image of the bee, so commonly used elsewhere of poets, is operative, cf. Hunter 2009a: 124–5, above p. 16.

τὴν ἱστορίαν 'the story', but covering all the information about history, myth, genealogy etc. necessary to interpret the poem in question.

ἐμφύεται: although the metaphorical usage is very common in P. (cf. LSJ s.v. II 3), the present context allows the basic 'agricultural' sense to resonate, as perhaps also at 28e after the simile of the vine.

τῇ κατασκευῇ 'artistic elaboration', cf. n. on 16b κατασκευῆς.

χρῶμαι . . . στρογγύλῳι: Aristophanes fr. 488.1 K-A. The second verse of the fragment runs τοὺς νοῦς δ' ἀγοραίους ἤττον ἢ κείνος ποιῶ, 'but my ideas are less vulgar than his'; P. must have this unquoted verse in mind also, as his point is that it is possible to pay attention (or indeed imitate) one part of a poem but ignore (or be quite different from) another. The speaker in Aristophanes is unknown; later critics thought that it was Aristophanes himself, and P. may have thought so too, though ὁ Ἀριστοφάνης does not prove this. **στρογγύλος** of style seems to mean 'compact', 'rounded off', cf. Pl. *Phaedr.* 234e7 (of Lysias, cited by P. at 45a), Rhys Roberts 1910: 323, Brink 1971 on Horace, *AP* 323. In later critics the word commonly refers to a virtue of the periodic style, but it has a somewhat derogatory tone, suggesting glibness, in Aristophanes (cf. also *Acharnians* 686).

δεινόν 'scandalous'; the full explanation of why the situation is so terrible does not emerge until ἀργῶς καὶ ἀμελῶς at the end of this long sentence.

τὸν μὲν φιλόμυθον . . . φιλότιμον: P. distinguishes three types of reader, which broadly pick up the threefold division just adumbrated. In the first two instances (**φιλόμυθον**, **φιλόλογον**) the potential reader is the accusative object of the verb (**λανθάνειν**, **ἐκφεύγειν**) and what they do not miss is the subject, whereas in the privileged case of the **φιλόκαλος**, the reader is the subject of a verb taking the genitive; such stylistic variation is one way in which P. manages his long sentences and directs us to what is important.

The **φιλόμυθος** is concerned with **ἱστορία**, with myth and its innovations; the **φιλόλογος** is essentially the rhetorical reader, interested in language and its tropes (a Dionysius of Halicarnassus, perhaps); the **φιλόκαλος καὶ φιλότιμος** is the moral or philosophical reader. In *Epistle* 108 (cf. on 30c ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ . . . καρπὸν), Seneca notes that three different readers would approach Cicero, *De re publica* (or Virgil or, by implication, any such text) differently. The philosopher's concern with the Ciceronian text will be with justice (§30) and with what contributes to 'the happy life (*uita beata*) . . . precepts which will be of benefit and utterances of grandeur and spirit which can soon be turned into action' (§35); the parallel with P.'s **φιλόκαλος καὶ φιλότιμος** is obvious. Seneca's *philologus* concerns himself with what the book says about Roman history and political and religious arrangements (§30–1); this is essentially P.'s **φιλόμυθος**. Finally, the *grammaticus* is concerned with the usage and history of words and with borrowings between poets and such like (we might think of Aulus Gellius, and cf. also Sen. *Ep.* 88.3); this partly overlaps with P.'s **φιλόλογος** (§32–4), and would be closer still if, as seems probable, Seneca's dismissive reference (§35) to a concern with *figurae dicendi* is largely aimed at *grammatici* (cf. P.'s ῥητορικῶς). The two systems are clearly very close and may well draw on the same material; the differences in terminology may in part reflect P.'s wish to make his classification applicable to educated but 'amateur' readers – he is not thinking of the 'professional' γραμματικός or scholar, or indeed the 'professional' φιλόσοφος.

τὰ καινῶς . . . περιπτῶς 'aspects of the story which are innovative and unusual'.

καθαρώς: 'purity' of diction, Ἑλληνισμός, had long been a primary virtue in stylistic discussion, cf., e.g., Dion. Hal. *Lysias* 2.1 '[Lysias] is completely pure in his expression and is the best model of Attic language'; it was a virtue that assumed particular importance against the background of the Atticist movement.

τὸν δὲ φιλόκαλον . . . ἀναπεφωνημένων 'but that the lover of the noble and the honourable, one who does not take hold of poems for sport but for education, should pay lazy and careless attention to the things uttered [by poets] which lead to bravery or temperance or justice'. P. here names three of the four cardinal virtues; only φρόνησις is missing, cf., e.g., 440e-f. A similar distinction between the way ὁ φιλότιμος καὶ φιλόκαλος studies history and how others do so is found in the proem of the *De genio Socratis* (575c). παιγνίας . . . παιδείας: this is the only example of the rare noun παιγνία in P., and he may have wished to avoid the more obvious (cf. Pl. *Laus* 2.656c2, Diog. Laert. 2.80 (Aristippus)) play between παιδιά, which Reiske conjectured here (παιδιᾶς), and παιδεία. For παιγνία in a related context cf. Philodemus, *Rhet.* 2.49-50 Sudhaus ῥητορεύειν δὲ σπουδαίως οὐκ ἔστιν μετὰ παιγνίας.

30e Τυδείδῃ . . . Ἐκτωρ: *Iliad* 11.313-15, Odysseus to Diomedes. Like P., the bT-Scholia admire the fact that Odysseus 'is concerned not about death but about disgrace (αἰσχύνῃ)'. For Eustathius (*Hom.* 846.50), Odysseus here demonstrates a combination of ἀνδρεία and φρόνησις, cf. P.'s τὸν φρονιμώτατον below.

τὸ γὰρ . . . τὸν νέον 'To see that the most prudent man, when in danger of being destroyed and killed together with the whole army, fears disgraceful and blameworthy conduct but not death will make the young man passionate for virtue.' τὸν φρονιμώτατον: Odysseus is the pattern of φρόνησις throughout ancient criticism of Homer; the rich philosophical discussion about ὁ φρόνιμος also resonates in P.'s use of the term here and elsewhere. Cf. Horace, *Epist.* 1.2.17-18 *quid uirtus et quid sapientia possit, / utile proposuit [sc. Homerus] nobis exemplar Ulixen.* ἐμπαθῇ . . . πρὸς ἀρετήν 'excited about virtue, keen for virtue', cf. 1125d Greeks are ἐμπαθεῖς πρὸς τὰ θεῖα, *Cicero* 6.5, Cicero was throughout his life πρὸς δόξαν ἐμπαθέστερος. The word carries no particular philosophical resonance here.

καὶ τῷ . . . δίδωσι 'And with the verse . . . [Homer] allows a similar conclusion'; Wyttenbach's τῷ is necessary as Homer is the subject of the verb, as ποιήσας 'representing' shows.

χαίρε . . . δικάζωι: *Odyssey* 3.52. The wise and just man is Nestor's son Peisistratos, but by mistake or under the influence of his anthological source P. may have thought it referred to Odysseus.

μήτε πλουσίωι . . . ἰσχυρῷι: for this list cf. 35a below. At Plato, *Republic* 6.491c1-4 Socrates lists the 'so-called goods' which distract from philosophy and damage the soul: 'beauty and wealth and bodily strength and powerful family connections and all such things'; so too, Isocrates contrasts beauty, wealth and bodily strength with the only possession which really matters, virtue (*Demonicus* 6-7).

30f φρόνιμωι: P's gloss on πεπνυμένος suits his purpose, but it is also one of the glosses for πεπνυμένος found in the scholia (e.g. on *Odyssey* 1.213, 2.309, and cf. n. on 32a Ἀντίλοχε... Ἴππους); the standard gloss is συνετός. In his commentary on this verse, Eustathius (*Hom.* 1456.59) makes the point that P. is about to make with regard to *Od.* 13.332, namely that 'like takes pleasure in like', because Athena herself is φρόνησις; for this allegorization, of a kind which P. chooses to avoid throughout this essay, cf. n. on 26d ἐκ δὲ τούτου... γενόμενον.

φάσκουσαν: ποιήσας must be understood with this participle also. The better attested nominative would make Athena, not Homer, the subject of ἐνδείκνυται, and this would be contrary to P.'s normal usage: it is the poets who are our teachers.

μὴ περιορᾶν μηδὲ προλείπειν: a typical Plutarchan doubling; the Homeric Athena merely says οὐ δύναμαι προλιπεῖν (*Odyssey* 13.331). It is possible that in this sentence P. evokes a memorable instance of π-alliteration in Athena's earlier speech in this scene (*Odyssey* 13.300–2).

οὐνεκ'... ἐχέφρων: *Odyssey* 13.332 with ἐστὶ for ἔσσι. The scholia offer three interpretations of ἐπιτητής here: λόγιος, δίκαιος and φρόνιμος; either of the last two would suit P.'s purpose, but he may well be thinking of φρόνιμος.

ἐνδείκνυται... πέφυκεν '[Homer] indicates that the only human thing which is dear to the gods and divine is virtue, if indeed it is the case that like naturally takes pleasure in like'. The proverbial wisdom (cf., e.g., 51b, Pl. *Gorgias* 510b4) goes back to *Odyssey* 17.218 (cf. Call. fr. 178.9 Pf. αἴνος Ὀμηρικός), which however makes a rather different point. P. may be thinking of Pl. *Laws* 4.716c–d where, after citing the 'like is dear to like' proverb, the Athenian Stranger explains that only those who are as like to god as possible, namely οἱ σὼφρονες, can be dear to god.

31a ἐπεὶ δὲ... ἄλῶναι 'But since, though mastering anger both seems to be and is a great thing, a greater is to guard against it and take precautions not to fall into anger and be ensnared by it...'. An abbreviated version of this passage (with καὶ δοκοῦντος) is cited by Stobaeus 3.20.52 in his collection of passages 'on anger'. The dangers of anger and the need to guard against it are a leitmotif in P.'s works, cf. n. on 31b ἐπισφαλῶς, Ingenkamp 1971: 80–1.

μὴ παρέργως 'not in a casual way', i.e. 'with special emphasis'; for this litotes cf. 36a below, 86c, 129d.

ἀνασχετικός 'tolerant', 'given to self-restraint'; LSJ cite no other instance of this word.

πρᾶος: this is a central ethical quality for P., cf., e.g., Martin 1960, Jones 1971: 114, Russell 1972: 90, Nikolaidis 1986: 239. In P.'s treatise *The control of anger* πρᾶότης is the opposite of a disposition to anger, cf., e.g., Plato, *Phaedo* 116c5.

μηκέτι... ἐφετμάς: *Iliad* 24.560–1, 569–70, the first and last couplets of Achilles' speech. In v. 569 the second syllable of γέρον is treated as long 'in arsis' before a pause. This passage seems to have been important to the ancient

discussion of Achilles' character, which Aristotle (fr. 391 Gigon) called ἀνώμαλον (cf. the bT-Scholia on v. 569).

31b καὶ τὸν Ἑκτορα... τίθησι: in Homer Achilles does not himself wash the corpse, but he does himself place the body on the bier and then help with lifting the corpse on to the wagon: P.'s words rewrite and simplify, to the greater glory of Achilles, vv. 589–90 αὐτὸς τὸν γ' Ἀχιλεὺς λεχέων ἐπέθηκεν αἰέρας, | σὺν δ' ἑταροὶ ἥειραν ἐυξέστην ἐπ' ἀπήνην. Like P., Eustathius too draws particular attention to Achilles' personal involvement in the preparation of the corpse (*Hom.* 1366.31).

περιστείλας 'lay out', 'prepare for burial', cf. LSJ s.v. I 2.

πρίν... ὀφθῆναι 'before he could be seen, in his disfigured state, by his father'; this corresponds to *Iliad* 24.582–3 in which, out of earshot of Priam, Achilles tells his servant-girls to take the corpse out of sight and to wash and anoint it 'so that Priam should not see his son'. ἡικισμένον: αἰκίζειν is standard in this context, but P. may be thinking of the phrase αἰκία ἔργα with which Homer describes the maltreatment of Hector's corpse by Achilles (22.395, 23.24), cf. 22.403–4 (of Hector), τότε δὲ Ζεὺς δυσμενέεσσιν | δῶκεν αἰκίσσασθαι ἔη | ἐν πατρὶδι γαίῃ. The b-Scholia on 22.395 gloss αἰκία as χαλεπὰ καὶ αἰκιστικά, and cf. n. on 19c τῶν πράξεων.

μή ὁ μὲν... ἐφετμάς: *Iliad* 24. 584–6, the poet explains Achilles' motives. Many ancient critics were puzzled by χόλον in 584 and emendation (e.g. γόον) was attempted, but despite the fact that control of anger is at issue, P. is here focused on Achilles' behaviour, not Priam's; this example is instructive for the reading practices which P. wishes to inculcate.

τὸ γὰρ ἐπισφαλῶς... προνοίας 'Not to be unaware that one is liable to anger and naturally harsh and given to *thúmos*, but to take precautions and guard against the causes [of anger] and by reason to anticipate them from afar so as not even involuntarily to fall into the passion is a mark of amazing foresight.' ἐπισφαλῶς: P. elsewhere uses ἐπισφαλῆς πρὸς of liability to disease (129b, 661b), and anger is indeed for P. a kind of disease (fr. 148 Sandbach, cf. Plato, *Tim.* 86b–c). The dangers and control of anger were much discussed in philosophical schools of all persuasions, and P. wrote both *On anger* (fr. 148 Sandbach) and *The control of anger* (452f–64d). Aristotle had defined anger as 'a desire, accompanied by pain, for a perceived revenge because of a perceived slight from people who are not appropriate to slight oneself or one's own' (*Rhet.* 2.1378a31–3), and for the Stoics ὀργή was (similarly) an irrational appetite to punish someone who is thought to have wronged you inappropriately (Diog. Laert. 7.113 = *SVF* III 396, 397). Central to P.'s presentation everywhere is his Platonist conviction that reason should control passion, cf. n. on 26d ἐκ δὲ τούτου... γενόμενον. For ancient discussions of anger cf. Harris 2001, Braund-Most 2003, Konstan 2006: 41–77. τραχύν: cf. 74e (of a man who has been offended by frank speaking) τραχὺς καὶ οἰδῶν καὶ ἀνώματος ὑπ' ὀργῆς, 453d, LSJ s.v. I 4; at Euripides, *Medea* 447 τραχεῖα ὀργή is an 'unendurable evil'. θυμοειδής: the word may just mean 'irascible'

(cf. god of Xanthippe), but in connection here with Achilles and the need for λογισμός it certainly evokes τὸ θυμοειδές as one of the parts of the Platonic soul (cf. 442a, fr. 200 Sandbach for P.'s knowledge of this); Plato notes that a πραῖα φύσις is the opposite of the θυμοειδής (*Rep.* 2.375c7, cf. *Galba* 1.3), and this too fits 31a οὐκ ἀνασχετικός ὢν οὐδὲ πρῶτος with n. ad loc.. The A-Scholia on *Iliad* 1.89 and the bT-Scholia on 1.193 associate Achilles' uncertainty there as to whether to strike Agamemnon with the θυμοειδές part of his soul. For Achilles as the θυμοειδής to excess cf. Hobbs 2000: 199–219. πόρρωθεν 'well in advance', cf. 31c below, 129a πόρρωθεν ἐξευλαβεῖσθαι, and esp. fr. 148 Sandbach on the need to practise the control of anger πόρρωθεν. οὐδ' ἄκων: μηδ' would have been normal, but a number of passages in P. show οὐ for μή, cf. 33b below εἰ γὰρ ἐκείνος οὐδὲν ἐνόμιζεν κτλ., Holden 1889: 247.

31c οὕτω δὲ δεῖ . . . ἐρωτικόν: both the desire for (more) drink and sexual desire and arousal are 'irrational' passions with unpredictable consequences, so one must use one's reason in advance of their attack to forestall the danger.

ὁ Ἀγησίλαος: Xenophon reports, as an example of Agesilaos' self-control in matters of sex, that he would not allow the young Persian Megabates to bestow a kiss of honour upon him, despite the fact that he loved the young man very much (*Agesilaos* 5.4–5). This famous anecdote was a favourite of P.'s, cf. 81a, 209d–e, *Agesilaos* 11.7.

ὁ δὲ Κύρος: another famous story from Xenophon. Pantheia, the extraordinarily beautiful wife of Abradatas of Susa, was captured, but Cyrus preserved her for her husband, refused himself to look upon her and advised his comrade Araspas to do likewise (*Cyropaideia* 5.1); P. cites from the story again at 521f–2a, and cf. also fr. 138 Sandbach (from *On love*).

τῶν ἀπαιδευτῶν . . . προιμένων 'whereas the uneducated, on the other hand, gather fuel for their passions and abandon themselves to those where they are weakest and most unsteady'. **τῶν ἀπαιδευτῶν** 'the (morally) uneducated', cf., e.g., 34d, 39e; for virtue as teachable cf. 31f below. **ὑπεκκαύματα**, 'fuel', picks up both anecdotes which P. has just recalled. Whereas Araspas contrasted the nature of fire and that of physical beauty (*Cyr.* 5.1.10), Cyrus draws an analogy: 'It is possible to touch fire and not be burned immediately and wood too does not burst into flame immediately; nevertheless, I do not willingly either touch fire or look at beautiful people' (*Cyr.* 5.1.16, cf. fr. 138 Sandbach). Although P. is fond of the word, ὑπεκκαύματα here also recalls another work of Xenophon, the *Symposium*, where Socrates jokingly observes that there is no fiercer ἔρωτος ὑπέκκαυμα than a kiss (4.25), and this takes us back to the Agesilaos anecdote; for ὑπέκκαυμα in erotic contexts cf. also 108gb, *Lycurgus* 15.5, Ach. Tat. 1.5.6.

ὁ δὲ Ὀδυσσεύς: this is a habitual characteristic of the Homeric Odysseus, but P. may well be thinking of the opening of *Odyssey* 20 where Odysseus restrains his anger (v. 9) at the disloyal servant-girls; he is there placed in a position not unlike

Achilles in *Iliad* 1 ('to react violently or bide one's time?'), a scene never far from P.'s mind, and τετλάτω in the verses he is about to quote may well have evoked Odysseus' famous τέτλαθι δῆ, κραδίη (*Od.* 20.18).

ἀλλὰ καὶ . . . ἀμβλύνει 'but he takes the edge off Telemachus too, when he sees from what he has said that he is angry and detests wickedness'. τοῦ λόγου: i.e. what Telemachus has told Odysseus, both before and after Odysseus has revealed his identity, in the first part of Book 16. χαλεπαίνοντα: the transmitted χαλεπὸν ὄντα is not impossible; χαλεπός may come close to 'angry', 'quick tempered', as well as difficult, cf. Pl. *Rep.* 2.375c2 (the opposite of πρᾶος), god (Xanthippe) θυμοειδῆ καὶ χαλεπὴν, LSJ s.v. II 2, but Telemachus has not in any way shown himself 'difficult', and indeed has stressed the numerical superiority of the suitors (16.243–55). χαλεπαίνοντα (RH) removes any ambiguity; for Telemachus' anger cf. 16.120–8. If the correction is adopted, it does not seem necessary also to emend to μισοπόνηρον ὄντα.

μισοπόνηρον perhaps refers particularly to Telemachus' denunciation of the suitors' ὕβρις at 16.85–6. For the connection between anger and μισοπονῆρία cf. also 170c.

οὐ δέ . . . ἀνέχεσθαι: *Odyssey* 16.274–7; in 274 Homeric MSS divide between οἱ δέ and εἰ δέ, which is to be preferred in Homer.

31d ὥσπερ . . . ἄγουσι 'Just as people put the bridle on horses, not during the race, but before it, so they lead into battles men who are hard to hold back in the face of dangers and quick to anger, by first getting a grip on them by reasoning and bringing them under discipline.' Seneca too notes that anger is not the right preparation for war, virtue is (*De ira* 1.9.1). There may be a memory here of Xenophon, *Mem.* 4.1 where Socrates is reported as telling young men who did not think that they required education that the finest horses, which are θυμοειδεῖς καὶ σφοδροί, turn out best if they are broken in at a young age, but if this does not happen, they become δυσκαθέκτατοι καὶ φαυλότατοι; P. certainly evokes this passage at 641f. Cf. also Plato, *Rep.* 3.413d6–9 and, more generally, the image of the horses of the soul in the *Phaedrus* (cf. Fuhrmann 1964: 141–3); St Basil too uses the image of λογισμός as a χαλινός (*Greek Lit.* 7.19–20 Wilson, cf. also 9.70–6). P. here clearly evokes a standard interpretation of Platonic psychology, in which the tripartite division of the *Republic* is to some extent subordinated to a basic dichotomy (reason – irrational passion), partly under the influence of Aristotle and partly by following the lead of the *Phaedrus* itself, cf. e.g., *Moral virtue* 445b–c, Repath 2007: 56–64. Horse imagery is (unsurprisingly) very common in such contexts, cf. [Plut.] *The education of children* 12c, 13e, Max. Tyr. 20.6 'God gave men reason (λόγος) . . . subjecting the erotic impulse to it, as a horse to a bridle'; there is a similar comparison found in late anthologies which has been associated with P. (fr. inc. 42 Bernardakis), but may have nothing to do with him (cf. Sandbach's edition pp. 407–10): 'Difficult horses are controlled by the bridle, passionate men by reason'. προκαταρτύντες: cf. 38d on the need to 'discipline' (καταρτύνειν)

improper impulses. Plato too used καταρτύνειν in an image for education drawn from the breaking-in of horses (*Laws* 7.808d6), and this and related words are often found in Pythagorean texts concerned with education and the control of impulses, cf. Headlam-Knox on Herodas 1.62, Hillyard 1981: 59.

P. now moves from scenes which direct our attention to moral attitudes to individual words and phrases which can cast light on the interrelationship of the cardinal virtues.

δεῖ δὲ . . . παραιτεῖσθαι 'We must also pay careful attention to words, but have nothing to do with Cleanthes' games'. μέν is answered by βελτίον δέ below. P. now begins (once again) with a counterexample, namely forced interpretations of the Stoics; for Cleanthes' and Chrysippus' interests in Homeric philology cf., e.g., Long 1992: 63–4, Atherton 1993: 245–6, above p. 12.

Κλεάνθους: Cleanthes was Zeno's successor as head of the Stoa in the middle of the third century, cf. Babut 1969: 207–11; the current passage is *SVF* I 535, II 101. Whether or not Cleanthes was actually 'playing' in the examples P. cites, may be debated. Cleanthes himself wrote poetry (both hexameters and iambs are extant) and a treatise 'On the poet' (i.e. presumably 'On Homer'), *SVF* I 481.

παιδιάν: P. begins his work *Contradictions of the Stoics* by asserting that philosophy is not 'a game of verbal ingenuity (παιδιὰ καὶ εὐρησιλογία) aimed at glory, but an activity deserving of the greatest seriousness' (1033b). Stoics were obvious targets for accusations of παιδιὰ, cf., e.g., 472a (= *SVF* III 655) 'Some people think that the Stoics are joking (παίζειν) when they hear that they consider the wise man not only intelligent and just and brave, but an orator and a poet and a general and . . . '.

κατεριωνεύεται γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε 'For sometimes he makes jokes . . . ', cf. LSJ s.v. ὅτε IV 2.

δῆ, if correct, indicates – almost like inverted commas – that what is coming is a quotation (cf. Denniston 234), but the text is uncertain; **τε**, if read, should follow προσποιούμενος rather than τό. DR suggests δῆ τό, with δῆ indicating that this is not a real explanation.

Ζεῦ . . . μεδέων: Cleanthes clearly interpreted Ἰδηθεν in an invocation to Zeus which occurs four times in the *Iliad* (cf. n. on 23c Ζεῦ πάτερ Ἰδηθεν μεδέων) as 'by knowledge', εἰδήσει; similarity of sound (with itacism operative on the first syllable of εἰδήσει) clearly lies at the basis of his interpretation. Cleanthes may have proposed to replace Ἰδηθεν by εἰδήσει in the text of Homer (there is no metrical objection), or he may have interpreted Ἰδηθεν as εἰδηθεν, which he then explained as εἰδήσει. Only one MS of P. preserves εἰδήσει μεδέων but the text is unintelligible without it. Either, therefore, Ἰδηθεν μεδέων has replaced it in transmission (DR), and we should read ἐξηγεῖσθαι τὸ δῆ "Ζεῦ πάτερ εἰδήσει μεδέων", or we should read (e.g.) Ἰδηθεν μεδέων <ὥς> εἰδήσει μεδέων (RH), and this latter solution is adopted here. In the context of the 'Deception of Zeus', Proclus interprets Mt Ida as 'the place of *ideai*' (*On the Republic* I 136.19 Kroll, cf. Lamberton 1986: 212–13).

31e καὶ τὸ Ζεῦ . . . ὄντα ‘and bidding us to read *Zeus ana Dōdōnaie* as a single word [i.e. *anadōdōnaie*], since the air coming as vapour from the earth is *anadōdōnaie* because of its rising (*anadosis*)’. At *Iliad* 16.23 Ζεῦ ἄνα Δωδωναίῃ seems to mean ‘Zeus, lord, one of Dodona’, but the passage was very much discussed, as the testimonia gathered in West’s edition and the scholia demonstrate; Zenodotus read Φηγωναίῃ and others Βωδωναίῃ, and Apollodorus of Athens had etymologized Δωδωναίος as Zeus who ‘gives (δίδωσι) us good things’ (*FGH* 244 F 88). Cleanthes offered an interpretation in line with Stoic physics: Zeus is the cosmic heat or fiery air which releases vapours from the ground, cf. n. on 19f τὸν δὲ τῆς Ἥρας καλλωπισμόν. ἀναθυμίασις, ‘exhalation’ is an important word in Stoic physics, cf. 1053a = *SVF* II 579, quoting Chrysippus, ‘The transformation of fire is as follows: through air it turns into water, and from this, as earth is precipitated, the air rises as vapour (ἀναθυμιᾶται)’, Cicero, *Nat. D.* 2.118 = *SVF* II 593, ‘The stars are fiery in nature, and therefore they are nourished by the vapours of the earth, sea and waters which are raised by the sun from the fields and waters which it has heated . . .’; the Stoic Sarapion offers another Homeric allegory involving ἀναθυμίασις at 400a-b. ὑφ’ ἐν is the origin of Eng. ‘hyphen’. Given that ancient texts had no word-division, the reader had to judge where to make breaks, and problems arising from this were often discussed. Aelius Theon (81.29-82.9 Sp. = 43 Patillon) gives two (standard) examples of such ἀμφιβολία: does ΑΥΛΗΤΡΙΣ represent αὐλητρίς, in which case the letters are read ὑφ’ ἐν καὶ ἀδιαίρετον, or αὐλὴ τρίς, which is τὸ διηρημένον (cf. Quintilian 7.9.4)? Is ΟΥΚΕΝΤΑΥΡΟΙΣ οὐ κενταύροις or οὐκ ἐν ταύροις? The Stoics were very interested in such linguistic ἀμφιβολία (cf., e.g., Diog. Laert. 7.44); Diog. Laert. cites the αὐλητρίς example in a Stoic context (7.62). Cf. in general Atherton 1993 and n. on Chrysippus below. ὥς . . . ὄντα: for the construction cf. n. on 16c ὥς ποίησιν οὐκ οὔσαν above, 31f below.

Χρύσιππος: Chrysippus followed Cleanthes as head of the Stoa from 232. On his importance for P. cf. above pp. 11-12, Babut 1969: 225-37. Chrysippus wrote several works on ἀμφιβολία of various kinds (Diog. Laert. 7.193) and held strong views about the inevitability of linguistic ambiguity (cf. Aulus Gellius, *NA* 11.12.1-3 = *SVF* II 152 = Long-Sedley 37 N); as such, he might well represent a danger to the moral certainties which P. wants the young to take away from literature. Chrysippus’ interest in Homeric interpretation gives particular point to Horace’s observation that Homer is a better and clearer ethical guide than Chrysippus and Crantor (*Epistles* 1.2.4).

γλίσχρος ‘sticky’, ‘difficult’, of someone given to pedantic problems, cf. 43a μικρὰ καὶ γλίσχρα προβλήματα.

εὐρησιλογῶν ἀπιθανῶς ‘finding ingenious and implausible explanations’, cf. 28a above, 625d.

παραβιάζόμενος . . . λόγου ‘forcing the *euruopa* son of Kronos to be the one who is mighty in dialectic and made expansive through the power of the *logos*’. The construction is somewhat awkward, and perhaps (e.g.) λέγων (DR) or λέγει

(RH) should be added after εἶναι or the former after Κρονίδην (Dyck); for this verb cf. 19f. εὐρύσπα is a common epithet of ‘the son of Kronos’ in the *Iliad*, whereas the *Odyssey* uses it of ‘Zeus’. In antiquity it was standardly glossed as either μεγάλωφωνος, through a connection with ὄψ ‘voice’, or μεγάλωφθαλμος, through ὄψ or ὥψ ‘eye’, cf., e.g., the Scholia on *Iliad* 1.498; modern scholars too are unsure, cf. *Lfgre* s.v. In connecting this word with the voice, Chrysippus was therefore doing nothing unusual; the ‘violence’ will therefore lie for P. in the particular connections which Chrysippus drew with Stoic applications of the idea of speech and the voice. τῷ διαλέγεσθαι: cf. Diog. Laert. 7.180 = *SVF* II 1: ‘Chrysippus was so renowned in dialectic, that most people thought that if the gods had dialectic, it would be none other than that of Chrysippus.’ The present passage suggests that this claim might in fact go back to something in Chrysippus’ own works. διαβεβηκότα: the meaning is uncertain, but at 1038e (= *SVF* III 226) P. refers to a remark of Chrysippus that ‘the virtues increase and διαβαίνειν’; Cicero seems to express the same idea by *dilatari* (*De finibus* 3.48), and cf. also 829d ‘money rolls in and heaps up and διαβεβηκε’. Chrysippus may thus have given particular emphasis to εὐρυ – and this is reflected in the tentative translation offered above. Alternatives would include the ‘ordinary’ meaning ‘with feet firmly apart’, i.e. secure, or perhaps ‘having passed through’, i.e. ‘consummate’, cf. Lampe s.v. 6. τοῦ λόγου: the universal *logos* was a crucial Stoic idea, closely associated with Zeus, and best known today from Cleanthes’ *Hymn to Zeus*.

τοῖς γραμματικοῖς: cf. P.’s dismissal of an interest in arcane glosses, 22c above.

πιέζειν ‘to concentrate upon’, ‘work hard at’, cf. Pl. *Laws* 12.965d4 τοῦτο . . . πῖεσαντες μὴ ἀνῶμεν (of a moral problem).

οὐδέ . . . ἐσθλός: *Iliad* 6.444, Hector to Andromache. It was standard lore that this verse shows that virtue is teachable and that the virtues can be learned, cf. AbT-Scholia ad loc., [Plut.] *Hom.* 2.144, Eustathius, *Hom.* 654.33–4 (with van der Valk’s note).

πᾶσιν . . . εἶναι: *Iliad* 17.671, Menelaus about Patroclus. P. interprets ἐπίστατο in an intellectual sense; [Plut.] *Hom.* 2.144 demonstrates that Homer anticipated the philosophic view that ἀρετή was ἐπιστήμη. The idea that courage is a form of knowledge brings us close to Plato’s *Laches*, and P.’s Platonism is again important here.

31f τὸ προσφιλῶς . . . ἑαυτῶν ‘holding the view that having friendly and pleasant relations with people derives from knowledge and is in accordance with reason, he urges us not to neglect ourselves . . .’.

ὥς καὶ . . . οὔσαν ‘since social boorishness and cowardice are unlearnedness and ignorance’; for the construction cf. n. on 16c ὡς ποιήσιν οὐκ οὔσαν. Having commented on the two citations in the order in which they were given, P. now points the lesson in reverse order: σκαιότης is the opposite of τὸ

προσφιλῶς . . . ὀμιλεῖν and δειλία of ἀνδρεία. ἀμαθής and related words are regularly used as ‘social’ terms, ‘boorish’, ‘awkward’, ‘uncultured’, but P. exploits the literal sense of ‘not having learned’.

λέγει: sc. ὁ Ὀμηρος.

32a ἡ μὲν . . . ἡ ἰδὴ ‘Indeed both were of the same family and shared one native land, but Zeus was born first and knew more’, *Iliad* 13.354–5 (the poet explains why Poseidon is angry with Zeus). If the primary virtues were a unity (cf. below), then that was φρόνησις, and the fact that Zeus ‘knows more’ shows that this is where he himself has the edge; if there was only one virtue (the Socratic position), then that too was wisdom or knowledge. At the opening of *Isis and Osiris* P. observes that Zeus ‘gives men a share of intelligence and wisdom (νοῦς καὶ φρόνησις), because these are peculiarly his (οἰκεῖα) possessions and activity’; it is by ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρόνησις, not by riches or thunder and lightning, that Zeus rules, and then P. cites these same Homeric verses to illustrate the point (351d–e). P.’s interpretation of Homer may here be thought closer to allegory than that of the scholia, which stress that the verses teach us to respect older brothers who are also wiser. [Plut.] *Hom.* 2.114 uses this passage similarly to show that Homer understood that the god who knows all things and controls the universe is νοῦς, ‘intellect’.

θειότατον: ‘the virtue of wisdom most of all has some element of the divine (θειοτέρου τινὸς τυγχάνει)’, Plato, *Rep.* 7.518e1.

ἅτε δὴ . . . νομίζων: that all the virtues are interrelated and all forms of φρόνησις was a Socratic thesis adopted widely in later philosophy. For Middle Platonism cf. ‘Alcinous’, *Handbook of Platonism* 183.3–16, concluding that ‘the virtues, in perfect form, are inseparable from each other’, with Dillon 1993: 180–1. Earlier, it is particularly associated with the Stoics, cf. 440c–1d (= Long-Sedley 61 B), 1034c–d, Long-Sedley 61 A–I, Dyck on Cic. *De off.* 1.15, Diog. Laert. 7.125 (= *SVF* III 295), ‘they say that the virtues follow along with (ἀντακολουθεῖν) each other, and that the man who has one has them all’, 7.90 (ἀκολουθεῖν), Babut 1969: 89. When writing for a different audience, P. was happy to find inconsistencies in the Stoic position, cf. 1046e–f (= *SVF* III 299 = Long-Sedley 61 F).

ἐπεσθαι seems to reflect the Stoic ἀντακολουθεῖν of the interrelation of the virtues, under the primacy of φρόνησις, cf. 1046e, *SVF* III 295 (previous note). P. now illustrates this by showing (32a–e) that the φρόνιμοι are just (they do not lie or cheat) and σώφρονες and that the σώφρονες are also inevitably brave.

ἐγρηγορότως ‘with his mind wide awake’, cf. 40c (of lecture audiences) τοὺς ἐγρηγορότας καὶ προσέχοντας.

ψεύδος . . . ἐστί: *Odyssey* 3.20 and 328 (Athena about Nestor, Nestor about Menelaus). The scholia too connect this praise with φρόνησις, but point out that Odysseus himself told Penelope lies (19.203 ἴσκε ψεύδεα πολλὰ κτλ.); the φρόνιμος is allowed to lie κατὰ καιρόν. P. teaches a less nuanced lesson. For the Stoics too the wise man does not lie (*SVF* I 216, III 548, 554).

Ἀντίλοχε . . . Ἴππους: *Iliad* 23.570–1, the opening verses of Menelaus' accusation to Antilochos that he cheated him out of second prize in the chariot-race; Antilochos then yields in a gracious speech (vv. 586–95). P. will be thinking of the whole scene, and a further link (cf. πεπνυμένε) is made with the previous citation, as Menelaus takes precautions (vv. 575–8) that no one can say that he himself has used ψεύδεα to cheat Antilochos; Homer had himself already classed Antilochos' overtaking manoeuvre as κέρδεα (v. 515). As elsewhere (cf. n. on 30f φρονίμωι), the bT-Scholia here gloss πεπνυμένος as φρόνιμος.

Γλαῦκε . . . ἄλλων: *Iliad* 17.170–1, Hector responding to Glaucus' charge that he failed to rescue Sarpedon's corpse. It was in fact Zeus who caused Hector to abandon the struggle (16.656–8), and so Hector's subsequent appeal to the power of Zeus at 17.176–8, whether he knows it or not, is fair and Glaucus' charge was indeed παρ' ἄξιαν (32b). P.'s assessment is here more accurate than that of the bT-Scholia, which take a rather jaundiced view of Hector's tactic in blaming Zeus. At 809f P. uses v. 171, together with *Iliad* 7.358 (cf. 20e above), to show how one can reprove ἠθικώτερον those who go wrong.

32b κακομαχούντων: Lucian, *Demonax* 49 similarly uses this verb of athletes who bite in the *pankration*.

τὸν Πάνδαρον: the reference is to *Iliad* 4.104, ὥς φάτ' Ἀθηναίη, τῷ δὲ φρένας ἄφρονι πείθειν, already cited for a slightly different reason at 19d (where see n.).

δῆλος . . . ἡγούμενος '[Homer] shows himself as holding the view that the wise man would not act unjustly'.

σωφροσύνης: P. has already shown how courage and justice depend upon φρόνησις, and now he turns to another cardinal virtue.

ἐπιστάντα 'directing [the young's] attention' cf. n. on 17e ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον . . . ποιήμασιν.

τῷ δὲ γυνή . . . Βελλεροφόντην: *Iliad* 6.160–2, Glaucus tells Diomedes of Anteia's attempt to seduce his ancestor Bellerophon; as Bellerophon's σωφροσύνη is in this story obvious, ἀγαθὰ φρονέοντα and perhaps also δαίφρονα (cf. *Lfgre* s.v. 2) are interpreted to mean that Bellerophon was φρόνιμος, whereas the D-Scholia gloss ἀγαθὰ φρονέοντα as σωφρονοῦντα. At *Coriolanus* 32.5 P. cites vv. 161b–2 as an instance where Homer does not involve the gods, because this is a decision by a hero 'in accordance with reason', cf. Hunter 2009a: 196–8.

32c ἡ δ' ἦτοι . . . ἀγαθῆσιν: *Odyssey* 3.265–6, Nestor telling Telemachus of Clytemnestra's initial resistance to Aegisthus. According to P., Clytemnestra had φρόνησις (φρεσὶ . . . κέχηρτ' ἀγαθῆσιν) and this led her to be σώφρων. Nestor says that Clytemnestra remained chaste until Aegisthus killed the αἰοδός whom Agamemnon had set to protect his wife; this he did, according to some scholia, by telling her 'of the virtuous deeds (ἀρεταί) of men and women', and for as long as he was present Clytemnestra 'showed σωφροσύνη'.

αἰδώς . . . ἔσται: *Iliad* 16.422, the opening verse of an exhortation by Sarpedon to his men.

ἀλλ' ἐν φρεσὶ . . . ὄρωρεν: *Iliad* 13.121–2, Poseidon encouraging the Greeks. The first verse of Poseidon's speech, αἰδώς, Ἀργεῖοι, κοῦροι νέοι κτλ. (16.95) is very like Sarpedon's opening which P. has just cited. Both Sarpedon and Poseidon try to shame their audience into action. The bT-Scholia on 16.95 note that the appeal to αἰδώς is 'Greek', whereas at 12.250 Hector tries to frighten 'the barbarians'; cf. n. on 29d τὰς ἐν τοῖς γένεσι διαφοράς. To simplify, αἰδώς refers to one's own sense of self-esteem, νέμεσις refers to what others will say and think about you.

ἀνδρείους . . . σώφρονας: the last two citations are interpreted as showing that the σώφρονες are also ἀνδρείοι; as we already know that σωφροσύνη arises from φρόνησις, the linkage between the virtues is thus very clear.

32d ὑπερβαίνειν 'go beyond', i.e. 'disdain, have nothing to do with'.

Τιμόθεος . . . Πέρσαις: cf. n. on 22a Τιμοθέωι.

ἀφ' ὧν . . . ὀρμηθεῖς 'setting off from [this Homeric material]'. There is perhaps an echo of *Odyssey* 8.499 (Demodocus) ὁ δ' ὀρμηθεῖς θεοῦ ἤρχετο, which was standardly interpreted in antiquity as 'inspired by/setting off from the god he began' – Homer was himself a θεός in ancient education (cf. Hunter 2009a: 173); cf., however, 623a ὀρμηθεῖς ἀφ' ὧν Θεόφραστος εἶρηκεν περὶ μουσικῆς κτλ., Proclus, *On the Republic* I 167.15 Kroll ἐντεῦθεν ὀρμηθεῖς of the Athenian of the *Laws* who has picked up material from Homer. One would like to know more about P.'s sources which discussed Timotheus' debt to Homer; cf. the collection of (largely) poets' debts to Homer at [Plut.] *Hom.* 153–60.

σέβεσθ' . . . δοριμάχου 'respect *Aídos* who works together with courage in battle', Timotheus, *PMG* 789 (cited again at 323e). Analysis of the metre (— — — — — — — —) is uncertain, but perhaps a bacchiuss (— —) followed by three cretics (with resolution).

Αἰσχύλος . . . τίθεται 'Aeschylus regards it as part of wisdom to be free of pompousness about reputation and not set fluttering or lifted up by the praise of the many . . .'. The image in διασοβεῖσθαι is of scattering birds, cf. *Pompey* 29.4 (a young man) παντάπασιν ἐμπλήκτου καὶ σεσοβημένου πρὸς δόξαν. **ἀτύφως:** at 43b P. warns young men not to concern themselves with frivolous questions, but rather with 'how you will release yourself from conceit and pretension and love-affairs and nonsense, and settle into a life free of vanity (ἄτυφος) and full of health'.

οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν . . . βουλευματα 'for he does not wish to seem to be best but to be it, harvesting a deep furrow in his mind from which spring good counsels', Aeschylus, *Septem* 592–4 (with ἀφ' ἧς for ἐξ ἧς). This was a famous passage, in part because of an anecdote which associated it with Aristides 'the just', cf. 88b, 186b, *Aristeides* 3.5, where δίκαιος replaces ἄριστος in v. 592. Plato too paraphrases v. 592 and cites vv. 593–4 in the context of justice and injustice at *Rep.* 2.362a–b, but ἄριστος seems here protected by διαθέσει . . . κρατίστηι.

τὸ γὰρ . . . ἀνδρός ἐστι 'For to take pride in oneself and one's own excellent disposition is the mark of a sensible man'. **διαθέσει:** cf. n. on 24d εὐθύς . . . νοοῦμεν.

περὶ αὐτόν is equivalent to ἐαυτοῦ, by a periphrasis very common in Hellenistic prose, in which a prepositional phrase replaces a genitive, cf. 159d ἡ νῦν οὖσα περὶ ἡμᾶς ἔξις, ‘the condition in which we now find ourselves’, Palm 1955: 180–3, de Foucault 1972: 112–13, above p. 21.

32e πάντων . . . διδασκαλίας ‘Since they are all to be referred to φρόνησις, every form of virtue is shown to result from reason and instruction’. πάντων (sc. εἰδῶν), rather than πασῶν (ἀρετῶν), looks forward to εἶδος.

ἐκ λόγου (Krebs) is a plausible correction of the nonsensical ἐκάστου (one MS has a marginal note ἐκ μαθήσεως), but it cannot be considered certain; if ἐκάστου arose under the influence of πᾶν εἶδος, the real reading which it displaced may have been quite different.

CHAPTER 12

Readers can find good even in suspect texts, just as bees cull honey from bitter plants. Agamemnon is suspected of bribery: but his motive in exempting a rich man from military service may be good. Thetis tries to tempt Achilles to enjoy pleasures, but he shows his quality in rejecting the temptation. On the same principle, adaptations and parodies of difficult passages, such as philosophers make and we may invent ourselves, can also be of service in inculcating proper attitudes.

32e ἡ . . . μέλιττα: the bee now has a simile to itself (see on 30c-d above), but it is for variation constructed as parallel μὲν . . . δέ statements, rather than in traditional ‘as . . . so . . .’ form, cf. above p. 23 n. 63. The image is closely paralleled at 467c, ‘Just as thyme, the bitterest (δριμύτατον) and driest plant, offers the bees honey, so sensible men (οἱ φρόνιμοι) often draw something appropriate (οἰκεῖον) and useful from the most difficult events’, and cf. also 145b, St Basil, *Greek lit.* 4.36–46 Wilson, and already Isocrates, *Demonicus* 52 (the closing exhortation), ‘For just as we see the bee settle on every plant and take from each what is best, so those who long for culture (παιδεία) should leave nothing untried, but should gather (συλλέγειν) what is useful from every source. For even with such effort it will be very difficult to overcome the faults of nature.’ On these images cf. Morgan 1998a: 262–4.

φυσικῶς: the bee’s activity is one of nature, the student’s of nurture (ἐντρέφονται).

δριμυτάτοις . . . τραχυτάτοις: P. is thinking particularly of thyme, cf. 41f τὸν τραχύτατον καὶ δριμύτατον θύμον (in another bee simile), 467c (cited above), Porph. *De abstinentia* 4.20.8 (imitating P.). The opposition between τραχυτάτοις and λειότατον stresses the apparent paradox; Aristotle says that honey from thyme is especially sweet (*HA* 5.554a10–11).

ἐξανευρίσκει: P. is fond of this double compound which occurs only at Soph. *Phil.* 991 in extant texts of the classical period.

χρηστικώτατον: this adjective normally means ‘knowing how to use’ and is applied to persons; as a synonym of **χρήσιμος**, which it here varies (cf. immediately below), it first appears in P.

ἐντρέφονται: just as one account had it that bees drank honey from flowers (cf. Davies-Kathirithamby 1986: 56–8), so young men will ‘imbibe’ the useful moral lessons of poetry; it is their **τροφή**, as honey is the bees’ (cf. Aristotle, *HA* 5.553b25, 8.623b23). The idea of poetry as nourishment takes us back to the opening of the essay (cf. n. on 14f ὄψωι).

τῶν φαύλους . . . ἐχόντων ‘those that admit of low and bizarre suspicions’, cf. Pl. *Phaedo* 84c6–7 (τὰ λεχθέντα) πολλὰς . . . ἔχει ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβάς.

ἔλκειν is used of ‘drawing up’ liquids (LSJ s.v. II 4), and is thus appropriate both to bees who use a ‘tongue-like organ’ (Aristotle, *HA* 5.554a14–15) and to children, cf. Borthwick 1991: 561.

ἀμωσγέπως ‘in some way or other’.

αὐτίκα γοῦν ‘for example’. **αὐτίκα** follows a similar semantic development to **εὐθύς** (cf. 20e above): the example which follows is what ‘immediately’ comes to mind to illustrate the point.

ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων: at *Iliad* 23.293–9 Homer explains that one of the horses, Aithe, with which Menelaus entered the chariot race, had been a gift to Agamemnon from the very wealthy Echepolos (‘foal owning’) of Sicyon ‘so that he would not have to follow [Agamemnon] to windy Troy, but could remain at home and enjoy himself’. The example was a favourite of P., cf. 209c, 498b, where it is laudatory of a rich man who does not chase after even more riches, 767a, 988a (same analysis as here), *Agesilaos* 9.4.

32f δῶρ’ . . . ἄφενος: *Iliad* 23.297–9.

Ἀριστοτέλης: this is fr. 403 Gigon, presumably from the ‘Homeric problems’ (cf. Pfeiffer 1968: 67–73, Hunter 2009a: 21). A similar explanation appears in the AbT-Scholia to v. 297, and this too presumably descends ultimately from Aristotle. Plato had outlawed poetry showing **δωροδοκία**, which he illustrated from Homer (*Rep.* 3.390d7–91a2); here again, the subsequent critical tradition may be seen as a response to the Platonic challenge.

οὐδὲ γὰρ κυνὸς . . . διερρηκώς: this is all but certainly P. rather than Aristotle. In other circumstances (hunting) dogs and asses could be highly prized, but here they are used as ordinary, worthless creatures when set beside an excellent racehorse. P. stresses the worthlessness of Echepolos by adopting a proverbial tone, cf. Menander, *Misoumenos* 15–16 τὸ δ[ὲ] λεγόμενον, οὐδὲ κυνί, μὰ τοὺς θε[οὺς], νῦν [ἔξι] τητόν ἐστιν, ‘as the saying is, not even a dog should have to go out now . . .’; this saying does not in fact occur elsewhere but cf. ‘for not even a dog (οὐδὲ γὰρ κύων) would stop, once it’s learned to chew leather’ (Headlam-Knox on Herodas 7.63, Tosi 1991: 388). P. has strengthened the point by the addition of οὐδ’ ὄνου μὰ Δία; the ass is another animal which occurs very commonly in proverbial sayings. **δειλὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἀναλκίς**: the dactylic rhythm is very striking, but it is not very likely that P. is here quoting from lost verse. **ὑπὸ πλούτου καὶ**

μαλακίας: cf. n. on 24a μετ' ἀργίας καὶ μαλακίας καὶ πολυτελείας. διερρηκώς 'dissipated, gone to pieces', the perfect part. of διαρρέω, cf. Lucian, *Dialogues of the dead* 22.4 Macleod διερρηκότες ὑπὸ τρυφῆς (Diogenes speaking about the rich), LSJ s.v. II. Latin uses *difflo* very similarly (*OLD* s.v. 3a).

πάλιν introduces a new example, cf. 33a below, 54e, 533b etc.

33a ἡ Θέτις: at *Iliad* 24.126–37 Thetis asks her grieving son when he will again take food or have sex, 'for it is good to make love with a woman' (vv. 130–2), and tells him that his death is imminent. The verses caused scholarly disquiet: Aristarchus athetized vv. 130–2, and the scholia note that it is ἀπρεπές for a mother to say this to her son and that sex reduces the energy-levels of those who are going to fight (cf. also Eustath. *Hom.* 1342.30–2). It is tempting to think that P. did not here actually cite the offending verses, which he obviously thought genuine, because on the surface they were indeed too ἀπρεπές (note αἰσχιστά), unlike, for example, Phoenix's reference to sex with his father's mistress (25f, 26e–f) or Anteia's designs on Bellerophon (32b). P. urges the young to concentrate rather upon Achilles' behaviour ever since Briseis was returned by Agamemnon at 19.249–76; Achilles is certainly 'busy with actions' in Books 20–22, though P. glides silently over some very questionable behaviour. Though he raises the subject, P. has nothing to say about Thetis' motives (contrast Agamemnon in the preceding example); perhaps he could find nothing to say in her favour here. Others could, however: the T-Scholia on 130–2b suggest that this was a gambit to draw her son out of his grieving (Briseis does indeed lie beside him again at 24.676), and [Dionysius of Halicarnassus] similarly cites the charge of τὸ ἀπρεπές, but explains Thetis' words as a 'figured' form of consolation in which she reminds Achilles of his affection for Briseis and of their past pleasure together (II 324.24–325.13 U-R); for material shared between P. and [Dion. Hal.] cf. pp. 148–9, 164–5 above.

ἐφ' ἡδονάς . . . ἀφροδισίων: the chiasmic structure is typical of P., cf. λυπούμενος . . . διανοούμενος immediately below.

παραθεωρεῖν may just mean 'observe', 'consider' (cf. παραθεώρησις at 820c), but if the prefix carries force, the sense is perhaps 'set [Achilles' endurance] against [the disgraceful suggestion in the verses]'.

ἐρῶν: Achilles' love for Briseis became a prominent motif in later poetry and discussions of the *Iliad*, cf., e.g., Hor. *Epist.* 1.2.13, Max. Tyr. 18.8.

οὐδ' ὥσπερ . . . καθηκόντων 'nor like the many does he mourn his friend through inaction and abandonment of his duties'; the philosophical flavour of τὰ καθήκοντα is important here.

ὁ Ἀρχίλοχος: the reference is presumably to the same poem as cited in 23b.

οὐκ ἐπαινεῖται 'has incurred criticism'; the understatement ('litotes') is cultured and scholarly.

33b αἰτίαν . . . εἶρηκεν 'has given a reason [for his intention] which is reasonable'.

οὔτε . . . ἐφέπων: Archilochus fr. 11 West.

εἰ γὰρ ἐκείνος . . . ἐφέπουσιν: the argument seems to be that, as Archilochus recommends jollity, even in a period of grief, so *a fortiori* we should get on with our more serious occupations when grief strikes. This example helps us to see how to use, not only Archilochus' poem, but also the immediately preceding case of Achilles in our own lives; Achilles too got on with his 'ordinary life (of great action)', however remote from ours that might seem. For another such example cf. *Pericles* 36.4. Valgiglio 1973: 218–19 understands that P. moves from Archilochus to a general defence of ways of life dear to him, but it seems very difficult to remove the idea of 'grief' from P.'s use of the example, cf. further below. ἡμῖν τὰ παρόντα χεῖρον ἐξεῖ: it is somewhat awkward that P. does not make clear that we should use this example *when grieving*, but it may be unnecessary to suggest (e.g.) ἡμῖν <λυπούμενοις> (RH and DR); <πρὸς> τὰ παρόντα (DR), however, would provide greater clarity at very little textual cost. φιλοσοφοῦσι . . . ἐφέπουσιν: P. describes the ordinary activities of himself and his circle of friends. The first three are not tied to any particular location, whereas the Academy suggests Athens and γεωργία perhaps P.'s home in Boeotia. The point of the mixture is perhaps to indicate the wide applicability of the kind of lesson he is teaching us to draw. καταβαίνουσιν 'going off to'; Cicero, *De fato* 19 discusses the proposition *descendat in Academiam Carneades*, and P. perhaps here alludes gently to some familiar text (cf. also Cic. *TD* 2.9). The Academy, founded by Plato, was located to the north-west of the city, some 1.5 km outside the classical city walls. Whether or not this was still the site of 'Academic' or Platonic teaching in P.'s day is doubtful (cf. Gucker 1978: 226–55), but some classicizing nostalgia would be very typical of P.'s age; so too, the reference to agriculture fashions P. and his colleagues as latter-day Xenophons. Gucker 1978: 256–80 studies all references to the Academy in P.

δοθὲν forms an apparently very abrupt transition to a new class of examples (cf. above p. 19), but the transition is managed through the citation from Archilochus (cf. the transition though the case of Paris at the end of chapter 3). Just as Aristotle and P. himself have now given the lead in showing how to derive profit from morally dubious passages, and the young will be expected to use their moral sense to add to the list, so we can both use philosophers' 'rewritings' of what seems outrageous and also ourselves (33d–e) use this method. More particularly, just as we 'adapted' both Archilochus' meaning and his language to our own case, the latter by echoing (χεῖρον, ἐφέπουσιν) though not actually rewriting his verses, so we can go one step further and actually rewrite; P. does not use ἐφέπειν except in this passage.

αἱ παραδιορθώσεις 'corrections by adaptation', 'parodic corrections'.

Κλεάνθης: cf. n. on 31d Κλεάνθους. This anecdote is *SVF* I 562. For Stoic 'corrections' of poetry cf. also 1039e–f (= *SVF* III 167), where Antisthenes is again involved, 1069d–e, Nussbaum 1993: 132–3.

Ἀντισθένης: an associate of Socrates and philosopher and critic whose career extended well into the fourth century. Of his voluminous writings only fragments

survive (Giannantoni 1990: II 137–225), but it is relevant to his place here that he was seen to foreshadow both the Stoics and the Cynics in important regards; for the Cynic fondness for parody and ‘correction’ of famous verses cf., e.g., Lucian, *Lives for sale* 9. This same story of intervention in the theatre (fr. 60 Declava Caizzi) is elsewhere associated with both Plato and Diogenes (cf. Kannicht on Eur. fr. 19).

33c ὁ μὲν: i.e. Antisthenes; P. takes the examples in chiasmic order.

εὖ μάλα looks forward to παραβαλὼν.

τοὺς Ἀθηναίους: the text seems to have suffered abbreviation, as the main transmission offers no construction for the accusative; ἰδὼν from two MSS is adopted here, though it may have originated as an attempt to amend a corrupt text. τῶν Ἀθηναίων θορυβησάντων... (RH) is another possibility. So too, the transmitted text makes the quoted verse the direct object of θορυβήσαντας, ‘applauding/making a noise about [the verse]’ ‘What is shameful...?’; this is kept by Valgiglio and Bernardakis-Ingenkamp, but although examples of the passive of θορυβεῖν are found, no example of such an active use can be adduced. If, however, such an active use is possible, <τό> before the quotation (DR) would both ease the transition and be in the Plutarchan manner. The text printed, with Bernardakis’ <πρὸς τό> must be considered exemplary at best; other suggestions are gathered in Paton’s apparatus and Gärtner’s addenda. Such anecdotes of θόρυβος in the theatre are common, cf., e.g., 756b–c for another one involving Euripides and a ‘correction’ of a scandalous verse.

τί δ’ αἰσχρόν... δοκῆι; ‘What is disgraceful, if those involved do not think so?’, a notorious verse from Euripides’ *Aiolos* (fr. 19 K), which presumably referred to the incest of Aiolos’ son Macareus with his sister; it is parodied as early as Ar. *Frogs* 1475.

παραβαλὼν ‘throwing in (by way of correction)’. Antisthenes’ oral display is perhaps to be contrasted with the written corrections of later Stoics which P. cites; Diogenes Laertius 7.173, however, cites a story about Zeno in the theatre.

φίλοις... σῶσαι: Euripides, *Electra* 428–9, with φίλοις for Euripides’ ξένοις; Electra’s old husband is commenting on the value of wealth. This passage seems to have been a standard quotation in discussions of wealth, cf. Dio Chrys. 7.82, 102, Stobaeus 4.31.7. The couplet is unintelligible without v. 427, ‘I see how great is the power of wealth’, which was very likely in Cleanthes; P. substitutes περὶ τοῦ πλούτου.

μεταγράφων need not necessarily imply that he wrote these verses down, but in what is probably a reference to this same intervention of Cleanthes Dio expressly states that Cleanthes was ‘writing in a book’ (7.102).

πόρναις... ἐπιτρίψαι: Cleanthes may simply have been commenting on the foolishness with which people waste their money. For Stoics, however, both health and wealth were ἀδιάφορα ‘indifferent’; they cannot be ‘goods’, because they can be used well or ill (cf., e.g., 1048c–d = *SVF* III 123, *SVF* III 117), and so

Cleanthes may have been making an ethical point and/or contrasting the essential meaninglessness of wealth with the pursuit of virtue; cf. further 34c below. It may be relevant that one example attributed to Stoics is that, as wealth can be made from πορνοβοσκία, wealth cannot be a good (*SVF* III 152). For a rather similar thought about wasting money on πόρναι cf. Alcæus fr. 117.26–31 Voigt.

ὁ Ζήνων: Zeno of Citium (Cyprus), the founder of the Stoic school at the end of the fourth and early part of the third century. The present passage is *SVF* I 219. Elsewhere it is reported (*SVF* I 235) that Zeno ‘rewrote’ two verses of Hesiod (*WD* 293, 295); the Hesiodic scholia discuss Zeno’s change at some length, and this might well derive from P.’s commentary (fr. 42 Sandbach).

33d ὅστις . . . μόληι: Sophocles fr. 873 R; the verses became proverbial and are elsewhere associated with Pompey’s relations with Ptolemy (204d, *Pompey* 78.7) and Aristippus’ or Plato’s with Dionysius of Syracuse; cf. Radt ad loc., Hunter 1983: 119.

οὐκ ἔστι . . . μόληι: for the Stoic (only) the wise man is free, freedom being ἔξουσία αὐτοπραγίας (*SVF* I 222, III 355–6 etc.); Cleanthes wrote a Περὶ ἐλευθερίας and Philo’s essay ‘On the fact that every good man is free’ is extant. On Stoic freedom cf. Schofield 1999: 48–56.

τῷ ἐλευθέρῳ . . . ἀταπείνωτον ‘by “free” now indicating/designating the fearless and great-hearted and unhumbled’. **συνεμφαίνων:** the συν- prefix has little force (cf. 485c), other than to bind the concepts together; ἐμφαίνειν in the required sense is common in P., and συνεμφαίνων (Kronenberg) is to be preferred to the transmitted συνεκφαίνων.

ὑποφωνήσῃσι ‘retorts’, cf. *Pompey* 25.5.

ἀποκαλεῖν ‘to call [the young] away [from the worse to the better course]’. The transmission offers various prefixes and some uncertainty remains; ἀνακαλεῖν (Castiglioni) deserves mention.

τόδ’ ἔστι . . . πέσηι ‘what men most want is that the arrow of one’s thought falls where one wishes’, trag. adesp. fr. 354 K-S. We are invited to take the author of the rewriting as P. himself.

τὸ γὰρ . . . ἄζηλον ‘for to receive and achieve what one wants, when that is not what one should want, is pitiable and not at all to be desired’.

33e οὐκ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν . . . λυπεῖσθαι: Euripides, *Iphigeneia at Aulis* 29–31 (anapaestic dimeters); the old retainer seeks to console Agamemnon, who has just observed that positions of power have both their pleasures and their pains: things often go wrong, whether as the result of the gods or of human error. The old man’s point, very similar to that of Achilles to Priam in *Iliad* 24, is that Agamemnon shares the same human condition as everyone: θνητὸς γὰρ ἔφυς are the old man’s next words after P. cuts off the quotation. Thus, Stobaeus 4.41.6 (on the instability of good fortune) cites vv. 28–33 and [Plutarch] cites vv. 29–34 at *Consolation* 103b–c. P.’s objection seems to be that someone in Agamemnon’s position has no reason at all to feel grief here, as well as pleasure, in his lot. It is tempting to seek also

a Stoic use for these verses, and the Stoic rejection of λύπη as an irrational passion which the wise man will not feel (cf. *SVF* IV index s.v.) suggests one appropriate context for them; another is the absurdity of the idea, as the verses could be understood to suggest, that Agamemnon possessed ‘all good things’, i.e. all virtues, from birth; Chrysippus elsewhere used *LA* 28 (*SVF* II 180.5), and he may well have taken an interest in the following verses as well.

The very abrupt entry of the following example (Eur. fr. 841 K) and the fact that it introduces a section which occupies the rest of Chapter 12, in which – unlike all previous quotations in the discussion of παραδιορθώσεις – quotations are neither linked nor introduced, perhaps suggests textual abbreviation here. Moreover, the second citation of the *LA*, if it includes οὐ γάρ, is metrically faulty, whether we restore (or understand) σε as in Euripides or (with many editors) understand that P. has turned a vocative Ἀγαμέμνον into an accusative Ἀγαμέμνον. Finally, given the other signs of textual disturbance, although the replacement of καί by μή in v. 31 preserves the anapaestic metre, the markedly iambic (or perhaps trochaic) rhythm of τυγχάνοντα μετρίων is at least noteworthy. It is possible that vv. 29–30 have been mistakenly repeated, thus causing the loss of an introduction to Eur. fr. 841 K. If they are to be retained, however, then the text adopted here seems the best solution (so Bernardakis 2008): οὐ γάρ introduces the quotation *extra metrum*, σ’ ἐφύτευσ’ is restored from the Euripidean tradition and the words now conform to anapaestic rhythm.

αἰαῖ . . . χρῆται δὲ μή: Euripides fr. 841 K, from *Chrysippus*; the verses were very familiar to the anthological tradition (cf. Stobaeus 3.3.33). The subject is Laios’ desire for Pelops’ son Chrysippus, but the speaker is uncertain. P. cites the verses again at 446a as an illustration of ἄκρασία (rather than ἀκολασία), and the second-century *Handbook of Platonism* of ‘Alcinous’ cites them, together with *Medea* 1078–9, to illustrate the conflict between the λογιστικόν and the παθητικόν parts of the soul (24.3). Chrysippus is known to have cited these famous verses of the *Medea* (*SVF* III 473, cf. II 906 (p. 255)) – and indeed to have had a particular interest in that play as a whole (Diog. Laert. 7.180, Nussbaum 1993: 142–4); the present citation may perhaps go back to him also, although P.’s analysis is opposed to the Stoic position. How Chrysippus might have dealt with the awkward (for him) title of Euripides’ play we can only speculate, cf. further Wilamowitz 1935: 179–81, Dillon 1993: 150.

θηριῶδες . . . ἄγεσθαι ‘No! Rather [it is] beast-like and irrational and pitiable to know what is better but to be led by the worse, as a result of weakness of will and softness’. The suggested ‘rewriting’ consists in the replacement of θεῖον in v. 1 by three different epithets; the hyperbole, three epithets against one, is very emphatic. P. may not actually be suggesting replacement within the verse, but θηριῶδες would preserve the initial iambic shape of the quotation and θηρ – resonates against θει –; for what it is worth, the other two adjectives would each produce a just recognizable trimeter, with hiatus after ἦδη. θηριῶδες . . . ἄλογον: for this pairing cf. 380c, 390e. θηριώδης is very common in P., particularly in

outbursts against philosophical doctrines (1089c, 1070c, 1108d, 1124e etc.). In the present context it is to be noted that, for Aristotle, the three types of moral failing are κακία, ἀκρασία and θηριότης (*EN* 7.1145a16). μὲν οὖν ‘no, rather . . .’ cf. Deniston 475. τοῦ χείρονος: P. will be thinking of τὰ πάθη; according to Aristotle, it is πάθος which makes the ἀκρατής act as he does, whereas the ἐγκρατής is guided by λόγος (*EN* 7.1145b13–14, cf. ἄλογον here). ἀκρασίας ‘lack of self-control’, a central problem of Greek ethics at least since Plato; the fundamental later discussion is Aristotle, *EN* 7. P. discusses ἀκρασία in his essay ‘On moral virtue’, where he cites these same verses, and there too he links ἀκρασία to μαλακία (446a), following Aristotle’s lead; ἀκρασίας καὶ μαλακίας is essentially a ‘quotation’ from Aristotle (cf., e.g., *EN* 7.1145a36, 1145b10).

33f τρόπος . . . λόγος ‘It is the speaker’s character which persuades, not the speech’, Menander fr. 362.7 K-A, from the *Hymnis*, the final verse of a longer extract preserved by Stobaeus 3.37.17 (περὶ χρηστότητος). P. cites this verse again and ‘corrects’ and explains it in almost identical fashion at 801c-d; at 41b he makes a distinction between political speeches, where character is indeed paramount, and philosophy where it is what is actually said that counts. P.’s ‘correction’, which insists on a close linkage between moral character and what is said, is a Platonizing one, cf. *Rep.* 3. 400d5–6 ‘What of the manner of the style (ὁ τρόπος τῆς λέξεως) and the words (λόγος)? Do they not follow the character (ἦθος) of the soul?’ The primacy of ‘character’ over verbal style is an important tenet of P.’s rhetorical works, cf. Ziegler 1951: 929 [= 1964: 293].

καὶ τρόπος . . . λόγος ‘No, rather both character and speech or character expressed by speech’. For μὲν οὖν cf. above on 33e μὲν οὖν.

ἵππεύς . . . κυβερνήτης: chiastic order again. In the parallel passage at 801c–d P. extends the image of the steersman to encompass ‘the ship of state’.

οὐδὲν . . . λόγον ‘as virtue has no instrument which is as humane or as closely related to itself as speech’. The possession of λόγος and ἀρετή are the principal characteristics which separate us from the beasts. συγγενές may be a further pointer to a Stoic source, cf. Philo, *Every good man* 21 ‘nothing is so closely related (συγγενές) to another thing, as independence of action (αὐτοπραγία) is to freedom’.

34a πρὸς θῆλυ . . . ἀμφιδέξις: trag. adesp. 355 K-S, perhaps from a satyr play (cf. Euripides, *Cyclops* 583–4). The verses are cited again at 766f–7a, where it is claimed that the first verse is a question put to a lover of pleasure; if so, it is possible that the original reading was the second-person νεύεις (so also Görgemanns 2006: 177 n.362). The change to the third person is of a familiar kind in the anthological tradition, and 766–7a strongly suggests that this is the form in which P. knew the citation. ‘Ambidexterous’, ‘taking with either hand’ in the fragment means ‘making no distinction between women or boys (provided that they are beautiful)’, but in P.’s correction it means ‘grasping with both hands’, so ‘well balanced’ as in P.’s explanation.

ισόρροπος 'well balanced', 'in equipoise'. At *Every good man* 24 Philo notes that the wise and free man knows 'that all mortal things are tossed about on the surging wave of events and sway unevenly on the balance'; the Stoic context and the combination of a nautical metaphor (cf. μεταϊακίζόμενος) with the image of the scales is suggestive for P's sources here.

δεῦρο κἀκεῖ μεταϊακίζόμενος 'steered around this way and that', cf. Aristotle, *EN* 10.1172a20–1, 'people educate young men, steering them (οἰακίζοντες) by pleasure and pain'; the μετα- prefix implies constant change. This verb is found nowhere else, but it is more vivid than the alternative μετακίζόμενος, 'moving house, changing residence', and takes us back to the nautical imagery of 15d.

ἐπαρίστερος 'left handed', hence 'awkward' and 'unstable' (ἀβέβαιος), as well as unreliable; the word is particularly chosen to resonate with δεξιός, on the right side, in ἀμφιδέξιος. The person who is fixed on τὸ σῶφρον has a single, worthwhile object in view; the person who is driven by the pursuit of beauty (κάλλος, ὥρα) will constantly change direction as he finds another beautiful person in whom to take an interest and seek pleasure. At 467c P. observes that the uneducated often receive ἐπαρίστέρως the blessings of Fortune (lit. 'Fortune offering herself on the right'). 'Stability' is an important element in Stoic discussions of virtue, cf. 441c (cited in n. on 24d εὐθύς . . . νοοῦμεν), 1058b.

φόβος . . . βροτῶν: trag. adesp. 356 K-S, also cited by Stobaeus 3.3.30 (περὶ φρονήσεως). φόβος τὰ θεῖα is apparently the opening of a verse of Euripides' *Cretans* (fr. 472c.5 K), but the rest of that verse is not preserved on the papyrus. For the Stoics φόβος was an 'expectation of bad' (*SVF* III 406), and θάρσος, knowledge or confidence that nothing bad would happen to one (D-Scholia on *Iliad* 5.2, *SVF* III 287), is an obvious 'opposite' of that.

οὐδαμῶς 'No, not at all . . .', cf. μὰ Δία in 33e for the asyndetic retort. The transmitted καὶ μὴν is perhaps not impossible in an adversative sense (Denniston 357–8), but Pohlenz's deletion seems an improvement, though it is difficult then to understand how καὶ μὴν entered the text. Other possibilities include οὐ μὴν with deletion of οὐδαμῶς (DR) and οὐ μὴν οὐδαμῶς (RH).

ἄφροσι . . . ἀχαρίστοις: the three adjectives, all with 'alpha privative', are an excellent example of the amplitude of P's style, cf. above p. 22. ἀχαρίστοις 'ungrateful', i.e. for the benefits the gods bestow.

ὅτι . . . δεδίασι 'because they view with suspicion and fear even the power and principle which is responsible for all good as being harmful'.

CHAPTER 13

Another approach is by learning to generalize advice given by the poet. Chrysippus taught us this. It is like using a medicine known to be a specific for a particular complaint for other similar conditions, and students should be encouraged to do this. How Homer distributes praise and blame can also be instructive. This can teach us not to blame people for misfortunes which are

not their fault, and not ourselves to be thrown off balance by misfortune or by undeserved abuse. Attacks on external misfortunes do not touch the heart or make an impression on those who really need correction.

34b τὴν . . . Χρύσιππος ‘Chrysippus showed the correct way to give what is said [in texts] a wider application.’ On this passage and the Chrysippian theorizing which may lie behind it cf. Lamberton 2001: 50–1.

ὁ Χρύσιππος: cf. above p. 12, n. on 31ε Χρύσιππος, Nussbaum 1993: 140–1. The current passage is *SVF* II 100.

ὅτι δεῖ . . . τὸ χρήσιμον ‘that one should transfer and extend useful points to analogous matters’; the scholia on Hesiod (see next note) express this as δεῖ . . . ἐκτείνειν ἐπὶ τὰ ὅμοια τὸν λόγον.

οὐδ’ ἄν . . . εἴη: Hesiod, *WD* 348. In making the same point, which presumably goes back to Chrysippus, about extending the reference of the verse, Columella (1.3.5–6) notes how familiar it is, ‘anyone of decent parents will have first heard it in the cradle’. Plutarch made the same point also in his commentary on *WD* (fr. 49 Sandbach), as also does Dio 77.5, noting that Hesiod expected intelligent readers for his poetry.

τίς . . . ἀφροντίς ὧν: Euripides fr. 958 K, a commonly cited verse (see Kan-nicht’s testimonia). For the Stoics both life and death are ‘indifferent’, with ‘life’ being the ‘preferred’ half of the pair; the same situation applies to health-disease and pleasure-pain, cf., e.g. *SVF* I 190, III 117. The wise man who knows these things is also free, cf. n. on 33d οὐκ ἔστι . . . μόληι. Philo, *Every good man* 22–3 also cites this verse and ‘extends’ it in exactly the way that P. does.

ὑπακουστέον ‘we must understand’, cf. LSJ s.v. III.

τὰ αὐτά: we might have expected ταυτό, τοῦτο or ταῦτα (DR).

34c οὕτω καὶ . . . ὀξυηκόας ‘so also we must not allow a statement, which can share and spread its usefulness around, to be connected to just one thing, but we must direct it towards everything which is similar; and we must accustom the young to grasp what is common [between things] and quickly to transfer the particular [to the general], giving themselves training and practice in acuteness of understanding by means of many examples’. The language is suggestive of Horace, *AP* 128 *difficile est proprie communia dicere*, where however Horace is considering the problem of turning generalities into particulars, not particular instances into moral generalities; for this interpretation of P. here and for the language of ‘common’ and ‘particular’ in general cf. Brink 1971: 204–7. οἰκεῖον picks up the metaphor in δημοσιεύειν: what was private (to one instance) is now public. Alternatively, ἐπὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον (DR), εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον (Kronenberg) and πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον (Hartman) have all been proposed: ‘quickly transfer [the example] to its kin/to that which is related to it’ (rather than ‘to one’s own theme’); this would be a verbal variation of κινεῖν ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ ὅμοια. ὀξυηκόας: P. uses ἀκούειν of all forms of reception, including reading, throughout the treatise, cf. n. on 14f ἐν ταῖς ἀκρόασεσιν καὶ ἀναγνώσεσιν above.

μακάριος . . . ἔχει: Menander fr. 111.1 K-A from the *Dēmiourgos*; the second verse of the fragment is χρῆται γὰρ οὗτος εἰς ἃ δεῖ ταύτηι καλῶς. The couplet was very familiar to the gnomological tradition (see the testimonia in Kassel-Austin). It is easy to see why Chrysippus might have been interested: wealth cannot be a good, as it can be used both well and ill (cf. v. 2 of the fragment, n. on 33c *πόρνοις . . . ἐπιτρῖψαι*). Anyone, wealthy or poor, powerful or humble, who had νοῦς (i.e. the wise man) would certainly be μακάριος.

περὶ δόξης . . . δυνάμεως: a similar list is given in 34c below, but ἡγεμονία is here 'power/leadership', not specifically 'generalship' as in 34e. For the Stoics δόξα 'reputation/public standing' is another 'preferred indifferent' (*SVF* I 190, III 117 etc.).

34d τὴν δὲ . . . Ὀδυσσεώς: the epic cycle seems to have told the story of how Thetis hid Achilles, disguised as a girl, with the daughters of King Lycomedes on Scyros, so that he would not have to go to Troy; while there and living in the female quarters, he seduced one of the daughters, Deidameia, who subsequently gave birth to Neoptolemus. The story of how Odysseus discovered him on Scyros was the subject of Euripides' *Skyrioi*, and it is not improbable that the fragment which P. quotes comes from that play. It has been objected that 'greatest father among the Greeks' is inappropriate to Peleus, and that therefore these verses may belong to Sophocles' *Skyrioi*, which probably told the story of the later fetching of Neoptolemus, rather than that of his father; cf. Radt's introduction to the fragments for the arguments and bibliography. There is, however, no evidence that Neoptolemus repeated his father's trick of hiding among women – far from it in fact, cf. Quintus Smyrnaeus 7.169-393 – and so Sophocles is unlikely to be the author of these verses; Peleus did after all marry a goddess, is called by Plato 'most *sôphrôn* and a grandson of Zeus' (*Rep.* 3.391c1), and in the situation some rhetorical exaggeration seems pardonable. P. is about to suggest that we can extend this to almost anyone guilty of shameful behaviour: ἐπίπληξιν 'rebuke'.

σὺ δ' . . . γεγώς: Euripides fr. **683a K, cited by P. also at 72e (with καταισχύνων for ἀποσβεννύς), as an example of how one may commend a friend's parents while reproving the friend himself. The rebuke is very like the (jesting) apostrophe to Achilles by the poet at Ovid, *Ars am.* 1.691-6 (*quid facis, Aeacide? non sunt tua munera lanae* etc.), and Bergk suggested that Eur. fr. 880 K, 'young men should not sit amidst women, but gain honour with swords and weapons', came directly after fr. ** 683a in the *Skyrioi*. Fr. 880 survives because it was quoted by Chrysippus (*SVF* II 180.8), and this is at least suggestive for the current context.

τὸν ἄσωτον 'the wastrel'. For Aristotle ἄσωτρία is the condition of excess with regard to expenditure – the ἄσωτος gives and spends too much and does not receive or earn enough; its opposite is ἀνελευθερία and the proper mean is ἐλευθεριότης (*EN* 2. 1107b10-12, 4.1121a10-12). Aristotle notes that ἄσωτοι are

also very often ἀκόλαστοι because they spend their money on disgraceful things (4.1121b8–9), and the meanings of the two words very often run together; cf. further on 34e ἀκολασίας.

τὸν αἰσχροκερδῆ is the man who makes (and enjoys making) money, often fairly insignificant sums and through disgraceful means, by taking advantage of other people, cf. Diggle 2004: 507. For Aristotle αἰσχροκέρδεια and ἀνελευθερία, the opposite of ἀσωτία, are closely linked (EN 4.1122a2–3).

πίνεις . . . τοκογλυφεῖς: P.'s list is in roughly ascending order of disgracefulness, with a quantum leap marked by νῆ Δία; only the first, πίνεις, produces a trimeter with ἀρίστου πατρός γεγώς, and this too suggests rising indignation. 'Drinking' is presumably here a mark of ἀσωτία. κυβεύεις: for Aristotle dicing is a mark of both ἀνελευθερία and αἰσχροκέρδεια because it involves making money out of one's friends (EN 4.1122a7–12). Here it may also be ἄσωτον, as the gambler is likely to lose money; for the bad reputation of dicing cf., e.g., Lysias 16.11, dicing and drinking are two of the ἀκολασίαι of young men, Philostratus, *VA* 5.36.3, Hunter 1983: 142. Quintilian notes that there is a rhetorical *communis locus* against the *aleator* (2.4.22), and [Plut.] *The education of children* 12b lists dicing amongst the terrible things young men do, such as 'gluttony, stealing their father's money, revels and drinking-bouts, love-affairs with young girls and corrupting married women'. ὀρτυγοκοπεῖς refers to a game in which quail were 'tapped' or had their head feathers pulled by one player and, if they withstood this ill-treatment, their owner won, but if they flinched or fled the 'tapper' won, cf. Pollux 9.107–9, Thompson 1936: 217, Dunbar on Ar. *Birds* 1297–9. The quail-tapper presumably suffers from the same faults as the dicer. It may be coincidence that Chrysippus listed ὀρτυγομανία among the conditions to which people attach the label μανία (SVF III 667), but Marcus Aurelius lists among the things he has learned 'not to take part in quail-tapping and not to get excited about such things' (1.6), and a Stoic source might again lie behind P. here. Plato, however, is also dismissive of a quail-tapper at *Alcibiades* 120a9 (see Denyer's n. ad loc.). καπηλεύεις: another example of αἰσχροκέρδεια. At 173c 'small-scale trading' is as shameful as brothel-keeping, and at 819e such traders, like money-lenders, are examples of shameless greed; for Aristotle such activity contributes nothing to εὐδαιμονία (EE 1215a32). τοκογλυφεῖς: cf. n. on 18e τάλαντον . . . ἀργυροῦν;

μὴ πλοῦτον . . . ἐκτήσατο: Euripides fr. 20 K from the *Aiolos* (cf. 33c above). Although the theme is a common one (cf. 'Longinus' *On the sublime* 44.7), a Stoic source is again here likely; for the Stoic attitude to wealth cf. on 33c πόρνοις . . . ἐπιτρίψαι. Immediately before citing Eur. fr. 892 K (cf. 36f ἐπεὶ τί δεῖ . . . ὑδρῆχόνου;), Sextus Empiricus explicitly says that fr. 20 was used by a Stoic, whom he does not name (*Against the grammarians* 1.271, cf. Blank 1998: 287, n. on 36f below), and Athenaeus 4.159c cites the verses apparently from Diogenes' *Republic*, but the whole context there is full of Chrysippian material. Cicero too seems to allude to these verses in a Stoic context (*Tusc.* 5.46) and, like P., he extends the reference, in his case to noble birth, popular reputation (cf. δόξα), physical

attractiveness (cf. εὐμορφία) and winningness of speech (cf. λόγου δυνάμειος in 34c above). Seneca, *Ep.* 87 writes at length about how the very worst people can be rich. The citation of this fragment at Stobaeus 3.3.31 is in a nest of passages which Stobaeus shares with *How to study poetry*.

34e σώματος εὐμορφίαν: physical beauty was another Stoic ‘indifferent’ (*SVF* III 117), though the Stoics were also credited with the saying that beauty was the ἄνθος ἀρετῆς or the ἄνθος σωφροσύνης (767b, Diog. Laert. 7.23, *SVF* III 718). Stobaeus cites three relevant passages from P. (fr. 144–6 Sandbach), two of which he seems to ascribe to a work ‘On beauty’; such a work is not in the Lamprias Catalogue, and Sandbach doubts their authenticity.

στρατηγικὴν χλαμύδα: particular cloaks often denoted power; cf. LSJ s.v. 3. This variation upon ἡγεμονία in 34c gives emphasis, as does ἱερατικὸν στέφανον which follows, to the display of power; to how the powerful like to be seen as powerful; it is therefore closely connected with δόξα and other forms of vanity.

ἱερατικὸν στέφανον: cf. previous note. Priestly office was often both lucrative and purchasable, and so this instance is connected with both ‘wealth’ and ‘reputation’.

τῆς δειλίας . . . τέκνα: trag. adesp. 357 K-S. For Aristotle, the δειλός displayed an excess of fear and a deficiency in boldness (*EN* 2.1107b3–4); for the Stoics δειλία was ignorance about τὰ δεινά (*SVF* III 262) and, like ἀκολασία, a vice (κακόν), cf. *SVF* I 190, III 70, 265 etc. For the image in τέκνα cf. esp. ‘Longinus’ *On the sublime* 44.7, expanding upon Plato, *Rep.* 9.573c.

ἀκολασίας: cf. previous note. For Aristotle this is an excess with regard to pleasure, the approved mean being σωφροσύνη (*EN* 2.1107b5–6). For the Stoics it was ignorance in the field of moral choice (*SVF* III 262).

δεισιδαιμονίας: in the Hellenistic and later period, the negative sense of ‘(inane) superstition’ rather than ‘fear of god’ generally prevails, as throughout P.’s own essay on the subject; for the history of the concept cf., e.g., Koets 1929, Diggle 2004: 349–50. Antipater of Tarsus, the Head of the Stoa in the mid-second century BC, wrote a *Περὶ δεισιδαιμονίας* (*SVF* III 64), and Marcus Aurelius lists it among the attitudes he has learned to reject (1.16.3, cf. 6.30.14); like all fear, superstition was classed by the Stoics as an irrational passion (*SVF* III 411 etc.). The Epicureans, however, twitted the Stoics with being δεισιδαίμονες (fr. 369 Usener).

φθόνου: ‘malicious envy’ was an evil to all Greek intellectual traditions, and P. wrote an essay *Envy and hatred* (536e–8e); cf. 529b, the philosopher can remove envy from a young man’s soul. For the Stoics envy was a form of λύπη and therefore irrational; Cleanthes wrote a *Περὶ φθονερίας* (*SVF* I 481).

νοσημάτων: that such vices are ‘illnesses’ underlies P.’s whole concept of moral ills and their cure, cf., e.g., 38c μυρίων παθῶν καὶ νοσημάτων, 536f, 1128e (anger, jealousy, love). The idea is of course commonplace (‘Longinus’ *On the sublime* 44.6 on greed, Dio 55.13 etc.), and Stoics too expressly compared bodily and psychic illnesses, cf. *SVF* III 422 where φθονερία is one of the examples, III 424.

ἄριστα δ' εἰρηκότος Ὀμήρου: cf. below on 35a. The resonance between ἄριστα and the subject to which P. now turns is probably accidental, rather than a pun (Heirman).

Δύσπαρι εἶδος ἄριστε: *Iliad* 3.39, the opening of a very abusive speech by Hector; the second example, Ἐκτορ εἶδος ἄριστε, opens the speech in which Glaucus attacks Hector for abandoning Sarpedon's body (*Iliad* 17.142, cf. n. on 32a Γλαῦκε . . . ἄλλων). It may seem surprising that P. seems here to class Hector with Paris as someone who has 'no finer attribute than their good looks', but P. or his source is focused on the reference to external form, not to a balanced assessment of Hector's qualities; the two phrases are also linked in the bT-Scholia on 3.39. Modern defences of Hector's honour here include deletion of the second phrase (Heirman) and, better, Philippon's suggestion that the form Δύσπαρι shows Homer's view of Paris in contrast to Ἐκτορ; the two phrases are, however, paired, not contrasted.

34f εὐμορφίας κάλλιον: the very common moral use of καλόν makes it difficult to assess how pointed 'more beautiful than bodily beauty' actually is.

ἐφαρμοστέον . . . ὁμοίοις 'this must be adapted to similar cases also'.

κολούοντα 'putting down', 'cutting down to size'.

παισίν 'slaves', rather than 'children'. Like 'dinners' and 'beasts of burden', slaves are a sign of wealth, not of anything deserving praise; these phrases are taken as abusive reproof, not because wealth or slaves are intrinsically 'bad', but – so P. argues – because such phrases imply that there is nothing better to say, as, for example, 'best in bravery'.

τὸ λέγειν ἐφεξῆς ἄριστε '[and to consider a disgrace] saying ἄριστε all the time', i.e. about everything indiscriminately; such indiscriminate praise, often bestowed for utterly worthless 'goods', is itself a form of λοιδορία, revealing a warped sense of value. νή Δία marks this last case as a kind of *reductio ad absurdum*; <ἐπὶ πάντων> ἐφεξῆς (DR) would make the matter clearer, but on balance seems unnecessary. Text and meaning are, however, uncertain. Other proposals and interpretations include 'best at making continuous speeches' (not particularly pointed, and ἐφεξῆς is not regular in that sense), καὶ νή Δία <ἐν ἄλλοις τοιούτοις> ὥστε μὴ πάντα ἐφεξῆς λέγειν, 'and in other such things, so as not to mention everything in turn' (Wytttenbach, but hardly in keeping with P.'s satirical method), and τῶι λέγειν ἐφεξῆς ἄριστε ἄριστε 'best at saying "best" at one thing after another' (RH).

35a δεῖ γὰρ . . . μεγίστοις 'For it is from honourable actions that one must seek distinction, to be first in what is of primary importance and great in the greatest matters'.

ὑπεροχὴν: P.'s students might here have thought of αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων, the instruction which their fathers gave to Glaucus and Achilles (*Iliad* 6.208, 11.784).

περί . . . μεγίστοις: P. emphasizes the statement by chiasmic structure and the variation ἐκ . . . περί . . . ἐν. There is a proverbial flavour to the sentiment, cf. Pindar, *Pyth.* 3.107–8 (in a passage concerned with wealth, reputation and virtue) σμικρὸς ἐν σμικροῖς, μέγας ἐν μεγάλοις | ἔσσομαι; whereas the Pindaric passage has to do with adapting to external circumstances (cf. the Scholia (Drachmann II 90) and Cingano ad loc.), P. is speaking of moral qualities.

δόξα . . . ἄδοξος is an oxymoron of a type particularly familiar in tragedy, cf. Soph. *Ajax* 665 ἄδωρα δῶρα, Eur. *Hipp.* 1144 πότμος ἄποτμος, Fraenkel on Aesch. *Ag.* 1142. At 64a P. has χάρις ἐπαχθής καὶ ἄχαρις.

ἀφιλότιμος: both ‘lacking in ambition’ and ‘unworthy of an honourable man’. Elsewhere P. pairs ἀφιλότιμος with ἀγεννής (605e, 715e) and ἀνελεύθερος (754a); a soul may be ἀφιλότιμος πρὸς ἀρετήν (*Lycurgus* 18.3, *Lysander* 2.2).

τοῦτο δ’ ἡμᾶς . . . νομίζειν ‘This example [i.e. the εἶδος ἄριστε phrases] reminds us at once to make a careful study of instances of blame and praise, especially in Homer’s poems; for this is a powerful indication that he considers physical qualities and gifts of fortune to be unworthy of serious concern.’ It is characteristic that P. takes no account here of the fact that both the εἶδος ἄριστε phrases and the Homeric addresses he is about to consider are spoken by characters in Homer rather than by the poet himself; ancient critics and teachers ignore or take account of the distinction between the narrator or dramatist and his characters as it suits the argument of the moment. **ἐμφασις**: cf. n. on 19a ἐμφάσεις. **σωματικά καὶ τυχερά**: cf. n. on 23e πλούτους . . . τὰ ἐκτός. Paris himself had already outlined a response to Hector’s abuse in *Iliad* 3.64–6 (verses which had caused much head-scratching, cf. the Scholia ad loc.).

πρῶτον μὲν is picked up by ἔπειτα in 35b.

δεξιῶσσεσι καὶ ἀνακλήσεσιν ‘greetings and addresses’. The point that P. proceeds to make would seem to ignore the εἶδος ἄριστε examples he has just discussed, but such fragmentation of the discussion is again characteristic both for this treatise and for the level of criticism at which P. is operating here.

καλοῦς . . . ἰσχυροῦς: cf. n. on 30e μήτε πλουσίῳ . . . ἰσχυρῶι.

εὐφημίαις ‘forms of praise’, little more than a synonym of ἐπαίνοις, cf. *Timoleon* 38.6 ταῖς εὐφημίαις καὶ τοῖς ἐπαίνοις, *Cato maior* 25.4.

διογενές . . . Ὀδυσσεύ: this verse is used seven times in the *Iliad* (first 2.173 by Athena) and thirteen times in the *Odyssey* (first 5.203 by Calypso).

35b Ἑκτορ . . . ἀτάλαντε: *Iliad* 7.47 (Helenus) and 11.200 (Iris). The second syllable of μήτιν is lengthened ‘in arsis’.

ὦ Ἀχιλεῦ . . . Ἀχαιῶν: *Iliad* 16.21 (Patroclus) and 19.216 (Odysseus); in both places Homer has μέγα φέρτατ’ Ἀχαιῶν. –εος is scanned as a long syllable by synizesis (cf. Janko on 16.21), and the final syllable of υἱέ is lengthened by the following μ.

δῖε . . . θυμῶι: *Iliad* 11.607 (spoken by Achilles).

οὐδέν: a strengthened negative, ‘not at all’, cf. LSJ s.v. III; ἐφαπτόμενοι governs the genitive.

οἰνοβαρές . . . ἔχων: *Iliad* 1.225 (Achilles to Agamemnon), cf. n. on 19c οἰνοβαρές . . . ἐλάφοιο.

Αἶαν . . . κακοφραδές: *Iliad* 23.483 (Idomeneus).

Ἰδομενεῦ . . . ἔμμεναι 'Idomeneus, why do you always bluster on? There is no need for you to be a blusterer'. *Iliad* 23.478-9 (spoken by Ajax, son of Oileus) are ἀλλ' αἰεὶ μύθοις λαβρεύεαι· οὐδὲ τί σε χρή | λαβραγόρην ἔμμεναι; these verses are cited by [Plut.] *Hom.* 2.149.3 to show Homer's disapproval of constant noise and talking and by Stobaeus 3.36.7 (περὶ ἀδολεσχίας). To suit this passage to a slightly different purpose, P. or his source has replaced the first part of 478 by the very similar 474 Ἰδομενεῦ, τί πάρος λαβρεύεαι; This is not just a slip, as it allows P. to combine an address, which is the subject of this section, with a statement of what one 'should not' do, and this too clearly fits P.'s agenda; the remainder of v. 474 (αἶ δ' ἔτ' ἀνευθεν | ἵπποι) was quite unsuitable for P.'s purpose. Aristarchus athetized v. 479, precisely on the ground that it was superfluous after 478.

Αἶαν ἀμαρτοεπὲς βουγῆς: *Iliad* 13.824 (spoken by Hector). βουγῆς (scanned – – ∪ ∪) was much discussed by lexicographers, cf. *Lfgre* s.v. P. presumably follows the explanation that it meant 'big braggart' (γαυριῶν), cf. the A- and D-Scholia ad loc. (with Erbse's further testimonia) and the Scholia on *Odyssey* 18.79; this follows well from the previous example.

35c χωλός is taken from Homer's description of Thersites at 2.217.

φαλακρός glosses ψεδνή δ' ἐπενήνοθε λάχνη at *Iliad* 2.219. ψεδνός, 'scanty, thin', almost only appears in imitations of this Homeric passage, and Lucian makes Thersites himself use it in the sense 'bald' (*Dial. mort.* 30.1 Macleod).

κυρτός: cf. *Iliad* 2.217-18.

ἀκριτόμυθος: cf. *Iliad* 2.246, the opening of Odysseus' savage reply to Thersites; this case too fits with the two preceding examples. Lines 246-7 are cited by [Plut.] *Hom.* 2.149.2 on Homer's distaste for noise (cf. on 35b above) and foreshadowing of Pythagorean ἐχεμυθία, and Stobaeus 3.33.16 (περὶ σιγῆς) similarly cites from P. a fragment adducing vv. 246-7 as an example of how Homer approves of ἐχεμυθία (= fr. 207 Sandbach); P. may therefore have discussed this example elsewhere, though the status of this Plutarchan fragment is disputed (cf. Sandbach ad loc.).

τὸν δ' Ἥφαιστον . . . ἐμόν τέκος: in *Iliad* 21.331-41 Hera tells Hephaestus to help Achilles in his battle with the raging river. The scholia reveal that the apparent inappropriateness of κυλλοπόδιον (v. 331) when Hera addresses her 'dear son' (v. 330) and asks him to help may have led to v. 331 being athetized. P.'s discussion meets this charge. If lameness were a disgrace, then clearly Hera would not have referred to it here: she was, after all, his mother and was kindly disposed towards him (at least at that moment) – φιλοφρονουμένη corresponds to φιλανθρωπευομένη in the A and Ge Scholia ad loc.

χωλότησιν ἢ τυφλότησιν 'instances of lameness or blindness'; for the plurals, which also avoid hiatus, cf. K-G I 19.

ψεκτόν . . . αἰσχρόν: cf. *SVF* II 1003 τὸ μὲν καλὸν ἐπαινέτόν, τὸ δὲ αἰσχρόν ψεκτόν, II 1005.

μη δὶ ἡμᾶς ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τύχης: cf. n. on 23e πλούτους . . . τὰ ἐκτός. The distinction between things we are and are not responsible for is here not philosophically technical, but the pattern αἰσχυνομένων . . . μὴ αἰσχρὸν . . . αἰσχρὸν stresses that what matters are moral qualities, not physical, 'external' circumstances.

τὸ μὲν εἰς μετριότητα . . . φέρειν δὲ πρῶως κτλ. 'one with respect to moderation, that we do not hurtfully and foolishly rebuke anyone with what fortune has given them, and the other with respect to greatness of mind, that we ourselves are not humbled or upset when we meet with misfortunes, but bear gently . . .'; P. then proceeds, with a further μὲν . . . δέ pairing, to illustrate the two cases in chiasmic order, first behaviour when one is reproached, then moderation as reproacher. That poetry can actually help us deal with misfortunes is in part an answer to Plato's charge in *Republic* 10 that poetry encourages us to react in ways which we would normally find demeaning, cf. above p. 7. What should matter to us, of course, is not unfair mockery but our moral health, cf., e.g., Plato, *Gorgias* 527c6-d2. μηδενὶ . . . ὀνειδίζειν: traditional wisdom, cf., e.g., Theognis 155-8, Isocrates, *Demonicus* 29 'Do not rebuke anyone with misfortune (μηδενὶ συμφορὰν ὀνειδίσῃς), for chance is common to us all and the future cannot be seen'. πρῶως: cf. n. on 31a πρᾶος. τύχαις 'misfortunes', cf. LSJ s.v. III 2.

35d πρόχειρον: cf. 16a above.

ῥῆδιον . . . φέρειν: Philemon fr. 23.1-2 K-A. Stobaeus 3.19.2 (περὶ ἀνεξικακίας) adds vv. 3-4, ὁ λοιδορῶν γάρ, ἂν ὁ λοιδορούμενος | μὴ προσποιῇται, λοιδορεῖται λοιδορῶν; P.'s omission of this verbal buffoonery suits the moral position he is establishing (μουνικώτερον is 'more cultured').

ἐπιλήψεως 'rebuke'.

τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων καὶ τῶν παθῶν 'moral faults and passions', as opposed to physical defects or accidents of fortune. This, together with the illustration which follows, shows that, despite the distinction he draws, P. does not in fact firmly separate μετριότης and μεγαλοφροσύνη; to rebuke someone only for the things they are actually responsible for shows both qualities.

ἐπιλαμβανομένους is parallel to ἔχοντας above; the construction thus continues over the quotation from Philemon, and this seems to have caused textual uncertainty.

ἀνδροκτόνου . . . ἐγείνατο: Sophocles fr. **187 Radt, tentatively assigned to the *Erigonoi*; P. cites the verses and explains the point again at 88f. Alcmaeon abuses Adrastus, who led the campaign of the 'Seven against Thebes', for being the brother of Eriphyle, who had been bribed to cause the death of her husband, the seer Amphiaraus; Alcmaeon, the son of Amphiaraus and Eriphyle, subsequently killed his mother in revenge, after which he suffered a bout of madness. Alcmaeon thus accuses Adrastus of something for which he had no responsibility (a fault against μετριότης), whereas Adrastus fastens on to a 'moral fault or passion', thus showing himself both μέτριος and μεγαλόφρων, cf. n. above.

35e καθάπερ . . . σώματος: Artaxerxes was said to have instituted a practice whereby the clothes of Persian nobles who had done wrong were whipped while the nobles themselves wept and begged for mercy, cf. 173d, 565a, Dio (Favorinus) 37.45. At 565a P. uses the example similarly: 'Punishment by means of possessions and physical penalties . . . does not attack (ἐπιλαμβάνονται) the vice itself, but is largely addressed to opinion and perception.' In that passage and what follows P. is thinking of Plato's eschatological myths, particularly that of the *Gorgias*, and this explains why the Persian practice is so useful to P: for a Platonist, the body was simply clothes, or indeed a prison, for the soul, and proper judgement and reproof was to be aimed at the soul. In the *Gorgias* both judge and judged are to be naked (523c–e), for judgement takes place 'when the soul has taken off the body (γυμνωθῇ τοῦ σώματος, 524d5)', and what is revealed are the scourge marks upon the soul (524e).

δυσγενείας: for the plural cf. n. on 35c χωλότησιν ἢ τυφλότησιν.

τὰ ἐκτός: cf. n. on 23e πλούτους . . . τὰ ἐκτός.

ἐντείνονται 'exert themselves', cf. 963f πρὸς τοῦναντίον ἐντείνονται τῷ λόγῳ.

ἀνονήτως, 'without benefit' (Paton's conjecture), makes an important point which is lost in the transmitted ἀνοήτως: to attack external 'failings' secures no improvement for the person rebuked, cf. 36d below (where one MS offers ἀνοήτων for ἀνονήτων).

τῶν ἀληθῶς . . . δέξεως: neuter, 'the things which really require . . . '.

CHAPTER 14

Just as philosophical and other wisdom can be used to correct the poets' misleading statements, so also their better observations can be confirmed by reference to philosophical texts. Homer, Hesiod, the tragedians and the lyric poets all provide material for this approach. Such a procedure both makes poetry more relevant and gives the young student a foretaste of philosophy. The false ideas which children may imbibe from various sources (fear of death, admiration of wealth and reputation) can now be counteracted. The disillusionment may be painful, but the pain is mitigated by the use of myth to convey truth. Careful guidance will make the transition to the study of philosophy easier, because the student will already be familiar with its main tenets.

35e ἐπάνω: the reference is to 21d–22a, as echoes here of the language there make clear, τοῦ χείρονος ἀποστήσει τὴν πίστιν . . . ἐνδόξων ἀποφάσεις ἀντιτάττοντας (21d).

ἐνδόξων καὶ πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν 'men of distinction and statesmanship'. In fact, in 21d–22a P.'s examples were Socrates, Diogenes, Cinesias and Bion; the first two (and perhaps Bion) were certainly ἐνδοξοί and the subject of large anecdotal traditions, but none were really πολιτικοί, though at 88a a saying of Diogenes is described as φιλόσοφον σφόδρα καὶ πολιτικὴν. The method of correction exemplified in 21d–2a could, however, be greatly extended, and

it would be unwise to assume that P. had actually gone back to check which examples he had used.

ἔδοκοῦμεν . . . πίστιν ‘we thought that we could divert and keep in check their belief’. The image in ἀνακρούειν may be from breaking-in or controlling a horse, cf. 445c (picking up the soul-chariot of the *Phaedrus*) [τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν] ὑπὸ πληγῆς καὶ χαλινοῦ καταβιαζόμενος καὶ ἀνακρούων; for such imagery cf. 31d.

ἀστεῖον ‘well said’, ‘smart’.

αὐτοῖς: i.e. the poets, understood from ποιήματα.

ἐκτρέφειν . . . καὶ αὔξειν ‘nourish and develop’, cf. 48b–c for this pairing.

ἀποδιδόντας . . . ἐκείνοις ‘while assigning the discovery [of the wisdom] to them [i.e. the poets]’. There was a rich ancient literature which traced the origin of all philosophical insights and dogmas back to Homer; texts such as ‘Heraclitus’, *Homeric problems* and [Plutarch], *On Homer* illustrate the practice at length; for Homer and Plato cf. Russell on ‘Longinus’, *On the sublime* 13.3. P. is not, however, advocating such a radical approach, which was in any case often aimed at downgrading the achievements of philosophy, for it is philosophy, rather than poetry, which is the ultimate goal for P.’s students. His language in the sections which follow (οὐδὲν διαφέρει . . . ταῦτόν ἐστι . . . τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ . . . τί διαφέρει; . . .) might indeed suggest this radical approach – and among his sources for the examples he offers may indeed have been works which made such claims for Homer – but that the object of such discussions of poetry is only preparation for philosophy is clearly spelled out in the peroration of the essay, cf. n. on συνοικεῖν in 36d. Seneca wryly points out that some of those who make Homer a philosopher make him a Stoic, others an Epicurean, others a Peripatetic and yet others an Academic (*Epist.* 88.5). On this passage of P. cf. further Van Hoof 2010: 72–3.

καὶ γὰρ . . . προσλαμβάνουσης ‘For it is legitimate and helpful to do this, since our belief gains additional strength and value . . .’

35f μελετωμένοις ἐν διδασκαλείῳ ‘learned by heart in school’. The stylistic variety, ἀπὸ . . . πρὸς . . . ἐν, with each governing a different case, is appropriate for the sense, but also elegant, and the elegance is increased by the inversion of the order of participle and prepositional phrase for the third member.

Χίλωνος . . . Βίαντος: Chilon of Sparta and Bias of Priene were two of the traditional Seven Sages and appear in P.’s *Banquet of the Seven Sages*; Diogenes Laertius (1.69–70, 86–8) gives ample examples of their ‘precepts’.

36a οὐ παρέργως ὑποδεικτέον ‘it is vital to point out’, cf. 31a above.

τέκνον . . . γάμοιο: *Iliad* 5.428–9, Zeus consoling Aphrodite after her wounding by Diomedes; Homer has οὐ τοι, τέκνον κτλ., but P.’s version, which requires metrical lengthening of the second syllable of ἐμόν, also appears at Cicero, *Att.* 14.13.2. P.’s equation of this sentiment to ‘know yourself’ also appears in the bT-Scholia on v. 428; ancient scholarship also found the same maxim in Apollo’s warning to Diomedes at *Iliad* 5.440 (cf. 472b, Scholia on Aesch. *PV* 309), Hector’s

reproof to Paris at *Iliad* 3.53 (cf. bT-Scholia ad loc.), and – as P.’s next citation shows – in Hector’s avoidance of Ajax at *Iliad* 11.542–3 (bT-Scholia ad loc.). P. offers a prose paraphrase of these verses at 472b. There is some evidence for Stoic interest in these verses (cf. Erbse on Schol. *Iliad* 11.542), and this may be suggestive for P.’s ‘source’ here. P., however, wrote a work entitled ‘On “know yourself” and whether the soul is immortal’ (Lamprias Cat. 177), and cf. further Van Hoof 2010: 36–7.

Ζεὺς . . . μάχοιο: *Iliad* 11.543, quoted also at 24b–c (see n. on 24b αὐτὰρ . . . μάχοιτο); P. here rewrites the verse with the second person pronoun, in order to fit his argument (‘know yourself’).

γνῶθι σαυτόν, one of the famous sayings inscribed on the temple of Apollo at Delphi (cf. *Demosthenes* 3.2), is variously ascribed to (inter alios) Chilon, Bias, Solon and Thales, cf. *Banquet of the Seven Sages* 163d–4c, Plato, *Protagoras* 343a1–b3. At *The Delphic “E”* 385d it is said of the Delphic inscriptions ‘know yourself’ and ‘nothing in excess’: ‘How many philosophical enquiries they have set going and what a multitude of discourses has sprung up from each, as from a seed’; that passage reinforces the point by an elegant echo of Pl. *Rep.* 5.450a7–b2. On the actual relation between these sayings and early philosophy cf., e.g., Morgan 2009.

νῆπιος . . . παντός: Hesiod, *WD* 40. Plato alludes to this verse at *Rep.* 5.466c1, and it became semi-proverbial (cf. West’s testimonia, Koning 2010: 184–5); Aulus Gellius, *NA* 18.2.13 lists its meaning as a puzzle put to learned men at dinner. The implication of the allusion in Plato, the discussion in the Hesiodic scholia (which may or not reflect P.’s commentary), and the quotation at Stobaeus 3.10.11 (περὶ ἀδικίας) is that one should be content with the good things one has, rather than trying to grab everything; better to have a half which is justly acquired than the whole acquired unjustly. It may, thus, be forced into alignment with Plato’s views about injustice, though not as obviously as *WD* 266 which follows. DR therefore suggests that the real ‘philosophical’ parallel, quite likely μηδὲν ἄγαν to match γνῶθι σαυτόν, has dropped out of the text, e.g. . . . παντός, <ταυτόν ἐστι τῷ μηδὲν ἄγαν>, καὶ τό κτλ. Ancient scholars traced μηδὲν ἄγαν (inter alia) to *Iliad* 10.249 (cf. Scholia ad loc.) and *Odyssey* 15. 70–1 ([Plut.] *Hom.* 151).

ἡ δὲ . . . κακίστη: Hesiod, *WD* 266, again a very frequently cited verse; for the reception of this verse and its connection with Plato cf. Hunter 2008b. P. will also be thinking of the preceding verse, ‘the man who plots evil for another plots evil for himself’. At 553f–4a P. again explicitly associates this passage of *WD* with Plato’s views on justice and injustice, while also making a distinction between them; the Hesiodic scholia, which may or may not go back to P.’s commentary, also associate this passage with Platonic thought.

τοῖς . . . δόγμασι: cf. *Gorgias* 469b, 473a (473a5 τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι is virtually cited here), *Rep.* 2.358a–c etc.

36b ἐπιρρητέον ‘we must say about’, ‘we must add to the quotation of . . .’; this form is apparently not found elsewhere.

θάρσει . . . χρόνον: Aeschylus fr. 352 Radt. τᾶκρον (Burges) gives the sense 'the extreme of pain does not last long', and this is the sense P. requires, cf. Epicurus, *Kyriai Doxai* 4 (= 140 IV Usener) τὸ μὲν ἄκρον τὸν ἐλάχιστον χρόνον πάρεστι. The verse might well make us think of Philoctetes, and he, together with the quotation of appropriate verses, was a standard counter-argument against the Epicurean position on terrible pain: P. himself cites Aeschylus' *Philoctetes* in this context at 1087f, and cf. also Cicero, *Tusc.* 2.19, 44, *De finibus* 2.94 (citing Accius). This verse is here said rather to confirm the Epicurean position, but there must be a possibility that it comes from Aeschylus' *Philoctetes*, for which cf. Dio 52, Aesch. fr. 249–57 Radt. At 1069d–e P. observes that although the Stoics criticize Theognis (vv. 175–6) for apparently recommending suicide as a remedy for poverty, they themselves echo the poet, for 'they say that one must flee terrible disease and intense pain, if a sword or hemlock is not to hand, by throwing oneself into the sea or down from rocks'; relevant here is (again) the use of classical poetry and the apparent evocation of the abandoned Philoctetes.

ὅτι τοῦτ' . . . ἔχουσιν 'that this is the constantly repeated and admired saying of Epicurus [fr. 442 Usener], to the effect that "pains which are great quickly pass away, those which are long-lasting have no strength"'. The tone of P.'s reference here to *Kyriai Doxai* 4 (see previous note) is somewhat ambiguous; at the very least a non-Epicurean source is certainly possible. The principal witnesses to this Epicurean idea are gathered as fr. 446–7 Usener and cf. further Warren 2004: 14–15; as here, rhyme and word-play seem to have been a feature of this memorable quasi-paradox, cf. *Sent. Vat.* 4 πᾶσα ἀλγηδὼν εὐκαταφρόνητος· ἡ γὰρ σύντονον ἔχουσα τὸ πονοῦν σύντομον ἔχει τὸν χρόνον, ἡ δὲ χρονίζουσα περὶ τὴν σάρκα ἀβληχρὸν ἔχει τὸν πόνον. The Epicureans seem to have meant that intolerable pains 'remove us (ἐξάγουσιν)' because they kill us in a very short time (cf., e.g., 1103e = Epicurus fr. 448 Usener, ὁ γὰρ πόνος ὁ ὑπερβάλλον συνάφει θανάτῳ, Marcus Aurelius 7.33, 64); ἐξαγωγή 'death' and ἐξαγεῖν (ἐαυτόν) 'to die' were terms current in philosophical circles, cf. 1063c, 1076b, *SVF* III 757–9 etc. Aeschylus is unlikely to have meant that the pain will not last long because it will in fact kill the victim (cf. θάρσει), so it is likely that P. or his source is playing with the various senses of ἐξαγεῖν, here understood intransitively as 'finish, fade' (cf. LSJ s.v. I b1).

παρὰ κείμενον ἔστιν 'is closely linked to/follows naturally from [what is explicitly stated]'.

εἰ γὰρ . . . δυσεγκατέρητος: P. adopts a flavour of philosophical reasoning to suit the context; δυσεγκατέρητος, 'difficult to endure', occurs elsewhere only at Sext. Emp. *Math.* 9.152 in an argument about the nature of the good. P. may here be quoting an Epicurean text.

ὄρῳις . . . ἐπίσταται: 'Thespis' fr. 3 K-S. The very few verses ascribed to the 'first inventor' of tragedy are all but certainly spurious, though P. seems to accept the present case. Aristoxenus (fr. 114 W) claimed that Heraclides Ponticus (cf. n. on 14e τὸν Ἀβαριν τὸν Ἡρακλείδου) wrote tragedies and ascribed them to

Thespis, cf. Gottschalk 1980: 136, Schütrumpf 2008: 35. The sentiment of the verses – that Zeus does not lie or boast or laugh foolishly and is the only god who does not know pleasure – is unusual; Wilamowitz 1935: 373 n.2 saw Chrysippus as still P.’s source here. For the divine abstinence from ψεύδος cf. Pindar, *Pyth.* 3.29, 9.42 (both concerning Apollo). Plato had outlawed the divine laughter of *Iliad* 1.599–600 (*Rep.* 3.389a1–6), which presumably included Zeus; though he is expressly summoned to observe by name, nothing is said about his presence at *Odyssey* 8.321–59, where μῶρος γέλως certainly occurs, although there Poseidon too does not laugh. Max. Tyr. 18.5 includes among ‘disapproved’ Homeric scenes ‘gods drinking and laughing with unquenchable laughter’, and Proclus also felt that the laughter of the Homeric gods required explanation (*On the Republic* I 126.8–28.33 Kroll).

36c Πλάτων: *Epistle* 3.315c3, also cited by Proclus, *On the Republic* I 123.16 Kroll; cf. also *Epinomis* 985a 5–7 ‘god . . . is outside . . . grief and pleasure’. At *Why are the Delphic oracles* . . . 397b P. makes Sarapion say that ‘the passionless and pure does not admit pleasure’.

ἱδρυται ‘is established’, ‘has its abode’.

φάσω . . . ὀμιλεῖ: Bacchylides 1.159–61 (dactylo-epitrite). P.’s few quotations of Bacchylides presumably come from anthologies, and the occasional references to his life and work (605d exile, 1136f composition of lyrics) do not suggest any great familiarity with him. The sentiment of these verses would certainly suit a Stoic source.

ἐγὼ δ’ . . . ζύνεστι: Euripides fr. 959 K (aeolic metre based on choriamb, – ∪ ∪ –). The verses are ascribed to Menander at Stobaeus 3.3.29 (περὶ φρονήσεως).

τί μάταν . . . ἀνολβοι ‘Why, mortals, have you to no purpose acquired much and think by wealth to achieve virtue? . . . Amidst good things you will sit without blessings’, Euripides fr. 960.6–8, 14 K (aeolic metre based on choriamb, – ∪ ∪ –). The passage is preserved in the papyrus text of the *Life of Euripides* by the third-century Peripatetic Satyrus (p. 51 Arrighetti, 95 Schorn). P. has clearly cited an abbreviated version which has also suffered corruption in transmission; the text and colometry printed here is that of Kannicht, and what exactly P. read – and what colometry he used – must remain uncertain. Satyrus seems to use this passage on the subject of unnecessary striving for wealth as one example of a closeness between Euripides and Socrates; P. is thus making a traditional use of the passage, even if he changes the reference.

36d περὶ . . . ἀγαθῶν: cf. n. on 23e πλούτους . . . τὰ ἐκτός.

ἀνωφελῶν: for the Stoics only ἀρετή is of benefit, cf. 1069c (= *SVF* III 153) ἀνωφελῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ἀδιαφόρων, *SVF* III 505 ‘everything which is outside *aretê* is useless (ἀνωφελῆ)’.

τὸ γὰρ οὕτω . . . λόγοις ‘For to link and accommodate them in this way to doctrines brings poems out of the sphere of fable and mask and invests their useful lessons with seriousness. Moreover, it opens up the soul of the young man

and stimulates it in advance to philosophical discourse.’ When, in other words, we find agreement between poets and philosophers, we can impart a level of seriousness to the words and not have to treat them merely as a fable or as being said ‘in character’.

συννοικειοῦν: cf. n. on 22f συννοικειοῦν. This practice of ‘accommodation’ of early poetry to later philosophical views is expressly associated with Cleanthes and Chrysippus by Philodemus, *On piety*, cf. Henrichs 1974: 17–18, Obbink 1995b: 201–2. P. wants us, however, to use the practice in a wider and less specific way. τοῦ προσωπείου: there is no clear parallel for this use of ‘mask’ to mean ‘impersonation’; at 857f P. says that Herodotus abused the gods ἐν τῷ Σόλωνος προσωπείῳ [προσώπῳ Cobet], and at 404b we are warned against supposing that Apollo suggests oracles to his priestess, ὥσπερ ἐκ προσωπείων φεγγόμενον. προανοίγει καὶ προκινεῖ: for the paired verbs cf. 19a προδιαβάλλει . . . καὶ προσυνίστησι, 36e προακηκοότες . . . καὶ προεγνωκότες, 37a μὴ προδιαβληθεῖς ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον προπαιδευθεῖς, above p. 22; another pair, ἔγευστος . . . ἀνήκοος, immediately follows. For the thought cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 88.20, children are educated in ‘humane studies’, *non quia uirtutem dare possunt, sed quia animum ad accipiendam uirtutem praeperant*.

οὐδ’ ἀκρίτως . . . παιδαγωγοῦ ‘nor indiscriminately stuffed with what he has been constantly told by his mother and nurse and, by Zeus, by his father and tutor’. νῆ Δία marks the fact that, contrary to what we might have expected or hoped, males can purvey unhealthy views as well; for a similar crescendo, but from a more positive perspective, cf. Plato, *Prt.* 325c7–d1 ‘as soon as the child can understand, the nurse and the mother and the *paidagōgos* and the father himself (αὐτὸς ὁ πατήρ) struggle over making the child turn out as well as possible’. The potential benefits and dangers of what young children hear in the nursery were a familiar theme, cf. Plato, *Rep.* 2.377c3–5, *Laws* 10.887d2–3; nurses in particular enjoyed a doubtful reputation (cf. Aulus Gellius, *NA* 12.1.17–18, Hunter 1983: 209), and P. wrote a Τιτθευτικός (Lamprias Catalogue 114) which presumably discussed the whole issue, cf. Albini 1997: 62–3; P. sneers at παιδαγωγοί again at the opening of *On listening to lectures* (37e). P.’s source here is again, however, likely to be Stoic, cf. Babut 1969: 89; Chrysippus seems to have been particularly interested in the matter of early education by nurses, expressing the hope that they should be ‘wise’, cf. *S/F* III 229, 733–5. Cicero, *De legibus* 1.47 lists parents, nurses, school-teachers, poets and plays as potential sources of threat.

36e τοὺς πλουσίους . . . σεβομένων: the Athenian Stranger criticizes the inappropriate praise of wealth, rather than wealth acquired justly and with moral health, at Plato, *Laws* 9.870a6–c1, and cf. Socrates’ words at Plato, *Apology* 30b2–4. Diatribes against the pursuit of wealth and extravagance are commonplace in the early empire, cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 115.11–12, ‘Our parents have instilled in us an admiration for gold and silver; the greed has been implanted when we were very young, has settled deep, and grown with us. The whole people disagree

about other things, but agree on this; this is what they respect, this is what they desire for their children, this is what they dedicate to the gods, when they wish to seem grateful, as though it was the greatest of human things . . . Poems are adduced to ignite our passions further; poems in which riches are praised as the only glory and ornament in life', 'Longinus', *De subl.* 44.6–7 (with Mazzucchi 1992: 296–300). On the other side, Seneca elsewhere notes that philosophical lectures against greed achieve much less than poetry which preaches the same message (*Ep.* 108.11–12). A high proportion of gnomic school texts preserved on papyri are indeed to do with wealth and the horrors of poverty, cf. Morgan 1998a: 125–31; P's preaching is not simply idle theorizing, but it is important to recall that 'wealth was more important [than descent], and indeed is the one feature common to all members of Plutarch's society' (Jones 1971: 42).

πόνον 'pain'.

ἀζηλον . . . ἀγόντων 'but thinking virtue not worth seeking and as nothing, if not accompanied by wealth and reputation', cf. Horace, *Sat.* 2.5.8 (Odysseus to Teiresias) *et genus et airtus, nisi cum re, utilior alga est*. For τὸ μηδέν cf. LSJ s.v. μηδεῖς III.

οἷς ἀντίφωνα . . . φεύγειν 'When they hear from the philosophers things which are opposed to such views, at first they are gripped by astonishment and confusion and amazement, and do not allow or endure these ideas, unless, as though they were going to see the sun after having been in thick darkness, they have become accustomed, by means, as it were, of a borrowed light in which the brilliance of the truth is softened by being mixed with stories, to gaze on such things without pain, rather than fleeing from them.' P's primary model for this image of how poetry, if properly studied, can act as a half-way house on the path up into the full dazzle of philosophy is Plato's famous image (*Rep.* 7.514a–18b) of mortals imprisoned in a dark cave, seeing only shadows which they believe to be reality, of the painfulness of the first glimpses of light (ἀλύπως ~ 515c8, e1) and of the wish to flee the pain (φεύγειν ~ 515e1), of the need for habituation to both light and dark (ἐθισθῶσι ~ 516a5) and of the man – the philosopher – who escapes up to see the sun of reality and the truly good; Plato's concern is, like P's, *paideia* (cf. *Rep.* 7.514a2, 518b–c), and P's recall of Plato's transcendent image is itself a reminder of the value of that philosophy which is the end-product for which young men should be striving. P. here recalls the opening lesson of 15f, but in a higher, more 'philosophical' mode. Cf. further Hunter 2009a: 169–70. For the importance of Plato's cave image for Middle Platonism cf., e.g., 'Alcinous', *Handbook of Platonism* 180.28–39. ἐκπληξις . . . θάμβος: in Plato too, philosophical words and truth can produce ἐκπληξις, cf. *Symposium* 215d5, *Phaedrus* 250a6, but P. here also evokes the experience of the initiand into mysteries. A bright light out of darkness seems to have been a familiar element of initiatory ceremonies, cf. fr. 178 Sandbach (probably from P's lost work *On the soul*): '[Death is like initiation . . .]. In the beginning there is exhausted roaming and wandering around and nervous, endless journeys through darkness, then just before the end

(τέλος) all the terrors, shivering and trembling and sweating and amazement (φρίκη καὶ τρόμος καὶ ἰδρώς καὶ θάμβος). After this an amazing light and open spaces and meadows receive [the wanderer] . . .'. For the association of ἐκπληξίς with the mysteries cf. also Proclus, *Theol. Plat.* 3.18, Lada-Richards 1999: 236–7. The idea of philosophy as 'mysteries' may also be traced back to Plato and beyond, cf. especially *Progress in virtue* 81d–e, the speeches of 'Diotima' and Alcibiades in the *Symposium*, and *Euthydemus* 277d–e where the brother sophists bamboozle the young man Cleinias with 'unaccustomed words' as, in Socrates' image, the Corybants treat an initiate before the rite itself, cf. Sheppard 1980: 146–61. νόθωι: 'bastard' light is here 'reflected', 'borrowed'. The 'enlightenment' that poetry can offer is but a reflection of the true light of philosophy, as the light of the moon is a 'bastard' reflection of the sun, cf. Catullus 34.15, Lucretius 5.575. κεκραμένης μύθοις ἀληθείας: cf. 14e δόγματα μεμειγμένα μυθολογίαι, one of a number of echoes of the opening with which the essay concludes. μαλακήν 'soft', as opposed to the full glare of the sun. P. uses μαλακός of fire at 590c.

τὸν φύντα . . . δόμων 'to mourn the new-born for all the ills which he is facing, but to escort from his home the man who has died and ceased from his troubles with joy and words of praise', Euripides fr. 449.4–6 K from the *Cresphontes*; the verses were very much cited in antiquity (see Kannicht's testimonia), and are discussed by Dio 23.2–5: P. cites v. 6 again at 615d, and Menander Rhetor calls them 'known and familiar to the majority' (III 413.30–1 Sp. = p. 162 R-W). P. or his source may also have cited or had in mind v. 3, ἐχρῆν γὰρ ἡμᾶς σύλλογον ποιουμένους, 'we should gather an assembly together', as the syntax of the citation is incomplete and not integrated to P's own syntax, unless we are to understand the infinitives as imperatival ('mourn the new-born . . . but escort . . .'). On P's possible source here cf. below on 37a τὸ εὐδαιμον . . . δρίζουσα. Euripides may be indebted to the account of the customs of the Thracian Trausoi at Herodotus 5.4 (cf. Nenci ad loc.).

36f ἐπεὶ τί δεῖ . . . ὑδρηχόου; 'Since what need do men have beyond two things only, Demeter's grain and a draught of flowing water?', Euripides fr. 892.1–2 K. The passage continued ' . . . which we have and which naturally sustain us? Filling ourselves with them is not enough, but in our luxury (τρυφή) we hunt for ways of procuring other things to eat.' The verses were again a standard quotation (see Kannicht), but it is likely that P. again has a Stoic source: Chrysippus was fond of the citation (1043e = *SVF* III 153, 1044b = *SVF* III 706, 1044f, Aulus Gellius 6.16.6–7), and Stobaeus preserves a quotation of vv. 1–3 by Musonius Rufus (p. 45 Hense); Marcus Aurelius too stresses the simplicity of his diet (1.3, 1.16.8). At *Against the grammarians* 271 Sextus says that a Stoic, presumably Chrysippus, used the verses to argue for αὐτάρκεια; immediately before, Sextus has cited Euripides fr. 20 K (cf. above 34d–e) as having been used by a different Stoic in an argument against φιλαργυρία. Sextus may well be thinking of passages of

different philosophers, but it is likely enough that Chrysippus cited both passages somewhere.

δυσεῖν is a later genitive form, though one approved by Atticists, cf. K-B I 633; Euripides will have used *δυσῖν*.

ἰὼ . . . φίλῃ: trag. adesp. 359 K-S. P.'s explanation in 37a shows that he understands 'dear to barbarians' to mean that barbarians might think tyranny a wonderful thing (cf. Eur. *Held.* 423, *Tr.* 933–4), but Greeks know that real εὐδαιμονία lies elsewhere; the theme is again perhaps most familiar from Plato's *Gorgias*.

37a *ἡ βροτῶν . . . λυπουμένων*: trag. adesp. 360; the τ' is metrically dispensable and may be a remnant from a longer citation; DR suggests γ'.

ταράττονται picks up *ταραχή* in 36e and also glances towards Epicurean ἀταραξία, cf. Hunter 2009a: 177.

ὁ θάνατος οὐδέν πρὸς ἡμᾶς: Epicurus, *Kyriai doxai* 2 (= 139 II Usener), cf. fr. 123 Sandbach. This clearly corresponds to Euripides fr. 449 K. At 1092c P. criticizes this Epicurean mantra.

ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος ὥριστα 'the wealth of nature is bounded', Epicurus, *Kyriai doxai* 15 (= 139 XV Usener); this corresponds to Euripides fr. 892 K on the superfluity of anything except bread and water. The Epicurean δόξα continues ' . . . and easily obtainable (εὐπόριστος), whereas the wealth of empty opinions is unbounded'; the first part of this continuation also finds a match in that part of the Euripidean passage which P. does not cite. Cf. also *Gnom. Vat.* 25 'Poverty which is measured in accordance with the end given by nature is great wealth; wealth which is not bounded is great poverty.'

τὸ εὐδαιμον . . . ὀρίζουσα 'Not large sums of money nor lofty circumstances nor positions of power and authority bring happiness and blessedness, but freedom from pain and a calmness of the passions and a disposition of the soul which marks the boundary of what nature does.' This is *Epicurea* 548 Usener, though it is not found elsewhere. Disdain for the pursuit of money and power is a familiar Epicurean theme, cf., e.g., *Kyriai doxai* 7, *Gnom. Vat.* 67, 81 ('Neither the greatest wealth nor honour and regard from the many nor anything else which arises from unbounded causes releases the confusion of the soul or produces genuine joy'), Lucretius 2.1–13, 3. 59–64 (*avarities et honorum caeca cupido* etc.). P. himself wrote a *Περὶ ἀλυπίας* (Lamprias Catalogue 172), and extensive parts of Galen's *Περὶ ἀλυπίας* have recently been published. At 1101a–b P. cites an Epicurean view which resonates interestingly against Eur. fr. 449 K: '[The Epicureans] take issue with those who do away with grief (λύπας) and tears and groans at the death of friends, and they say that an absence of grief (ἀλυπία) which becomes an absence of feeling (ἀπαθής) comes from a greater evil . . .' (= 120 Usener). For διάθεσις ψυχῆς cf. on 24d εὐθύς . . . νοοῦμεν (and for Epicurus, fr. 34.24.9 Arrighetti), and life 'setting the bounds of the natural' is a familiar Epicurean idea cf., e.g., 1125c = 554 Usener. Different elements of this passage pick up the previous poetic citations: the stress on nature ~ Eur. fr. 892 K, rejection of political power ~ trag.

adesp. 359, freedom from λυπή and calmness of the passions ~ trag. adesp. 360 (with perhaps also a glance at Eur. fr. 449).

κυβερνήσεως takes us back to the Sirens and the nautical imagery of 15d, cf. Hunter 2009a: 176–7. The thought itself picks up παιδαγωγίας δεομένους (15a) as part of the ring which is closed around the essay (cf. Heirman 1972: 21–2).

προδιαβληθεῖς ‘made prejudiced in advance’, presumably by the ‘slanders’ people spread about philosophy and philosophers; the ordinary sense of the participle would be ‘slandered in advance’.

37b εὐμενής . . . προπέμπηται: there is perhaps a reminiscence of Plato, *Rep.* 3.401c8–d2 (the young of the new state should receive every stimulus) ‘like a breeze which brings health from advantageous regions and imperceptibly guides them, from earliest childhood, towards likeness (ὁμοιότης) and friendship and harmony (συμφωνία) with the beautiful *logos*’. For P.’s elision of rhetoric in this gesture towards the educational curriculum cf. above p. 11 n. 32. εὐμενής ‘well disposed’ to philosophy, cf. 37f (the young man should) εὐμενῇ καὶ οἰκεῖον ἤκειν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν, 122c οὐκ εὐμενής . . . πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, *Lucullus* 2 (Lucullus was) εὐμενής καὶ οἰκεῖος towards all philosophy. For the Stoics εὐμένεια, ‘lasting goodwill’ (*SVF* III 432), was an example of a ‘rational desire’ (*SVF* III 431). τὸ εὐμένες is one of the things which Marcus Aurelius has learned (1.9.1, cf. 6.30.2). φίλος suggests φιλόσοφος. οἰκεῖος: cf. n. on εὐμενής above. This, ‘naturally akin’, became virtually a technical term in Stoic ethics, cf., e.g., 1038b, *SVF* IV Index s.v., Schofield 2003: 243, Brennan 2005: 154–68. προπέμπηται is a final glance at the imagery of the journey which frames the treatise, cf. LSJ s.v. II. As often, P. ends on a high and reassuring note, cf., e.g., 48d, 137e, 771e. The whole final section of the essay breathes something of the spirit of the exhortation with which Epicurus opens the *Letter to Menoeceus*, φιλοσοφητέον καὶ νέωι καὶ γέροντι κτλ.

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PLUTARCH

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